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maynard

Registered:
Posts: 1,192
Reply with quote  #101 
Music Video Codes By VideoCodeZone









VANG PAO RESURFACES-
-- NOW A U.S. RESIDENT, Drug Lord VANG PAO ONCE SUPPORTED HIS TRIBAL ARMY DURING THE VIETNAM WAR WITH SALES OF HEROIN, SHIPPED ON PLANES OWNED BY AIR AMERICA AND PAID THE MONIES DIRECTLY TO THE PRESIDENT OF VIETNAM'S REPRESENTATIVES.


ACCORDING TO HIS CIA HANDLER ANTHONY ("TONY POE") POSPHENY:
"Oh, he was making millions, 'cos he had his own source of, uh, avenue for his own, uh, heroin.... They fly down to Pakse, then they fly over to Da Nang, and then the number two guy to President Thieu would receive it."

http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/shows/drugs/archive/gunsdrugscia.html
(EXCERPT)
Speaker:
His name was Vang Pao, a charismatic, passionate and committed man. A patriot without a country.

NARRATOR
Vang Pao, however, did more than just lead his people in war. According to observers he and his officers dominated the trade in the Meo farmers' cash crop. In 1968, one visitor got a first-hand look at this trade in the village called Long Pot.

JOHN EVERINGHAM, Photographer
I was given the guest bed in the village, in fact the district headman's house, and I ended up sharing it with a guy in military uniform who I later found out was an officer of the Vang Pao army and one morning I was awoken very early by this great confusion of people and noise at the bottom of the bed, just, literally people brushing against my feet with the packets of black sticky substance in bamboo tubes and wrapped up in leaves and bits and things and the military officer who was there was weighing it out and paying off a considerable amount of money to these people and this went on for most of the morning and it went on for several mornings he brought up a great deal of this substance which I then started to think about and asked and had it confirmed that this was in fact raw opium.

NARRATOR
War photographer John Everingham has lived in Southeast Asia for over twenty years. He was one of the very few outsiders who dared to look for and photograph the secret army for himself.

John Everingham:
They all wore American supplied uniforms and the villagers very innocently and very openly told me, "oh they took it to Long Chien," and I asked them how they took it and they said, "oh well they took it on the helicopters as everything else that went to and from Long Chien went by helicopter and so did the opium."

Frontline:
And whose helicopters were they?

John Everingham:
Well they were the Air America helicopters which were on contract to the CIA.

NEIL HANSEN
We did not go down to the embassy and be privy to their secret briefings or anything else. We flew the airplanes. If they put something on the airplanes and told you not to look at it you didn't look at it, because you'd no longer be employed.

JOHN EVERINGHAM
I know as a fact soon after the army was formed the military officers soon got control of the opium trade. It helped not only them make a lot of money and become good loyal officers to the CIA but it helped the villagers. The villagers needed their opium carried out and carried over the land in a war situation that was much more dangerous and more difficult, and the officers were obviously paying a good price 'cos the villagers were very eager to sell to the military people.









http://atimes.com/atimes/Southeast_Asia/GF14Ae02.html
June 14, 2005
A slap for helping the Hmong
By Richard S Ehrlich

BANGKOK - American Ed Szendrey claims a former Central Intelligence Agency (CIA)-backed Laotian general helped finance his trip into communist Laos, which ended in expulsion last week because Szendrey bought illegal satellite telephones for Hmong rebels, set up a "communications network", and aided their movement.

Szendrey, a former US Navy veteran who served in the Gulf of Tonkin at the start of the Vietnam War, said he negotiated the "surrender" of 173 minority ethnic Hmong on June 4, and hoped to arrange future deals for thousands of other Hmong who are led by armed fighters. "We have never supported a military solution," Szendrey, 62, said in an interview.

Laotian officials expelled Szendrey and his wife, Georgie, on June 6 after interrogating the activist couple who live in Chico, California. Before arriving in Laos on June 3, Szendrey met US State Department "Laos desk" officials in Washington along with Vang Pao, a notorious, former CIA-backed Laotian general.

Szendrey said he went with Vang Pao to the State Department to explain the Hmong's plight and to ask for help in getting their story to the United Nations.

Vang Pao was named "a despotic warlord" in Alfred McCoy's respected book The Politics of Heroin in Southeast Asia for allegedly smuggling opium on the CIA's Air America and operating a heroin factory in Long Tieng, Laos, during the late 1960s and early 1970s - while commanding the CIA's so-called Secret Army against Laotian and Vietnamese communists in Laos during the Vietnam War.

Much of Vang Pao's heroin was probably "for [American] GI addicts in Vietnam," McCoy wrote.

After years of massive aerial bombardment of tiny, landlocked Laos, the US lost the war in Vietnam in 1975 , and communist Pathet Lao forces seized power. Many of Vang Pao's CIA-trained Hmong mercenaries, however, fled into the hills, where they dwindled due to injuries, malnutrition, disease and neglect.

Laos currently suffers occasional deadly bombings of its markets, buses, bridges, government outposts and other soft targets, which it blames on right-wing "bad elements" and "exiled Lao reactionaries" in the US, France, Australia, Thailand and elsewhere.

Concerned about the alleged "persecution" of Hmong who refuse to surrender, Szendrey created a fact-finding commission that includes a website, and he has visited Laos several times. He also boosts that Vang Pao, who is based in California, is the Hmong's best leader.

"As the one who was involved with the US government, was involved with the development of the CIA army, was the person who was the go-between, he [Vang Pao] is looked up to by the majority of the Hmong community," Szendrey said. "He is the individual that should be the one that can represent them, and communicate for them, to the world."

Vang Pao helped finance Szendrey's ill-fated trip this month.

"I know that he has helped raise money; for instance, when we take a trip like this, the funding becomes available, and we understand it comes from a variety of Hmong," Szendrey said. "It's good. My only hesitancy is that when I say that, we have [people reacting]: 'Oh, this is a Vang Pao thing.' No, we do not work for General Vang Pao."

"We do have people who are followers of his, and organizations who are followers of his, who have financially supported us," Szendrey added.

Laotian security officials expelled the Szendreys after they deceptively entered the country on tourist visas. "We were not there on vacation," Szendrey said. "They charged us with having interfered with their rural village relocation program. That was the offence they deported us on."

Szendrey said he met 173 unarmed Hmong women, children and elderly men on June 4 on a country road, to ensure their "surrender" would be peaceful. No Hmong fighters surrendered at the site in the Xaysomboun Special Zone, which is off-limits to foreigners.

Future "surrenders" could include up to 17,000 Hmong who are hiding in about 20 scattered clusters, each led by two or three armed leaders, Szendrey said. But those 50 or 60 leaders will probably never surrender, he added. "They probably have already been tried and convicted," in absentia, by the Laotian government for treason, armed rebellion and related crimes, and would likely face imprisonment or execution.

Laotian officials detained the Szendreys on June 4 and interrogated them after the Hmong gathering. The security forces were especially angry about Szendry's earlier role in providing illegal satellite phones to Hmong fugitives.

"Over the last four years, we have established a communications network in which they do have [satellite] telephones up in the jungle," Szendrey said. "We helped with the purchase" of the satellite phones. "We don't know physically how those actually got to them," he said. "I think the total we got in was four or five" satellite phones.

"On Saturday night, when they [Laotian interrogators] started zeroing in, that's the questions they wanted to know. How these people got the phones. They wanted to know how our communications, how our satellite phones, got to them, and how we had our communications system going."

The interrogation ended in havoc. "I kind of almost made a mistake that was turned [around]. I said, 'Yeah, we encouraged getting the phones in there'... and they were turning that into a serious confession," Szendrey said. "I said, 'We did not smuggle the phones in, we have no personal knowledge of actually how they got from the borders to these people'."

Szendrey did not tell his interrogators that he paid for the satellite phones. "No, no, we 'encouraged' getting the phones in there," he told Laotian officials. "It finally ended when I demanded to see the [American] Embassy, and refused to sign the paper."

The unsigned confession, written by Laotian authorities, listed Szendrey's support for the Hmong, and described "our contacts with them, that they had satellite phones and how they were used, what were the goals of our organization, things like this".

The Szendreys entered Laos on June 3, went north to meet the Hmong the next day and were seized by security forces several hours later. The Szendreys were expelled to Thailand on June 6 and flew home from Bangkok on Friday.

Richard S Ehrlich is a Bangkok-based journalist from San Francisco, California. He has reported news from Asia since 1978 and is co-author of Hello My Big Big Honey!, a non-fiction book of investigative journalism. He received a master's degree from Columbia University's Graduate School of Journalism.

(Copyright 2005 Richard S Ehrlich.)




__________________
A TAINTED DEAL http://www.motherjones.com/politics/1998/06/tainted-deal

 LA DEA; Murder of Kiki Camarena http://www.laweekly.com/news/how-a-dogged-la-dea-agent-unraveled-the-cias-alleged-role-in-the-murder-of-kiki-camarena-5750278  

"Several informed sources have told me that an appendix to this Report was removed at the instruction of the DOJ at the last minute. This appendix is reported to have information about a CIA officer, not agent or asset, but officer, based in the LA Station, who was in charge of Contra related activities. According to these sources, this individual was associated with running drugs to South Central L.A., around 1988. Let me repeat that amazing omission. The recently released CIA Report Vol II contained an appendix, which was pulled by the DOJ, that reported a CIA officer in the LA Station was hooked into drug running in South Central Los Angeles." Maxine Waters Oct, 1998
https://fas.org/irp/congress/1998_cr/h981013-coke.htm   

0
maynard

Registered:
Posts: 1,192
Reply with quote  #102 
HERE IS THE PBS FRONTLINE SPECIAL IN ITS ENTIRETY:

http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/shows/drugs/archive/gunsdrugscia.html




FRONTLINE

guns, drugs and the cia

video: realplayer g2

(5:02) An accountant for the Medellin drug cartel explains how he was asked by the CIA to provide funding to the Nicaraguan Contra rebels.
start the video
#613
Original Air Date: May 17, 1988
Produced and Written by Andrew and Leslie Cockburn
Directed by Leslie Cockburn

NARRATOR
Tonight, on FRONTLINE: An investigation of the CIA and its role in international drug dealing.

VICTOR MARCHETTI
The history of the CIA runs parallel to criminal and drug operations throughout the world, but it's coincidental.

NARRATOR
Is the CIA using drug money to finance covert operations?

RAMON MILIAN RODRIGUEZ
Narcotics proceeds were used to shore up the Contra effort.

JOHN KERRY
Something's wrong, something is really wrong out there.

NARRATOR
Tonight, "Guns, Drugs and the CIA."

JUDY WOODRUFF
Good evening.

Two of the most persistent offensives of the Reagan presidency have been the war against communism in Central America and the war on drugs here at home.

But investigations of America's secret war in Nicaragua have revealed mounting evidence that the Central Intelligence Agency has been fighting the Contra war with the help of international drug traffickers.

It is not a new story.

Tonight's FRONTLINE investigation traces the CIA's involvement with drug lords back to the agency's birth following World War II. It is a long history that asks this question: "In the war on drugs, which side is the CIA on?"

Our program was produced by Leslie and Andrew Cockburn. It is called Guns, Drugs, and the CIA and is reported by Leslie Cockburn.

Ronald Reagan:
Illegal drugs are one thing that no community in America can, should, or needs to tolerate. America's already started to take that message to heart. That's why I believe the tide of battle has turned and we're beginning to win the crusade for a drug-free America.

U.S. Senator John Kerry:
The subcommittee on narcotics, terrorism, international operations will come to order. From what we have learned these past months, our declaration on war against drugs seems to have produced a war of words and not action. Our drugs seem to have produced a war of words and not action. Our borders are inundated with more narcotics than in anytime ever before. It seems as though stopping drug trafficking in the United States has been a secondary U.S. foreign policy objective, sacrificed repeatedly for other political and institutional goals such as changing the government of Nicaragua, supporting the government of Panama, using drug-running organizations as intelligence assets, and protecting military and intelligence sources from possible compromise through involvement in drug trafficking.

RAMON MILIAN RODRIGUEZ, Government Witness
If we start with the premise that drug trafficking is morally reprehensible, our government agencies are not supposed to do anything like that, but they live in a practical world.

SUBCOMMITTEE HEARINGS

John Kerry:
Would you raise your right hand please.

NARRATOR
Ramon Milian Rodriguez saw that world as the chief accountant of the Colombian cocaine cartel responsible for managing eleven billion dollars in drug profits. Now serving a forty-three year sentence for money laundering, he has been a key witness for a senate investigation probing links between drugs and the CIA.

RAMON MILIAN RODRIGUEZ
Say for instance, the drug group was involved in a war with a terrorist group, a communist terrorist group, well, it would behove the CIA to give that drug group as much help and advice as possible so they could win their little war.

VICTOR MARCHETTI
The history of the CIA runs parallel to criminal and drug operations throughout the world, but it's coincidental.

NARRATOR
Victor Marchetti came to know the world of covert operations as a long time CIA officer. He is the highest ranking agency official ever to go public about what he learned.

VICTOR MARCHETTI, Central Intelligence Agency
It goes all the way back to the predecessor organization OSS and its involvement with the Italian mafia, the Cosa Nostra in Sicily and Southern Italy. Later on when they were fighting communists in France and--that they got in tight with the Corsican brotherhood. The Corsican brotherhood of course were big dope dealers. As things changed in the world the CIA got involved with the Kuomintang types in Burma who were drug runners because they were resisting the drift towards communism there. The same thing happened in Southeast Asia, later in Latin America. Some of the very people who are the best sources of information, who are capable of accomplishing things and the like happen to be the criminal element.

WILLIAM COLBY, Former Director, CIA
CIA has had a solid rule against being involved in drug trafficking. That's not to say that some of the people who CIA has used or been in touch with over the years may well have themselves been involved in drug traffic, but not the CIA.

RAMON MILIAN RODRIGUEZ
If the CIA is going to, if their job is to maintain the safety of our country and freedom by manipulating foreign powers to do what this country wants, and if the guy who's holding the power at that particular moment happens to be a drug lord, then you have to get involved with the drug lord.

VICTOR MARCHETTI
As a result, we kept getting involved with these kinds of people, not for drug purposes and not for personal gain but to achieve a higher ideological goal.

NARRATOR
In a refugee camp in Northeast Thailand, there live the remnants of one such involvement. They are the Hmong or Meo Tribe. While American troops were fighting in Vietnam, these people were the foot soldiers of a secret CIA army. They fought in undeclared war in Northern Laos, across the border from North Vietnam.

GENERAL RICHARD SECORD
They're hill people, they're little guys. Like most hill people they're pretty fierce. In Laos we were the guerrillas. The war in Laos was a textbook example of what can be done in unconventional warfare.

NARRATOR
General Richard Secord is one of the many veterans of the CIA secret war in Laos. Because Laos was officially neutral, American troops could not be used. The CIA relied on massive air power and a tribal army to fight the local communists and the North Vietnamese.

On the ground in Northern Laos, a handful of CIA officers directed as many as eighty-five thousand soldiers drawn from the mountain tribes. But American officials did more than just send their allies into battle.

RON RICKENBACH, Former Official, U.S. Agency for International Development
Early on, I think that we all believed that what we were doing was in the best interests of America, that we were in fact perhaps involved in some not so desirable aspects of the drug traffic, however we believed strongly in the beginning that we were there for a just cause.

NARRATOR
Ron Rickenbach served in Laos as an official for the U.S. Agency for International Development from 1962 to 1969. He was on the front lines.

RON RICKENBACH
These people were willing to take up arms. We needed to stop the Red threat and people believed that in that vein we made, you know, certain compromises or certain trade-offs for a larger good. Growing opium was a natural agricultural enterprise for these people and they had been doing it for many years before the Americans ever got there. When we got there they continued to do so.

RICHARD SECORD
When they would move from one place to another they would carry their little bags of opium, they smoked it in pipes. And opium could be bought in the streets of any village.

FRED PLATT, Former Pilot, Laos
When a farmer raised a crop of opium, what he got for his year's worth of work was the equivalent of thirty-five to forty U.S. dollars. That amount of opium, were it refined into morphine base, then into morphine, then into heroin and appeared on the streets of New York, that thirty-five dollar crop of opium would be worth fifty, sixty, a hundred thousand dollars in 1969 dollars--maybe a million dollars today.

NARRATOR
The war isolated the Meo tribespeople in their remote villages. CIA-owned Air America planes became their only life line to the outside world. While Meo children came to believe that rice fell from the sky, Meo farmer witnesses could count on Air America to move their cash crop.

RON RICKENBACH
It was then the presence of these air support services in and out of the areas in question where the product, where the opium was grown that greatly facilitated an increase in production and an ease of transhipment from the point of agriculture to the point of processing. So, when I say the Americans greased the wheels, essentially what I'm saying is we did not create opium production. We did not create a situation where drug trafficking was happening. But because of the nature of our presence, this very intense American means that was made available to the situation it accelerated in proportion dramatically.

NARRATOR
The possibility that Air America flew drugs is still hotly disputed by many former senior officers.

RICHARD SECORD
You can question any number of people who were there, who actually were there, not people who claim that they had some knowledge of rumors, you can question any number of people and I venture to say they will all support what I'm saying, and that is that there was no commercial trade in opium going on.

RON RICKENBACH
I was on the airstrip, that was my job, to move in and about and to go from place to place and my people were in charge of dispatching aircraft. I was in the areas where opium was transshipped, I personally was a witness to opium being placed on aircraft, American aircraft. I witnessed it being taken off smaller aircraft that were coming in from outlying sites.

NEIL HANSEN, Former Pilot, Air America
Yes I've seen the sticky bricks come on board and no one was challenging their right to carry it. It was their own property.

NARRATOR
Neil Hansen is a former senior Air America pilot, now serving a sentence for smuggling cocaine.

NEIL HANSEN
We were some sort of a freebie airline in some respects there, whoever the customer or the local representative put on the airplane we flew.

Primarily it was transported on our smaller aircraft, the Helios, the Porters and the things like that would visit the little outlying villages. They would send their opium to market.

NARRATOR
From the villages, the planes carried their cargo over the mountains to Long Chien, CIA headquarters for the war. It was a secret city. Unmarked on any map and carefully hidden from outsiders, Long Chien became one of the busiest airports in the world, with hundreds of landings and takeoffs a day.

ED DEARBORN, Former Pilot, Air America
At the height of the war when there were thousands of people in there, there were villages all over, there were landing pads up on what we called Skyline drive which was the ridge on the north side of Long Chien. T-28s were going in and out of there, C-130s were going in and out of there. It was an amazing place, just amazing.

NARRATOR
Ed Dearborn is a veteran of Long Chien and Air America. A key figure in the covert air operation.

ED DEARBORN
From a sleepy little valley and village you know, surrounded by the mountains and the karst, this great war machine actually was working up there.

It was the heart and pulse of Laos at that time, more commonly referred to as the CIA's secret base you now, heh heh heh.

NARRATOR
To lead their Meo army, the CIA selected Vang Pao, a former lieutenant in the French colonial army in Laos. The agency made very effort to boost his reputation.

CIA FILM

Speaker:
His name was Vang Pao, a charismatic, passionate and committed man. A patriot without a country.

NARRATOR
Vang Pao, however, did more than just lead his people in war. According to observers he and his officers dominated the trade in the Meo farmers' cash crop. In 1968, one visitor got a first-hand look at this trade in the village called Long Pot.

JOHN EVERINGHAM, Photographer
I was given the guest bed in the village, in fact the district headman's house, and I ended up sharing it with a guy in military uniform who I later found out was an officer of the Vang Pao army and one morning I was awoken very early by this great confusion of people and noise at the bottom of the bed, just, literally people brushing against my feet with the packets of black sticky substance in bamboo tubes and wrapped up in leaves and bits and things and the military officer who was there was weighing it out and paying off a considerable amount of money to these people and this went on for most of the morning and it went on for several mornings he brought up a great deal of this substance which I then started to think about and asked and had it confirmed that this was in fact raw opium.

NARRATOR
War photographer John Everingham has lived in Southeast Asia for over twenty years. He was one of the very few outsiders who dared to look for and photograph the secret army for himself.

John Everingham:
They all wore American supplied uniforms and the villagers very innocently and very openly told me, "oh they took it to Long Chien," and I asked them how they took it and they said, "oh well they took it on the helicopters as everything else that went to and from Long Chien went by helicopter and so did the opium."

Frontline:
And whose helicopters were they?

John Everingham:
Well they were the Air America helicopters which were on contract to the CIA.

NEIL HANSEN
We did not go down to the embassy and be privy to their secret briefings or anything else. We flew the airplanes. If they put something on the airplanes and told you not to look at it you didn't look at it, because you'd no longer be employed.

JOHN EVERINGHAM
I know as a fact soon after the army was formed the military officers soon got control of the opium trade. It helped not only them make a lot of money and become good loyal officers to the CIA but it helped the villagers. The villagers needed their opium carried out and carried over the land in a war situation that was much more dangerous and more difficult, and the officers were obviously paying a good price 'cos the villagers were very eager to sell to the military people.

HARRY ADERHOLT, U.S. General
That's hogwash. No way and as far as the agency ever, ever advocating that is do you think I would be in an organization where I've devoted my life to my country--involved in a operation like that without blowing the whistle?--absolutely not.

       

NARRATOR
For veterans like General Aderholt and General Secord the war in Laos is now commemorated at nostalgic reunions. Last fall they gathered at a Florida air base to talk over old times and current business.

While Vang Pao does not attend such functions, he is well remembered by his old comrades.

Frontline:
Was the agency responsible for people's salaries, were they paying Vang Pao?

Harry Aderholt:
Of course, they were a hundred percent responsible, because Vang Pao was responding to agency requirements, even though they may have come from the highest levels of the U.S. government, yes, of course.

Frontline:
He was in the chain of command.

Harry Aderholt:
Yes.

Frontline:
Did you work with Vang Pao?

Richard Secord:
Sure, all the time.

Frontline:
What was your relationship?

Richard Secord:
I was his supplier of air, therefore he stayed in close contact with me.

Frontline:
Were you in charge of supplying Air America planes?

Richard Secord:
For the tactical air operations, yes.

NARRATOR
The movement of Air America planes say witnesses were influenced by Vang Pao's business requirements.

Ron Rickenbach:
Vang Pao wanted control of the aircraft-- sure, he would do the work that needed to be done but it would give that much more freedom and that much more flexibility to use these aircraft to go out and pick up the opium that needed to be picked up at this site or that site and to bring it back to Long Chien, and there was quite a hassle and Vang Pao won. Not only did he get control of the aircraft, but there was also a question of the operational control of the airplanes that were leaving Long Chien to go south, even into Thailand, and there was an embarrassing situation where the Americans knew that this could be exposed and it would be a very compromising situation. The way they got around that was to concede, to create for Vang Pao his own local airline, and Xieng Kouang airlines came into reality as a direct result of this compromise that was worked out, and they brought in a C-47 from the states and they painted it up nice and put Xieng Kouang airlines on it and they gave it to Vang Pao, and that aircraft was largely used for the transshipment of opium from Long Chien to sites further south.

Frontline:
Air Opium?

Ron Rickenbach:
Air opium.

Harry Aderholt:
Those airlines didn't really belong to General Vang Pao.

Frontline:
They belonged to the agency.

Harry Aderholt:
They belonged to the agency. They were maintained by the United States government in the form of Air America or Continental, so they didn't really own anything. It wasn't something he could take away with him, it was something that we controlled every iota of that operation, lock, stock and barrel.

Frontline:
You know what the nickname for that airline was?

Richard Secord:
No.

Frontline:
Opium Air.

Richard Secord:
I've never heard that before.

NARRATOR
Back in the old days the men who flew for Air America and drank in the Purple Porpoise Bar in Vientiane were less discreet.

Most of them are long gone and far away from Laos now but one legendary CIA officer still lives across the Mekong River close to his old mountain battleground.

RON RICKENBACH
The man that was in charge of that local operation was a man by the name of Tony Poe, and he was notorious. He had been involved with the agency from the OSS days he was a World War II combat veteran and he had been with the agency from its inception and he was the prototype operations officer. They made a movie about him when they made Apocalypses Now. He was the caricature of Marlon Brando.

NARRATOR
Until now, Tony Poe has never talked publicly about the Laos operation. He saw it from beginning to end. one of Vang Pao's early case officers, Poe claims he was transferred from Long Chien because unlike his successors, he refused to tolerate the Meo leader's corruption.

TONY POE, Former CIA Officer
You don't let him run loose without a chain on him. You gotta control him just like any kind of an animal or a baby. You have to control him. Hey! He's the only guy that had a pair of shoes when I first met him--what are you talking about, why does he need Mercedes Benz, apartments and hotels and homes where he never had them in his life before. Why are you going to give it to him?

Frontline:
Plus he was making money on the side with his business?

Tony Poe:
Oh, he was making millions, 'cos he had his own source of, uh, avenue for his own, uh, heroin.

Frontline:
What did he do with the money?

Tony Poe:
What do you mean? U.S. bank accounts, Switzerland, wherever.

Frontline:
Didn't they know, when Vang Pao said 'I want some aircraft', didn't they know what he wanted that for?

Tony Poe:
I'm sure we all knew it, but we tried to monitor it, because we controlled most of the pilots you see. We're giving him freedom of navigation into Thailand, into the bases, and we don't want him to get involved in moving, you know, this illicit traffic--O.K., silver bars and gold, O.K., but not heroin. What they would do is, they weren't going into Thailand, they were flying it in a big wet wing airplane that could fly for thirteen hours, a DC-3, and all the wings were filled with gas. They fly down to Pakse, then they fly over to Da Nang, and then the number two guy to President Thieu would receive it.

NARRATOR
Nguyen Van Thieu was president of South Vietnam from 1967 to 1975. Reports at the time accused president Thieu of financing his election through the heroin trade. Like Vang Pao, he always denied it, remaining America's honored and indispensable ally.

Tony Poe:
They were all in a contractual relationship:Some of this goes to me, some of this goes to thee. And you know just the bookkeeping--we deliver you on a certain day; they had coded messages and di-di-di. That means so and so as this much comes back and goes into our Swiss bank account. Oh they had a wonderful relationship and every, maybe, six months they'd all come together, have a party somewhere and talk about their business:is it good or bad. It is like a mafia, yeah, a big organized mafia.

NARRATOR
By the end of 1970, there were thirty thousand Americans in Vietnam addicted to heroin. GI's were dying from overdoses at the rate of two a day.

WILLIAM COLBY
When the drug traffic became a real problem to the American troops in Vietnam, then the CIA was asked by President to get involved in the program to limit that traffic and stop it.

NARRATOR
But in 1972, a U.S. intelligence agent in Southeast Asia sent a secret field report to customs. It suggested a serious conflict of interest: quote--"It was ironic that the CIA should be given the responsibility of narcotics intelligence, particularly since they were supporting the prime movers. Even though the CIA was, in fact, facilitating the movement of opiates to the U.S., they steadfastly hid behind the shield of secrecy and said that all was done in the interest of national security." End quote.

VICTOR MARCHETTI
I doubt that they had any strong deep understanding of what they were allowing to happen by turning their head the other way and letting Vang Pao ship his dope out which was made into heroin which was going to our troops, which was corrupting people throughout Southeast Asia and back here, the effect it had on crime, I doubt that any one of them really thought in those terms at the time.

NARRATOR
While the heroin trade was flourishing by 1970, the war in Laos was going badly. As the communists steadily advanced, the civilian population faced a choice between evacuation to refugee camps or being bombed by the U.S. Air Force. These operations only added to the huge cost of feeding, training and supplying the secret army. For a war that did not officially exist, the CIA was spending heavily.

Harry Aderholt:
The money was always there. We had a program--In fact, that's the reason the agency supply system was so much better than the military supply system.

Frontline:
Cash?

Harry Aderholt:
Cash. They didn't have to go through a procurement system, a bureaucracy, that made everything cost three times as much.

Fred Platt:
On two different occasions I brought bags up that I knew was payroll. Wish I'd have crashed on those times, and been able to stick that somewhere in the jungle and go get it, 'cos it was unaccounted funds.

Frontline:
How much money would be in a bag?

Fred Platt:
Well I--you know, a bag would probably have a couple of hundred thousand dollars in it, depending on where you were going with it and who it was going to.

VICTOR MARCHETTI
I was sitting up there in the Director's--on the Director's staff, and that's where it all came together.

NARRATOR
The CIA Director's senior staff prepared the agency's official budget.

Victor Marchetti:
For Laos, I think it was around thirty million, perhaps forty million, but it was very small.

Frontline:
Was that enough to run this war?

Victor Marchetti:
Well, I don't think so. I would think the war was costing quite a big, probably--if all the costs were pulled together, I would imagine it would probably cost as much as the entire agency's budget.

Frontline:
How was the war in Laos financed?

Richard Secord:
U.S. appropriated funds.

Frontline:
Through which agency?

Richard Secord:
I think through the CIA and through the Defense Department both.

NARRATOR
A secret Pentagon report put the Defense Department contribution to the war in Laos at a hundred and forty-six million dollars in 1970. But the report also showed that the CIA was spending up to sixty million dollars more than they were getting from Congress.

Victor Marchetti:
Well, there may have been other funds generated by Vang Pao himself through his dope operations. After all I mean they were poppy growers and opium smugglers, so I imagine there was money being earned that way that was Vang Pao's contribution to the war.

Frontline:
Is it conceivable that the CIA would fight a war with dope money?

Victor Marchetti:
Well, yes, in the sense that they would not sell dope to earn money to support an operation. But they would look the other way if the people they were supporting were financing themselves by selling dope.

Harry Aderholt:
General Vang Pao was financed by U.S. government funds.

Frontline:
How much was he getting?

Harry Aderholt:
I don't know what General Vang Pao was getting, but the Meo program, I'm sure, ran several hundred million dollars. At the end, to fight a war like we were fighting, and to have an airline...I don't know what the funding was, but I'm sure the Congressional Committees have access to those records.

NARRATOR
As a former chief counsel for the House Select Committee on Narcotics, Joe Nellis did indeed have access to the records.

Joe Nellis:
Vang Pao had a heavy hand in the production of heroin in that area.

Frontline:
How much of the money that was going to pay these thousands and thousands of tribesmen to fight for us, for the CIA. Where was that money coming from?

Joe Nellis:
From the trade.

Frontline:
From the opium trade?

Joe Nellis:
Yes surely.

Frontline:
How would that work?

Joe Nellis:
Well, money would be paid for the transportation, and the safe arrival of the merchandise to its proper destination, and that money would be paid to the carrier, the person transporting the merchandise and that money would be used to pay off the farmers. But as I told you, they got so little of it that there was an enormous amount left over, and it was that money was used to feed to the peasants in order to get them to continue not only fighting for us but also continuing to give us very important intelligence about the movement of the North Vietnamese.

Richard Secord:
We wouldn't have permitted it, it would have been too dangerous.





__________________
A TAINTED DEAL http://www.motherjones.com/politics/1998/06/tainted-deal

 LA DEA; Murder of Kiki Camarena http://www.laweekly.com/news/how-a-dogged-la-dea-agent-unraveled-the-cias-alleged-role-in-the-murder-of-kiki-camarena-5750278  

"Several informed sources have told me that an appendix to this Report was removed at the instruction of the DOJ at the last minute. This appendix is reported to have information about a CIA officer, not agent or asset, but officer, based in the LA Station, who was in charge of Contra related activities. According to these sources, this individual was associated with running drugs to South Central L.A., around 1988. Let me repeat that amazing omission. The recently released CIA Report Vol II contained an appendix, which was pulled by the DOJ, that reported a CIA officer in the LA Station was hooked into drug running in South Central Los Angeles." Maxine Waters Oct, 1998
https://fas.org/irp/congress/1998_cr/h981013-coke.htm   

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Frontline:
Why?

Richard Secord:
Because the American system wouldn't put up with it.

Joe Nellis:
I have never revealed any classified information that I obtained when I was with the committee and I'm not going to start now, but I do know that that was verified.

Frontline:
That it was known here?

Joe Nellis:
Yes.

Frontline:
Well, without getting into classified information, was that at a high level or a low level?

Joe Nellis:
Well, I can't discuss the level. Let's put it this way; you're familiar with the Iran-Contra business.

Frontline:
Yes.

Joe Nellis:
That was known at a very high level, it was known at all sorts of levels really--it's amazing that they could keep it secret as long as they did, and I guess that was the situation with Air America. People in CIA certainly knew it, and at that time Dick Helms I think was the head of the office, and I'm sure he must have reported it to Nixon.

NARRATOR
Former CIA Director Richard Helms told us: "I knew nothing of this. It certainly was not policy."

RICHARD SECORD
It's patently impossible. There are thousands of people involved in the intelligence community in the United States who read the reports, who are intimately familiar with details of field activities, and no such operation could ever be kept secret from the authorities in Washington, and would never be tolerated, never, not for a minute.

Frontline:
How many people knew what was going on?

Joe Nellis:
Oh I don't think it was very many at all--

Frontline:
Five?

Joe Nellis:
--A handful--

Frontline:
Ten?

Joe Nellis:
--A handful, maybe a hundred.

RON RICKENBACH
I personally did not complain, not at the time. I certainly complained after the fact, but that came as a result of my own awakening as to the rather horrible implications of what we were doing and I left working for the government rather abortively because I just could not tolerate myself-what was going on.

NARRATOR
His disgust was not only at the drug trade, but at the human cost of a war in which the recruits were as young as eight years old.

RON RICKENBACH
These people were absolutely decimated. The war itself took its own toll. Thousands and thousands of these people were either maimed or killed or died of disease or malnutrition secondary to the effects of the war. Many were bombed, many were blown away by conflict and combat. What was left after the war was the exodus to the south or to the west.

These people have had their whole life destroyed for helping out in our war. For helping out in our war.

NARRATOR
By 1981, six years after leaving Laos, the CIA was fighting another secret war, this time in Central America. The secret army were the Contras, fighting to overthrow the leftist government of Nicaragua. Once again, they were trained and equipped by the CIA. It was time for the old hands to go to work again.

Richard Secord:
It's an irregular war in Central American, and there aren't a lot of people who have experience in irregular warfare, paramilitary warfare, so it would be natural to see people who are experienced in this kind of operation utilized again.

ED DEARBORN
It's the old boy network as somebody called it one time. The call goes out and who's got the experience? It's the same war, different place and different names. We're not speaking Laotian, we're speaking Spanish now, but it's the same darn war, I don't care what anybody says.

NARRATOR
Eugene Hasenfus was just one of a number of veterans from Laos who answered the call in Central America. When his plane was shot down over Nicaragua in October 1986, an Air America handbook turned up in the wreckage. Hasenfus had operated out of the Illopango Airbase in El Salvador, headquarters for the White House Contra resupply network. His commander there had been a veteran of another old CIA network. Felix Rodriguez, a Cuban American, had been sent down from Miami.

FELIX RODRIGUEZ
The feeling that I see now in the Nicaraguan freedom fighters, I know their experience, because I was left inside once, and I wanted to help them as much as I could.

NARRATOR
Like Rodriguez, the Miami Cubans of Brigade 2506 are still ready to support the anti-communist cause, thirty years after their failed invasion of Cuba. They were willing recruits for the CIA's war against Nicaragua. The Brigade supplied soldiers in the field, commanders and fundraisers for the Contra cause.

The Brigade had been created and trained by the CIA for the Bay of Pigs invasion in 1961. After their defeat the CIA continued to maintain and use this skilled force of covert operators, wherever they were needed. Their numbers grew into the thousands. They had their own navy, as well as other assets provided by the CIA, including businesses and banks.

Manuel Artime:
I was in charge...

NARRATOR
Manuel Artime was the agency's favorite Cuban, handpicked to command both the Bay of Pigs and the covert operations that followed. In 1972, he recruited and arranged CIA training for a brilliant young accountant called Ramon Milian Rodriguez.

Ramon Milian Rodriguez:
He ran covert operations out of Miami for the CIA.

Frontline:
So Artime had a whole group of people who were his people?

Milian Rodriguez:
Oh yes, Artime ran a very large operation, it was very large. It was very active, all over Central and South America.

Manuel Artime:
A lot of Cubans go to work with the Central Intelligence Agency in foreign operations.

Milian Rodriguez:
He was in charge of, among other things, the Watergate burglars and things like that.

Frontline:
Did you launder any money for the Watergate guys?

Milian Rodriguez:
I made payments for the Watergate burglars, yes. I start out in life in one scandal and I've ended it in another, it seems. After Watergate, the group that Manuel Artime was running in Miami was disbanded. The fact that the burglars were Cuban really hurt in Miami, so you had a situation where people were laid off. They were just given the assets. For instance, if you were running a print shop, you kept the print shop. If you had a boat, as there were many boats for surveillance and intelligence, you just kept the boat. That was really the starting off point where you got some well trained people into the drug business.

RICHARD SECORD
Many, many Cubans worked for a time in that time. Some of them have become very successful good American citizens. Others have become gangsters.

NARRATOR
But with a secret Contra was to fight, the agency was more interested in covert skills than good citizenship, particularly when it came to raising money. Ramon Milian Rodriguez was ideally placed. With access to the limitless resources of the Medellin cocaine cartel, he had no problem raising cash.

SUBCOMMITTEE HEARINGS

John Kerry:
You've been a supporter living in the Cuban community, passionately anti-communist and anti-Castro. You've also been a supporter of the Contras. Is that accurate?

Ramon Milian Rodriguez:
Yes sir.

John Kerry:
Are you aware whether or not narcotics proceeds at some time may or may not have supported Contra efforts?

Milian Rodriguez:
Yes sir. Narcotics proceeds were used to shore up the Contra effort.

John Kerry:
Did you personally play a role in some of the transfer of that money?

Milian Rodriguez:
Yes I did.

NARRATOR
In 1984, when Congress cut off Contra funding, the White House turned to other sources for support. According to documents, Ramon Milian Rodriguez had been laundering foreign payments for the CIA up through 1982, at the same time as he was laundering cash for the cocaine cartel. He says the CIA turned to him again.

MILIAN RODRIGUEZ
To have people like me in place that can be used, is marvelous for them. The agency, and quite rightly so, has things that they have to do which they can never admit to an oversight committee, all right, and the only way they can fund these things is through drug money or through illicit money that they can get their hands on in some way.

KERRY HEARINGS

John Kerry (in hearings):
Was any of the money traceable to drugs or to drug related transactions?

Milian Rodriguez:
The money that we--you're taIking about the money that we provided?

John Kerry:
That's right.

Milian Rodriguez:
No sir.

John Kerry:
And why was that?

Milian Rodriguez:
Because we're experts at what we do.

JOSE BLANDON

Frontline:
Who is Ramon Milian Rodriguez?

Jose Blandon:
He worked for the Cartel.

Frontline:
So he was laundering money for the cartel?

Jose Blandon:
Yes.

Frontline:
And he worked with Noriega?

Jose Blandon:
Yes.

NARRATOR
Until last year, Jose Blandon was General Manuel Noriega's head of political intelligence in Panama. He was a key U.S. government witness for the grand jury that indicted Noriega for drug trafficking.

General Noriega was more than ready to support the Reagan administration in the Contra war after Congress cut off funding.

Frontline:
How important was Noriega to the White House in the Contra resupply effort?

Jose Blandon:
He play a key role in the supply of arms to the Contras.

Frontline:
So when various administration officials like Oliver North met with General Noriega, did they know that he was involved in narcotics trafficking?

Jose Blandon:
I think that the United States had information that Noriega is involved in drugs since at least eight years.

Frontline:
Eight years?

Jose Blandon:
Yes, so they knew about that.

Frontline:
Were they just looking the other way on his drug trafficking?

Jose Blandon:
The problem is that for the white House, I mean for the administration, the Reagan administration, Nicaragua was so important. The focus of all the foreign policy of the United States in Central America was Nicaragua and the fight against the communists, so for them drugs was something in second place.

Frontline:
Drugs took second place?

Jose Blandon:
Yes.

NARRATOR
Noriega's Contra support earned him powerful friends in Washington, including the CIA Director William Casey. Noriega was on his payroll at a reported two hundred thousand dollars a year.

Jose Blandon:
That was a very special relationship.

Frontline:
What kind of special relationship?

Jose Blandon:
Well, Noriega talked with Casey and they had at least, that I know, more than three meetings. And he always received the support of Casey.

Frontline:
What kind of support from Casey?

Jose Blandon:
All kinds of support. Political support. So when somebody tried to investigate anything, Casey stopped it, look this is a very important person in this war

Frontline:
So Casey would actually stop investigations of Noriega?

Jose Blandon:
Yes, he was a man that helped Noriega very much.

NARRATOR
According to Blandon, Noriega was not the only drug trafficker to reap the rewards of Contra support. The cocaine cartel also saw the advantages of backing U.S. policy.

Jose Blandon:
That's the reason why the Cartel of Medellin decided in 1983 to cooperate with the Contras.

Frontline:
So you're saying that in 1983 the Cartel started supporting the Contras?

Jose Blandon:
Yes.

Frontline:
And the reason was because they knew that they could therefore get protection?

Jose Blandon:
Yes.

Frontline:
How did they help them out? Was it arms, plus cash, or was it jut arms? How did that work?

Jose Blandon:
They work in different ways. First, they established the network to supply arms, and also they pay in cash.

SUBCOMMITTEE HEARINGS

General Paul Gorman:
If one wants to organize an armed resistance or an armed undertaking for any purpose; the easy place to get the money, the easy places to get the guns are in the drug world.

NARRATOR
General Paul Gorman was the commander of the U.S. southern command, based in Panama, from 1982 to 1985.

PAUL GORMAN
The most ready source of money, big money, easy money, fast money, sure money, cash money is the narcotics racket.

NARRATOR
General Gorman was asked whether the Contras could have relied on drug cash.

SUBCOMMITTEE HEARINGS

John Kerry:
Based on your knowledge of how it works and what you understood from your experience down there, it wouldn't surprise you?

Paul Gorman:
Not at all, particularly if they'd been on somebody's payroll and had their funds cut off. It would be the natural recourse of those people.

Frontline:
How much money was actually contributed by you or through you for the Contras, total?

Ramon Milian Rodriguez:
It was a little under ten million dollars.

Frontline:
I presume it wasn't all sent in one suitcase.

Ramon Milian Rodriguez:
Oh no no. It was delivered on a per need basis. You know, they'd say we need so much at such a location and we'd take care of the logistics of it.

NARRATOR
Milian Rodriguez says he used a series of Cuban controlled front companies in Miami and Costa Rica to funnel the ten million dollars to the Contra cause. These fronts ranged from banks to obscure fish companies located in out of the way Miami shopping centers or in provincial port towns in Costa Rica. The route for the drug cash was carefully disguised.

SUBCOMMITTEE HEARINGS

John Kerry:
Are you familiar with the name of a company called Frigirificos de Puntarenas.

Ramon Milian Rodriguez:
Yes sir, I am.

John Kerry:
What is that company?

Ramon Milian Rodriguez:
Well it's a shrimp processing warehouse, but more importantly, was one of the fronts that we used.

John Kerry:
Did you set it up? What role did you play in it?

Ramon Milian Rodriguez:
I was the key person in setting up the interlocking chain of companies around Frigorificos de Puntarenas.

John Kerry:
Were payments or arrangements made by which the Contras could receive money through Frigorificos?

Ramon Milian Rodriguez:
Yes sir.

Ramon Milian Rodriguez:
If you add up what it cost to run the Contra operation and you get to a bottom line figure, and you deduct from that the known sources, you're going to have a tremendous deficit and I think the question has to be where...you know, how was the deficit taken care of?

Frontline:
There was a deficit?

Ramon Milian Rodriguez:
Yes.

Frontline:
they realized that.

Ramon Milian Rodriguez:
And we took care of it.

IRAN CONTRA HEARINGS

Congressman Les Aspin:
I've been spending some time looking at the numbers here of the amount of aid that the Contras were getting at various time and I come to the conclusion that we're missing something, that there's got to be another source of funding for the Contras other than those which this committee has so far identified.

NARRATOR
Last summer, the Iran Contra committees were aware that there had been an unacknowledged source of money from somewhere.

Congressman Aspin:
I think there's got to be some other source of funds that we, we meaning this committee has not yet uncovered.

Admiral Poindexter:
Well I don't think I can help you there, I don't know of anything else.

Frontline:
The war cost so much every day.

Richard Secord:
Uh-huh.

Frontline:
They were getting a certain amount, thanks to you, through Switzerland.

Richard Secord:
Any many others, yes.

Frontline:
And many others. But the war cost more than that.

Richard Secord:
Uh-huh.

Frontline:
Do you have any idea how much more it cost?

Richard Secord:
Well I think, uh--Director Casey asked me that, a similar question in the spring of '86 I think it was an I told him that I thought that the Contra effort would need a minimum of ten million dollars over the next three months over and above the monies that we could apply in order to hang in there through the summer months til the Congress would act. There was some expectation in the White House I guess, and in State, that the Congress would act much sooner than they acted. Things were going downhill rapidly.

SUBCOMMITTEE HEARINGS

Senator D'Amato:
Did the people who received this money, were they aware of the fact that this was drug money, the proceeds came from drug money?

Ramon Milian Rodriguez
I--let's put it like this, Senator D'Amato, the Contra peasant in the field did not but the men who made the contact with me did. At that time I was under indictment, I mean I was red hot.

NARRATOR
His arrest was well publicized. The five million dollars seized with him brought Vice President Bush to Miami to pose with what the money launderer termed his petty cash.

Frontline:
Did Ramon Milian Rodriguez have any friends who were working in the Contra resupply network?

Jose Blandon:
Yes.

Frontline:
Who would that have been?

Jose Blandon:
Felix Rodriguez.

Frontline:
Felix Rodriguez?

Jose Blandon:
Yes.

NARRATOR
A veteran of the Artime organization and the CIA, Felix Rodriguez was a key member of the White House resupply network. The Senate was told by the money launderer that it was Felix Rodriguez who solicited the drug cash.

RAMON MILIAN RODRIGUEZ
You have a fellow that's a tremendous patriot, like Felix Rodriguez, who has sacrificed his personal needs for the cause of fighting communism and all of a sudden he finds himself in a position where his troops are going to run out of money. They won't have money for bullets, for food, for medicine. I think in the case of Felix it might have been something done out of desperation, they had to get money and they were willing to get it from any source to continue their war.

Richard Secord:
When they go on the offense they burn up a lot of ammunition, weapons, they need a lot of air resupply, radios, uniforms, boots, food, and all this stuff. You know, the cost just goes up.

Frontline:
Well there were allegations that Felix Rodriguez was desperately trying to make up that deficit.

Richard Secord:
If he was it certainly didn't come to our attention.

Frontline:
So you have no knowledge of it?

Richard Secord:
No, not at all.

Frontline:
Well the allegations are that he tried to make up the deficit by soliciting money from drug traffickers.

Richard Secord:
Well I thought you were circling back to that but certainly we didn't hear anything like that at the time. As I said Felix is no friend of mine but I'd be astonished if he were involved with drug traffickers, I really would.

Frontline:
When General Noriega told you that Felix Rodriguez was friendly with Ramon Milian Rodriguez, were you surprised to hear that Felix Rodriguez would be involved with a drug traffickers?

Jose Blandon:
Surprised? Why?

NARRATOR
According to Blandon, while Felix Rodriguez was supplying the Contras from Illopango, he was receiving arms shipments with the help of this man: Mike Harare, a former Israeli intelligence agent and a key aide to General Noriega. Harare, says Blandon, was also in business for the cocaine cartel, using the same network to ship arms and drugs, all with the sanction of the CIA.

Frontline:
Did he get involved with narcotics trafficking in the course of helping to supply the Contras with weapons?

Jose Blandon:
Yes, that was part of the business.

Frontline:
So he was moving cocaine --

Jose Blandon:
--Yes--

Frontline:
--From Colombia to the United States?

Jose Blandon:
No. They moved the cocaine from Colombia to Panama, to the airstrips in Costa Rica or Honduras to the United States.

Frontline:
At the same time as he was gathering up arms for the Contras?

Jose Blandon:
Yes.

Frontline:
Where were the arms coming from?

Jose Blandon:
From Yugoslavia, and from the East bloc, the communist countries

NARRATOR
From 1983 to 1985, says Blandon, this network, supported by Israeli and U.S. intelligence was a major source of arms for the Contras.

Frontline:
Harare, the Israeli, who was working with Noriega, was working with Felix Rodriguez?

Jose Blandon:
Yes.

Frontline:
And Harare at the same time was involved with drug trafficking?

Jose Blandon:
Yes.

Frontline:
Who was Felix Rodriguez working for, or with, when he approached you?

Ramon Milian Rodriguez:
Well the only government mention he made was Vice President Bush.

Frontline:
And what was his relationship with Bush as you understood it?

Ramon Milian Rodriguez:
He was reporting directly to Bush. I was led to believe he was reporting regularly to the Vice President.

Richard Secord:
He was in touch with the VP's office on a number of occasions. I really don't know, I've never understood that relationship.

Ramon Milian Rodriguez:
The request for the contribution made a lot more sense because Felix was reporting to George Bush. If Felix had come to me and said I'm reporting to anyone else, let's say, you know, Oliver North, I might have been more skeptical, I didn't know who Oliver North was and I didn't know his background. But you know, if you have a...let's say we'll call him an ex-CIA operative, even though it's not true you know, he's a current operative...

Frontline:
Who is?

Ramon Milian Rodriguez:
Felix. You know, everyone says he's ex-CIA--

Frontline:
This is Felix Rodriguez--

Ramon Milian Rodriguez:
--Yeah, there's nothing ex about him. But if you have a CIA, what you consider to be a CIA man coming to you saying 'I want to fight this war, we're out of funds, can you help us out. I'm reporting directly to Bush on it', I mean it's very real, very believable, here you have a CIA guy reporting to his old boss.

NARRATOR
This February 1985 memo from General Paul Gorman confirms that Bush and the Cuban had known each other for years, and that Rodriguez' primary responsibility was Nicaragua and the Contra FDN forces.

Rodriguez quote "is operating as a private citizen, but his acquaintanceship with the Vice President is real enough, going back to the latter's days as Director of Central Intelligence. Rodriguez' primary commitment to the region is in Nicaragua, where he wants to assist the FDN."

IRAN CONTRA HEARINGS

Iran Contra investigator:
Did you say anything to Vice President Bush about your activities on behalf of this resupply operation?

Felix Rodriguez:
No sir, not to him or anyone on his staff.

NARRATOR
But when Hasenfus was shot down, the first call that Rodriguez made from Central America was to a staffer of Vice President Bush. Questions about that call forced the Bush office to put out a summary, listing seventeen meetings with Rodriguez, including three with Bush himself. Nevertheless the Vice President has insisted that these contacts with Rodriguez concerned only El Salvador, not the Contras.

Ramon Milian Rodriguez:
He wasn't selling drugs. We were, you know, he was just raising money, tainted money granted, but for a very good cause.

NARRATOR
Felix Rodriguez claims he met with the cartel's money launderer only once, and never solicited cash.

SUBCOMMITTEE HEARINGS

John Kerry:
We permitted narcotics we were complicitous as a country in narcotics traffic at the same time as we're spending countless dollars in this country to try to get rid of this problem. It's mind boggling.

Frontline:
Is the war on drugs a big priority in this country, really?

Joe Nellis:
Oh no, no, it's largely a joke. There is no war on drugs. No president who's ever announced one has ever fought one, and no President who's ever announced one has ever given the soldiers the ammunition with which to fight one.

Senator D'Amato:
The intelligence agencies of this country by God should be involved in this battle instead of working with the scum of the earth, which they've been doing. They should be involved in this battle as a crusade for the survival of this country and this hemisphere.

John Kerry:
I don't know if we've got the worst intelligence system in the world, I don't know if we've got the best and they knew it all and just overlooked it. But no matter how you look at it, something's wrong. Something is really wrong out there.

RAMON MILIAN RODRIGUEZ
Now, you can deny U.S. government involvement in drugs all you wanted, but the patterns are there and the players are there popping up again and, you know, eventually somebody's going to realize what the truth is.



JUDY WOODRUFF
This summer, both Ramon Milian Rodriguez and Felix Rodriguez are expected to testify publicly in front of Senator Kerry's committee about the drug cartel's alleged 10 million dollar contribution to the Contras.

Vice President Bush declined to be interviewed for this program or to reply to FRONTLINE's written questions about his relationship with Felix Rodriguez.

Thank you for joining us. I'm Judy Woodruff. Good night.





__________________
A TAINTED DEAL http://www.motherjones.com/politics/1998/06/tainted-deal

 LA DEA; Murder of Kiki Camarena http://www.laweekly.com/news/how-a-dogged-la-dea-agent-unraveled-the-cias-alleged-role-in-the-murder-of-kiki-camarena-5750278  

"Several informed sources have told me that an appendix to this Report was removed at the instruction of the DOJ at the last minute. This appendix is reported to have information about a CIA officer, not agent or asset, but officer, based in the LA Station, who was in charge of Contra related activities. According to these sources, this individual was associated with running drugs to South Central L.A., around 1988. Let me repeat that amazing omission. The recently released CIA Report Vol II contained an appendix, which was pulled by the DOJ, that reported a CIA officer in the LA Station was hooked into drug running in South Central Los Angeles." Maxine Waters Oct, 1998
https://fas.org/irp/congress/1998_cr/h981013-coke.htm   

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June 9, 2005

The Charmed Life of a Mass Murderer

Posada Carriles and Bush's Anti-Terror Hoax

By SAUL LANDAU

President George W. Bush has emphasized that if one of the myriad of U.S. police agencies even suspect someone of planning, abetting or carrying out a terrorist act, he will, at a minimum, get tossed into a dark hole. Indeed, Bush has thrown the Magna Carta into the garbage heap when it comes to Muslims suspected of pernicious thoughts toward the United States.

But if suspected terrorists turn their rage toward the detested Fidel Castro, these rules don't apply.

Indeed, those who try to bomb Cuban targets, or those related to Cuba, receive special treatment. This double-standard casts a shadow over the president's commitment to fight terrorism.

For example, TV footage showed Homeland Security cops arresting Posada in mid May. But the arresting officers didn't even handcuff the Western Hemisphere's most notorious terrorist. (Remember how Bush's pal Ken "Kenny Boy" Lay ­ ENRON's CEO ­ got handcuffed?) Justice Department spokespeople said they plan to charge the foremost terrorist in the western hemisphere with "illegal entry into the United States."

The FBI has reams of files on Posada, affectionately called "Bambi" by his terrorist friends. Former FBI Special Agent Carter Cornick told New York Times reporter Tim Weiner that Posada was "up to his eyeballs" in the October 1976 destruction of a Cuban commercial airliner over Barbados. All 73 passengers and crew members died. Recently published FBI and CIA documents not only confirm Cornick's statement, but also reveal that U.S. agencies had knowledge of the plot and did not inform Cuban authorities or try to stop the bombing.

Posada denied involvement at the time, but police nabbed two of the plotters who had disembarked in Barbados. They fingered Posada as the man who hired them to place the bomb on the plane. His name became ubiquitous in the files of agencies that monitored terrorists. Nevertheless, several weeks after Posada announced his presence on U.S. soil, Roger Noriega, Assistant Secretary of State for Inter-American Affairs, still claimed he had no information that Posada had even entered the country.

Posada himself promoted his high international profile. So that the world knew of his exploits, he boasted to New York Times reporters Anne Bardach and Larry Rohter in 1998 that he had organized a sabotage campaign of Cuban tourist spots. In 1997, one of Posada's agents in Cuba detonated a bomb at a Cuban hotel that killed an Italian tourist. Posada replied that "it was a freak accident, but I sleep like a baby." A hardened terrorist can't afford to be sentimental!

In 1999, Panamanian police discovered that the 71-year-old Posada, between visits to his proctologist, conspired with three other anti-Castro geezers to assassinate Cuba's leader in Panama. Castro was to give a public speech there.

This quartet of seniors, Guillermo Novo, Pedro Remon, Gaspar Jimenez and
Posada, planned to blow up the platform from which Castro would speak. After Panamanian police arrested them, they denied any involvement. "What proof do they have?" sneered Posada et. al. ­ a mere set of their fingerprints on the explosives found in their rented car.

This March, Posada entered the U.S. surreptitiously. He left Panama less than a year after out-going Panamanian President Mireyea Moscoso pardoned him and his accomplices.

Moscoso also apparently contravened Panamanian law by issuing the pardons before the appeals process had ended. The Panamanian press mused about the "coincidence" between the issuing of pardons and the simultaneous $4 million deposited in her Swiss bank account.

After pardoning the geezers, Moscoso phoned U.S. Ambassador Simon Ferro, saying she had complied with Washington's request to release the men.

On May 20, 2004, the four caught a waiting airplane that took them to Honduras. There, Posada, the veritable padrino of Latin American terrorism, disembarked while the other three continued to Miami so their arrival could coincide with President Bush's campaign stop. They entered the United States without problems, despite their terrorist rap sheets.

Did Homeland Security personnel read Bush's November 26, 2001 declaration? "If anybody harbors a terrorist, they're a terrorist." Did Bush send a note to anti-terrorist agencies explaining that they should make exceptions for "zealous patriots" who wanted to assassinate Castro ­ and anyone else who happened to be near him when the bomb went off?

Indeed, all four pardoned Castro-haters had for decades tried to assassinate and commit sabotage against Cuban and other officials and properties in New York, Mexico and the Caribbean.

A Washington D.C. jury had convicted Guillermo Novo first of conspiring to assassinate former Chilean Chancellor Orlando Letelier. When an appeals court reversed that conviction on procedural grounds, a second jury in 1982 found Novo guilty of perjury for lying to a grand jury about his knowledge of the assassination plot. In September 1976, five Cubans working with Chilean secret police agents on orders from Generalissimo Augusto Pinochet had car-bombed Letelier on Washington's Embassy Row.

Ronni Moffitt, Letelier's young colleague at the Institute for Policy Studies, also died in the bombing. The FBI also knew that Posada had knowledge of the plot to kill Letelier.

Born Luis Clemente Faustino Posada Carriles in Cienfuegos, Cuba in 1928, this Cuban expatriate served on dictator Fulgencio Batista's repressive forces until the January 1959 revolutionary takeover. Posada then swore vengeance.

The CIA recruited him for its 1961 invasion of Cuba at the Bay of Pigs. But the Agency placed Posada in an anti-Castro version of the Waffen SS, a squad that would "mop up" after the invaders had prevailed. Following the April fiasco, the CIA sent Posada for "training" at Fort Benning, Georgia, to learn about spying, using explosives and other lethal devices. In 1971, working out of Venezuela, he partnered with Antonio Veciana, founder of Alpha 66, another anti-Castro terrorist group, to plan an elaborate plot to assassinate Castro.

In a 1996 interview, Veciana told me how he and Posada had recruited two Venezuelan hit men, disguised them as a TV news crew and sent them to Santiago, Chile, before Castro arrived on a visit. Meanwhile, the assassins "blended in" with the press corps. CIA technicians had outfitted their news camera with a gun. Fortunately for Fidel, the assassins chickened out. Posada, enraged over such cowardice, recruited other assassins to use the same lethal camera on Castro when he stopped in Caracas for a press conference on his return to Cuba. Those whackers also had second thoughts and the plot failed again.

Perhaps Posada's frustration over the failed 1971 hits abated after the "success" of his 1976 Barbados air sabotage. After Venezuelan authorities charged him with responsibility for the airline bombing, they tossed him into prison while appeal after appeal took place ­ until August 1985. Then, someone who knew and admired Posada ­ perhaps Jorge Mas Canosa, leader of the Cuban American Nation Foundation in Miami, who is listed with a $50 note next to his name in Lt. Col. Oliver North's notebooks, published by the Iran-Contra Congressional subcommittees --­ bribed prison authorities to help Posada "escape."

Following his "escape," North then engaged this fugitive to re-supply the CIA-backed Contras from El Salvador. When the United States stopped funding the Contra War, with the 1990 electoral defeat of the Sandinista government in Nicaragua, Posada returned to the bombing business. This time, he selected bombing hotels in Cuba, a strategic target that would impair Castro's foreign exchange source by making the island a dangerous spot for European tourists. Posada told Times reporters Bardach and Rohter that the money came from wealthy Cubans in Miami.

Given Posada's own boasting and from the available evidence in published documents, the Justice Department had to either try him for terrorist acts or deport him to Venezuela, which has requested his extradition. He plotted the 1976 airliner bombing from Caracas and escaped from prison there. He also apparently committed murder and torture there as well. Despite this overwhelming documentation, however, the Justice Department rejected Venezuela's May 2005 extradition request to try Posada for this crime on the grounds that the request lacked sufficient detail.

One wonders: Did Posada announce his illegal presence in the United States with the idea that U.S. government complicity in aiding and abetting his past acts of terrorism would protect him? U.S. authorities didn't inform Cuba or try to stop the 1976 air-bombing plot, and in 1971, as Veciana stated, the CIA made the gun that Posada's agents placed inside the camera to assassinate Castro. And Ollie North has knowledge of Posada's covert activities for U.S. intelligence as well.

Given Washington's decade long history of terrorism aimed at Cuba, Bush might ask his staff to re-word the doctrinaire anti-terrorist statements they write for his press conferences.

After the foul 9/11 deeds, a few wise counselors had recommended that Bush leave the anti-terrorist campaign to police and judicial agencies. But Bush insisted on war. By employing the military to this task and in the process justifying the erosion of human rights as necessary to fighting terrorism, the world has come to think of the U.S. government as hypocritical ­ at best.

Posada, an old U.S. terrorist chicken, has come home to roost in Bush's nest. He has also exposed Bush's anti-terrorist policies as a hoax.

Saul Landau teaches at Cal Poly Pomona University and is a fellow of the Institute for Policy Studies. He wrote Assassination on Embassy Row, an account of the Letelier-Moffitt murders, (with John Dinges). A version of this article appeared in Foreign Policy In Focus.
http://www.counterpunch.org/landau06092005.html


__________________
A TAINTED DEAL http://www.motherjones.com/politics/1998/06/tainted-deal

 LA DEA; Murder of Kiki Camarena http://www.laweekly.com/news/how-a-dogged-la-dea-agent-unraveled-the-cias-alleged-role-in-the-murder-of-kiki-camarena-5750278  

"Several informed sources have told me that an appendix to this Report was removed at the instruction of the DOJ at the last minute. This appendix is reported to have information about a CIA officer, not agent or asset, but officer, based in the LA Station, who was in charge of Contra related activities. According to these sources, this individual was associated with running drugs to South Central L.A., around 1988. Let me repeat that amazing omission. The recently released CIA Report Vol II contained an appendix, which was pulled by the DOJ, that reported a CIA officer in the LA Station was hooked into drug running in South Central Los Angeles." Maxine Waters Oct, 1998
https://fas.org/irp/congress/1998_cr/h981013-coke.htm   

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maynard

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Homeland security allows terrorist drug dealer Posada to stay in the U.S.



http://www.counterpunch.org/alarcon06172005.html
June 17, 2005

Argentina Strikes Down Impunity for Government Sponsored Terrorists; Will the US Do the Same?

Who Helped Posada Enter the U.S.?

By RICARDO ALARCÓN

Very important news came from Buenos Aires earlier this week: The Supreme Court of Argentina has declared un-Constitutional certain laws granting impunity to those involved in crimes --30 000 desaparecidos-- during the last military regime. This dramatic ruling opens the possibility for justice to be done in hundreds or thousands of cases still unresolved.

It comes ten days after an International Conference Against Terrorism for Justice and Truth was held in Havana with 681 participants from 67 countries that asked, among others things, for such steps to be taken. The Argentina decision hopefully may contribute to a process that should not be limited to that country. At the Havana Conference the international connections of Operation Condor were document, as was the role of such groups as CORU and the CIA in government sponsored terrorism and massive violations of human rights.

Ironically a number of the most notorious individuals involved in those criminal actions are now freely walking the streets of Miami, such as Orlando Bosch--regardless of now declassified official papers showing his connection with the assassination in Washington DC of Letelier and Ronnie Moffit.

On the other hand, Luis Posada Carriles is waiting for admission to join the club of welcomed terrorists. He has been in the US since March, a fugitive from Venezuelan justice for twenty years, his trial for masterminding the midair destruction of a civilian airplane and the killing of 73 innocents still pending. Instead of extraditing him to Venezuela, as required according to a number of antiterrorists Conventions, the Bush administration is handling his case as a matter of possible violations of immigration laws.

Adding insult to injury, it is assumed that Posada just entered the US by land from Mexico, just as thousands of poor Latinos attempt ever day,-alone and without any help. Does anybody really believe that? Or is this rather an effort to cover up a case of human smuggling-- in this case of a notorious, self proclaimed terrorist--into US territory?

At the recent El Paso hearing, Posada was accompanied by, among others, Santiago Alvarez, a pretty well known anti-Cuba fanatic himself. Mr. Alvarez has been supporting Posada, quite openly, at least since Mr. Posada was arrested in Panama in 2000. Alvarez sent a plane to pick up Posada, when he was pardoned by the Panamanian President. It was Mr. Alvarez who announced, in March 2005, that Posada was in Miami. Since that moment Alvarez has been acting as his spokesman and he was the one that organized and chaired the press conference with Posada last May.

Since April, Cuba has been denouncing the fact that Posada entered US territory by sea from Islas Mujeres, Mexico, on board of the Santrina a boat owned by Mr. Alvarez. We base our accusation on what was published in a series of investigative reports by a local Mexican newspaper indicating that the Santrina entered that Mexican resort island by mid march to take Posada to Miami. The newspaper has quoted several witnesses and official records of what happened there just a few days before Mr. Alvarez announced that Posada was in Miami.

The Department of Homeland Security should be invited to answer some questions. How did Posada enter the US territory? Who helped him? What do they intend to do, if anything, to investigate such serious violation of the laws?

I believe that impunity must also be fought in the United States.

Ricardo Alarcon Quesada is Cuba's Vice President and President of its National Assembly.


__________________
A TAINTED DEAL http://www.motherjones.com/politics/1998/06/tainted-deal

 LA DEA; Murder of Kiki Camarena http://www.laweekly.com/news/how-a-dogged-la-dea-agent-unraveled-the-cias-alleged-role-in-the-murder-of-kiki-camarena-5750278  

"Several informed sources have told me that an appendix to this Report was removed at the instruction of the DOJ at the last minute. This appendix is reported to have information about a CIA officer, not agent or asset, but officer, based in the LA Station, who was in charge of Contra related activities. According to these sources, this individual was associated with running drugs to South Central L.A., around 1988. Let me repeat that amazing omission. The recently released CIA Report Vol II contained an appendix, which was pulled by the DOJ, that reported a CIA officer in the LA Station was hooked into drug running in South Central Los Angeles." Maxine Waters Oct, 1998
https://fas.org/irp/congress/1998_cr/h981013-coke.htm   

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IMAGE: S.S. Santrinahttp://www.narconews.com/Issue38/article1354.html

June 22, 2005 | Issue #38
               

How Authentic Journalists Caught an International Terrorist in Mexico

               

The Daily Por Esto! Found Posada Carriles on Isla Mujeres but George W. Bush Is Trying to Set Him Free in Miami

               

By Al Giordano
Special to The Narco News Bulletin

               

June 21, 2005

                       
“He who protects a terrorist is a terrorist”        

-George W. Bush

       

Mérida, Yucatán, June 2005: On Mexico’s Caribbean island of Isla Mujeres, on March 14, Authentic Journalist Yolanda Gutiérrez Sagrero and photojournalist Mario Alonzo pulled the first threads on a curtain that now disintegrates in tatters. Sunlight now shines upon the darkest recesses and hypocrisies of George W. Bush’s so-called “War on Terrorism,” and thus, Bush’s terror war is in doubt as never before.

       

Gutiérrez, Alonzo, and their colleagues at Mexico’s daily Por Esto! tugged on the threads and found América’s most-wanted fugitive behind that curtain: Luis Posada Carriles, the Cuban-born, Miami-fed, CIA-paid, confessed architect of the 1976 terrorist passenger jet bombing that killed 73 civilians, including the teenage members of Cuba’s Olympic fencing team.

       

Known as “the Latin American Osama bin Laden,” Posada Carriles, 77, has publicly confessed, as well, to bombings of civilian targets in tourist hotels, and additional terrorist acts. His trail of violence under a cloak of official protection goes back decades. A recent book even places him at Dealey Plaza, in Dallas, in 1963, at the hour when President John F. Kennedy was assassinated there. Whether or not he also helped kill JFK, Posada Carriles, with 40 years of collaboration with the U.S. Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), is not somebody that the U.S. government wants talking too much, or too honestly, or too loudly about what he’s seen and done, and with whom, and on whose authority (dad’s, Mr. President?) to the press. Read it and weep, citizens of the United States: A terrorist named Luis Posada Carriles is blackmailing your president, George W. Bush, today in order to win “political asylum.” And, so far, the cowardly Bush doesn’t have the courage to stop him.

       

Ever since his pardon and release from Panamanian prison in the final hours of the presidency of Mireya Moscoso in August of last year, this terrorist successfully eluded an international manhunt. He is wanted by the government of Venezuela (the country where he is a naturalized Cuban-born citizen) to face trial for the 1976 passenger jet bombing. He was free as an ocean pirate until the boat that took him to the United States washed up against the sandbars of Isla Mujeres, which, unfortunately for Posada Carriles (but fortunately for everyone else) is an isle where the flag of the Authentic Journalism renaissance waves higher than his own Jolly Roger.

       

The latest chapter in this saga of an international terrorist and those who protect him began with the March 14th report of what seemed to be a routine story about a shrimp boat adrift off of Isla Mujeres – poetically, it is also the island campus of the first Narco News School of Authentic Journalism – by Isla bureau chief Yolanda Gutiérrez…

       
A Terrorist Trawler Adrift
       

Another day on the job, another seemingly routine story to be reported: Early on the morning of March 14, journalist Yolanda Gutiérrez learned that a 90-foot shrimp boat was stranded near a sand bar off the shores of the island. She leaped into action. After all, the journalist Gutiérrez has steadfastly defended the nearby endangered coral reefs from environmental destruction, and the locals were worried that this boat adrift might do them more harm.

       


Isla Mujeres fishermen save the S.S. Santrina run ashore on a sandbar on March 14, 2005
Photo: D.R. 2005 Mario Alonzo, Por Esto!
Her report, a local news story that would soon blow into an international scandal, in the March 15th issue of Por Esto!, began:

       
“ISLA MUJERES, March 14: A shrimp boat from the United States with five crew members aboard was stranded for various hours while it attempted to enter the navigation canal and drifted to close to shore, although sources of the Port Captain’s office said that it did not affect any coral reef zones.        

“The boat named ‘Santrina,’ approximately 90 feet long and five or six meters wide, with license number 604553 went adrift at about 7:45 a.m. when it attempted to arrive in the Isla Mujeres port from the North.

       

“The crew and its captain, José Pujol, had left from the Bahamas and came to the island to stock up on food, water and fuel, in order to continue its route, which is unknown because the captain refused to speak with reporters…”

       


Cuban-American crew members of the S.S. Santrina, United States license #604553, and sporting the American flag, try to pull their boat to safety.
Photo: D.R. 2005 Mario Alonzo, Por Esto!
According to the report, the S.S. Santrina had “tried to make a shortcut around the buoys” that set the path that most boaters obey when navigating shallow ports. This kind of running of red lights of the sea is particularly bad form if, say, you are harboring a fugitive, or, worse, a wanted international terrorist: the crew’s own sloppiness (“to live outside the law you must be honest,” chicos!) and disregard for the maritime traffic signs has now led to an intercontinental uproar that strikes at the cornerstone of Washington’s fake war on terrorism.

       

There’s more to Yolanda’s report:

       
“Personnel from the Port Captain’s office coordinated the rescue efforts with the help of the S.S. 3 de Diciembre, a boat belonging to Javier Ayala Rejon, and two speedboats belonging to the tourist boat co-op of Isla Mujeres…        

“The S.S. Santrina finally escaped from the sand bank at 12:30 p.m., near the concrete docks, where the crew immediately presented itself to the Mexican Marines who conducted a routine inspection with drug-sniffing canines…

       

“…the officials of the National Marine Park conducted an inspection of the area where the boat had been adrift to confirm that there had been no damage to the marine ecosystem… International Sanitary inspectors, immigration, and customs agents also inspected the boat…”

       

And there it stood: solid daily journalism on what seemed to be a small story but one important to the island’s residents who care deeply about the preservation of the local coral reefs.

       


Five Men Arrived, and Six Launched Out: According to local fishermen and witnesses, the S.S. Santrina left for Miami with an extra passenger on board.
Photo: D.R. 2005 Mario Alonzo, Por Esto!
In the following day’s newspaper, March 16, Gutiérrez filed a follow-up story: “The S.S. Santrina Continues Its Voyage Toward Miami.”

       

Authentic Photojournalist Mario Alonzo snapped pictures of the skipper and crew, and his latest models were none too happy about it, refusing to talk to the press.

       

Little did anybody know – until those photos received scrutiny across the Caribbean – that the remodeled shrimp boat was carrying a monster onto U.S. shores.

       
Two Weeks Later, a Terrorist Appears in Miami
       

On March 29, Channel 41 TV of Miami (a controversial Spanish-language station that, in 2004, conducted interviews with armed paramilitaries who said they were plotting violent overthrows of the Cuban and Venezuelan governments), a broadcaster that counts with the nephew of former Cuban dictator Fulgencio Batista as one of its program hosts, announced that Posada Carriles was in South Florida and would seek political asylum in the United States.

       


Luis Posada Carriles
Photo: D.R. 2005 Por Esto!
Oligarch’s Daily, er, the Miami Herald reported the basics of Luis Posada Carriles’ criminal record (see Luis Gómez’s more detailed chronology, “The Bloody Face of Bambi,” at this link):

       
“If Posada is indeed in Miami, his visit mirrors his shadowy career as a CIA-trained spy, an explosives expert, escape artist, security advisor to presidents across the Caribbean and—some say—terrorist…        

Born in 1928 in the south-central port of Cienfuegos, Posada quickly soured on Castro’s revolution and joined Brigade 2506 before its disastrous landing at the Bay of Pigs.

       

“His ship never hit shore, and he went on to be a CIA operative in Miami, specially trained in the science of explosives.

       

“But by 1967 he was working with the Venezuelan police, tracking down pro-Castro guerrillas. And until 1976, when he and Miami pediatrician Orlando Bosch were arrested in Caracas for the midair bombing of a Cuban airliner that killed 73 people, he had been just another anti-Castro militant.

       

“Venezuela’s cumbersome legal system never convicted either man for the airplane bombing. Bosch eventually won his freedom, but Posada escaped from prison, while awaiting a prosecutor’s appeal, in August 1985.

       

“One year later he turned up in El Salvador, secretly working for U.S. National Security Council member Lt. Col. Oliver North and managing part of the supply operations for contra guerrillas fighting the Marxist-led Sandinista government in Nicaragua….

       

“In 1997, a dozen or so bombs went off in tourist spots around Havana for the first time in decades, killing one tourist and wounding half a dozen others. A young Salvadoran, Raul Ernesto Cruz Leon, was arrested in Havana.

       

“Herald reports linked Posada to the bombings and said Cuban exiles in South Florida had provided $15,000 in funding. The next year, the New York Times quoted Posada as saying he was responsible for the bombings and that leaders of the Cuban American National Foundation had ‘’supported’’ his efforts to topple Castro. Posada later said he lied to the newspaper, and denied a role in the bombings.

       

“Posada then melted back into shadows until November 2000, when he and Miami exiles Pedro Remón, Gaspar Jiménez and Guillermo Novo were arrested in Panama for allegedly plotting to assassinate Castro during a summit there.

       

“They were convicted only on charges of endangering public safety and sentenced to up to eight years, but Panamanian President Mireya Moscoso pardoned them in late 2004. The three Miami men came home, but Posada went into hiding…”

       

Soon after the report that the terrorist had come ashore in Florida, Miami attorney Eduardo Soto, representing Posada Carriles, announced that his client was “asking for political asylum” in the United States. He claimed, curiously, that Posada Carriles had entered the U.S. over land from Mexico to Texas, “like thousands of people do each day.”

       


S.S. Santrina captain José Hilario Pujol with the boat’s reputed owner, Santiago Álvarez, being questioned in the office of the Port Captain of Isla Mujeres.
Photo: D.R. 2005 Mario Alonzo, Por Esto!
Meanwhile, across the Caribbean, between Miami and Isla Mujeres, on the Island of Cuba, somebody was reading – and looking at the photographs that accompanied – Por Esto!’s March 15 and 16 reports about the shrimp boat that went adrift and then headed for Miami.

       

There, in the photos, on the S.S. Santrina, were Santiago Álvarez Fernández-Magriña, owner of the S.S. Santrina, and ship captain José Pujol, a.k.a. ‘Pepín’… considered to be terrorist accomplices of Posada Carriles by Cuban Intelligence.

       
Por Esto! in Hand, Fidel Takes to the Airwaves
       

“What is the United States doing giving asylum to someone who exploded a civilian airliner?” boomed Comandante Fidel Castro, waving a copy of the March 16 issue of Por Esto! in the air.

       

“Look!” he lectured the international journalists present: “Look at what a newspaper can do! This is Authentic Journalism!”

       


“This is Authentic Journalism!” On April 15, Fidel Castro informs the international press that photographs and reports in the Mexican daily Por Esto! reveal the maritime path of terrorist Luis Posada Carriles toward the United States.
Photo: D.R. 2005 Por Esto!
Por Esto! correspondent Jorge Gómez Barato, in Havana, watched, listened, and took notes, as Castro’s press conference was aired on live television. Castro congratulated the Yucatán daily “for service to humanity through the reporting of useful information in the war against terrorism.” Citing the “exhaustive and valuable work” of the newspaper, Fidel turned his attention to the “suspicious crew” found in the photos of the S.S. Santrina and lashed out at the Mexican government for having “protected international terrorists.”

       

The Associated Press later quoted Mexican immigration officials, who were among the authorities that revised the papers of the crew of the S.S. Santrina back on March 14, as claiming that “all of them were U.S. citizens” and that “the five crew members identified themselves as employees of the Caribbean Dive and Research Foundation, an organization dedicated to oceanic investigation with its headquarters in Miami. The boat was also reported as property of this company.” Mexican immigration confirmed that the boat, when it left Isla Mujeres, did indeed head toward Miami.

       

By April 18, the daily Por Esto! had learned more details:


  • Captain Jose Hilario Pujol’s United States Passport #301981339 lists his date and place of birth as October 21, 1929 in Cuba: Smuggling an illegal alien such as Posada Carriles into the U.S. could result in revocation of his citizenship.
    Photo: D.R. 2005 Por Esto!
    That the S.S. Santrina, en route from the Bahamas to Miami, had to veer off course in order to go to Isla Mujeres: an island that would not normally be along that route;

  • That the boat’s owner, Santiago Alvarez Fernández Magriña was the same person who, last August 26, sent two executive airplanes to the Panama City airport to retrieve Posada Carriles and his accomplices after their pardon for an assassination attempt during the 2000 presidential summit in that country;

  • That, last August, the U.S. citizens in that assassination plot were brought in one plane to Florida, while the other plane brought Posada Carriles to the San Pedro Sula Airport in Honduras, where he was received by alleged anti-Cuban terrorist Rafael Hernández Nodarse;

  • That, to enter Honduras, Posadas Carriles used a United States passport with the name of Melvin C. Thompson;

  • That Posada Carriles remained various months in Honduras, also traveling in El Salvador, Costa Rica, Guatemala and Belize, from where he entered Mexico through the border city of Chetumal, south of Cancún;

  • That the identity of another “crew member” that Por Esto! had photographed on the S.S. Santrina was that of Miguel Alvarez, another accused terrorist sought by the Cuban government.
       

At his next press conference, Cuban leader Fidel Castro noted, again, the work of Por Esto!, “a newspaper that has shined a lot of light, has continued investigating, and has revealed very interesting details.”

       

By the morning of April 20, at his six a.m. press conference, Castro began reading the Por Esto! reports aloud on national television. Complaining about “the total silence” by the governments of Mexico, Honduras and Guatemala regarding Posada Carriles’ stays in those countries, Castro said: “What we do have are new reports about what happened in Isla Mujeres. Por Esto! has kept on investigating and reports new facts….”

       
Fidel Goes to J-School
       


Por Esto! publisher Mario Menéndez (standing in the center) converses with students and professors of the Narco News School of Authentic Journalism, Mérida, Yucatán, 2003. Standing with him are his wife, Por Esto!’s director of international relations Alicia Figueroa, and Al Giordano. Seated left to right: Andrea Daugirdas Hawes, Ugo Vallauri and Sunny Angulo.
Photo: D.R. 2003 Jeremy Bigwood
Meanwhile, the rabidly anti-Castro TV station in Miami, Channel 41, called Por Esto! publisher Mario Menéndez Rodríguez and interviewed him. The telephone interview was broadcast live. The interviewers were uninterested in the facts of the Posada Carriles case. All they wanted to know from don Mario was: “Is it true that you are a friend of Fidel Castro’s?” Menéndez explained that, in 1963, he had published the first interview by a foreign reporter with Cuba’s president after the revolution of December 31, 1958, and that Cuba had given him exile for eight years (after the Mexican government blew up his newspaper offices with a bomb, took away his passport, and expelled him from his own country). For the gusanos of Miami, the facts about an international terrorist, or the innocents he had murdered, held no import. All they wanted to know was whether don Mario was a friend of Fidel’s. Menéndez, after almost an hour on the air, told them they were supporting a terrorist, betraying their own people, that they should be ashamed of themselves, and hung up abruptly.

       

Watching that televised phone interview, in Havana, was Fidel Castro, who the next morning again convened the press. He said:

       
“The fact that the editor of Por Esto! has lived here (in Cuba) is not a problem, because nobody can say that (the Posada Carriles news story) is an invention of Castro or anyone else. The monster, Posada Carriles, is there, among them. He is one of them. He was brought from Isla Mujeres to Miami and this has become a nightmare for Washington. The whole world knows that the man is there! They don’t know what to do with him, but they have the monster with them. Meanwhile, Por Esto! continues doing its own thing: It continues investigating.”
       


Photo: D.R. 2003 Jeremy Bigwood
Speaking about the journalist Menéndez’s long trajectory (known to Narco News readers as this newspaper’s victorious co-defendant in the landmark Internet press freedom case in the New York Supreme Court in 2001), Fidel joked: “(Menéndez) was very radical in his youth. I had to moderate him. But he has behaved since then.”

       

In a reference to Menéndez’s role as a professor of the Narco News School of Authentic Journalism, Castro added: “Now he even teaches Authentic Journalism to North American journalists!”

       
Terrorist Spottings: Civil Society Steps Forward
       

Meanwhile, fishermen and citizens of Isla Mujeres (where Por Esto! is the dominant daily newspaper) began to step forward as to what they had witnessed: “Five Men Arrived and Six Launched Out” was the headline in the newspaper’s April 24 edition. “Six persons could be seen on the boat” as the S.S. Santrina left Isla Mujeres on March 15, reported Yolanda Gutiérrez, based on interviews with eyewitnesses “who for obvious reasons asked not to be named.”

       

“One of the crew members noticed that (the people on) a small boat that was entering the Macax lagoon were observing them and, immediately, one of the people who could be seen on the S.S. Santrina ran to take cover inside the boat, although at the moment nobody suspected what was really happening,” reported Gutiérrez. (True to the week’s script, Fidel Castro read her article on national TV the next morning.)

       

In a May 17 “exclusive interview” with the Miami Herald, Posada Carriles repeated his attorney’s claim that he had entered the United States, over land, from Mexico to Texas, and spun an elaborate account of his supposed Greyhound bus trip to Florida from there.

       

And yet, contradicting the veracity of his own claims, Posada also told the Herald:

       
“Posada said that sometime earlier this year, a friend drove him across the border into Belize and then into the Cancún area of Mexico.        

“That was around the same time that the Santrina was docked at Isla Mujeres. Posada declined to say whether he met Alvarez there.”

       


“Posada declined to say whether he met Alvarez there,” according to the Miami Herald: Crew members of the S.S. Santrina, reportedly owned by Santiago Alvarez of Miami, in Isla Mujeres while terrorist Luis Posada Carriles admits to being nearby.
Photo: D.R. 2005 Mario Alonzo, Por Esto!
After all, a lot is at stake for Santiago Alvarez if authorities conclude that he and the other crew members were found to have smuggled an illegal alien into the United States. Their own legal presence on U.S. soil, as Cuban-born naturalized American citizens, could become jeopardized, not to mention additional burdens under law for immigrant smugglers. Cuba’s Vice President Ricardo Alarcon seems particularly focused on Alvarez’s well-financed activities. The debate over how Posada entered the United States, thus, falls heaviest on Alvarez’s future.

       

That might explain the bizarre story offered by Posada Carriles and his attorneys that he somehow entered the U.S. through Texas and not via the easier route from Yucatán to Florida. Yet, it simply does not make sense that someone with Posada Carriles’ economic means and with generous support from the wealthy Miami ex-Cuban mafia would enter Mexico from Belize and travel, at age 77, the arduous 90-hour exodus via land from Cancún to Miami, at the precise moment when his buddies were docked in nearby Isla Mujeres.

       

Meanwhile, other citizens came forward – in Chetumal, in Cancun and in Isla Mujeres – to bear witness to the presence of the international terrorist Posada Carriles in their locales.

       

“I saw Luis Posada Carriles,” the former mayor of Isla Mujeres Fidel Villanueva told Por Esto! on May 19. “We all saw him. In reality, don Luis was there. I tied my boat at the Isla Mujeres port and he was there. On a Saturday, we saw him there, watching the boats, but we didn’t know who he was.”

       


School of Authentic Journalism Class of 2003 on Narco News’ Isla Mujeres Campus.
Photo: D.R. 2003 Jeremy Bigwood
As the 50 students and professors of the Narco News School of Authentic Journalism who spent a week on Isla Mujeres in 2003 know, the island is a very small town: 500 yards at its widest, and just two roads across the three-mile-long isle, that’s all. Once a tourist or outsider is there for more than a day, people take note of the newcomer. And if the visitor has a disfigured face (from a bullet wound) and dresses dapperly enough in white linen to have earned the nickname “Bambi,” like Posadas, well, before too long a big white guy like him, with a sharp Cuban accent, attracts attention in a sleepy Mayan fishing village.

       

“I saw him just as many people in the Isla Mujeres port saw him,” continued former Mayor Villanueva.

       

On May 26, the daily El Sol of Zacatecas, Mexico, published an interview with the Secretary of the Navy in Mexico, Marco Antonio Peyrot, who confirmed that Posada Carriles entered the United States on the remodeled shrimp boat, the S.S. Santrina, that launched from Isla Mujeres. “This is the Mexican Navy!” proclaimed Fidel Castro, in Havana, at his May 27 press conference. “The Secretary of the Navy in Mexico!”

       

By protecting his smugglers with an incredible tale that he entered the U.S. through Texas, Posada Carriles’ claim has led to his own immigration hearings being held in El Paso. But, lo’ and behold, his attorneys have filed for a change of venue to Miami, where a federal judiciary, historically supportive of the ex-Cuban “exile community” in South Florida, would be more likely to protect him. (There’s an analysis of the legal questions surrounding Posada’s plea for asylum by Arthur Shaw, published at Vheadline.) And… this just in! A judge has ruled that Posada Carriles will have to press his case not on the home court of Miami, but in Texas.

       

Meanwhile, along Mexico’s Yucatán Peninsula, and up and down this hemisphere, an Authentic Journalism “swarm” of the type that just eleven days ago shook Bolivia, is digging deeper into the facts…

       
The Scent of the Narco
       


D.R. 2005 Nuez
The coastline of Mexico’s state of Quintana Roo, from Chetumal to Cancún, as this newspaper has widely reported for five years, is a major thoroughfare for cocaine smuggling from Colombia to the United States. These are the facts that, after all, were reviewed and vindicated by the Drug War on Trial case in the New York Supreme Court, where Narco News, Por Esto! publisher Mario Menéndez, your correspondent, and the facts we reported withstood the heaviest scrutiny placed on any drug trafficking story in the early years of this young century.

       

As Por Esto! and its journalists dug deeper into the path of terrorist Luis Posada Carriles along that same coastline into the United States – the same path as the cocaine, after all – the newspaper began to find an ugly confluence between the maritime smuggling of illegal immigrants from Cuba into Mexico (with the protection of the U.S. and Mexican governments) and the historic maritime smuggling of the drug cocaine (with the protection of the U.S. and Mexican governments) in the same waters.

       


Renan Castro explains the routes of narco-trafficking in the Caribbean to students and professors of the 2003 Narco News School of Authentic Journalism, at the daily Por Esto! offices in Cancun. Visible left to right: Charlie Hardy, Alex Contreras, Zabeth Flores, Andrea Arenas, Ava Salazar, and Ashley Kennedy.
Photo: D.R. 2003 Jeremy Bigwood
The little thread about a shrimp boat adrift offshore of a tiny island, first pulled by journalist Yolanda Gutiérrez, now pulls at the part of the curtain where the Miami mafia and narco-trafficking meet. After all, as Luis Gómez documents in today’s Narco News, Posada Carriles “worked to procure weapons… on the orders of the mind behind it all: Oliver North” in the 1980s. That was when the US government trafficked in cocaine to fund arms for anti-communist paramilitaries in Nicaragua. Could it be that Posada and company are up to their old tricks again?

       

Invited to give a presentation at the World Summit Against Terrorism and for Truth and Justice in Havana, Cuba, early this month, Por Esto!’s Quintana Roo editor (and professor of the School of Authentic Journalism) Renán Castro explained that the Posada Carriles story is “the tip of the iceberg of a dangerous operation for all the nations in the region, and specifically for the Republic of Cuba and for my country, Mexico.”

       


Authentic Journalist Renán Castro addresses the World Summit Against Terrorism and for Justice and Truth in Havana, Cuba, June 2005.
Photo: D.R. 2005 Por Esto!
The Mexican Authentic Journalist Renán Castro continued:

       
“The dangerous international terrorist Luis Posada Carriles was protected in Guatemala, Belize and Mexico by narco-traffickers that belong to the Central American cartel headed by capo Otto Herrera García, who is associated with Mexican criminal organizations led by Ismael Zambada (a.k.a. El Mayo) and Joaquin “Chapo” Guzmán, all of them associated with the Cuban-American mafia located in Cancún. They directed all the logistics so that (Posada Carriles) could remain for more than a week inside Mexican territory without being detected officially by Mexican authorities.        

“In Cancún, in the state of Quintana Roo, Posada Carriles was supported by a known trafficker of illegal Cuban immigrants named Juan Carlos Riberol (a.k.a. El Profe), who for more than seven years has led a powerful criminal network linked to a group of Cuban-American drug traffickers known as Los Marielitos, who maintain a close relationship with the Cuban-American Foundation with its headquarters in Miami…

       

“We believe the reports of the courageous Colombian journalist Hernando Calvo Ospina who in his presentation here mentioned that the Cuban-American Foundation has, since the 1980s, maintained connections with Colombian narco-traffickers to finance subversive acts against the revolutionary government of Cuba…

       

“The most serious element in all of this is the participation of the Cuban-American Foundation in all these operations that are being constructed to allow for 55 to 100 illegal Cuban immigrants to arrive in Quintana Roo each week, who are then taken to the United States and, when they don’t have family members in Miami, Florida, who can pay the costs of their transport, they are used to smuggle drugs onto U.S. territory.”

       


“There are things that nobody dares say, and what you have just said here are the words of the valiant,” responds Fidel Castro, to Renan Castro’s presentation about the links between drug trafficking and Posada Carriles’ voyage to the United States.
Photo: D.R. 2005 Por Esto!
Fidel Castro, at the same conference, rose after Renán’s presentation, looked straight at the Mexican Authentic Journalist, and said:

       
“There are things that nobody dares say, and what you have just said here are the words of the valiant. They use those boats for drugs. You have denounced something that has not been mentioned until now, that the boat is also dedicated to drug trafficking. That’s serious. But the most serious thing is what they did in violation of United States laws, smuggling terrorists, something that is severely punished in the United States…”
       
Authentic Journalists: Pull This Thread
       

Writing from Florida in this month’s Clamor magazine, Narco News School of Authentic Journalism professor Andrew Stelzer writes about his fulltime job as a radio reporter:

       
“It’s a grind, and often I feel as if I’m not doing what I should be — going deeper into stories, uncovering hidden secrets buried inside the machinery of government and corporations, and holding the powerful accountable for wrongs against society.”
       

Stelzer speaks of the difficulty for journalists like his colleague and ours, the late Gary Webb, who dug so deeply into the cocaine-trafficking scandals in which Posada Carriles was involved in the 1980s that his newspaper editor, Jerry Ceppos, betrayed the search for the truth and cast Gary out as an industry pariah.

       


Andrew Stelzer, at the 2004 session of the Narco News School of Authentic Journalism in Cochabamba, Bolivia.
Photo: D.R. 2004 Jeremy Bigwood
And yet this story about a news story that explodes wider and with greater force each day – on the trail of an international terrorist and those who, in Bushspeak, “protect terrorists” – began precisely with the kind of “grind” work that journalist Stelzer finds, at times, frustrating (and don’t we all).

       

But, as in the case of Authentic Journalist Yolanda Gutiérrez rising early on the morning of March 14 on Isla Mujeres to report one of those seemingly routine stories, only to end up tugging on a thread that now unravels the gigantic, previously impenetrable, falsehood of Washington’s “wars” against terrorism and drugs, this kind of daily journalism work can be, and is, immensely important.

       

What Gutiérrez, and photojournalist Mario Alonzo, and Renán Castro, and the rest of the Por Esto! team have that Gary Webb did not have at the San Jose Mercury News in the 1990s is the knowledge and faith that they count with a publisher that will back them to the ultimate consequences as long as they report the truth, and, now, an international network of Authentic Journalists to spread the story far and wide across borders and languages.

       


Gary Webb – Presente
Photo: D.R. 2003 Jeremy Bigwood
Authentic Journalism has become the people’s Intelligence Agency. Horizontal in form, without interests or lies to protect, this international network is now faster, and more accurate, than the spook agencies of any government on earth. Instead of hoarding information to manipulate it, the Authentic Journalists of this hemisphere and the world conduct our work in the sunlight of a better-informed public. Heads of State are coming to count on the information speeding across these screens as more accurate sources of authentic intelligence than official sources.

       

And so it is no longer a surprise when someone like Hugo Chávez reads Narco News aloud on his national radio show, or when Fidel Castro reads aloud from Por Esto! on national television. Nor is it any surprise when these developments get translated and exported across the globe, basking the isolated journalists in the sunlight of public protection.

       

Authentic Journalists of the world: Yolanda Gutiérrez pulled a thread three months ago. She and her Por Esto! colleagues were and are backed by everyone at her newspaper and in our Authentic Journalism renaissance. The informational curtain that had kept the truth about a state-sponsored international terrorist from public view is shredded and coming apart wider each day. There are a thousand frays already. Grab one of those strings, right now, and start pulling. The Posada Carriles case can topple an Empire that is no more formidable than a shrimp boat adrift in a sea of terrorism and narco-trafficking. Pull this string. Yank hard, and do it for justice. Avenge the lies. Do it for Gary Webb.

                               

Enter the NarcoSphere for comments on this article

                               

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__________________
A TAINTED DEAL http://www.motherjones.com/politics/1998/06/tainted-deal

 LA DEA; Murder of Kiki Camarena http://www.laweekly.com/news/how-a-dogged-la-dea-agent-unraveled-the-cias-alleged-role-in-the-murder-of-kiki-camarena-5750278  

"Several informed sources have told me that an appendix to this Report was removed at the instruction of the DOJ at the last minute. This appendix is reported to have information about a CIA officer, not agent or asset, but officer, based in the LA Station, who was in charge of Contra related activities. According to these sources, this individual was associated with running drugs to South Central L.A., around 1988. Let me repeat that amazing omission. The recently released CIA Report Vol II contained an appendix, which was pulled by the DOJ, that reported a CIA officer in the LA Station was hooked into drug running in South Central Los Angeles." Maxine Waters Oct, 1998
https://fas.org/irp/congress/1998_cr/h981013-coke.htm   

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http://narcosphere.narconews.com/story/2005/6/24/213823/010

Posada Carriles may well choke on Bush's pickle
By Bill Conroy,
Posted on Fri Jun 24th, 2005 at 09:38:23 PM EST
Accused anti-Castro terrorist Luis Posada Carriles will have to sit in a jail cell in El Paso, Texas, a bit longer. His bail hearing before U.S. immigration judge Lee Abbott has been postponed until July 25, according to news reports.

Strangely, the major mainstream media outlets have been slow to pick up on the news.

If you recall, Posada Carriles was arrested in Miami in mid-May after allegedly entering the United States illegally via the Texas/Mexico border. He then claims to have taken a bus from Texas to Miami.

Well that tall tale may be coming back to haunt the long-time CIA operative who is accused of blowing up a Cuban airliner in 1976, snuffing out the lives of some 73 innocent people. Of course, that is just the tip of the ice pick in terms of the crimes Posada Carriles stands accused of in the eyes of the world. Venezuela, in particular, wants justice served up to Posada Carriles and is seeking his extradition in connection with the airline bombing.

The 77-year-old Posada Carriles is a native of Cuba but later also became a citizen of Venezuela, where the airline-bombing plot was allegedly masterminded. Now, he is seeking to wrap himself in the U.S. flag in a bid for political asylum – part of a desperate attempt to protect himself from the fate his past deeds have thrust upon his future.

But it’s tough to beat fate when you’re playing against the house.        

Posada-Carriles made a critical mistake in his return to the shores of the U.S. of A. Most folks inclined to look a horse in the mouth won’t buy his claim about entering the states through Texas. It is almost certain he was delivered to the shores of Miami with the assistance of his benefactor, Santiago Alvarez, and a misguided shrimp boat captain who, prior to reaching U.S. soil, washed nearly ashore with his crew in public view off the coast of Mexico.

If only Posada-Carriles would have stuck with the Miami version of the story, instead of the tall Texas tale, he might be sitting in the catbird seat today, facing an immigration hearing in Miami. Instead, he’s now a jailbird in El Paso with the paw of the mighty U.S. government planted squarely on his soul.

How can this be? How is it that the U.S. government, which created this Frankenstein Posada-Carriles, is now seeking to cage the monster?

Remember, pride is the devil’s fatal flaw. The Bush Administration has made it known to the world that it has a zero-tolerance policy on terrorism: You’re either with us or with the terrorists, right?

The arrogance of such a philistine foreign-policy stance, though, is certain to become a bitter pill to swallow when you find a terrorist caught up in your own system. That is precisely what has happened to the Bush Administration in the Posada-Carriles case.

The White House is now confronted with a terrorist who has played for their team: Posada-Carriles -- and they don’t want too many of his dirty little secrets getting out in the sunshine, particularly in a Venezuelan court of all places.

But the Bush Administration, despite its deftness at making buzzards appear to be eagles, has been caught in a game of pickle. If they run toward the base called “asylum,” the world media currently focused on Posada-Carriles will surely tag them out. If they run toward the base called “extradition,” they can’t get around Venezuela’s claim on their CIA operative.

So what to do?

First, back to that pride thing. The whole reason the White House finds itself in this pickle is because Posada Carriles jumped off base to begin with by shooting off his big mouth. After all of the cloak-and-dagger tactics that were employed to assure his safe passage to Miami, Posada Carriles decided to jump on a soapbox to brag about his adventure by granting an interview to the media.

In other words, Posada Carriles put the spotlight on himself, in an act of egotistical stupidity, forcing the Bush Administration to swoop in and pick him up -- via U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) -- before he did even more damage to the Administration’s already putrid world image.

But the big question is why did they move Posada Carriles to El Paso, Texas?

If the Bush Administration really wanted him to be granted asylum, wouldn’t they have left him plead his immigration case in Miami, where he has the backing of the anti-Castro Cuban community and political machine? Instead, they arrested him the day after he granted an “exclusive” interview to the Miami Herald, flew him to the former Homestead Air Force Base in South Florida and then sent him directly to jail in El Paso.

Narco News decided to ask a number of high-ranking law-enforcement officials who have experience with immigration and intelligence-agency matters about this strategy. They agreed to share their views, if we would agree to keep their names confidential.

Following is their take on what is now happening to Posada-Carriles and why the recent postponement of his bond hearing comes as no surprise:

Source 1: A former high-ranking DEA official

“If he was a CIA operative, and he was, I don’t think the CIA wanted him in custody,” the source says. “But he had the audacity to grant an interview with the Miami Herald, and he was arrested the day after that interview. … He did a stupid thing and rubbed it in the government’s face by coming into the U.S. illegally and then having the balls to grant an interview to the press in the middle of Miami.”

The source adds that if the immigration judge in El Paso was really under political pressure to grant Posada Carriles asylum, then he would have granted his motion to have the case moved to Miami, “but he didn’t.”

“They’re going to keep him in custody where the government can keep an eye on him,” the former DEA official says. “How many Cubans are incarcerated already (in the United States)? They can hold him indefinitely, until he dies, maybe due to bad prison food.”

Source 2: Another former high-ranking DEA official

"They put him in El Paso to bury him. They picked him up because they had no choice (after he went public) and they put him in El Paso, a small community that doesn't get much media attention."

He adds that the government "would have been content to let him wile away in the Cuban community, but now they have a political hot potato on their hands." The source adds that the Bush Administration is faced with the hypocrisy of its own stand on the war on terror.

"So they will prolong the situation and keep him around for years pretending it is being litigated. He is not in good health from what I understand, so it will get tied up in the courts for the few years he has left, and he will die in prison."

The source adds that after a time, he will be put under "house arrest." What that means, the source explains, is that Posada Carriles will be put in a minimum-security prison or other confinement where he will be under guard 24/7. The former DEA official adds that he knows of people who are in this situation right now and have been under “house arrest” for three years or more.

"Their (the U.S. government's) hands are tied. They've taken this strong stand on terror, and now they have Posada Carriles."

The source then slammed the mainstream press, saying that it's just amazing how they let the Bush Administration get a free pass on scandals like these.

"They talk about state control of the media in Iraq. The same thing exists here (in the U.S.). If the New York Times or the Washington Post would publish something too negative, the White House would cut them off, so they don't pursue these things."

Source 3: A private consultant who does work for the intelligence community

"They will get Posada Carriles in prison." the source opines.

"He will die of syphilis. That would be the easiest excuse. He's never had it before, but they will give it to him. (The disease) takes 25 years (to kill you) if not treated. In his case, they'll condense his syphilis.”

Source 4: A high-ranking Department of Homeland Security (DHS) official

This source agrees that Posada Carriles was sent to El Paso to be deep-sixed until the flurry of media coverage dies down. However, he departs with the others in predicting Posada Carriles’ ultimate fate. He says what will matter is whether the government (the Agency) thinks Posada Carriles is still "useful."

If not, well the DHS official does concede the government is capable of anything, including causing an inconvenient exit from this life for Posada. But he says that is a very extreme outcome. It's more likely, the DHS official says, that Posada Carriles will just rot in prison.

But, if deemed useful, then he will be held in El Paso until the media sunshine on his case is eclipsed by other news.

"Why take Posada out, because he still might have information that is useful, or he might still be useful?” the source explains. “If he is alive, then he can be useful. I think (after the press dies down) they will load a van with 100 illegal aliens, put him in, and take him back to Mexico and drop him off.

“... Who's going to know if the Agency shows up with a document that looks legitimate to transfer him to a different prison, and then he disappears?"

As far as the media picking up on Posada Carriles’ "disappearance" down the road, this source says: "The media will not get hold of it. It will happen after everything has died down. If someone in the media does try to get at it, they'll tie the reporter up in knots and back him off the story. And no one will care."

On the record

One former law enforcement source was willing to speak openly about his analysis of the situation. Lok Lau is a former CIA operative and FBI agent who worked a deep undercover assignment spying on China in the late 1980s.

Here’s his take on Posada Carriles:

“I think he used the media as leverage to try to get asylum, and he was betting on the fact that he wouldn’t be arrested,” Lau says. “I think they arrested him because people in the (U.S.) government got scared. If you were a top dog at the CIA station in Florida, would you want to take a chance on Posada Carriles and risk that your career might be ruined, or would it be easier to arrest him and shut him up? Most of these guys in the government are only concerned about themselves and their careers, so why would they stick their necks out (for Posada Carriles)?”

Lau adds that Posada Carriles was “playing a high risk game trying to get something over on the government.”

“He lost in a game of power politics,” Lau says. “People in the government are running scared now. The war is going badly, the polls look bad for the President and the Congress, so no one wants to be left holding the bag when the shit hits the fan.

“This guy has a lot of baggage. If you put together a list of his dirty deeds, it would be thicker than the Holy Bible.”

As far as what might happen to Posada Carriles in jail, Lau concedes there is a “possibility they will knock him off.” However, he says a much more realistic outcome is that he doesn’t survive the prison experience due to a type of benign neglect.

“I’ve been in jail as an undercover agent,” he explains. “The criminal element and gang activity is so bad that if they want to get rid of him, all they have to do is make it convenient for him to die by not doing enough to protect him.”

So there you have it. Posada Carriles has come to “America” wrapped in the flag seeking asylum. And he may well soon find himself buried in America, wrapped in a flag, in the shelter of a coffin.

Sometimes, fate is the ultimate form of justice.

http://www.narconews.com/Issue38/article1353.html

The Bloody Face of “Bambi”

               

A Brief Dossier on Luis Posada Carriles

               

By Luis A. Gómez
Special to The Narco News Bulletin

               

June 21, 2005

                       


Photo: Por Esto!
This man’s name is Luis Faustino Clemente Posada Carriles, better known among the CIA (for whom he worked) and intelligence circles as “Bambi.” He stands nearly six feet three inches tall, and has green eyes and a sweet look about him. Born on February 15, 1928 in Cienfuegos, Cuba, his hair has left behind its black color for an charming, grandfatherly white. He is a chemist by trade, and has used at least a dozen false names for a variety of “missions.”

       

This robust man, who has both Venezuelan and Cuban nationality, speaks slowly. This man, who U.S. immigration agents arrested on May 17 and now keep guarded in an El Paso, Texas prison, is the murderer of 73 people who died October 6, 1976, in a mid-flight attack on a Cubana de Aviación passenger airplane, as Authentic Journalist Alicia Herrera documented so well in her book Pusimos la bomba… ¿y qué? (“We Planted the Bomb, So What?”). But Luis Posada Carriles is responsible for more terrorist attacks in the last few decades… for many more…

       

For example, Posada has always been connected to dozens of anti-Castro terrorist groups, training them and supporting their actions from various countries throughout North and South America. Come on, the guy was an agent in former Cuban dictator Fulgencio Batista’s secret police before the 1959 Cuban Revolution. And according to the Cuban newspaper Juventud Rebelde, which published a succinct biography of this terrorist, there is evidence he may have even been involved in John F. Kennedy’s assassination.

       

Let’s just take a look at some important dates:

       


A young Luis Posada, in an undated photograph.
Photo: Wikipedia.org: Fair Use Doctrine
April 17, 1961: The day of the failed Bay of Pigs landing in Cuba. Dozens of mercenaries and anti-Castro Cubans hope to carry out an invasion of the island and create a “guerrilla war” against Fidel Castro’s government. They fail, infamously, and despite funding from Miami-based Cuban businessmen and the United States government. Among the participating groups is “Brigade 2506,” led by Félix Rodíguez. Rodríguez, another Cuban CIA, agent is famous for having been in Bolivia just after “Che” Guevara’s capture and cutting off the revolutionary’s hands after his execution. Posada Carriles, a member of Brigade 2506, does not participate in the landing, though he does in its organization and in logistical support from the United States. The reason? “Bambi” was recruited by the CIA, and also worked for the FBI, as he admitted to the New York Times in July 1998.

       

1961 to 1967: Posada, aside from raising suspicions of his involvement in the Kennedy assassination, receives military training in explosives and other skills at Fort Benning (later home to the School of the Americas), where he graduated with the rank of lieutenant. He, in turn, goes on to train anti-Castro mercenaries and dedicates himself to various terrorist operations while the CIA provides him a salary. Cuban exile leader Jorge Mas Canosa occasionally finances his activities, as declassified FBI documents have now shown. He operates during these years out of other Latin American counties, such as Mexico and Guatemala.

       

1967 to 1975: The CIA taps him to work with the General Directorship of the Venezuelan Police, and then later with that county’s intelligence service, the DISIP. From Caracas, until 1975, he works in the service of several intelligence agencies, always as a high-ranking DISIP official. He also has time to help organize torture sessions of Venezuelan guerrillas during this period. At this point in his career, according to the declassified CIA documents, Posada Carriles seems to have begun worrying his bosses with his extreme propensity for violence. From then on, his “actions” are no longer openly linked to the CIA and U.S. government (though this is merely because there are still not enough documents available to prove it).

       

1976: The key year in Luis Posada Carriles’ terrorist career.

  • October 6: A plane from the Cuban airline Cubana de Aviación explodes in mid-air, just off the coast of Barbados. Seventy-three people die, among them several Latin American students and a Cuban sports club. Luis Posada Carriles and his partner in the Committee of United Counterrevolutionary Organizations (CORU in its Spanish initials), Orlando Bosch, according to multiple documents, had planned the attack. For this reason, Bosch and Posada are both imprisoned in Venezuela that same year, Posada escaping in 1985. Bosch is today based in Miami (the senior George Bush having pardoned him and granted him amnesty from pending terrorism charges in the United States, these resulting from the bombing of a Polish ship in 1972).

  • But earlier, in May of that year, in Bonao, Posada was present in the Dominican Republic, putting together a plan “to overthrow the Castro regime” in the company of Orlando Bosch and other anti-Castro Cubans. Among the actions they agreed on was that year’s September 21st assassination of Chilean dissident and former defense minister Orlando Letelier in Washington, D.C. Posada, according to statements from Augusto Pinochet’s former intelligence chief Manuel Contreras, was the one who led the meeting and planned the assassination.
       

This made-in-the-USA jewel of international terrorism then spends nearly nine years in the shadows, in reality living like a king (protected by Venezuelan police and intelligence officials)... until the night of August 18, 1985, when, draped in a black leather jacket, he walks out the door of the prison where he was staying in Caracas. He has new tasks to carry out for the United States government.

       

1985: After his “graceful flight” from Venezuela, via Aruba and Costa Rica, Luis Posada Carriles arrives in El Salvador, just in time for the climax of the counterinsurgency war in that country, and just as the Regan administration’s most brutal monstrosity, the Nicaraguan “contra” war, is really beginning to take off. There his old comrade in arms, Félix Rodríguez, awaits him. As the U.S. Congress had prohibited further funding for the contras, a terrorist group fighting against Nicaragua’s Sandinista government, Posada and Rodríguez had to work extra to obtain guns… under the orders of the mind behind all of this: Oliver North. Yes, Posada Carriles, operating from the Salvadoran Ilopango military base, formed part of the group that gave rise to the famous Iran-Contra case.

       

With the Irangate scandal heating up, in October 1986 Posada begins working on a variety of projects that will take him through the next fourteen years. He works with the Salvadoran police to capture and torture members of the Farabundo Martí National Liberation Front (FMLN), and does similar work in Guatemala. He allies himself with the Cuban-American National Foundation, presided over at that time by its founder Jorge Mas Canosa, to create the foundation’s “security commission.” This commission was a terrorist group that has continued to carry out violent attacks, including a failed assassination attempt against Fidel Castro in Cartagena, Colombia, in 1994. That same year, the dangerous agent dedicated himself to the task of publishing a book entitled El camino del guerrero (“The Path of the Warrior”), in which he declares himself “active” once again. (As a CIA agent? As a terrorist? Or as both?)

       

2000: Posada enters Panama on November 5 with a false passport. On the 17th of that month he is arrested together with three of his accomplices (one of them their Panamanian chauffeur) before trying to assassinate Fidel Castro, for at least the fourth time since 1959. “Bambi” goes back to jail in Panama for another three years and a few months… until then-president Mireya Moscoso pardons him on August 26, 2004, the day before she leaves office.

       

Posada and his henchmen were sent to the United States by plane, courtesy of Moscoso, but “Bambi” got off in Honduras and took a long tour of Central America and Mexico, by land, sea, and plane, until he finally arrived in Miami… where he was arrested on May 17, as we said earlier (see Al Giordano’s report of today for more details.) This señor, with his angelic face, is without a doubt the most soulless terrorist of our times: he has killed and tortured in Venezuela, Guatemala, El Salvador, Cuba, Argentina, Portugal, and in the United States. But for the moment, Washington is only pressing hypocritical charges of “illegal entry” into U.S. territory.



__________________
A TAINTED DEAL http://www.motherjones.com/politics/1998/06/tainted-deal

 LA DEA; Murder of Kiki Camarena http://www.laweekly.com/news/how-a-dogged-la-dea-agent-unraveled-the-cias-alleged-role-in-the-murder-of-kiki-camarena-5750278  

"Several informed sources have told me that an appendix to this Report was removed at the instruction of the DOJ at the last minute. This appendix is reported to have information about a CIA officer, not agent or asset, but officer, based in the LA Station, who was in charge of Contra related activities. According to these sources, this individual was associated with running drugs to South Central L.A., around 1988. Let me repeat that amazing omission. The recently released CIA Report Vol II contained an appendix, which was pulled by the DOJ, that reported a CIA officer in the LA Station was hooked into drug running in South Central Los Angeles." Maxine Waters Oct, 1998
https://fas.org/irp/congress/1998_cr/h981013-coke.htm   

0
maynard

Registered:
Posts: 1,192
Reply with quote  #108 
Notice how they didnt even cuff his hands!  Posada and his partners now live in the USA




click this link for the full series of 62 photos:

http://news.yahoo.com/photos/sm/events/wl/051105posadacarriles/p:1
Photo
AFP
Fri Jun 24,11:50 AM ET

A US immigration judge has postponed a bail hearing for Luis Posada Carriles, a hardline opponent of Cuban leader Fidel Castro seen here in May 2003. US authorities accuse Posada Carriles of illegally entering the United States through Mexico in March.(AFP/File)




Photo
Reuters
Tue Jun 21, 9:34 AM ET

Luis Posada Carriles is escorted by U.S. law enforcement officers to a golf cart to be driven to a helicopter at Miami's Krome detention center after being arrested by U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement officials in Miami, May 17, 2005. A U.S. judge has refused to move the request for asylum case of Cuban exile and Castro foe Luis Posada Carriles to a federal court in Florida from Texas. (Reuters - Handout)

Photo
Reuters
Mon Jun 20, 6:16 PM ET

Cuban-American Luis Posada Carriles gets out of car at a courthouse in Panama City, in this photo taken March 15, 2004. A U.S. judge has refused to move the request for asylum case of Cuban exile and Castro foe Luis Posada Carriles to a federal court in Florida from Texas. Posada, who is wanted in Venezuela for the 1976 bombing of a Cuban airliner, is being detained in El Paso, but asked to move his immigration case to Miami because his lawyer is based there. Photo by Alberto Lowe/Reuters

Photo

AFP
Fri Jun 10, 3:49 PM ET

Newly declassified US documents show that a terror suspect and former CIA asset in US custody, Luis Posada Carriles, said in 1976: 'We are going to hit a Cuban airplane' prior to the bombing of a Cubana flight off Barbados October 6 of the same year.(AFP/File/Teresita Chavarria)



__________________
A TAINTED DEAL http://www.motherjones.com/politics/1998/06/tainted-deal

 LA DEA; Murder of Kiki Camarena http://www.laweekly.com/news/how-a-dogged-la-dea-agent-unraveled-the-cias-alleged-role-in-the-murder-of-kiki-camarena-5750278  

"Several informed sources have told me that an appendix to this Report was removed at the instruction of the DOJ at the last minute. This appendix is reported to have information about a CIA officer, not agent or asset, but officer, based in the LA Station, who was in charge of Contra related activities. According to these sources, this individual was associated with running drugs to South Central L.A., around 1988. Let me repeat that amazing omission. The recently released CIA Report Vol II contained an appendix, which was pulled by the DOJ, that reported a CIA officer in the LA Station was hooked into drug running in South Central Los Angeles." Maxine Waters Oct, 1998
https://fas.org/irp/congress/1998_cr/h981013-coke.htm   

0
maynard

Registered:
Posts: 1,192
Reply with quote  #109 
This is a great article about the drugwar...from 1997. includes interview with former head of El Paso Intelligence Center (EPIC) Phil Jordan. Amado Carillo Fuentes was killed while undergoing plastic surgery to alter his appearance shortly after this article was written, July 4, 1997. His brother Vicente clawed his way to absolute power, overcoming all obstacles and defying the predictions of experts both in Mexico and the U.S. He now rules the Juarez Cartel to this day.

The Juarez Cartel remains the last major cartel to have suffered no major losses.



GQ magazine
April 1997

The Killer Across the River
By Charles Bowden


He may be the richest man who has ever walked the earth. He is a business
genius and a murdering sociopath. His income more than $10 billion per year
results from controlling the distribution of most of the cocaine that comes
into our country. He lives two miles from our southern border. His name is
Amado Carrillo Fuentes, and his story demonstrates that everything we've
been told about progress in the war on drugs is a lie.

Rocio Aguero Miranda went for a ride at about the same time the tiger broke
free. Juarez, check-by-jowl across the Rio Grande from El Paso, baked under
the sun, twisted in the withering winds and lost belief in rain. At 4:30
a.m. on July 20, 1996, two travel-all-type vehicles pulled up to a fine
house in one of the city's nicer districts. Fifteen men armed with AK-47s
got out. To the neighbors awake at that hour, they looked exactly like
federal police, right down to the black ski masks they sported. The large
dogs protecting the grounds backed off as the men entered. The maid fled
into the bathroom with Rocio's 8-week-old baby, and when the officers took
Rocio, 36 years old, she was wearing a bra and panties. Blood was found on
the
walls of her home. The maid's account was confused, and then, after a day or
so, she disappeared from the newspaper articles. The authorities said the
armed men were not really police but imposters. Next came something as
persistent as drought in the Mexican north: a vast silence. It was as if the
kidnapping had never occurred and an 8-week-old baby had not been left
wailing. No one in the media said who was suspected of this act.

Just about the same time, a tiger suddenly stalked the streets of the city.
Garrets has no public zoo, so officially the tiger's appearance was a
mystery. The beast was captured and supposedly sent to the state zoological
garden in the capital, Chihuahua. Across the river in the United States, in
El Paso, Garrets's sister city of 700,000, neither event received much
notice in the newspapers. Garrets, brooding on the border with around 2
Million souls, is the kind of place that does not exist for North Americans.
Nor does the man generally credited with offering Rocio Aguero Miranda a
ride and owning the tiger who broke free. His name is Amado Carrillo
Fuentes, and until very recently mention of him almost never occurred in the
newspapers of either city or on their radio or television. His primary
residence is in Garrets. In September 1995, when Ross Perot finished a
narcotics briefing at the Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA) intelligence
center buried in the bowels of El Paso's Fort Bliss, an agent took Perot to
the installation's parking lot and pointed toward Carrillo's house, a few
miles away, hunkered near the Rio Grande. Perot said in disbelief, " You
mean he's right there and we can't do anything?" No one is certain what
Carrillo looks like or how old he is or how well educated. Only four
photographs exist, and they are
nearly a decade old at best. What we know is that he heads a business that
earns a profit of $200 million a week, a number that spins out to more than
$10 billion a year. He does not advertise his business: he makes no stock
offerings, floats no junk bonds, seeks no government subsidies. He is
publicity shy. He has never experienced a strike or a boycott. He has been
the cause of hundreds of murders in Garrets in the past two to three years
but, of course, that is his carnage in only one city.

Like any transnational businessman, he mocks the boundaries of
nation-states. He controls the cocaine coming into Mexico, and this makes up
50 to 80 percent of the cocaine coming into the United States. He is a huge
part of Mexico's drug industry, an economic activity that, at minimum, earns
that country $30 billion a year in profits, a sum more than quadruple the
revenues from its largest export, oil, and a sum sufficient to service the
entire $160 billion government and private foreign debt.
Carrillo thrives because of the consent of the Mexican government. He gives
the police and the highest government officials an estimated $500 million to
$800 million a year for protection. And he thrives with the knowledge and
tolerance of the United States government, though officially Washington
wants him on a drug-trafficking charges in Dallas and Miami. In Mexico he is
known as El Senor de los Cielos, " the Lord of the Skies," perhaps because
he is the silent owner of the largest charter-jet service in Latin America
and because he moves his coke from Columbia in ten-to fifteen-ton lots in
727s, which land at Mexican airports and are unloaded by the federal police.
In the United States, you have never heard of him until February, when his
profile was suddenly raised: It turns out that Carrillo had in his employ
the Mexican government's drug czar, General
Jesus Gutierrez Rebollo. As a result, after decades of massive Mexican
participation in drug trafficking, the Clinton administration and our
newspapers of record suddenly acknowledged that there was a problem. And
they gave that problem a name: Amado Carrillo Fuentes. But Carrillo is only
the current manifestation of a major, long-term problem called Mexico.

Here is the gist of the problem: We can't stop drugs from entering the
United States, because our border with Mexico is the most heavily crossed
one on earth and, at 1,995 miles in length, unpoliceable. We can't stop
Mexicans from illegally entering the United States, because that nation is
poor , overpopulated and growing, and if the poor do not come north, Mexico
implodes. We can't force the Mexican government to seriously crack down on
the drug trade, because the country is dependent on drug money for its
survival.. And we can't stop money laundering or the transfer of billions of
narco-dollars back and forth across the border because of the North American
Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) and because of the sheer velocity of modern
capital flows. And we can't discuss any of these matters, because for years
both parties have made it an act of faith that the war on drugs, the 1986
Immigration Reform Bill, NAFTA and a steel wall here and there on the border
are taking care of the problem. And you cannot believe what I have just
written, because, well, you haven't read it before. We're left with a very
strange world where a man we'd never heard of makes more than General Motors
and where a man we cannot officially find lives in plain view of our largest
drug-intelligence center.

I first encountered Carrillo's name at the drunken wedding of a
narcotraficante in May 1993. The groom had a warm smile, and I became the
court historian of his fiesta. I was leaning against a wall, drinking a
Tecate on the second or third day of a five day bender, when a Mexican
friend whispered three words: Amado Carrillo Fuentes," and then added,
"never repeat this name out loud." The groom had just come from a meeting
with Carrillo in Mexico City. I recall clearly that when the man mentioned
his name the parrots in a nearby cage screamed. Carrillo is a kind of
management genius. Just about the time Ross Perot stood in the parking lot
at Fort Bliss and stared in disbelief toward Carrillo’s mansion across the
river in Garrets, El Senor appeared in one of that city's most favored and
public venues for a meeting with the local head of the Mexican federal
police. When Carrillo arrived for his social belt with the authorities, he
naturally came with his customary bodyguards: twelve federal police. The
public appearance was simply to show he was still in charge. To survive in
the drug world, one must make a public appearance from time to time, a
reality understood by monarchs everywhere.
His story is not simply a tale of Mexican corruption. He is also a creation
of the United States. What I mean is simple: We tolerate the drug world
because a serious attack on it would destroy the economy of Mexico and the
stability of its government, and by this tolerance we make an Amado Carrillo
Fuentes inevitable. His real, singular achievement is that he is far better
at his job than we could have imagined in our worst nightmares. According to
U.S. intelligence and to the man who was in charge of Mexico's
drug-enforcement effort for a year and a half under president Carlos Salinas
Gortari, Carrillo has organized the
various gangs and cartels of Mexico into a business federation, much as the
five families in New York once found that peace was good for business. He is
the managerial talent who was inevitable, and now he has arrived.
Periodically, the U.S. government leans on the Mexican government and the
Mexicans offer us a prize, such as the deportation of Juan Garcia Abrego,
the head of the Gulf cartel, in early 1996. But such arrests do not change
the drug world; they merely create an opening in top management. So for the
moment, Amado Carrillo Fuentes flourishes, and he is probably one of the
richest men who has ever walked on this earth. Amado Carrillo is our guy,
and we don't know what to make of him. Rocio Aguero
Miranda can answer that question. No doubt the tiger can also. Now it is our
turn.

I carry a coded number I am to use to reach the agent. He will get back to
me that is the way it must be done. He is a DEA agent, and we rendezvous in
a saloon. He heads instinctively for a chair under a purring television. Our
talk must always be drowned out. He sits with his back to the wall you can
never be too careful. His eyes never cease scanning the room you must never
feel safe. He puts a leather pouch on the table in front of him the gun must
always be within reach. He speaks softly and when he says something he
considers confidential, he unconsciously speaks out of the corner of his
mouth. He has been with Carrillo in the past. And that is why I am talking
with him. Despite the $15 billion we throw at the war on drugs each
year, despite the massive police presence we have created to battle drugs,
we have very little information from people who have spent time with Amado
Carrillo. He lives barricaded behind family members, and he kills anyone who
arouses his suspicion. We drink light beers as we talk blood, and I brush my
fingers against the dark wood of the tabletop as the agent's purrs next to
me. There are things he and I both know, details our government has
collected. Carrillo sometimes disappears into coke and freebasing. When he
parties, he'll rent a floor or two at a hotel and invite a crowd, and nobody
leaves until he does and he may roar for five or six days straight. He likes
to fuck American beauty queens and is no doubt grateful that we
have fifty states.

ALL this the agent and I skip over lightly, like the notes of a familiar
piano composition. Amado (the name means "loved one") was born in !950, 1954
or 1955 to a dirt poor farmer in Sinaloa. He was one of eight or nine
children, according to his mother. He was formed in and by a geographic
triangle where the states of Chihuahua, Sinaloa and Durango meet, an area
American narcs call Jurassic Park. His uncle, Ernesto Rafael Fonseca
Carrillo, known as Don Neto, was A key figure in the drug cartel based in
Culiacan and Guadalajara. In the '70s, Don Neto sent his nephew to tend a
marijuana field in Zacatecas. The young Amado was successful at agriculture,
so next his uncle sent him to Ojinaga, Chihuahua, a mere dot on the Texas
border, to work with a man called Pablo Acosta Villarreal. Acosta was a
charismatic wizard at dope smuggling, and for a short while in the '80s
Ojinaga became the major bridge between the coke laboratories of Columbia
and the noses of North Americans.

Carrillo thrived as Acostas lieutenant; he built a church in the community.
He and Acosta whiled away hours freebasing. He gave Acosta a gold Rolex
watch and a small gold ingot, which his boss wore around his neck. In April
1987, choppers took off from Fort Bliss, Texas, ferrying FBI agents and
Mexican federal police to Acostas hideout across the Rio Grande from Big
Bend National Park. The troop was led by Comandante Guillermo Calderoni, a
sophisticated man who spoke French and English and the most renowned
enforcer in the employ of the Mexican government. Pablo Acosta, wearing his
little gold ingot, was slaughtered, Amado Carrillo had earlier departed with
Acosta's Columbian connections etched in his head. American intelligence now
believes Carrillo paid the comandante $1 million to perform the operation.
The FBI took credit for wiping out Acosta, the American press headlined
another victory in the war on drugs, and the drug business continues to
thrive. And nobody paid much attention to this punk named Amado Carrillo.

Next he popped up in Torreon, Coahuila, working with the Herrera
organization, a family business based in Durango that provides heroin,
marijuana and cocaine and that had deep Columbian connections. The Herreras
had a lock on drugs in Chicago and Buffalo. The organization totaled more
than 3,000 members (at the time, a force greater than all of DEA), and
almost everyone in the outfit was kin. That was the point, in 1987, when the
agent talking to me in the bar entered Carrillo's life. He and his colleague
had been trailing Carrillo for two and a half weeks in Mexico. "We're after
Jaime Herrera," he says with a smirk. "This punk [Carrillo] didn't have
shit. Jaime had the Colombians. We asked ourselves, "who the fuck is this
fat fucker?" In part Carrillo turned out to be the owner of a one-story
house where he lived and which also functioned as a stash pad. One night
they were watching the house. Three women came out with kids, got in a car
and left. OK. that doesn't matter. Then three guys came out and got in a
truck. This does matter. Carrillo also came out and drove away by himself,
but, fuck him, he's nothing. They followed the men in the pickup. The U.S.
agents were accompanying Comandante Calderoni and his team of federales. The
truck was pulled over, and a federale walked up to the driver's side. He was
immediately killed by a blast from the driver's AK-47. Another federale
crept up undetected on the other side of the truck. He capped two of the
occupants with a .45 . The driver took off running. Calderoni's assistant
dropped the man with a .45 . When they rolled him over, they discovered he
was the local army commander, there for his payment. Then they all went for
Jaime Herrera, the custodian of Columbian connections in the Mexican drug
world, and busted him.

Carrillo once again escaped. In those few months of 1987, Carrillo managed
to make two great Rivals disappear, and he scampered off with their
Rolodexes to the Columbian cartels. The rest is arithmetic.
Carrillo, in his quiet, nondescript way, advanced through this world of
violence and deception. There were bumps in the road: one of his brothers is
said to have committed suicide in Sonora in 1989. The DEA notes this suicide
was accomplished with fifteen or so rounds from an AK-47 into his mouth. It
is said that at his wedding in the late '80s, Carrillo lost his temper and
slaughtered a relative. In 1989 he was arrested and briefly detained in
Guadalajara on a minor weapons charge and lost a million dollar mansion when
the government confiscated it. Sometime in the early '90s , Carrillo showed
up in Garrets, a city nominally under the command of Rafael Aguilar
Guajardo, a former Mexican official in internal security who had married
into a fine family, built a hotel and given it his wife's name. It was a
place where, it is said, he maintained a torture chamber for moments of
leisure. Aguilar owned the Shah of Iran's former estate
in Acapulco, plus $800 million more in gewgaws. He was murdered in Cancun in
April 1993, on a day when his bodyguard happened to skip work. The same
bodyguard subsequently showed up in Carrillo's employ, and the DEA assumes
Carrillo was behind the killing, for Garrets is now his.

In November 1993, while Carrillo and his wife and children dined in a fancy
Mexico city restaurant, gunmen entered and raked the place with
automatic-weapons fire. Carrillo and his family dove under the table, but
several of his people perished , including his number two man, who was
sitting next to him. The DEA believes he survived because none of the
killers knew what he looked like. As the gunmen fled the place, a cop tried
to stop the car. They ran him over. Carrillo stormed out of the restaurant
and pumped the downed officer full of rounds. No one has gotten close to him
since that date. Where earlier drug leaders Acostaa in Ojinaga; Caro
Quintero in Sonora, Sinaloa and Guadalajara; Aguilar in Garrets sought fame
and press clippings, Carrillo seeks the shadows. He no longer carries a gun.
He owns banks, television stations, newspapers, this and that. And though
the man is unrecognizable, he does have one signature flourish. When he
loses a load, he has everyone connected with that load killed to make sure
he gets the weak link, the snitch. I asked the DEA agent I'm drinking with
what one thing I should know about Amado Carrillo.
Everybody wants to be ruthless," he finally responds," but Carrillo has the
balls to be ruthless."

In October 1996, an odd thing happened. El Paso has a relatively low
homicide rate because it has been the local custom to take people into
Garrets, where their slaughter will attract little attention. But there were
signals that this decorum was coming to an end. There was an unseemly
contract on a DEA agent stationed inside the United States. Then an American
electronics and communications expert who was doing some consulting in
Garrets (and was also believed to be handling a few chores for the American
agencies) disappeared, along with his wife. Then, in late September, an El
Paso stash house with more than two tons
of coke was discovered by American authorities. It was Carrillo's, and the
coke was awaiting sale through his people in Albuquerque, New Mexico.
Shortly After that, the odd thing happened, the bad moment at El Kumbala. El
Kumbala is a working-class bar in El Paso. In early October, some guys
drilled five guys in the chest there. A number of them from Alberquerque,
with alleged narcotics connections. What was striking about these
assassinations was that they could easily have been done out in the big
emptiness of the West Texas desert and no one would have been the wiser.
Someone wanted the act known, just as someone wanted the DEA to know that it
was no longer immune and just as someone wanted the American intelligence
world to know that its electronic snoops were no longer welcome. Someone
clearly no longer gave a fuck about making waves or drawing attention.

The man is trying to explain something simple to me: why the government of
the United States ignores the fact that Mexico is collapsing, that
narco-dollars are propping up its staggering economy, why illegal
immigration will grow, and why no major party or official in the United
States will talk about it. His voice is even, his words exact. He says, "
We're like a deer paralyzed in the headlights. Mexico is our biggest
foreign-policy problem, but no one has a solution to it. It begins with a
political problem: The last three presidents of the United States have sold
us on the proposition that Mexico is a developed, stable country and the way
we should relate to it is by opening our borders and developing trade. Now
they find it difficult to come back and describe the reality. The reality of
the moment is, serious questions as to whether democracy even exists in
Mexico; the question of corruption going to the very top of the government;
that we have a next-door neighbor whose principal export is narcotics. Once
you accept the problem, you wind up saying that you can't do anything about
it. You can't solve it."

His name is Jack A. Blum, and he is one of the uncelebrated people who make
Congress hum and hearings happen. He worked with the Senate Judiciary
Committee 1965 to 1972, and with William Fulbright at the Senate Foreign
Relations Committee from 1972 to 1976, and then returned for another bout at
Foreign Relations from 1987 to 1989; he ran the committee's hearings on
drug-law enforcement and foreign policy, which meant Manuel Noriega, the
Contra War and the flood of dope coursing through each. Since then he has
had a private Washington law practice specializing in ferreting out money
laundering and has been a consultant on laundering for various clients,
including the government of Columbia. For him Amado Carrillo Fuentes is the
current name on a long-term condition. Blum is a harsh critic of U.S. policy
and a passionate defender of U.S. policy makers: " What do you do? What is
the solution? Every time you want to criticize someone in the government for
not acting, the question is, OK, smart guy, what would you do?"
Mexico's drug economy is untouchable because it runs $30 billion a year
("conservatively," Blum notes) into a cash-short nation. Intervening in
Mexican politics by demanding action against the drug cartels blows up in
our faces and fuels Mexican nationalism. Money laundering cannot really be
contained because the same avenues used by criminal organizations are used
and protected by U.S. corporations for tax evasion.
He rolls on and on, ticking off forgotten efforts, as when during Richard
Nixon's administration the border was shut for sixteen days and all hell
broke loose because of the economic losses; and the spraying program of the
'80s, when CIA reports allegedly revealed that the Mexican government's drug
eradication program was using U.S. helicopters to spray fertilizer instead
of herbicide on fields of marijuana, which kept getting greener and bigger.
" We are married to Mexico," he finally explains. "You can't sever a head
from a body." His account of the seeming hopelessness is like a tonic for my
system. One of the experiences of trying to explain the drug economy is that
everyone you talk to acts as if you are crazy or, in Blum's words, " from
Mars." He remembers drinking with DEA agents in Florida when he was
investigating Noriega and marveling that they could still risk their lives
in a cause that was "hopeless."
"All the options are bad," he states flatly. "Everything you want to do
doesn't work. How do you live in a world like that?" His words are familiar
to me. And his question how do you live in a world like that? feels like a
slap in the face. Since, that is precisely the world we do live in.

Two poor boys were walking along the sewage canal in Garrets on July
30,1996, when they saw a barrel floating in the filth. They thought, We can
fish that barrel out and sell it for a few dollars. So they fished it out.
When they pried off the lid, a leg floated up. The police arrived and poked
the fifty gallons of acid with poles. Rocio Aguero Miranda was finally
identified by her surgeon from the registration numbers on her breast
implants. A day later, the physician had second thoughts and recanted his
identification. She was a successful woman who had allegedly done some drug
deals and taken a professional car thief and killer as a lover. In the fall
of 1995, Rocio leased nice quarters for nightclub, a place she named "Top
Capos", "Top Bosses." The children of the rich came to the club to buy
drugs, and on the weekend Rocio had major entertainers up from Mexico City
at a reported $20,000 to $30,000 a night. Things began to go bad on May 3,
1996, when her two key employees, one the father of her unborn child, were
kidnapped. Their bodies turned up a day later, tortured, bound hand and foot
and bleeding from the anus. She closed the club, went off, had the baby and
returned. Then she was kidnapped on July 20, only to reappear on July 30 in
fifty gallons of acid. In the spring of 1996, the DEA had shared the names
of some of its informants with Mexican Authorities. the list had evidently
made it to Carrillo. No one in the DEA officially places Rocio's name on
this list or officially denies that it was there. For months executions
clogged the streets of Garrets, and by August somewhere between forty and
sixty people had been dispatched. Sometimes the bodies would be found bound
with gray tape, the heads wrapped in bandages or gauze, with paper stuffed
in their mouths. Sometimes a cheap wall tapestry of, say, a tiger would be
draped over the face. Styles change. For a while a few years ago, Carrillo
was having the bodies of informants tied up with yellow ribbon and a bow.
There is an attitude that what happens over there does not concern people
over here. I travel a lot, and you can go to any small town anywhere in the
United States and find drugs. Our banking system slops over with
inexplicable money $50 million to $70 million a month in El Paso, $3 billion
a year in Dallas, and so forth. It is an article of faith that the United
States is immune to Mexican corruption. It is not our thing. Every day of
the year, there is enough cocaine stored in northern Mexico to supply a line
for every man, woman and child on earth. It all comes here. We are 5 percent
of the planet's population and consume 50%
of the planets illicit drugs. I remember standing in El Paso and looking
across the river at Carrillo's house with a DEA agent who said to himself as
much as to me, " He's sitting over there laughing at us." On another day,
I'm standing with a big official in the DEA and looking out at Mexico from
El Paso. Garrets's international airport lurks in the dust smudge of the
horizon. I say, " You know, Carrillo has a compound at the airport, and he's
landing full-body jets full of coke. The federales have a compound there
also and help unload the planes." The man stares ahead and says without
looking at me: You think I don't know that?"
I've become a bit petulant about secret agents nodding yes, then shrugging
about matters of state. I'm losing my tolerance for talk of drug lords, as
if these men were some kind of new gentry. I'm sick of official government
analysis of the state of the Mexican economy and of our own that never
mention drug money. Imagine a business in the United States that generates
tens of billions of dollars a year in profits. Now imagine that this
business has no hand in our banks, owns no one in Congress, influences no
policies. Imagine it simply operates largely out of sight and never touches
your life or mine and never exercises any
power except in its own dank corners of the world. Oh yes, one more thing
you must master. Every time some awkward moment occurs a particular horrific
killing or embarrassment in the banking community occasioned by the brother
of the president of a neighboring country or a foreign official who seems
swell but turns out to be deep into the drug world you must sigh and say,"
Well, yes, there are exceptions, but look at the big picture." We can do it.
We've been doing it for a long time.


(Continued)



__________________
A TAINTED DEAL http://www.motherjones.com/politics/1998/06/tainted-deal

 LA DEA; Murder of Kiki Camarena http://www.laweekly.com/news/how-a-dogged-la-dea-agent-unraveled-the-cias-alleged-role-in-the-murder-of-kiki-camarena-5750278  

"Several informed sources have told me that an appendix to this Report was removed at the instruction of the DOJ at the last minute. This appendix is reported to have information about a CIA officer, not agent or asset, but officer, based in the LA Station, who was in charge of Contra related activities. According to these sources, this individual was associated with running drugs to South Central L.A., around 1988. Let me repeat that amazing omission. The recently released CIA Report Vol II contained an appendix, which was pulled by the DOJ, that reported a CIA officer in the LA Station was hooked into drug running in South Central Los Angeles." Maxine Waters Oct, 1998
https://fas.org/irp/congress/1998_cr/h981013-coke.htm   

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maynard

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Reply with quote  #110 
(continued)




Phil Jorden knows the big picture. Phil Jorden gave thirty years to DEA,
rose from the streets to a top position in the bureaucracy: head of the El
Paso Intelligence Center (EPIC). the DEA's 350-agent bunker, gathering dope
secrets from around the world. He made his early bones in the '70s, doing
raids with Comandante Calderoni in Mexico. He has watched the gangs mutate
into cartels and the cartels fuse into the machine they call the Federation,
which is largely dominated by Amado Carrillo Fuentes.
On January 20, 1995, Jorden's brother Bruno, 27 years old, was murdered
during a carjacking in the parking lot of an El Paso K-Mart about two miles
from the barrio home where he and Phil had been raised. this was the first
carjacking death in the history of El Paso. Two days later, Jorden
officially took over command of EPIC. To this day, Jorden tortures himself
over whether Amado Carrillo orchestrated his brother's death. He is a large
man, a former college basketball star, who seems invisible. He is a quick
study who likes to appear befuddled. He is the man you never notice until he
slaps the cuffs on you. And he is a man with his brother's blood pooled
around his life. In January 1996, he retired, and he now runs a
private-security venture in Dallas. But he cannot leave the drug world any
more than he can he can escape the crack of the nine-millimeter cutting down
his brother in the K-MART parking lot. I have talked long with Phil Jordan.
I have wandered the tomb of EPIC, peered down at the room full of computer
monitors
churning endlessly through the intelligence files of the DEA, the CIA, the
FBI, the IRS and the Department of Defense and the narcotics reports of
twenty nations. I've heard Jordan tell of briefing Attorney General Janet
Reno, Senator Phil Gramm, Ross Perot and other visiting firemen. I've looked
out with him at Amado Carrillo Fuentes's house and practically heard his
teeth grind I've sat late at night with his aged father while the old man
explained how he would gladly go to prison for it, listened to this flat
statement of the hunger of vengeance as we sat in the family home not far
from thee Rio Grande and a few miles from where Amado Carrillo likely sat
and talked at that very moment. I have seen Phil Jordan enter rooms and
dominate them with a natural air of authority and the confidence of a star
athlete. But I have not seen any movement on the murder of his brother or
any ability to force the U.S. government to act. I have heard him snap at me
when I asked him why the DEA does not say what it knows about Carrillo,
about his brothers murder, about the war on drugs " They've told us not to
talk." By "they" he means the executive branch of the United States
government.
And I have to wonder: If a man of such force and a man with a brother's
blood splattered across his conscience can not act, who will and who can? So
I know this man who knows more than I do, and I know this man who said in
court that his brother's murder killed his whole family, and I know this man
who leaned over his brother's open casket and said before his family, "
Bruno, I promise I'll get whoever
did this to you." And I know that just across the muddy river a man is
making at least $10 billion a year, and no one and nothing stops him. And I
have sat in the house of Phil Jordan"s parents in the barrio by the river in
El Paso and listened helplessly as his mother wept. And I know that when
Bill Cosby's son was murdered in January, a local television crew descended
on Phil Jordan's parents who also had lost a son in an apparently
meaningless death.
And I know that making death meaningless is a way to make us all feel safe.
It takes time for him to open the door, what with the lock, the chain, the
dead bolts, all securing his entryway. Finally, the door swings open to the
night, and he appears, shirtless, a generous beer gut spilling over his
belt, and waves us inside. A red sign with a circle and a slash is fastened
to the door of the downstairs bathroom: NO FIREARMS PERMITTED IN THIS
ESTABLISHMENT. Evidently, even in exile, Eduardo Valle has kept a sense of
humor. He is finishing a bottle of Jack Daniel's, smoking Camel filters and,
a traditionalist at heart,
using a Zippo lighter. He looks to be around 50, has a grizzled three-day
beard, a black shock of hair and the trademark glasses that when he was a
boy earned him the nickname El Buho, "the owl."

Eduardo Valle, El Buho, is a survivor of the night of October 2, 1968. That
evening 10,000 students gathered in a square in Mexico city to hear speeches
in favor of democracy and human rights. The Mexican
army opened fire and killed at least 325 of them. Ten days later, the
Olympic games opened, and Mexico City and the world acted as if nothing had
happened. El Buho was a leader of the protest and got out of
prison two and a half years later. In the early '90s, after a career in
journalism, he was made the special advisor to two successive Mexican
attorneys general, a post from which he commanded an elite counter-narcotics
force and read all the secret reports on drugs and the capos created by his
government and ours. In 1994 he fled Mexico with documents that spell out
the ties between the government of President Carlos Salinas and the drug
capos and the cartels in Mexico. At that time as Salinas' six-year term was
ending, the American government was trying to peddle Salinas as its
candidate to head the World Trade Organization, the Vatican of global free
trade. Imagine the U.S. drug czar Barry McCaffrey fleeing the country and
proclaiming that our president was in cahoots with drug cartels and you get
the feel of El Buho's situation.

El Buho is the living body through which the violence of Carrillo, the
corruption of the Salinas presidency and the impotence of U.S. policy have
coursed. He is the man who has seen the connection between the drug world
and the official world and lived to tell the tale. El Buho and Carlos
Salinas go back a long way. They met in 1966, when both were studying
economics in Mexico City. Salinas was the scion of a wealthy and powerful
family; his father was a member of the president's cabinet in the '60s. Back
in their students
days, Salinas was marginal in El Buho's circle, a small, intense man plowing
through Mao Tse-tung, the architects of the budding European Community and
the theorists of American free trade. To El Buho, Salinas was a man " with
a dark face."
When Salinas became president in 1988,El Buho met with him as a leader of
the journalists' union. This was all very normal. Mexico is a nation of 100
million ruled by a small and incestuous set of the educated and the rich and
the powerful. In 1992, when Salinas was four years into his term, he had to
placate the United States if he was to ensure the success of NAFTA, and
drugs were always an official flash point in dealing with the gringos. So
he placed El Buho, A dissident known to be independent of the government, in
the Mexican justice department and put in charge of fighting drug
traffickers but warned him, El Buho recalls, that he wanted " no
adventures."

Much like the DEA, El Buho largely ignored Amado Carrillo at first. He
focused on other men who he believed were more important. El Buho targeted
the Gulf cartel, then headed by Juan Garcia Abrego, a man who had amassed
$15 billion moving cocaine from Columbia to the United States through the
northeast sector of Mexico, the home ground of the Salinas family. At that
time, Carrillo was a blip on El Buho's radar screen. El Buho's second
research he kept to himself: the investigation of La familia Salinas.
In the matter of Juan Garcia Abrego, who was on the FBI's Most Wanted List,
President Salinas thwarted all of Buho's efforts to capture him. The bribe
offers from drug traffickers came to El Buho quickly $2 million to release
an Abrego brother-in-law from prison, then $400,000 " for a little, little,
little man. For a nothing." Documents crossed El Buho's desk showing that
Abrego was often in the United States, that the FBI and the DEA knew when he
was there and where, and that they did nothing. "You think your government
didn't know? " El Buho asks. I am not surprised. DEA agents had told me of
staking out Abrego in Chicago and other places and then doing nothing.
Abrego had been wanted on U.S. warrents since 1989. But then agents have
also told me that Carrillo comes and goes in the United States. Once, I told
them I had stood in front of a house in the United States while Carrillo
was staying there. They didn't ask for the address. They simply said,
"Doesn't sound surprising." El Buho arrested a bunch of Abrego's smaller
capos, but what he really relished was his research into the Salinas family.
He found the president's chief of staff and the man's beautiful lover
functioning as the Salinas administration's connection to the Colombian
cartels. he discovered the president's brother hobnobbing with Abrego. He
saw a Salinas cabinet studded with men known to have narcotics links going
back to the previous presidency of Miguel de la Madrid. (In 1982 the Mexican
economy collapsed, and it was widely believed in Mexico that de la Madrid
cut a deal with the narcotrafficantes to bail the nation out. Carlos Salinas
was de la Madrid's fair-haired boy, and in the eyes of many Mexicans he took
over real control of the country beginning in 1985. " De la Madrid," El Buho
says," took the drug money for his country Salinas took the drug money for
himself.")

We have been talking for hours now, shifting to beer and then wine. El Buho
is on a roll. "A week or ten days before I crossed the border in June of
1994," he explains, "the press adviser to Salinas tells me to come to Los
Pinos. I go, and he asks, 'Buho, what's happening with your life?" "I say,
'I have my notes."
The adviser replied by handing him a book, Chronicles of the Dead. El Buho
said," Thank you." He under-
stood the warning: They are going to kill you. "I began to move fast then,
rapidly, rapidly, rapidly," he remembers. "I drove during the day and made
it to the border in eleven hours."
Now El Buho lives by his wits a column he faxes to a Mexican newspaper and a
book he publishes in Spanish that is stuffed with revelations of government
corruption and which sold 65,000 copies in Mexico, a very big sale.
Meanwhile, Amado Carrillo, El Buho, notes, has not been wasting time. El
Senor de los Cielos has expanded his reach beyond Colombia, into Peru,
Bolivia and Equador. He has recently begun to handle Golden Triangle heroin
from Asia. And for the last few years, the man with free access to Mexico's
international airports has been trying to reduce the combat of the drug
world. Just before he left Mexico, El Buho learned that Carrillo had hosted
a meeting of all the major capos. It took place in Puerto Morales, Oaxaca,
in June 1994. A second meeting took place near Cuernavaca that November. His
policy proposal was simple: Carrillo would import the drugs and wholesale
them to anyone who wanted to move them into the United States. To hell with
this fighting and killing over territory, to this old-fashioned vertical
structure with soldiers, chiefs, branch offices and the like. Amigos, we're
going to downsize, get lean and mean, be flexible. Carrillo would retain his
retail here, his routes there, but he was shifting into a higher sphere. It
was a reasonable plan.

I have seen organizational charts of this new beast of commerce, which the
US agencies call the federation, and I have had them explained to me, at
length, by DEA analysts. I have gone over the endless nuances
of this structure how it is not like G.M. or the Pentagon, how it is more
fluid and how it almost always wins. It is like Mexico itself, an apparent
shambles it does not die and, despite our disbelief keeps going.

Even as an outcast, a man on the run from a date with his own violent death,
El Buho is not tough enough to be cynical. The rebel of '68 who did two and
half still casts off flickers of hope in the room full of cigarette smoke.
El Buho survived the night the Mexican Government machined gunned hundreds
of students in a public square in Mexico City, and then he disappeared into
the secret jails of the rulers.
His mother used all her family connections and found him two weeks later
stumbling down a staircase "like a mole," she later recalled. El Buho had
been beaten almost to death. Naturally, his glasses had perished in the
experience, so he blindly staggered toward his Mother guided by a voice, and
she looked into a face she could hardly recognize and believe he was her son
only when she heard his voice. I keep this moment in my mind when I listen
to El Buho, because deep within his hustle and his loud talk and a sense of
drama, there is this man who saw the naked face of power and survived and
who carries that memory with him always as a bleeding wound.

"The shit" El Buho suddenly roars, "is not only in Mexico; the shit is in
the US too. We need respect for the US we need, both of us, for the shit to
be the light. "If you don't clean the shit you eat the shit".

Later, as I prepared to leave, El Buho says, Almost by way of apology, "It's
a dirty world. I'm sorry." I have lived in two worlds for several years. One
world goes like this: In 1993 the Economist calls Carlos Salinas "one of the
great men of the twentieth century" Time Magazine had him as one of the five
finalist for "man of the year" in 1992. Henry Kissinger, in 1993, wrote that
Salinas "quelled corruption and brought into office and extraordinary group
of young, highly trained technocrats. I know of no government anywhere that
is more competent"

The other world I live in goes like this: In the election for the President
of Mexico in 1994, the one anointed by American observers, and celebrated by
the American government as the cleanest ever, the one that elected Ernest
Zedillo a man hailed by President Clinton as a reformer, (all Mexican
Presidents are reformers to American Presidents), there was a new twist in
campaign financing. Beginning in 1993, and allegedly at the direction of
President Carlos Salinas, fifty secret bank accounts were set up around
Mexico. Accounts were slush funds for the candidates of the ruling party.
The fifty secret bank accounts were nourished by drug cartels in Columbia
and Mexico, and when the election falderal ended in late August, 1994, as
much as three-quarters of a billion had cascaded through the slush fund. In
early 1996, Alvaro Cepeda Neri, a Mexican lawyer and civil rights advocate,
published an account of the buying of the election. In May of that year, he
was severely beaten and hospitalized.

I have a photograph of the first world, the official world. It's of
President Clinton at the El Paso airport. During the tail end of his recent
presidential campaign. He was in the city for 17 and 1/2 minutes. He
expressed his friendship for the Mexican people. And he did tackle drugs. He
said we have to marshal our forces against the enemy: the tobacco interests.
The other world I have lived in goes like this: I'm am in a rooms with
government analysts, and they say I cannot mention their names. They foist
an analysis on me so that the drug world will have the look of order and
reason. They sketch this beast in Mexico called the Federation. A thing
pouring at least $30 Billion dollars of profit into Mexico. ($10 Billion
more than the U.S. gave in 1995 to bail out the collapsing Mexican economy).
They say it is invincible, but they do not say where all the money goes. I
sit with one analyst who has spent nearly two decades devouring everything
thing there is to know about the Mexican drug war. For an hour or two, he
talks on a global scale, for all that cash being used to buy up industries,
of shopping for cheap steel mills in the fire sale atmosphere of Eastern
Europe, of the penetration and purchase of legitimate corporations in
Mexico. He mentions one Mexican financier who bought a big chunk of the Del
Monte corporation and was negotiating for the rest when he disappeared in
1994. He is widely believed by U.S. intelligence to have been a front for
drug money. I doubt that anyone will ever conclusively prove this, because
under the new ways of global capitalism it is hard to determine who exactly
owns any particular thing. So the man simply shrugs after all his years of
research, "It's too late." We have a major international economic force
whose public face is a crack addict we believe must be busted or
exterminated to ensure our safety. We never see
the billions of dollars, the huge international banking system, the silent
collusion of nations, the utter dependence of Mexico, or a barrel
containing a woman floating in a sewage canal. We flounder with rhetoric
about a war on drugs and present pie charts and analysis about some
federation of thugs even as we willfully ignore the scale, the nature and
the vitality of the thing we are confronting. And this is true whether we
think we should legalize drugs or toughen prison sentences, whether we use
the stuff and love it or know nothing about the stuff and dread it.

Imagine it is night and we have poor jobs and little money and we are
walking down a lonely city street with garbage strewn about the sidewalk and
suddenly out of nowhere a huge fleet of limousines races past, the long
stretch bodies gleaming, the windows tinted and the occupants obscured. The
tires slash through puddles and splash us. And then they are gone, and
instantly we forget it ever happened. Later, we feel our
wet clothing and think there must have been a light shower we did not
notice. That is the walk we all now make each evening. When you finish this
story, everything you have read will cease to exist. Then the vast silence
will return again and sucker each and every one of us.

In the gray light of morning, I do not believe in the existence of a Amado
Carrillo Fuentes. I stand on a porch near the border in El Paso and listen
to the traffic hum of the two cities. The air is a brown paste of pollution,
and until I take that first sip of coffee, Carrillo has no reality for me.
This happens every dawn.

In December six tons of coke was found in a warehouse in Tucson within a
mile of my home. The newspapers played the story for two days and then
dropped it, never identifying where the coke
had come from. I checked with the DEA, and they said it had come from
Juarez. A few weeks after
this load was lost, the executions began in Juarez. During the time this
fist full of murders took place,
Amado Carrillo's name never came up. On any given day, I'd check with
friends and be told matter of
factly that Carrillo was in Juarez or not in Juarez. And yet he could not be
found. Sometimes I pretend to live inside Carrillo's mind. He is in a trap.
He cannot retire with his billions; he is too notorious. But if he stays in
the life, he will eventually be slaughtered. He cannot ratchet back the
volume of his business because if he tries to do this, he will be replaced.
He cannot stop buying the Mexican government he
needs its assistance to run his business but this very act makes him a
threat to the ruling elite, an inevitable target. So he must continue
moving, killing and gathering power. He is intelligent, ruthless and
exacting in his plans. These traits cannot save him. So I think of him and
wander through his mind. He is much like the
U.S. government, the agents of the DEA he shares an understanding with Phil
Jordan. He can know everything but still not control the outcome.

Amado Carrillo came into my life not as a subject, a man to be researched
and written about, but as violence. I still remember the wide smile and the
quick happy eyes of the groom at the wedding where the parrots screamed. In
April 1995, the groom at that wedding was slaughtered in front of this
family. In a
resort on a Sonoran coast. I remember standing there several days later and
looking at his blood on the pavement. Then, in September 1995, a DEA told
me that the groom was believed to have been murdered on the order of Amado
Carrillo for losing a load.

Carrillo has taken up residence in my mind, and I need to comfort myself
with the knowledge that
he is human, a man, and not as El Senor De los Cielos.

I am drunk in the midnight hour when I arrive at what is said to be the
private club of Amado Carrillo
in Juarez. Inside glows an exact copy of a section of Michelangelo's mural
in the Sistine Chapel, the
detail where God reaches out to an all but comatose Adam and gives him a hit
of the new drug, life.
The outside of the club is marble, the doors are brass, and the gatekeepers
loom before me as the
standard human refrigerators. The club has been opened since December 1995 a
bevy of rich, light
skinned women and powerful, light skinned men attending that inaugural was
celebrated in a full
page of color coverage in the Juarez morning paper. But there was no mention
of the man who spent the
night at a table, front and center, snorting coke and being his wonderful
self Amado Carrillo Fuentes. In fact, the newspapers never mentioned who
really owned the place.

So I wield down to this finer district, where Carrillo's club gleams,
literally as bold as brass. I'm a bit testy about the air of mystery
cloaking the man. Where is he? What does he look like? What's he up to?
Across the river in El Paso is a big bank, and, according to the DEA, he
owns it. No one mentions this. He owns factories in this city. No one
mentions this either. I'm stuffed with the lore of my government's research.
There are hundreds of pages of files on Carrillo, but they still leave him a
ghostly presence. Cops like
tactical information license plates, business fronts and the like and don't
concern themselves much with the intellect or personality pulsing behind
these artifacts. Well, Carrillo's sitting in his club right now, and I aim
to pay a visit.

I know he's in there, twenty feet away, his face a blank, nostrils twitching
from the coke the man no one knows, the man no one can find. Inside the
club, he exists. Outside, on the street where I now stand, he is name never
mentioned, an invisible ten billion dollar man.

But as usual, I fucked up. The doorman says the club is closed. I pointed
out there are loud and merry voices coming from within. The doorman says
yes, but this is a special club, a very refined place,
and I failed to measure up to the dress code. My shirt he explains has
pockets, and this is a violation of the standards.

Charles Bowden is the author of "Blood Orchid: an unnatural history of
America", which was recently
awarded the Lannan Literary Award, which came with a big check.


__________________
A TAINTED DEAL http://www.motherjones.com/politics/1998/06/tainted-deal

 LA DEA; Murder of Kiki Camarena http://www.laweekly.com/news/how-a-dogged-la-dea-agent-unraveled-the-cias-alleged-role-in-the-murder-of-kiki-camarena-5750278  

"Several informed sources have told me that an appendix to this Report was removed at the instruction of the DOJ at the last minute. This appendix is reported to have information about a CIA officer, not agent or asset, but officer, based in the LA Station, who was in charge of Contra related activities. According to these sources, this individual was associated with running drugs to South Central L.A., around 1988. Let me repeat that amazing omission. The recently released CIA Report Vol II contained an appendix, which was pulled by the DOJ, that reported a CIA officer in the LA Station was hooked into drug running in South Central Los Angeles." Maxine Waters Oct, 1998
https://fas.org/irp/congress/1998_cr/h981013-coke.htm   

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maynard

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Posts: 1,192
Reply with quote  #111 
ORIGINAL COPY OF DARK ALLIANCE BY GARY WEBB
THANKS TO NARCO NEWS FOR KEEPING THE MEMORY OF A TRUE HERO ALIVE. PLEASE READ THIS AND FORWARD TO ANYONE WHO WILL LISTEN

http://www.narconews.com/darkalliance/drugs/start.htm

Stories by Gary Webb
Mercury News Staff Writer

For the better part of a decade, a San Francisco Bay Area drug ring sold tons of cocaine to the Crips and Bloods street gangs of Los Angeles and funneled millions in drug profits to a Latin American guerrilla army run by the U.S. Central Intelligence Agency, a Mercury News investigation has found. This drug network opened the first pipeline between Colombia's cocaine cartels and the black neighborhoods of Los Angeles, a city now known as the crack capital of the world.


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__________________
A TAINTED DEAL http://www.motherjones.com/politics/1998/06/tainted-deal

 LA DEA; Murder of Kiki Camarena http://www.laweekly.com/news/how-a-dogged-la-dea-agent-unraveled-the-cias-alleged-role-in-the-murder-of-kiki-camarena-5750278  

"Several informed sources have told me that an appendix to this Report was removed at the instruction of the DOJ at the last minute. This appendix is reported to have information about a CIA officer, not agent or asset, but officer, based in the LA Station, who was in charge of Contra related activities. According to these sources, this individual was associated with running drugs to South Central L.A., around 1988. Let me repeat that amazing omission. The recently released CIA Report Vol II contained an appendix, which was pulled by the DOJ, that reported a CIA officer in the LA Station was hooked into drug running in South Central Los Angeles." Maxine Waters Oct, 1998
https://fas.org/irp/congress/1998_cr/h981013-coke.htm   

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maynard

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Welcome to Mercury Center

The Stories
Dark Alliance
Frames: [ Enable | Disable ]

Postscript
Dealer's sentencing postponed.
More TV and radio appearances by Gary Webb.
Last updated: Sept. 16, 1996
Continuing coverage

Day One
Backers of CIA-led Nicaraguan rebels brought cocaine to poor L.A. neighborhoods in early '80s to help finance war -- and a plague was born.
Published: Aug. 18, 1996
Stories

Day Two
How a smuggler, a bureaucrat and a driven ghetto teen-ager created the cocaine pipeline, and how crack was "born" in the San Francisco Bay Area in 1974.
Published: Aug. 19, 1996
Stories

Day Three
The impact of the crack epidemic on the black community and why justice hasn't been for all.
Published: Aug. 20, 1996
Stories


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__________________
A TAINTED DEAL http://www.motherjones.com/politics/1998/06/tainted-deal

 LA DEA; Murder of Kiki Camarena http://www.laweekly.com/news/how-a-dogged-la-dea-agent-unraveled-the-cias-alleged-role-in-the-murder-of-kiki-camarena-5750278  

"Several informed sources have told me that an appendix to this Report was removed at the instruction of the DOJ at the last minute. This appendix is reported to have information about a CIA officer, not agent or asset, but officer, based in the LA Station, who was in charge of Contra related activities. According to these sources, this individual was associated with running drugs to South Central L.A., around 1988. Let me repeat that amazing omission. The recently released CIA Report Vol II contained an appendix, which was pulled by the DOJ, that reported a CIA officer in the LA Station was hooked into drug running in South Central Los Angeles." Maxine Waters Oct, 1998
https://fas.org/irp/congress/1998_cr/h981013-coke.htm   

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maynard

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Reply with quote  #113 


http://www.narconews.com/Issue38/article1358.html

Gary Webb’s “Dark Alliance” Returns to the Internet

               

After an Arduous Journey, the Historic Document About U.S.-Sponsored Narco-Trafficking Finds a New Home

               

By Dan Feder
Special to The Narco News Bulletin

               

June 23, 2005

                       

Click here to go straight to the restored Dark Alliance website.

       
For the better part of a decade, a San Francisco Bay Area drug ring sold tons of cocaine to the Crips and Bloods street gangs of Los Angeles and funneled millions in drug profits to a Latin American guerrilla army run by the U.S. Central Intelligence Agency, a Mercury News investigation has found.

This drug network opened the first pipeline between Colombia’s cocaine cartels and the black neighborhoods of Los Angeles, a city now known as the crack capital of the world.

– From the introduction to the original Dark Alliance website, August, 1996
       


The Dark Alliance logo. Jerry Ceppos called it “too suggestive.”
The investigative journalism series that started it all – that changed (or at least, at long last, confirmed) the way all of us think about the war on drugs, the CIA, and U.S. policy toward Latin America – has had a troubled life on the Internet.

       

In August 1996, Gary Webb began publishing the results of a yearlong investigation that traced the money fueling the horrific U.S.-backed “contra” war against Nicaragua to the profits from Los Angeles’ 1980s crack epidemic. The CIA led its contra army to spend the entire decade terrorizing the Nicaraguan people and their Sandinista government, happily allowing the contras to flood Los Angeles and other North American cities with cocaine to fund their efforts. Gary provided extensively documented evidence that while poor communities in L.A. paid the price of the crack explosion – from rampant addiction in their neighborhoods to oppressive law enforcement and jailing with Reagan’s stepped-up “war on drugs” – the United States government protected the men moving a great deal of the drugs coming into the city. Local dealers faced life sentences while the bigtime narcos from Washington to Managua went free.

       

What came next is well known. Gary’s story, and the website he and the San Jose Mercury News created to showcase and expand upon it, were initially the talk of the global village. Politicians cited the article in both Sacramento and Washington. The CIA launched an internal investigation. Millions of people were visiting the website.

       

But then the backlash came. The L.A. Times, embarrassed at having missed a major story on its own turf, and the New York Times, happy to follow its colleagues’ lead in squashing a story that didn’t fit with its own narrative, wielded their mercenary pens against him. Rather than follow up on his exhaustive research, the attack dogs on both coasts pulled his work apart and attacked him for things he hadn’t even said. Although the CIA’s internal investigation would later confirm many of Gary’s own claims, the paper retracted the story and marginalized Gary to the point where he was forced to quit.

       


Gary Webb – Presente
Photo: D.R. 2003 Jeremy Bigwood
San Jose Mercury News executive editor Jerry Ceppos’ cowardly retreat from Dark Alliance included deleting the website, and destroying thousands of undistributed CDROM versions of the site. It was the Internet’s first book burning. Among Ceppos’ lame excuses for the latter was that the now-famous Dark Alliance logo (above; how much more straightforward could a logo for a story about the CIA and crack be?) was “too suggestive.” (Inherent in that statement is that Ceppos’ could not find sufficient fault with Webb’s story itself to censor the website.) And so, for a long time, the most talked-about investigative news story of the 1990s was largely inaccessible to world beyond the small daily’s reach.

       

Even when copies of the text from the published stories were posted on websites and sent out to mailing lists, it was not the same. The Dark Alliance website was truly groundbreaking, one of the first innovations in using the Internet to not just replicate but expand what journalism could be. Rather than remaining static, the articles lived on the website, surrounded by images, sound files, reader discussion forums that Gary participated in, and an entire library of background information supporting Webb’s powerful case against the C.I.A. Millions of readers flocked to these pages, a nearly unheard-of response in those early days of the World Wide Web.

       

Until the end of his life, Gary was immensely proud of this website and its role in expanding the idea of what Internet journalism could be. In 2002, having gotten his hands on one of the few remaining copies of the CD, he triumphantly resurrected it. At that time, Gary wrote:

       
“This site, which won a CNET “Best of the Web” award in 1996, was constructed from a CDROM made by the San Jose Mercury News to promote its Internet presence. Thousands of CDs were made, then quietly incinerated. The reason: the website’s logo—a crack smoker superimposed over the CIA seal—had been criticized as “too suggestive.” Fortunately a few CDs were saved from the flames. Despite the passage of time, this webpage remains a brilliant testament to the power of Internet journalism.”
       

Gary Webb, a hero of authentic journalism, an inspiration to truth-seekers around the world, a friend to all of us at Narco News, but now an unemployable outcast in the world of commercial newspapers, took his own life on December 10, 2004. His resurrected website died with him: the company hosting it was bought out and the files lost.

       

…Almost. Today, Narco News, with support from The Fund for Authentic Journalism, is pleased to announce that the Dark Alliance website has a new, and this time permanent, home at Narco News. Gary’s family found that old, storied, (“priceless to us,” as his ex-wife, Susan Bell, described it to me) CDROM among his possessions. Nine years ago, the Mercury News had placed some kind of archaic copy protection on the CD (of the kind that nobody uses anymore because such obsolete cyber-padlocks are so frequently picked), and by the time Gary’s son Ian sent us a copy this historic work was available for public viewing again.

       

The expanded version that Gary posted in 2002 is gone. But the original pages, still bearing the logo of the newspaper that gave birth to and then disowned them, are all there. A few elements from the CDROM have been cleaned up to make the pages easier to navigate, but the content you will see is essentially unchanged from what those millions of first-time readers saw when they logged on nearly a decade ago. As with Gary’s original “director’s cut” version of it, this project is being carried out for educational and historic purposes, and, happily, is in no way connected to, nor sponsored by, the San Jose Mercury News.

       

Narco News will unveil the Dark Alliance website in its new home by publishing these stories in installments, the way they were originally published back in 1996, over the coming week.

       

Today we present Part I

       
Dark Alliance: Day One
       

Published on August 18, 1996, these first two reports of the Dark Alliance series introduced readers around the world to the players and relationships of the whole tangled affair. Webb identifies the alliance at the root of his story as “the union of a U.S-backed army attempting to overthrow a revolutionary socialist government and the Uzi-toting ‘gangstas’ of Compton and South-Central Los Angeles.”

       

Here we meet Ricky Ross, L.A.’s top dope dealer in the early eighties, and the men from the Nicaraguan Democratic Force (FDN, the 5,000-man, CIA-commanded group that led the contra war against the Sandinista government) he bought his cocaine from. We see the evidence of the help they received from the air force of El Salvador (a country receiving support from the U.S. for its own massive, bloody war against an internal popular uprising.)

       

We also learn about the “wall of secrecy” that allowed the Nicaraguan traffickers to operate with impunity. Attempts by U.S. law enforcement to bring down the Nicaraguan traffickers repeatedly fizzled out, leaving many agents convinced that the CIA was blocking their efforts. A DEA agent working in El Salvador documents cocaine flights leaving that country only to have his reports ignored and in internal investigation launched against him.

       

Read the reports:

       
America’s ‘crack’ plague has roots in Nicaragua war        

Testimony links U.S. to drugs-guns trade

       
Dark Alliance: Day Two
       

In the reports filed for the August 19 edition of the San Jose Mercury News, Gary Webb looks back to the origins of crack cocaine use in Los Angeles. Just as the invention of crack was bringing cocaine out of the parlors and clubs of the elite and into poor urban neighborhoods, a young Ricky Ross used his connections to the Crips organization in L.A. on the one hand, and to Nicaraguan suppliers with unbelievably low-priced cocaine on the other to become the king of the crack business. A former L.A. narcotics officer tells Webb of Ross that “…there’s no telling how many tens of thousands of people he touched. He’s responsible for a major cancer that still hasn’t stopped spreading.” Through Ross, the Contras and their North American allies were able to pour tons of cocaine into the streets of L.A. to fund their war.

       

Read the reports:

       
Shadowy origins of ‘crack’ epidemic        

Drug agent thought she was onto something big

       

Drug expert: ‘Crack’ born in San Francisco Bay Area in ‘74

       
Dark Alliance: Day Three
       

In his third set of reports, Webb tackles the racial aspects of his story, asking why the black community has been so disproportionately hit by the crack epidemic. He writes:

       
Nothing epitomizes the drug war’s uneven impact on black Americans more clearly than the intertwined lives of Ricky Donnell Ross, a high school dropout, and his suave cocaine supplier, Danilo Blandon, who has a master’s degree in marketing and was one of the top civilian leaders in California of an anti-communist guerrilla army formed by the U.S. Central Intelligence Agency.
       

While Ross sits in prison, Blandon leads a comfortable, U.S.-subsidized life back in Nicaragua as a member of the new business class there. Blandon’s white or well-connected, contra-allied associates in both Central and North America also remain free. Webb ties this in to the widely noted disparity in sentencing between whites and blacks in U.S. courts and the general trends that have caused African Americans to bear the brunt of the war on drugs in the U.S. The Dark Alliance story had a particularly strong impact in California’s black community, in large part because of Webb’s ability to lay out such connections between oppressive U.S. foreign policy in the 1980s and the contemporary problems that community faced.

       

Read the reports:

       
War on drugs has unequal impact on black Americans        

Flawed sentencing the main reason for race disparity

       

San Francisco Bay Area man tangled in drug web

       

Day Three also marks the unveiling (and unleashing) of the full Dark Alliance website, complete with the additional documentation, multimedia exhibits, reader forums, and links that made it so ahead of its time.

       

Dark Alliance Website

       

Watch a short video of Gary Webb, included on the unreleased Dark Alliance CDROM (Quicktime format).

       
Gary Webb in Narco News
       
Gary Webb Speaks on Narco News, October 23, 2000        

Narco News Solidarity Letter from Gary Webb, March 16,2001

       

Crack, Cigarettes, and the arrival of Gary by George Sanchez, March 3, 2003

       

Gary Webb Joins Narco News as Guest Editor by Al Giordano, March 3, 2003

       

Gary Webb, ¡Presente! by Luis Gómez, December 12, 2004

       

Gary Webb: Do What He Did by Al Giordano, December 15, 2004

       

Gary Webb Drew Blood by Bill Conroy, December 17, 2004

       

An Anonymous Eulogy for Gary… and Truth December 17, 2004

       

Gary Webb: In his own words, a Video by Narco News and GNN

       

The Life and Times of Gary Webb by George Sanchez, January 25, 2005

       

Saint Gary Webb by Charlie Hardy, February 10, 2005

Article by Robert Parry
http://www.consortiumnews.com/2004/121304.html
       

Read more in Gary Webb’s 1999 book Dark Alliance: The CIA, the Contras and the Crack Cocaine Explosion from Seven Stories Press.

                               

Enter the NarcoSphere for comments on this article

                                                               

Email this story to a friend

                                                               
Narco News is funded by your contributions to The Fund for Authentic Journalism.         Please make journalism like this possible by going to The Fund's web site         and making a contribution today.


- The Fund for Authentic Journalism


__________________
A TAINTED DEAL http://www.motherjones.com/politics/1998/06/tainted-deal

 LA DEA; Murder of Kiki Camarena http://www.laweekly.com/news/how-a-dogged-la-dea-agent-unraveled-the-cias-alleged-role-in-the-murder-of-kiki-camarena-5750278  

"Several informed sources have told me that an appendix to this Report was removed at the instruction of the DOJ at the last minute. This appendix is reported to have information about a CIA officer, not agent or asset, but officer, based in the LA Station, who was in charge of Contra related activities. According to these sources, this individual was associated with running drugs to South Central L.A., around 1988. Let me repeat that amazing omission. The recently released CIA Report Vol II contained an appendix, which was pulled by the DOJ, that reported a CIA officer in the LA Station was hooked into drug running in South Central Los Angeles." Maxine Waters Oct, 1998
https://fas.org/irp/congress/1998_cr/h981013-coke.htm   

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maynard

Registered:
Posts: 1,192
Reply with quote  #114 
July 10, 2005

Response
to
El Salvador La Prensa Grafica
Interview of U. S. Terrorist
Felix Rodriguez
On
June 28, 2005


“When once a republic is corrupted, there is no possibility of remedying any of the growing evils but by removing the corruption and restoring its lost principles; every other correction is either useless or a new evil.”
                                                Thomas Jefferson



On June 28, 2005, I received an email from a much-respected Latin American journalist. An attachment to the email was a La Prensa Grafica interview on a Cuban exile; Felix Rodriguez dated June 28, 2004. The name of Alfredo Hernandez was identified as the reporter who had conducting the interview for the Salvadoran Prensa-Grafica newspaper. In said interview, Felix made some serious allegation against my character. I immediately called the reporter. Hernandez confirmed that he had conducted the interview approximately a year prior to June 28. I asked him why this interview was now being re-released. He advised that he had no idea. I requested a rebuttal to the story to set the record straight. He stated that he would advise his supervisors and get back to me. As you guess it, I never received the call. I then proceeded to contact another reporter, Mr. Guillermo De Leon at La Prensa Grafica in Los Angeles, California. I made the same request to Mr. Deleon and he emailed me advising me that he had email my request to the newsroom in San Salvador. Once again, I never received the call. Therefore, I find no choice, but to respond to the allegations in this article. It boggles my mind why someone would go out of his or her way to make the Felix interview available at this time. My only conclusion, would be, that the U. S. government had instructed, since the U. S. government controls all aspects of that country, the newspaper to republish the interview in an attempt to assist another home grown terrorist, Luis Posada Carilles. Just recently, El Comandante Fidel Castro had pressured the United States, and succeeded, in the capture of Posada in the United States. The U. S. government was now utilizing Felix, as a puppet, to conduct character assassination on El Comandante Castro, in the evils of communism.

The interview was mostly on Felix’s assignment in El Salvador during the 80s. Felix initiated his interview by bragging about his capture of Ms. Nidia Diaz in El Salvador. How do you capture someone on the ground, when you are flying a helicopter? He proceeded to make some more accusations on Commandante Fidel Castro, and his government of possession of a well-built spy network in El Salvador. Of course, he gave no proof on his allegations.

Felix identified himself as an ex-CIA agent. Let’s get it straight; Felix was never a full-blooded CIA official. He was hired as contract labor into the CIA. In other words, Felix was a Cuban exile, who became a snitch “soplon” for the CIA in the early 60s, especially on June 1970. “Operation Eagle”, was a federal strike force in 10 major cities around the country derailed one of the biggest hard-drug networks of all time. The organization was responsible for distributing 30 % of all heroin sales and up to 80 % of all cocaine into the United States. Approximately 70% of those arrested had once belonged to the Bay of Pigs invasion force. Guess who the “soplon” was? In his book he claimed to have no green card, or being a citizen of this country. Because of his “back at the rear” involvement in the Bay of Pigs fiasco, he was commission into the United States Army for a few months and then quit to become a full time terrorist for the CIA. In his book, “Shadow Warrior”, (page 116) he claimed that he was commission into the military in March of 1963 for “basic training”. “I finished basic training in early October, and on October 9, 1963, I received an honorable discharge from the U. S. Army” (Page 118). What a joke! And the math is not right. I have never heard of basic training being 8 months long, but I could be wrong. Then, he has the audacity of taking a picture with a U. S. military uniform. Let me make this very clear, Felix is not and has never been a veteran of the U.S. military. A veteran is an individual who went through basic and his advance training. Some of us were drafted for two years, but after my active service in Vietnam, I continued to serve my country in the Texas National Guard and Army Reserve (a total of 6 years). AND THEN, continued to serve my country for 12 more years as a DEA agent, 6 of those years in Central and South America.

Felix then makes an accusation that the FMLN had received M-16s, from the Soviet Union, through Cuba. These weapons were supposedly U. S. military weapons that were abandoned in Vietnam. Our U. S. intelligence has always been that the FMLN used AK-47; especially their snipe rifle “Dragunov” which shoots a 7.62X54R round.

On January 5, 1990, DEA General File: GFTG-90-4015, in an undercover capacity, I negotiated with elements assigned to a Salvadoran military Col. Hernandez, for the purchase of several sniper rifles “Dragunovs” that had been seized from the FMLN. I was playing a member of one of the Colombian drug cartel. Of course, it was a “dog and pony” show for the United States to show that El Salvador could clean its own house. After flashing the Colonel’s elements $25,000.00, the Colonel and his people were arrested prior to the delivering of the weapons.

Felix claimed to have arrived in 1985 to helping the Salvadoran Air force with small helicopters. After flying, a small helicopter, he claims to have captured Ms. Nidia Diaz. First, what Felix does not say, is that he brags to everyone about having Ms. Diaz’s framed bra hanging in his living room in Miami. It’s amazing me that cowards like Felix have to show off war trophies to make themselves feel like a real men. Muy Macho Felix! Second and most significant, if you have recently read an American newspaper, you’ve read of the famous, “Salvador Option”. For those of you in Latin American, who haven’t heard of it, let me try to explain to you in very simple writing. It is a blue print of what the United States military used in Vietnam under the “Phoenix Program”, the implementation of the Death Squads “escuadrones del la muerte”. It is an embarrassment that El Salvador is known all over the globe, as the “Salvador Option”. And, let me tell you that I don’t exaggerate when I make the claim, “all over the world”. Just recently on May 1, 2005, New York Times reporter Peter Maass reports that former United States Army Col. James Steele is running the death squads commandos “Salvadoran Option” in Iraq. Yes, the same Colonel who was the Mil-Group commander in El Salvador that ran the death squads.

Now, Felix cries about how Ms. Diaz was traded for El Salvador President Duarte’s daughter and added that Ms. Diaz was seen in a demonstration in Cuba when “the plane was shot down in Nicaragua”. Oh, now it’s “the plane”. The fact of the matter is that the plane belonged to Felix, which he; himself had routed it out to Nicaragua. A well-documented drug trafficker, Barry Seal, also owned this same plane. Felix continues to make his allegations about how Cuba was involved with the FMLN. So what! When there is a struggle, some people did not have an option, and even if they did, it’s a choice. However, please do not tell me that you, Felix, was attempting to stop communism for our safety. Felix has never fought for anything that represented freedom. All he ever did was line his pockets with Contra money.

Felix claims that Ms. Nidia Diaz was carrying seven backpacks loaded with documents that had connections with communist countries. Come on Felix, what would you know about intelligence. You didn’t even go into advanced training in the military. You probably placed the documents in ALL the backpacks. No one in their right mind would put all their eggs in one basket. That is what persons like Felix do “exaggerate”.

        The question is then asked, “When does the Ilopango Base begin to be used in the Iran Contra Operation?”

Felix answers, “Oliver North asked me to help situate the planes and to maintain them, and of course I believe that this was of interest to the Salvadoran government to provide this assistance, since all the equipment that was coming in for the guerrillas come from Cuba by way of Nicaragua.”

In August 1982, then Vice-President Bush hired Donald Gregg as his principal advisor on National Security Affairs. On March 17, 1983, Felix met Gregg, officially and secretly, at the White House. Gregg then recommended Felix’s plan to National Security advisor Robert McFarlane. It was a plan for El Salvador where military attacks would be conducted on a target area of Central American nations including Nicaragua. Yes, it was the “Phoenix Program”. On October 13, 1986, The New York Times, quoted Vice-President Bush: “To the best of my knowledge, this man, Felix Rodriguez, is not working for the United States government.” Felix had now become the “bastard child that no one wanted”. Felix later becomes the “go-for” for Lt. Col. Oliver L. North. The question was about Iran-Contra, but “El Cobarde” continues to trash Cuba about the weapons that the guerrillas use in El Salvador.

        “Did you bring Posada Carriles to El Salvador?”

Felix’s answer: “I helped him enter and he was keeping the safe houses for the pilots of the operation, they were paid, they were provided with food. But Colonel
North never knew that he was working on the operation.” Come on Felix, you don’t expect us to believe that North did not know. Ilopango was North’s “baby”.

Just recently El Salvador, announced that they would not extradited Luis Posada to El Salvador for entering their country illegally.

Under oath: Senator John Kerry: “is it appropriate for a Felix Rodriguez to help a man indicted in a terrorist bombing to escape from prison, and then appropriate for him to take him to become involved in supply operation, which we are supporting?”

Answer: Gregg: I CANNOT JUSTIFY THAT SIR…

Most significant, the question is, “why is there not an arrest warrant for Felix for illegally transporting a terrorist into El Salvador?”

        “But the operation came to be investigated for possible drug trafficking?”

Felix’s answer: “Never, there were ill-intentioned persons who tried to connect the Contras with the drug trafficking. In fact, a DEA agent was kicked out, Celerino Castillo, who stated that he, was trying to investigate that in Ilopango drugs were being transported. He was so stupid that he said that he asked the ambassador in El Salvador not to issue visas to the pilots that I had there because they were involved in narcotics trafficking and this explains the total lack of knowledge he had, because they were all American citizens.”

        First and foremost, I was never kicked out of El Salvador, however I have been kicked out of better places. Second, FACTS:

• On Nov. 1, 1984, the FBI arrested Felix’s partner, Gerard Latchinian for smuggling $10.3 million in cocaine into the U.S. The dope was intended to finance the overthrow and murder of the President of Honduras.
• Felix was paid $10 million of drug money by Mr. Ramon Milian-Rodriguez. The co-founder of the Medellin cartel, Carlos Lehder, under oath, confirmed the payment to the Contras.

On June 4, 1986 U. S. Consulate General, Robert Chavez at the U. S. Embassy in El Salvador contacted me and stated to me that the CIA was attempting to obtain a U.S. visa for a documented narcotics trafficker. The individual was Carlos Alberto Amador, a Nicaraguan Contra pilot. He was mentioned in (6) six DEA files. Mr. Chavez gave a copy of the Visa application to me.
       
On June 18, 1996, Francisco “Chico” Guirola-Beeche had departed Ilopango to the Bahamas with a large shipment of cocaine. Guirola is documented in 11 DEA files and was arrested in 1985 in South Texas with 5 ½ million dollars in cash. He was also a Contra pilot.

Oscar “El Negro” Alvarado-Lara, another Contra pilot is mentioned in three DEA files. On June 11, 1986, Alvarado transported twenty-seven (27) Cubans to El Salvador Ilopango. Members of his smuggling organization were identified as Jose Nelson Branda-Cedeno (Panamanian) and Antonio Ernest Aguilar-Sarmiento. The aircraft used was identified as TG-REN.

You see, I could go on and on but I won’t. There are several dozen pilots; all documented in law enforcement files as traffickers and all worked for Felix. If you notice dates and descriptions on my response, it’s because Castillo, who is so stupid, kept dates, times, names, and most important pictures.

The operation was to prevent the spread of communism.

“It was strictly for that. For political reasons, in the US Congress they tried to involve the Contras with drug trafficking, it was never proved, in fact, Senator John Kerry from Massachusetts, who led the effort, had to apologize. They tried to damage the Ronald Reagan administration and later on that of George Bush Sr.”



As Kerry’s final report summarized: “It is clear that individuals who provided support for the contras were involved in drug trafficking. It is also clear that the supply network of the contras was used by drug trafficking organizations, and elements of the Contras themselves knowingly received financial and material assistance from drug trafficking.”

Jack Blum, investigator for the Senate Foreign Relations Subcommittee, under oath on Feb. 11, 1987: “The Contras moved drugs not by the pound, not by the bags, but by the tons, by the cargo planeloads.”

This goes to show that Felix, “El Cobarde” is also a liar. Kerry’s comment does not look like an apology to me. The Iran-Contra was the downfall on Bush Sr. A few weeks before his re-election efforts; it came back and bit him in the ass, where he lost.

Are there still connections between ex-guerrillas and Cuba?

Are those recording used as a weapon of loyalty?

Felix talks about what Cuba has on intelligence training. Felix should have gotten intelligence-training gathering from the Cubans, because number one, he does not have the security clearness to talk about intelligence.

What Felix don’t know, or should I say, didn’t know, is that “Sandrita”, his girl friend, in El Salvador was my source of information and she sure does have so nice pictures. How about that stupid Castillo?

And how about La Prensa Grafica; “Anos Escribiendo La Verdad”? I don’t think so! You need to find a backbone and stand up for the rights del pueblo de El Salvador by telling then the truth of what happen to their country not too long ago. La Prensa Grafica should practice what Jose Maria Vargas Vila once said, “La verda solo es digno de decirle aquel que no tiene miedo de morir por Ella”.


Todo Por La Patria!

Celerino “Xele” Castillo, 3rd
X Agente Del DEA
El Salvador 1985-1991
http://www.powderburns.org
powderburns@prodigy.net

__________________
A TAINTED DEAL http://www.motherjones.com/politics/1998/06/tainted-deal

 LA DEA; Murder of Kiki Camarena http://www.laweekly.com/news/how-a-dogged-la-dea-agent-unraveled-the-cias-alleged-role-in-the-murder-of-kiki-camarena-5750278  

"Several informed sources have told me that an appendix to this Report was removed at the instruction of the DOJ at the last minute. This appendix is reported to have information about a CIA officer, not agent or asset, but officer, based in the LA Station, who was in charge of Contra related activities. According to these sources, this individual was associated with running drugs to South Central L.A., around 1988. Let me repeat that amazing omission. The recently released CIA Report Vol II contained an appendix, which was pulled by the DOJ, that reported a CIA officer in the LA Station was hooked into drug running in South Central Los Angeles." Maxine Waters Oct, 1998
https://fas.org/irp/congress/1998_cr/h981013-coke.htm   

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IN ADDITION TO THE 3 PART DARK ALLIANCE SERIES IN SAN JOSE MERCURY NEWS (1996), WE WILL BEGIN POSTING SELECTED EXCERPTS FROM THE DARK ALLIANCE BOOK PUBLISHED IN 1998.

THE EXCERPTS CAN BE SEEN HERE:
http://www.websitetoolbox.com/tool/post/whosarat/vpost?id=537496

PLEASE HELP SUPPORT THE FAMILY OF THE LATE GARY WEBB BY PURCHASING THE BOOK FROM AMAZON.COM AND MAKE A CONTRIBUTION TO HIS FAMILY.
http://www.sevenstories.com/book/index.cfm/GCOI/58322100705890
http://www.amazon.com/exec/obidos/tg/detail/-/1888363932/002-6542029-5747203?v

GARY WEBB SACRIFICED HIS CAREER, HIS LIFE'S WORK, AND PAID THE ULTIMATE PRICE FOR TELLING THE TRUTH.



HEAR AUDIO OF 1999 GARY WEBB SPEECH IN OREGON:

20.Dec.2004 01:00

drug war

AUDIO FILE: Gary Webb In Eugene Oregon, January 6, 1999

Upon hearing about the recent death of investigative reporter Gary Webb, I searched my video tape archives and found a presentation he made in Eugene Oregon in January of 1999.
Gary's career in writing goes back to his high school days in Indianapolis, where he wrote for the school paper. Here he found his life's work, and he details the event which brought him to this decision. An amusing anecdote, yet Webb weaves a philosophy from this and shoots it like an arrow into his present expose of CIA complicity in the crack epidemic detailed in his book, Dark Alliance
Webb states right off, "I do not believe, and I've never believed that the crack explosion was a conscious CIA conspiracy, or anybody's conspiracy to decimate black America. I've never believed that south Central Los Angelus was targeted by the U.S. government to become the crack capital of the world. But that isn't to say that the CIA, the US government's hands are clean in this matter. Actually, far from it. After spending three years of my life looking in to this, I am more convinced than ever that the US governments responsibility for the drug problems in south central Los Angelus and other inner cities is greater than I wrote in the newspaper.
"But I think it's important to differentiate between malign intent and gross negligence. And that's an important distinction, because its what makes premeditated murder from manslaughter. That said, it doesn't change the fact that you've got a body on the floor. And that's what I want to talk about tonight, is the body."
Webb discusses "how the collapse of a brutal pro American dictatorship in Latin America combined with a decision by corrupt CIA agents to raise money for a resistance movement by any means necessary led to the formation of the nations first major crack market in south central Los Angelus, which led to the arming and the empowering of L.A. street gangs, which led to the spread of crack to black neighborhoods across the country, and the passage of racially discriminatory sentencing laws that are locking up thousands of young black men today behind bars for most of their adult lives. But it's not so much a conspiracy as a chain reaction. And that's what my whole book is about."
From here Webb goes on the explain in great detail the links in this chain. Webb was a meticulous researcher. His presentation style is direct and down to earth. I find it hard to believe that he would end his own life, that death offered the only viable option for him at that point in his life. His death, like so many who contest government activities, is suspicious, to say the least. Concerning this, I can only wait for further developments.

This 1999 event was video taped by Janet Marcley-Hayes, the widow of the late great Ace Hayes.
Ace is best known for conducting the "Secret Government Seminars", where he handed out large amounts of information in various subjects having to do with secret government activities. This sort of information has been marginalized and called "conspiracy theory," yet over the years, much of what he spoke about has subsequently been proven to be factual. Ace was a "conspiracy realist," and one of his favorite topics was CIA involvement in the drug trade, the story broke by Gary Webb.
Janet is cable casting these seminars through the facilities of Portland Community Media under the title American Revolutionary Television

Gary Webb's remarks are about 39 minutes
Gary Webb


The remarks were followed by about 23 mintues of questions and answers. The George Bush being referred to in the Q & A segment is George Bush senior.
Gary Webb Q & A


        homepage:         homepage: http://www.PhilosopherSeed.org



JULY 17 - 23, 1998
The Coke Machine
The Story behind the Contra-crack cocaine story
by Gary Webb

WHEN I CAME to work in the sprawling newsroom of the Cleveland Plain Dealer in the early 1980s, I was assigned to share a computer terminal with a tall middle-aged reporter with a long, virtually unpronounceable Polish name. To save time, people called him Tom A.

To me, arriving from a small daily in Kentucky, Tom A. was the epitome of the hard-boiled big-city newspaperman. The city officials he wrote about and the editors who mangled his copy were "fuckinjerks." A question prompting an affirmative response would elicit "fuckin-a-tweetie" instead of "yes." And when his phone rang he would say, "It's the Big One," before picking up the receiver. No matter how many times I heard that, I always laughed. The Big One was the reporter's holy grail--the tip that led you from the daily morass of press conferences and cop calls on to the trail of the Biggest Story You'd Ever Write, the one that would turn the rest of your career into an anticlimax. I never knew if it was cynicism or optimism that made him say it, but deep inside, I thought he was jinxing himself.

The Big One, I believed, would be like a bullet with your name on it. You'd never hear it coming. And almost a decade later, long after Tom A., the Plain Dealer, and I had parted company, that's precisely how it happened.

I didn't even take the call.

It manifested itself as a pink "While You Were Out" message slip left on my desk in July 1995, bearing an unusual and unfamiliar name: Coral Marie Talavera Baca. There was no message, just a number, somewhere in the East Bay.

I called, but there was no answer, so I put the message aside. If I have time, I told myself, I'll try again later. Several days later an identical message slip appeared. Its twin was still sitting on a pile of papers at the edge of my desk. This time Coral Marie Talavera Baca was home.

"I saw the story you did a couple weeks ago," she began. "The one about the drug seizure laws. I thought you did a good job."

"Thanks a lot," I said, and I meant it. She was the first reader who'd called about that story, a front-page piece in the San Jose Mercury News about a convicted cocaine trafficker who, without any formal legal training, had beaten the U.S. Justice Department in court three straight times and was on the verge of flushing the government's multibillion-dollar asset forfeiture program right down the toilet.

"You didn't just give the government's side of it," she continued.

I asked what I could do for her.

"My boyfriend is in a situation like that," she said, "and I thought it might make a good follow-up story for you. What the government has done to him is unbelievable."

"Your boyfriend?"

"He's in prison right now on cocaine trafficking charges. He's been in jail for three years."

"How much more time has he got?"

"Well, that's just it," she said. "He's never been brought to trial. He's done three years already, and he's never been convicted of anything."

"He must have waived his speedy trial rights," I said.

"No, none of them have," she said. "There are about five or six guys who were indicted with him, and most of them are still waiting to be tried, too. They want to go to trial because they think it's a bullshit case. Rafael keeps writing letters to the judge and the prosecutor, saying, you know, try me or let me go."

"Rafael's your boyfriend?"

"Yes. Rafael Cornejo."

"He's Colombian?"

"No, Nicaraguan. But he's lived in the Bay Area since he was like 2 or something."

It's interesting, I thought, but not the kind of story likely to excite my editors. Some drug dealers don't like being in jail? Oh. I knew what I would hear if I pitched Coral's story to my editors: We've done that already. And that was what I told her.

She was not dissuaded.

"There's something about Rafael's case that I don't think you would have ever done before," she persisted. "One of the government's witnesses is a guy who used to work with the CIA selling drugs. Tons of it."

"What now?" I wasn't sure I'd heard correctly.

"The CIA. He used to work for them or something. He's a Nicaraguan, too. Rafael knows him; he can tell you. He told me the guy had admitted bringing four tons of cocaine into the country."

I put down my pen. She'd sounded so rational. Where did this CIA stuff come from? In 18 years of investigative reporting, I had ended up doubting the credibility of every person who ever called me with a tip about the CIA. I flashed on Eddie Johnson, a conspiracy theorist who would come bopping into the Kentucky Post's newsroom every so often with amazing tales of intrigue and corruption. Interviewing Eddie was one of the rites of passage at the Post. Someone would invariably send him over to the newest reporter on the staff to see how long it took the rookie to figure out he was spinning his wheels.

Suddenly I remembered who I was talking to--a cocaine dealer's moll.

That explained it.

"Oh, the CIA. Well, you're right. I've never done any stories about the CIA. I don't run across them too often here in Sacramento. See, I mostly cover state government."

"You probably think I'm crazy, right?"

"No, no," I assured her. "You know, could be true, who's to say? When it comes to the CIA, stranger things have happened."

There was a short silence, and I could hear her exhale sharply.

"How dare you treat me like I'm an idiot," she said evenly. "You don't even know me. I work for a law firm. I've copied every single piece of paper that's been filed in Rafael's case, and I can document everything I'm telling you. You can ask Rafael, and he can tell you himself...He's got a court date in San Francisco coming up in a couple weeks. Why don't I meet you at the courthouse? That way you can sit in on the hearing, and if you're interested we could get lunch or something and talk."

That cinched it. Now the worst that could happen was lunch in San Francisco in mid-July, away from the phones and the editors. And, who knows, there was an off chance she was telling the truth.

FLIPPING ON MY computer, I logged into the Dialog database, which contains full-text electronic versions of millions of newspaper and magazine stories, property records, legal filings, you name it. OK. Let's see if Rafael Cornejo even exists.

A message flashed on the screen: "Your search has retrieved 11 documents. Display?" So far so good.

I called up the most recent one, a newspaper story that had appeared a year before in the San Francisco Chronicle. My eyes widened. "4 Indicted in Prison Breakout Plot--Pleasanton Inmates Planned to Leave in Copter, Prosecutors Say."

I quickly scanned the story. Son of a bitch. Four inmates were indicted yesterday in connection with a bold plan to escape from the federal lockup in Pleasanton using plastic explosives and a helicopter that would have taken them to a cargo ship at sea. The group also considered killing a guard if their keepers tried to thwart the escape, prosecutors contend. Rafael Cornejo, 39, of Lafayette, an alleged cocaine kingpin with reputed ties to Nicaraguan drug traffickers and Panamanian money launderers, was among those indicted for conspiracy to escape.

That's some boyfriend she's got there, I mused. The newspaper stories make him sound like Al Capone. And he wants to sit down and have a chat?

When I pushed open the doors to the vast courtroom in the San Francisco federal courthouse a few weeks later, I found a scene from Miami Vice.

To my left, a dark-suited army of federal agents and prosecutors huddled around a long, polished wooden table, looking grim and talking in low voices. On the right, an array of long-haired, expensively attired defense attorneys were whispering to a group of long-haired, angry-looking Hispanics--their clients. The judge had not yet arrived.

I had no idea what Coral Baca looked like, so I scanned the faces in the courtroom, trying to pick out a woman who could be a drug kingpin's girlfriend. She found me first.

"You must be Gary," said a voice behind me.

I turned, and for an instant all I saw was cleavage and jewelry. She looked to be in her mid-20s. Dark hair. Bright red lipstick. Long legs. Short skirt. Dressed to accentuate her positive attributes. I could barely speak.

"You're Coral?"

She tossed her hair and smiled. "Pleased to meet you." She stuck out a hand with a giant diamond on it, and I shook it weakly.

We sat down in the row of seats behind the prosecutors' table, and I glanced at her again. That boyfriend of hers must be going nuts.

She pointed out Cornejo, a short, handsome Latino with a strong jaw and long, wavy hair parted in the middle.

"Can we go out in the hall and talk for a minute?" I asked her.

We sat on a bench just outside the door. I told her I needed to get case numbers so I could ask for the court files. And, by the way, did she bring those documents she'd mentioned?

She reached into her briefcase and brought out a stack an inch thick. "I've got three bankers' boxes full back at home, and you're welcome to see all of it, but this is the stuff I was telling you about concerning the witness."

I flipped through the documents. Most of them were federal law enforcement reports, DEA-6s and FBI 302s, every page bearing big black letters that said, "MAY NOT BE REPRODUCED--PROPERTY OF U.S. GOVERNMENT." At the bottom of the stack was a transcript of some sort. I pulled it out.

"Grand Jury for the Northern District of California, Grand Jury Number 93-5, Grand Jury Inv. No. 9301035. Reporter's Transcript of Proceedings. Testimony of Oscar Danilo Blandón. February 3, 1994."

I whistled. "Federal grand jury transcripts? I'm impressed. Where'd you get these?"

"The government turned them over under discovery. Dave Hall did. I heard he really got reamed out by the DEA when they found out about all the stuff he gave us."

I SKIMMED THE 39-page transcript. Whatever else this Blandón fellow may have been, he was pretty much the way Coral had described him. A big-time trafficker who'd dealt dope for many years, he started out dealing for the Contras, a right-wing Nicaraguan guerrilla army, in Los Angeles. He'd used drug money to buy trucks and supplies. At some point after Ronald Reagan got into power, the CIA had decided his services as a fundraiser were no longer required, and he stayed in the drug business for himself.

What made the story so compelling was that he was appearing before the grand jury as a U.S. government witness. He wasn't under investigation. He wasn't trying to beat a rap. He was there as a witness for the prosecution, which meant that the U.S. Justice Department was vouching for him.

But who was the grand jury investigating? Every time the testimony led in that direction, words--mostly names--were blacked out.

"Who is this family they keep asking him about?"

"Rafael says it's Meneses. Norwin Meneses and his nephews. Have you heard of them?"

"Nope."

"Norwin is one of the biggest traffickers on the West Coast. When Rafael got arrested, that's who the FBI and the IRS wanted to talk to him about. Rafael has known (Norwin and his nephews) for years. Since the '70s, I think. The government is apparently using Blandón to get to Meneses."

Inside, I heard the bailiff calling the court to order, and we returned to the courtroom. During the hearing, I kept trying to recall where I had heard about this Contra-cocaine business before. Had I read it in a book? Seen it on television? Like most Americans, I knew the Contras had been a creation of the CIA, the darlings of the Reagan Right, made up largely of the vanquished followers of deposed Nicaraguan dictator Anastasio Somoza and his brutal army, the National Guard. But drug trafficking? Surely, I thought, if there had been some concrete evidence, it would have stuck in my mind. Maybe I was confusing it with something else. During a break, I went to the restroom and bumped into Assistant U.S. Attorney Hall. I introduced myself as a reporter. Hall eyed me cautiously.

"Why would the Mercury News be interested in this case?" he asked. "You should have been here two years ago. This is old stuff now."

"I'm not really doing a story on this case. I'm looking into one of the witnesses. A man named Blandón. Am I pronouncing the name correctly?"

Hall appeared surprised. "What about him?"

"About his selling cocaine for the Contras." Hall leaned back slightly, folded his arms and gave me a quizzical smile. "Who have you been talking to?"

"Actually, I've been reading. And I was curious to know what you made of his testimony about selling drugs for the Contras in L.A. Did you believe him?"

"Well, yeah, but I don't know how you could absolutely confirm it. I mean, I don't know what to tell you," he said with a slight laugh. "The CIA won't tell me anything."

I jotted down his remark. "Oh, you've asked them?"

"Yeah, but I never heard anything back. Not that I expected to. But that's all ancient history. You're really doing a story about that?"

"I don't know if I'm doing a story at all," I said. "At this point, I'm just trying to see if there is one. Do you know where Blandón is these days?"

"Not a clue."

That couldn't be true, I thought. How could he not know? He was one of the witnesses against Rafael Cornejo. "From what I heard," I told him, "he's a pretty significant witness in your case here. He hasn't disappeared, has he? He is going to testify?"

Hall's friendly demeanor changed. "We're not at all certain about that."

WHEN I GOT back to Sacramento, I called my editor at the main office in San Jose, Dawn Garcia, and filled her in on the day's events. Dawn was a former investigative reporter from the San Francisco Chronicle, and had been the Mercury's state editor for several years.

"So, what do you think?" she asked, editorese for, "Is there a story here and how long will it take to get it?"

"I don't know. I'd like to spend a little time looking into it at least. Hell, if his testimony is true, it could be a pretty good story. The Contras were selling coke in L.A.? I've never heard that one before."

She mulled it over for a moment before agreeing. "It's not like there's a lot going on in Sacramento right now," she said. That was true enough. The sun-baked state capital was entering its summertime siesta, when triple-digit temperatures sent solons adjourning happily to mountain or seashore locales. With any luck, I was about to join them.

"I need to go down to San Diego for a couple days," I said. "Blandón testified that he was arrested down there in '92 for conspiracy, so there's probably a court file somewhere. He may be living down there, for all I know. Probably the quickest way to find out if what he was saying is true is to find him."

Dawn OK'd the trip, and a few days later I was in balmy San Diego, squinting at microfiche in the clerk's office of the U.S. District Court.

I found Blandón's case file within a few minutes.

He and six others, including his wife Chepita Blandón, had been secretly indicted May 5, 1992, for conspiring to distribute cocaine. He'd been buying wholesale quantities from suppliers and reselling it to other wholesalers. Way up on the food chain. According to the indictment, he'd been a trafficker for 10 years, had clients nationwide and had bragged on tape of selling other L.A. dealers between two and four tons of cocaine.

He was such a big-timer that the judge had ordered him and his wife held in jail without bail because they posed "a threat to the health and moral fiber of the community."

The file contained a transcript of a detention hearing, held to determine if the couple should be released on bail. Blandón's prosecutor, Assistant U.S. Attorney L.J. O'Neale, brought out his best ammo to persuade the judge to keep the couple locked up until trial. "Mr. Blandón's family was closely associated with the Somoza government that was overthrown in 1979," O'Neale said. "He is a large-scale cocaine trafficker and has been for a long time," O'Neale argued. Given the amount of cocaine he'd sold, O'Neale said, Blandón's minimum mandatory punishment was "off the charts"--life plus a $4 million fine--giving him plenty of incentive to flee the country.

Blandón's lawyer, Brad Brunon, confirmed the couple's close ties to Somoza and produced a photo of them at a wedding reception with El Presidente and his spouse. That just showed what fine families they were from, he said. The accusations in Nicaragua against Blandón, Brunon argued, were "politically motivated because of Mr. Blandón's activities with the Contras in the early 1980s."

Damn, here it is again. His own lawyer says he was working for the Contras.

From the docket sheet, I could see that the case had never gone to trial. Everyone had pleaded out, starting with Blandón. Five months after his arrest, he pleaded guilty to conspiracy, and the charges against his wife were dropped. After that, his fugitive co-defendants were quickly arrested and pleaded guilty. But they all received extremely short sentences. One was even put on unsupervised probation.

I didn't get it. If O'Neale had such a rock-solid case against a major drug-trafficking ring, why were they let off so easily? People did more time for burglary. Even Blandón, the ringleader, only got 48 months, and from the docket sheet it appeared that was later cut almost in half.

As I read on, I realized that Blandón was already back on the streets--totally unsupervised. No probation. No parole. Free as a bird. He'd walked out of jail Sept. 19, 1994, on the arm of an INS agent, Robert Tellez. He'd done 28 months for 10 years of cocaine trafficking.

The last page of the file told me why.

It was a motion filed by U.S. Attorney O'Neale, asking the court to unseal Blandón's plea agreement and a couple of internal Justice Department memorandums. "During the course of this case, defendant Oscar Danilo Blandón cooperated with and rendered substantial assistance to the United States," O'Neale wrote. At the government's request, his jail sentence had been secretly cut twice. O'Neale then persuaded the judge to let Blandón out of jail completely, telling the court he was needed as a full-time paid informant for the U.S. Department of Justice. Since he'd be undercover, O'Neale wrote, he couldn't very well have probation agents checking up on him. He was released on unsupervised probation. I walked back to my hotel convinced that I was on the right track. Now there were two separate sources saying--in court--that Blandón was involved with the Contras and had been selling large amounts of cocaine in Los Angeles. And when the government finally had a chance to put him away forever, it had opened up the cell doors and let him walk. I needed to find Blandón. I had a million questions only he could answer.

BACK IN SACRAMENTO, I did some checking on the targets of the 1994 grand jury investigation--the Meneses family--and again Coral's description proved accurate, perhaps even understated. At the California State Library's government publications section, I scoured the indices that catalog congressional hearings by topic and witness name. Meneses wasn't listed, but there had been a series of hearings back in 1987 and 1988, I saw, dealing with the issue of the Contras and cocaine: a subcommittee of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, chaired by Sen. John Kerry of Massachusetts.

For the next six days I sat with rolls of dimes at a microfiche printer in the quiet wood-paneled recesses of the library, reading and copying many of the 1,100 pages of transcripts and exhibits of the Kerry Committee hearings, growing more astounded each day. The committee's investigators had uncovered direct links between drug dealers and the Contras. They'd gotten into BCCI (Bank of Credit and Commerce International) years before anyone knew what that banking scandal even was. They'd found evidence of Manuel Noriega's involvement with drugs--four years before the invasion. Many of the Kerry Committee witnesses, I noted, later became U.S. Justice Department witnesses against Noriega.

Kerry and his staff had taken videotaped depositions from Contra leaders who acknowledged receiving drug profits, with the apparent knowledge of the CIA. The drug dealers had admitted--under oath--giving money to the Contras, and had passed polygraph tests. The pilots had admitted flying weapons down and cocaine and marijuana back, landing in at least one instance at Homestead Air Force Base in Florida. The exhibits included U.S. Customs reports, FBI reports, internal Justice Department memos. It almost knocked me off my chair.

It was all there in black and white. Blandón's testimony about selling cocaine for the Contras in L.A. wasn't some improbable fantasy. This could have actually happened.

I called Jack Blum, the Washington, D.C., attorney who'd headed the Kerry investigation, and he confirmed that Meneses had been an early target. But the Justice Department, he said, had stonewalled the committee's requests for information, and he had finally given up trying to obtain the records, moving on to other, more productive areas. "There was a lot of weird stuff going on out on the West Coast, but after our experiences with Justice...we mainly concentrated on the cocaine coming into the East."

"Why is it that I can barely remember this?" I asked. "I mean, I read the papers every day."

"It wasn't in the papers, for the most part. We laid it all out, and we were trashed," Blum said. "I've got to tell you, there's a real problem with the press in this town. We were totally hit by the leadership of the administration and much of the congressional leadership. They simply turned around and said, 'These people are crazy. Their witnesses are full of shit. They're a bunch of drug dealers, drug addicts; don't listen to them.' And they dumped all over us. It came from every direction and every corner. We were even dumped on by the Iran-Contra Committee. They wouldn't touch this issue with a 10-foot pole."

"There had to have been some reporters who followed this," I protested. "Maybe I'm naive, but this seems like a huge story to me."

Blum barked a laugh. "Well, it's nice to hear someone finally say that, even if it is 10 years later."

A FEW DAYS later I got a call from Coral. My one chance to hook up with Blandón had just fallen through. "He isn't going to be testifying at Rafael's trial after all," she told me. "Rafael's attorney won his motion to have the DEA and FBI release the uncensored files, and the U.S. attorney decided to drop him as a witness rather than do that. Can you believe it? He was one of the witnesses they used to get the indictment against Rafael, and now they're refusing to put him on the stand."

I hung up the phone in a funk.

But pretty soon the San Diego attorney who had been out of town when I was looking for Blandón returned my call. Juanita Brooks had represented Blandón's friend and co-defendant, a Mexican millionaire named Sergio Guerra. Another lawyer in her firm had defended Chepita Blandón. She knew quite a bit about the couple.

"You don't happen to know where he is these days, do you?"

"No, but I can tell you where he'll be in a couple of months. Here in San Diego. Entirely by coincidence, I have a case coming up where he's the chief prosecution witness against my client."

"You're kidding," I said. "What case is this?"

"It's a pretty big one. Have you ever heard of someone named Freeway Ricky Ross?"

Indeed I had. I'd run across him while researching the asset forfeiture series in 1993. "He's one of the biggest crack dealers in L.A.," I said.

"That's what they say," Brooks replied. "He and my client and a couple others were arrested in a DEA reverse sting last year, and Blandón is the confidential informant in the case."

"How did Blandón get involved with crack dealers?"

"I don't have a lot of details because the government has been very protective of him. They've refused to give us any discovery so far," Brooks said. "But from what I understand, Blandón used to be one of Ricky Ross' sources back in the 1980s, and I suppose he played off that friendship."

My mind was racing. Blandón, the Contra fundraiser, had sold cocaine to the biggest crack dealer in South Central L.A.? That was too much.

"Are you sure about this?"

"I wouldn't want you to quote me on it," she said, "but, yes, I'm pretty sure. You can always call Alan Fenster, Ross' attorney, and ask him. I'm sure he knows."

FENSTER WAS OUT, so I left a message on his voice mail, telling him I was working on a story about Oscar Danilo Blandón and wanted to interview him. When I got back from lunch, I found a message from Fenster waiting. It said: "Oscar who?"

My heart sank. I'd suspected it was a bum lead, but I'd been keeping my fingers crossed anyway. I should have known; that would have been too perfect. I called Fenster back to thank him for his time, and he asked what kind of a story I was working on. I told him--the Contras and cocaine.

"I'm curious," he said. "What made you think this Oscar person was involved in Ricky's case?"

I told him what Brooks had related, and he gasped.

"He's the informant? Are you serious? No wonder those bastards won't give me his name!" Fenster began swearing a blue streak.

"Forgive me," he said. "But if you only knew what kind of bullshit I've been going through to get that information from those sons of bitches, and then some reporter calls me up from San Jose and he knows all about him, it just makes me...."

"Your client didn't tell you his name?"

"He didn't know it! He only knew him as Danilo, and then he wasn't even sure that was his real name. You and Ricky need to talk. I'll have him call you." He hung up abruptly.

Ross called a few hours later. I asked him what he knew about Blandón. "A lot," he said. "He was almost like a godfather to me. He's the one who got me going."

"Was he your main source?"

"He was. Everybody I knew, I knew through him. So really, he could be considered as my only source. In a sense, he was."

"When was this?"

"Eighty-one or '82. Right when I was getting going."

Damn, I thought. That was right when Blandón said he started dealing drugs.

"Would you be willing to sit down and talk to me about this?" I asked.

"Hell, yeah. I'll tell you anything you want to know."

At the end of September 1995, I spent a week in San Diego, going through the files of the Ross case, interviewing defense attorneys and prosecutors, listening to undercover DEA tapes. I attended a discovery hearing and watched as Fenster and the other defense lawyers made another futile attempt to find out details about the government's informant, so they could begin preparing their defenses. Assistant U.S. Attorney O'Neale refused to provide a thing. They'd get what they were entitled to, he promised, 10 days before trial.

"See what I mean?" Fenster asked me on his way out. "It's like the trial in Alice in Wonderland."

I spent hours with Ross at the Metropolitan Correctional Center. He knew nothing of Blandón's past, I discovered. He had no idea who the Contras were or whose side they were on. To him, Danilo was just a nice guy with a lot of cheap dope.

"What would you say if I were to tell you that he was working for the Contras, selling cocaine to help them buy weapons and supplies?" I asked.

Ross goggled. "And they put me in jail? I'd say that was some fucked-up shit there. They say I sold dope all over, but man, I know he done sold 10 times more than me. Are you being straight with me?"

I told him I had documents to prove it. Ross just shook his head and looked away. "He's been working for the government the whole damn time," he muttered.

__________________
A TAINTED DEAL http://www.motherjones.com/politics/1998/06/tainted-deal

 LA DEA; Murder of Kiki Camarena http://www.laweekly.com/news/how-a-dogged-la-dea-agent-unraveled-the-cias-alleged-role-in-the-murder-of-kiki-camarena-5750278  

"Several informed sources have told me that an appendix to this Report was removed at the instruction of the DOJ at the last minute. This appendix is reported to have information about a CIA officer, not agent or asset, but officer, based in the LA Station, who was in charge of Contra related activities. According to these sources, this individual was associated with running drugs to South Central L.A., around 1988. Let me repeat that amazing omission. The recently released CIA Report Vol II contained an appendix, which was pulled by the DOJ, that reported a CIA officer in the LA Station was hooked into drug running in South Central Los Angeles." Maxine Waters Oct, 1998
https://fas.org/irp/congress/1998_cr/h981013-coke.htm   

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maynard

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Great book...The First Chapter of WHITEOUT

CHAPTER ONE

Whiteout
The CIA, Drugs and the Press


By ALEXANDER COCKBURN and JEFFREY ST. CLAIR
Verso

Read the Review

Webb's Big Story

Sunday, August 18, 1996, was not a major news day for most American newspapers. The big story of the hour was the preview of the Democratic convention in Chicago.

    About 2,500 miles west of Chicago lies Silicon Valley. Its big newspaper is the San Jose Mercury News, which has a solid reputation as a good regional paper. Like other Knight-Ridder properties, such as the Philadelphia Inquirer and the Detroit Free Press, it has a middle-of-the-road political cast slightly tilted to the Democratic side.

    As the citizens of Santa Clara County browsed through their newspaper that Sunday morning, many of them surely stopped at the first article of a three-part series, under the slightly sinister title "Dark Alliance," subtitled "The Story Behind the Crack Explosion." The words were superimposed on a murky picture of a black man smoking a crack pipe, said image overlaid on the seal of the Central Intelligence Agency. The first day's headline was "America's Crack Plague Has Roots in Nicaraguan War," just above the byline of the author of the series, a reporter in the Mercury News Sacramento bureau named Gary Webb.

    Within a couple of weeks, the story that Webb laid across August 18, 19 and 20 in the San Jose Mercury News would convulse black America and prompt the Central Intelligence Agency first to furious denials and then to one of the most ruthless campaigns of vilification of a journalist since the Agency went after Seymour Hersh in the mid 1970s. Within three weeks, both the Justice Department and the CIA bowed to fierce demands by California Senator Barbara Boxer and Los Angeles Representative Maxine Waters for thorough a investigation. By mid-November, a crowd of 1,500 locals in Waters's own district in South Central Los Angeles would be giving CIA director John Deutch one of the hardest evenings of his life. In terms of public unease about the secret activities of the US government, Webb's series was the most significant event since the Iran/Contra affair nearly blew Ronald Reagan out of the water.

    From the savage assaults on Webb by other members of his profession, those unfamiliar with the series might have assumed that Webb had made a series of wild and unsubstantiated charges, long on dramatic speculation and short on specific data or sourcing. In fact, Webb's series was succinct and narrowly focused.

    Webb stuck closely to a single story line: how a group of Nicaraguan exiles set up a cocaine ring in California, establishing ties with the black street gangs of South Central Los Angeles who manufactured crack out of shipments of powder cocaine. Webb then charted how much of the profits made by the Nicaraguan exiles had been funneled back to the Contra army -- created in the late 1970s by the Central Intelligence Agency, with the mission of sabotaging the Sandinista revolution that had evicted Anastasio Somoza and his corrupt clique in 1979.

    The very first paragraph of the series neatly summed up the theme. It was, as they say in the business, a strong lead, but a justified one. "For the better part of a decade, a San Francisco Bay Area drug ring sold tons of cocaine to the Crips and Bloods street gangs of Los Angeles and funneled millions in drug profits to a Latin American guerrilla army run by the CIA." That San Francisco drug ring was headed by a Nicaraguan exile named Norwin Meneses Cantarero, who served "as the head of security and intelligence" for the leading organization in the Contra coalition, the FDN or Fuerza Democratico Nicaraguense. The FDN was headed by Enrique Bermudez and Adolfo Calero, who had been installed in those positions under the oversight of the CIA. Meneses came from a family intimately linked to the Somoza dictatorship. One brother had been chief of police in Managua. Two other brothers were generals in the force most loyal to Somoza, the National Guard. While his brothers were assisting Somoza in the political dictatorship that darkened Nicaragua for many decades, Norwin Meneses applied his energies mostly to straightforwardly criminal enterprises in the civil sector. He ran a car theft ring and was also one of the top drug traffickers in Nicaragua, where he was known as El Rey del Drogas (the king of drugs). Meneses worked with the approval of the Somoza clan, which duly received its rake-off.

    In 1977, Norwin Meneses felt it necessary to register his disquiet at a Nicaraguan customs probe into his smuggling of high-end North American cars from the US into Nicaragua. The Meneses gang murdered the chief of customs. Owing to Norwin's powerful family, the case was never prosecuted.

    The US Drug Enforcement Agency and other agencies had been keeping files on Meneses since at least 1974. Yet he was granted political refugee status in July 1979, when he and other members of Somoza's elite fled to the US. Meneses landed in San Francisco as part of what became known locally as the Nicaraguan "gold rush." Here he lost no time in rebuilding his criminal enterprises in stolen cars and drugs.

    Meneses's contact in Los Angeles was another Nicaraguan exile, Oscar Danilo Blandon. Blandon had left Managua in June 1979, a month before Meneses, on the eve of Somoza's downfall. The son of a Managua slumlord, Blandon had earned a master's degree in marketing from the University of Bogota in Colombia and had headed Somoza's agricultural export program. Agricultural exports were an important component of the country's mainly ranching- and coffee-based economy, with the Somoza family itself owning no less than a quarter of the nation's agricultural land.

    In his position as head of the export program, Blandon had developed close ties to the US Department of Commerce and the US State Department. He secured $27 million in USAID funding and was well known to the US military and the Central Intelligence Agency, both of which had a commanding presence in Somoza's Nicaragua. (Somoza had sent his officer corps for training in the US, and the CIA station chief was the most powerful foreigner in Managua.)

    Blandon's wife, Chepita, also came from a powerful clan, the Murillo family. One of her relatives was the mayor of Managua. Like many other Somoza supporters, both the Blandon and Murillo families lost most of their fortunes in the 1979 revolution and burned with the desire to evict the popular government headed by the Sandinista commanders.

    Blandon and his wife settled in Los Angeles, where he started a used-car business. He also began to involve himself in Nicaraguan emigre politics. Testifying on February 3, 1994 as a government witness before a federal grand jury investigating the Meneses family's drug ring in San Francisco, Blandon said he drove to San Francisco for several meetings with Norwin Meneses "to start the movement, the Contra revolution." Blandon had known the Meneses family in Nicaragua. In fact, Blandon said, his mother shared Meneses's last name of Cantarero, "so we are related." He said he and Meneses "met with the politics people," but couldn't find a way to raise big sums of cash.

    In the spring of 1981, Blandon got a phone call from an old friend and business associate from Managua named Donald Barrios. Barrios, then living in Miami, was moving in high-level Nicaraguan emigre circles. This group included General Gustavo Medina, once an important intelligence officer in Somoza's National Guard, a position in which he had long-standing ties to the CIA. Blandon later testified that Barrios "started telling me we had to raise some money and send it to Honduras." Barrios instructed Blandon to go to Los Angeles International Airport to meet Meneses. Blandon and Meneses then flew to Honduras and, in the capital city of Tegucigalpa, met with Enrique Bermudez, former National Guardsman and military commander of the FDN.

    In Somoza's final days, President Jimmy Carter had made a last-ditch effort to maintain a US-backed regime in Nicaragua even if Somoza should be forced to quit. The plan was to preserve the bloodthirsty National Guard as the custodian of US interests. When this plan failed and the Sandinistas swept to power, Carter ordered the initial organization of what later became known as the Contras, operating out of Honduras. The CIA mustered Argentinian officers fresh from their own death squad campaigns, and these men began to organize the exiled National Guardsmen into a military force.

    Bermudez was key to this CIA-organized operation from the start. He had been a colonel in the National Guard, had trained at the US National Defense College outside Washington, D.C., and had served from 1976 to July 1979 as Somoza's military attache in Washington. Furnished with $300,000 in CIA money, Bermudez took command of the fledgling Contra force in Honduras. In the summer of 1981, at the dawn of the Reagan administration, Bermudez held a press conference in Honduras. In language drafted by his CIA handlers, Bermudez announced the formation of the FDN and his own position as commander of its military wing. The CIA script later installed Adolfo Calero, formerly the Coca-Cola concessionaire in Managua, as the FDN's civilian head, operating mainly out of the United States, where he was under tight CIA supervision.

    Blandon and Meneses arrived to meet Bermudez at a moment of financial strain for the Contra army, then in formation. The CIA had provided seed money, but it wasn't until November 23, 1981 that Reagan approved National Security Directive 17, which provided a budget of $19.3 million for the Contras, via the CIA. The Contras, Bermudez said, needed money urgently, and, Blandon later testified to a US federal grand jury, it was at this meeting that the need for drug money to finance the Contras was proposed. "There's a saying," Blandon testified, "that `the ends justify the means.' And that's what Mr. Bermudez told us in Honduras."

    Bermudez was not repelled by the moral implications of drug smuggling. In fact, evidence gathered during congressional hearings in the mid-1980s suggests that Bermudez himself had previously had a hand in the drug trade. "Bermudez was the target of a government-sponsored drug sting operation," said Senator John Kerry, who chaired a committee that investigated charges of Contra cocaine smuggling. "He has been involved in drug running." Kerry charged that the CIA had protected Bermudez from arrest. "The law enforcement officials know that the sting was called back in the interest of protecting the Contras," Kerry concluded.

    Back in San Francisco, Meneses began educating Blandon, the graduate in marketing, on the finer points of cocaine wholesaling. Trained in accountancy, Blandon did some work on Meneses's books and rapidly became aware of the substantial scale of his cocaine operation. In 1981 alone, Blandon later testified, the Meneses ring moved 900 kilos of cocaine. At that time the wholesale price of a kilo of cocaine was $50,000. The cocaine was coming from Colombia via Mexico and Miami and then to the Bay Area, where it was stashed in about a dozen warehouses. Meneses was also keeping cocaine at the house of his mistress, Blanca Margarita Castano, who lived near the old Cow Palace in the Hunters Point area. Eventually Meneses's romantic complications prompted him to relocate his wife and young children to Los Angeles, with Mrs. Meneses ensconced in a silk-screening business under the eye of Blandon, who also set up a restaurant for Mrs. Meneses called Chickalina. Both the silk-screen shop and the restaurant became fronts for the drug business. As Blandon put it, "It was marketing, okay? Marketing."

    As a cocaine wholesaler in Los Angeles, Blandon got off to a slow start. He'd pick up a couple of kilos from Meneses, along with a list of local buyers, and he'd do the rounds in his white Toyota. But business remained static until he made a fateful contact with a young black fellow living in South Central named Rick Ross. Ross was born in Troup, Texas and as a young child moved to Los Angeles with his mother. He'd shown promise as a tennis player in high school and had set his sights on a college scholarship, when his coach found he could neither read nor write and dropped him. Ross went to Los Angeles Trade Technical College, was number three on the tennis team, and entered a course in bookbinding. To make some money he started selling stolen car parts, was arrested, and had to quit school.

    Ross first heard about cocaine, at the time a middle-class drug, from a college friend, and it wasn't long before he made a connection with a Nicaraguan dealer named Henry Corrales. Corrales gave Ross a good price, and he was able to make a decent profit in reselling to the Crips gang in South Central and Compton.

    As we shall see, the economics of cocaine became a bitter issue in the uproar over Webb's series. Was it true that the cocaine prices set by the Nicaraguans rendered the drug affordable to poor people for the first time? Arguably, this was the case -- and indeed there is more evidence to substantiate such a thesis than Webb was able to offer in his tightly edited series. Cheap cocaine began to appear in South Central Los Angeles in early 1982. Ross got it from Corrales, who worked for Meneses and Blandon, and it wasn't long before Ross went directly to Blandon.

    As Ross later told Webb, the prices offered by Blandon gave him command of the Los Angeles market. He was buying his cocaine supplies at sometimes $10,000 less per kilo than the going rate. "It was unreal," Ross remembered. "We were just wiping everyone out." His connections to the Bloods and Crips street gangs solved the distribution problems that had previously beleaguered Blandon. By 1983, Ross -- now known as "Freeway Ricky" -- was buying over a 100 kilos of cocaine a week and selling as much as $3 million worth of crack a day.

    Drugs weren't the only commodity Blandon was selling to Ross. The young entrepreneur was also receiving from the Nicaraguan a steady stream of weapons and surveillance equipment, including Uzi submachine guns, semi-automatic handguns, miniature videocameras, recording equipment, police scanners and Colt AR-15 assault rifles. Ross told Webb that Blandon even tried to sell his partner a grenade launcher.

    Blandon's source for this equipment was a man named Ronald J. Lister. Lister, who figures prominently in the story, was a former Laguna Beach police detective who at that time was running two security firms -- Mundy Security and Pyramid International Security Consultants. Blandon testified at Rick Ross's trial in March 1996 that Lister would attend meetings of Contra supporters in Southern California to demonstrate his arsenal. Lister had worked as an informant for the DEA and FBI, and boasted of his ties to the CIA during the 1980s, when the Reagan administration was waging war in Central America.

    Business was indeed booming. In 1981 Meneses had, according to Blandon's reading of his account books, been moving 900 kilos a year. Two years later the numbers had surged to around 5,000 kilos a year -- and the latter figure represents just the amount Blandon's LA operation was handling. Ross was a brilliant businessman. His greatest coup was to recognize the potential in recent technological innovations for the mass marketing of cocaine. Ross didn't invent the process whereby powder cocaine was converted into the "rocks" of crack that could be sold at affordable street prices; crack had first appeared in poor city neighborhoods on the West Coast in 1979. But Ross was the first to take full advantage. Crack could be bought for $4 to $5 a hit. It gave an intense, although brief, high, and was highly addictive. Consequently, as the furious black reaction to the Webb series tells us, crack engendered social disaster in neighborhoods such as South Central. Families were ravaged by addiction. Addicts stole and robbed to buy the next hit. Gangs fought bloody battles for control of turf. The plague elicited a savage response from the state. Prison sentences were a hundred times more severe for crack-related offenses than for powder cocaine.

    By 1985, Ross and his affiliates in the street gangs had begun exporting their crack operation to what the DEA reckoned to be at least a dozen other cities. Obviously, the sums accruing to Danilo Blandon in the drug trade were enormous, and he testified at Ross's trial that "whatever we were running in LA, the profit was going to the Contra revolution." Duane "Dewey" Clarridge, the CIA officer in charge of covert operations in Latin America, has denied, both in the press and in his memoir, allegations that the CIA would have sanctioned or turned a blind eye to Contra drug shipments for funding reasons. The CIA's Contra operation, said Clarridge, "was funded by the US government. There was enough money to fund the operation. We didn't need, and neither did the Contras need the money from anybody else."

    But from the beginning, Clarridge's plans for the Contras were much more ambitious than the initial scheme of the Reagan administration, which was to use them as part of an effort to seal off Nicaragua and try to stop it from aiding guerrilla struggles in neighboring countries. Clarridge wanted a covert war. In the summer of 1981, a week after becoming head of the CIA's Latin American operations, he took his recommendations to CIA chief William Casey: "My plan was simple. 1. Take the war to Nicaragua. 2. Start killing Cubans." This quickly evolved into a far-ranging program of assassinations, industrial sabotage and incursions into Nicaraguan territory from bases in Honduras and Costa Rica.

    The problem for Clarridge and for the CIA was that the US Congress tended to be dubious of such large plans, which were not politically popular. The initial appropriation was meager, amounting to only $19 million in 1982 for the CIA's covert operations against Nicaragua. In the spring of 1982 such covert costs soared when the Argentinians who had been supervising day-to-day military training for the fledgling Contra force in Honduras pulled out at the onset of the Falklands/Malvinas War. Later that year, Congress moved to restrict CIA aid for the Contras. At the last second Rep. Edward Boland of Massachusetts introduced an amendment to the Defense Appropriations Bill for fiscal 1983, prohibiting the CIA from spending any money "for the purpose of overthrowing the government of Nicaragua." The Agency was given only $21 million outside Boland's restrictions for activities related to the Contras.

    In December 1983 Congress capped Contra funding for fiscal 1984 at only $24 million, which was roughly a quarter of what the Reagan administration had claimed was necessary for a proper fighting force. The shortfall was what drove Robert McFarlane and Oliver North to hunt for alternative sources of funding -- for example, asking the Saudis for $1 million a month. Clarridge went on a similar mission to South Africa. North was in the process of setting up covert bank accounts in mid-1984.

    In April 1984, it emerged that the CIA had undertaken the mining of Nicaraguan harbors. The political uproar in the US resulted in the most restrictive of the Boland amendments, passed by Congress in October 1984. During fiscal 1985, the amendment read, "no funds available to the Central Intelligence Agency, the Department of Defense, or any other agency or entity of the United States involved in intelligence activities may be obligated or expended for the purpose or which have the effect of supporting, directly or indirectly, military or paramilitary operations in Nicaragua by any nation, group, organization, movement, or individual." The year 1985 also marked the peak of the Meneses-Blandon drug sales, at the time of the CIA's greatest need for money for its Contra army. The Boland amendment expired on October 17, 1986, and immediately the portion of the CIA budget allocated for the Contras rose to $100 million.

    During this stressful period of desperate Contra need for cash, when Reagan secretly decreed to National Security Adviser McFarlane that whatever Congress might stipulate, the Contras had to be kept together "body and soul," the drug operation run by Contra supporters Meneses and Blandon led a charmed life, without any disruption of its activities by law enforcement. Indeed, several law enforcement officers have complained publicly that actions targeted against Meneses were blocked by NSC officers in the Reagan administration and by the CIA.

    Only a few weeks after the Blandon-Meneses partnership was launched in the summer of 1981, a young DEA agent in San Francisco named Susan Smith began an investigation of Norwin Meneses. Smith had picked up rumors on the street that a group of Nicaraguan exiles headed by Meneses was selling cocaine in the Bay Area and sending money and weapons back to Central America. She checked the DEA files on Meneses and found a bulging record of the man's criminal activities, dating back to a 1978 FBI report charging that Norwin and his brother Ernest were "smuggling 20 kilos of cocaine at a time into the United States." One of the entry points for Meneses's cocaine was apparently New Orleans, where Smith came across records from the DEA's "Operation Alligator." This government sting had busted a large cocaine ring in New Orleans. One of the arrested men, Manuel Porro, told DEA agent Bill Cunningham that Meneses was the source of the cocaine. However, Meneses was never arrested.

    A few months later, Smith discovered, the San Francisco DEA office received a tip that Meneses was also the supplier for cocaine seized in a major bust in Tampa, Florida in February 1980. The cocaine had apparently been flown to Tampa from Meneses's ranch in Costa Rica, to be distributed by Meneses's relatives. Smith also learned that, beginning in early June 1981, Detective Joseph Lee of the Baldwin Park Police Department in Los Angeles had been investigating a Nicaraguan dealer named Julio Bermudez who was making two trips a month to San Francisco, where he would pick up 20 pounds of cocaine at a time from Meneses's warehouses.

    Smith mustered this information into an affidavit for a search warrant. dated November 16, 1981, and began trailing Meneses and his dealers. On one occasion, Smith followed Meneses's men to a house in Daly City, just south of San Francisco, which was owned by Carlos Cabezas, a Nicaraguan lawyer and accountant who had served as a pilot in Somoza's National Guard. Cabezas was a leading figure in the anti-Sandinista movement in California.

    Then Smith's superiors abruptly terminated her investigation and she was reassigned to cover drug dealing by motorcycle gangs in Oakland. Despite her huge file on Meneses, Smith told Webb, DEA managers evinced no interest. Smith quit the DEA in 1984, asking her superiors if they wanted her extensive files on the Meneses drug ring. They declined, and the files were shredded.

    What's more than a little curious about the DEA's lack of interest in Meneses in 1984 is that in February 1983 the FBI had scored one of the largest cocaine seizures in California history, in the so-called Frogman case. Members of the Meneses drug syndicate had been caught attempting to swim ashore at the San Francisco docks from a Colombian freighter, the Ciudad de Cuta, with 400 pounds of cocaine. According to the DEA, the drugs had a street value at that time of more than $100 million. Ultimately, thirty-five people were arrested in the Frogman case, including Julio Zavala and the man whose house Susan Smith had staked out, Carlos Cabezas. The Frogman trial was going on at the very moment the DEA was telling Susan Smith that information about Cabezas and Meneses held no interest for it.

    But then again, the Frogman case was not exactly your run-of-the-mill drug trial. On November 28, 1984, Cabezas testified in that trial that this cocaine-smuggling operation was a funding source for the Contras. Furthermore, he testified that the cocaine he brought into the US came from Norwin Meneses's ranch in Costa Rica. His testimony at the trial was limited, because the judge would not allow the defense to explore the CIA's role in any detail. In a subsequent interview recorded for a British TV documentary, Cabezas said that the CIA was aware of, and in fact had supervised, a crucial phase of his drug-trafficking operation. "It wasn't until the second trip that I had to go to Costa Rica," Cabezas said, "when I met this guy [Ivan Gomez] that's supposed to be the CIA agent. They told me who he was and the reason he was there, it was to make sure that the money was given to the right people and nobody was taking advantage of the situation and nobody was taking profits that they were not supposed to. And that was it. He was making sure that the money goes to the Contra revolution."

    Concerns that the drug money might have been diverted to the bank accounts of Contra leaders were not without foundation. Two of Cabezas' colleagues in this Costa Rica/San Francisco cocaine enterprise were Troilo and Ferdinand Sanchez, close relatives of Contra leader Aristides Sanchez. Sanchez was a member of the FDN's directorate. He and his relatives maintained an offshore bank account in the Dutch Antilles, which Oliver North's aide Robert Owen suspected was being refreshed with cash intended for the Contra effort. Owen wrote a memo to North that he believed that "the CIA is being had." North took no action. Clearly, Reagan's National Security staff knew well that drug money from the Meneses syndicate was supposed to go, with CIA approval, to the Contra war effort, and they were chagrined that the money might have been diverted from that mission.

    One of the other leaders of the Frogman operation was Julio Zavala, a brother-in-law of Cabezas. After his arrest, FBI agents seized $36,800 in cash from Zavala, which the government considered to be drug money and therefore subject to seizure. Zavala claimed that the money was cash meant to buy weapons for the Contras. His attorney, Judd Iverson, submitted letters to the court from two Contra leaders backing up Zavala's story. US District Attorney Joseph P. Russoniello, who had also been urged by the CIA to return the money, stipulated in a court filing on October 2, 1984 that the money would be given back. In 1987 this deal came to the attention of Jack Blum, investigator for Senator John Kerry's committee probing the stories of Contra drug running. Blum and Kerry called Russoniello to ask about the case. "We had a telephone conversation with Mr. Russoniello," Blum recalled during his testimony before the Senate Intelligence Committee on October 23, 1996, "and he shouted at us. He shouted at Senator John Kerry, who chaired the committee. He accused us of being subversives for wanting to get into it."

    So Zavala got his money back, though he did spend some time in prison. Norwin Meneses, the kingpin of the operation, was never indicted or arrested for his part in the Frogman case. Witnesses testified before Kerry's committee in 1988 that Meneses had been tipped off about the planned arrest "by his sources in US law enforcement." Another witness said he believed that Meneses was working "as an FBI informant" at the time of the arrest.

    In fact, the US government did not indict Norwin Meneses until 1989, after the end of the Contra war, and the indictment was for conspiracy to sell precisely 1 kilo of cocaine in 1984. By then Meneses, sensing his veil of protection might have worn thin, had left San Francisco for his ranch in Costa Rica. No attempt was made to secure Meneses's arrest or to persuade the Costa Rican government to extradite him. The indictment wasn't made public and was kept under seal in San Francisco at the request of the federal government. Interestingly enough, 1984 -- the year for which the US government chose to charge Meneses with dealing in cocaine -- was the very year in which he had been most conspicuous as a big figure in the Nicaraguan emigre movement supporting the Contras. During that year Meneses had been entertaining Contra leaders, hosting Contra fundraising dinners and having his photograph taken with Adolfo Calero.

    Webb uncovered evidence that even Contra supporters in San Francisco were uncomfortable about the source of Meneses's disbursements in the Contra cause. The Mercury News series included an interview with, Dennis Ainsworth, a former Cal State/Hayward economics professor who was a well-connected Reagan Republican and active in the Contra cause. In 1985 he was told by Renato Pena, an FDN leader in San Francisco, "that the FDN is involved in drug smuggling with the aid of Norwin Meneses who also buys arms for Enrique Bermudez, a leader of the FDN." Ainsworth finally told his friends in the Reagan administration about Meneses, and asked what they knew about the Nicaraguan. He was told that the DEA had a drug file on Meneses "two feet thick." Ainsworth gave a detailed interview to the FBI on February 27, 1987, a severely edited version of which had recently been declassified by the US National Archives. In this interview, Ainsworth not only backed the contention that Meneses was using drug profits to buy weapons for the Contras, but also gave details of how US Customs and DEA agents trying to investigate Meneses "felt threatened and intimidated by National Security interference in legitimate narcotics smuggling investigations."

    Norwin Meneses was finally arrested in 1990, when Nicaraguan authorities caught him trying to transport 750 kilos of cocaine. Reporters in Managua soon unearthed the sealed San Francisco indictment. The Nicaraguan police and the Nicaraguan judge presiding over Meneses's trial expressed outrage that the United States had known about the drug lord's activities for fifteen years, but had never arrested him. "We always felt there was an unanswered question," recalled Rene Vita, a former narcotics investigator, to the British TV documentary crew. "How was it that this man, who was known to be involved in drug-related activities, moved so freely around Central America, the US and Mexico?"

    Meneses had been turned in to the Nicaraguan police by his longtime associate Enrique Miranda, a former intelligence officer in Somoza's National Guard, who had been Meneses's link to the Bogota cocaine cartel in Colombia. Miranda testified that from 1981 through 1985 Meneses transported his cocaine out of Colombia through the services of Marcos Aguado, a Nicaraguan who had become a senior officer in the Salvadoran air force. Aguado was a contract pilot for the US "humanitarian aid" flights to the Contras, based at Ilopango airbase in San Salvador. The overseer for such operations at this airport was a career CIA officer, Felix Rodriguez. Miranda testified that Aguado flew Salvadoran air force planes to Colombia to pick up cocaine shipments and delivered them to US Air Force bases in Texas. On the basis of Miranda's testimony, Norwin Meneses was sentenced by the Nicaraguan court to thirty years in prison.

    Danilo Blandon enjoyed good fortune as far as any intrusion by law enforcement into his affairs was concerned. All the way through the first half of the 1980s, the prime wholesaler of cocaine to Los Angeles was not once raided or inconvenienced in any way by any authorities. The Boland amendment barring aid to the Contras was lifted on October 17, 1986. On October 27, 1986, warrants were issued by the FBI, IRS and Los Angeles County Sheriff's office for the arrest of Blandon and his wife. The arrest warrants from the LA Sheriff's office included an affidavit from Sergeant Tom Gordon, charging that "Danilo Blandon is in charge of a sophisticated cocaine smuggling and distribution organization operating in southern California. The moneys gained from the sales of cocaine are transported to Florida and laundered through Orlando Murillo who is a high-ranking officer of a chain of banks in Florida named Government Securities Corporation. From this bank the moneys are filtered to the Contra rebels to buy arms in the war in Nicaragua." Orlando Murillo was a cousin of Blandon's wife, Chepita. Police raided twelve warehouses suspected of being used by Blandon. No drugs were found. The police were convinced that Blandon had received a tip-off about the impending raids and had cleaned up.

    One of the targets in those early morning raids on October 27 was the Mission Viejo home of Ronald Lister, the former Laguna Beach police detective who had been the arms supplier to the Blandon ring. Lister opened the door wearing his bathrobe, and sheriff's deputies flooded in. Lister became belligerent and told the deputies they were "making a big mistake." He informed the police that he didn't deal drugs, but that he did do a lot of business in Latin America for the US government, and that his friends in the government weren't going to be happy about the deputies ransacking his house.

    Then Lister picked up the phone and said he was calling his friend "Scott Weekly of the CIA." The cops continued in the search, and though they found no cocaine, they did turn up an amazing cache of weapons, military manuals and training videotapes. Even though Lister escaped arrest, the police seized boxes of military material. Again, the police were convinced that someone had tipped Lister to the impending raid. These suspicions magnified when, less than a week later, all of the evidence carted from Lister's house mysteriously disappeared from the Sheriff's Department's property room.

(C) 1998 Alexander Cockburn and Jeffrey St. Clair All rights reserved. ISBN: 1-85984-897-4




__________________
A TAINTED DEAL http://www.motherjones.com/politics/1998/06/tainted-deal

 LA DEA; Murder of Kiki Camarena http://www.laweekly.com/news/how-a-dogged-la-dea-agent-unraveled-the-cias-alleged-role-in-the-murder-of-kiki-camarena-5750278  

"Several informed sources have told me that an appendix to this Report was removed at the instruction of the DOJ at the last minute. This appendix is reported to have information about a CIA officer, not agent or asset, but officer, based in the LA Station, who was in charge of Contra related activities. According to these sources, this individual was associated with running drugs to South Central L.A., around 1988. Let me repeat that amazing omission. The recently released CIA Report Vol II contained an appendix, which was pulled by the DOJ, that reported a CIA officer in the LA Station was hooked into drug running in South Central Los Angeles." Maxine Waters Oct, 1998
https://fas.org/irp/congress/1998_cr/h981013-coke.htm   

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maynard

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Reply with quote  #117 

IN 1999, REUTERS REPORTED THAT THE HEAD OF THE NEW YORK STOCK EXCHANGE, RICHARD GRASSO, MET WITH Manuel Marulanda, THE HEAD OF THE COMMUNIST FARC GUERILLAS. HE ENCOURAGED THE FARC LEADERS TO PARTICIPATE (THEIR DRUG PROFITS, FARC'S PRIMARY SOURCE OF INCOME) IN U.S. CAPITAL MARKETS. FARC DECLINED, AND THE WAR STARTED SHORTLY THEREAFTER.

FARC is considered a TERRORIST ORGANIZATION by the U.S. STATE DEPARTMENT (on its list of foreign terrorist organizations) and is alledgedly responsible for kidnappings and narcotics trafficking in order to bankroll their revolutionary activities .

NICE JOB, GUYS! AND OF COURSE PLAN COLOMBIA PRIMARILY ATTACKS THE CROPS OWNED BY FARC, NOT ONES OWNED BY ESCOBAR CRONIE AND NOW PRESIDENT URIBE.




NYSE Chairman Richard Grasso with a FARC Commmander

NYSE Chairman Richard Grasso with a FARC Commmander
Reuters


NYSE Chief Meets Top Colombia Rebel Leader

Saturday, 26 June 1999

BOGOTA -- The head of the New York Stock Exchange held face-to-face talks Saturday with a leader of Colombia's main Marxist rebel group, government sources said.

They said NYSE Chairman Richard Grasso flew into a demilitarized region of Colombia's southern jungle and savanna for his talks with a member of the general secretariat of the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC).

A government spokesman initially said Grasso had met Manuel Marulanda, a legendary figure known by the alias ``Sureshot'' and the FARC's maximum commander.

But the state-run news agency ANCOL later reported that Grasso had met Raul Reyes, one of Marulanda's top deputies and his chief negotiator in fledgling peace talks with the government.

The meeting was thought to be the first between a senior member of the FARC, which is radically opposed to capitalism, and a representative of one of the world's top financial markets.

ANCOL quoted Grasso as having stressed the importance of full-fledged negotiations between the government and FARC, which are due to get under way on July 7 and aimed at ending a conflict that has taken more than 35,000 lives over the last decade alone.

The news agency said Grasso had extended a personal invitation to leaders of the FARC, which is considered a ''terrorist'' organization by the State Department, to visit Wall Street as soon as possible.

"I invite members of the FARC to visit the New York Stock Exchange so that they can get to know the market personally," Grasso was quoted as saying.

"I truly hope that they can do this," he added.

The government has granted the FARC control of a Switzerland-sized area of south and southeast Colombia since last November as a confidence-building measure to enter into peace talks.

ANCOL said Grasso's talks with Reyes, which lasted 1-1/2 hours, took place inside the rebel-controlled zone in an area near the village of La Machacha, in southern Caqueta province.

The news agency also said Grasso, whose presence in Colombia was kept secret until Saturday, was slated to return to New York Sunday.

Local media said Grasso had asked to meet a representative of the FARC's high command to discuss foreign investment and the future role of U.S. businesses in Colombia.

The FARC and a smaller rebel group, the National Liberation Army (ELN), both took up arms against the state in the mid-1960s and have a long-running tradition of targeting U.S. interests in Colombia.

Both groups also use kidnapping to help bankroll their war effort.

©1999 Reuters Limited




NYSE Chairman Richard Grasso with a FARC Commmander


A Real World Example:

NYSE's Richard Grasso and the

Ultimate New Business "Cold Call"

Lest you think that my comment about the New York Stock Exchange is too strong, let's look at one event that occurred before our "war on drugs" went into high gear through Plan Colombia, banging heads over narco dollar market share in Latin America.

In late June 1999, numerous news services, including Associated Press, reported that Richard Grasso, Chairman of the New York Stock Exchange flew to Colombia to meet with a spokesperson for Raul Reyes of the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Columbia (FARC), the supposed "narco terrorists" with whom we are now at war.

The purpose of the trip was "to bring a message of cooperation from U.S. financial services" and to discuss foreign investment and the future role of U.S. businesses in Colombia.

Some reading in between the lines said to me that Grasso's mission related to the continued circulation of cocaine capital through the US financial system. FARC, the Colombian rebels, were circulating their profits back into local development without the assistance of the American banking and investment system. Worse yet for the outlook for the US stock market's strength from $500 billion - $1 trillion in annual money laundering - FARC was calling for the decriminalization of cocaine.

To understand the threat of decriminalization of the drug trade, just go back to your Sam and Dave estimate and recalculate the numbers given what decriminalization does to drive BIG PERCENT back to SLIM PERCENT and what that means to Wall Street and Washington's cash flows. No narco dollars, no reinvestment into the stock markets, no campaign contributions.

It was only a few days after Grasso's trip that BBC News reported a General Accounting Office (GAO) report to Congress as saying: "Colombia's cocaine and heroin production is set to rise by as much as 50 percent as the U.S. backed drug war flounders, due largely to the growing strength of Marxist rebels"

I deduced from this incident that the liquidity of the NY Stock Exchange was sufficiently dependent on high margin cocaine profits (BIG PERCENT) that the Chairman of the New York Stock Exchange was willing for Associated Press to acknowledge he is making "cold calls" in rebel controlled peace zones in Colombian villages. "Cold calls" is what we used to call new business visits we would pay to people we had not yet done business with when I was on Wall Street.

I presume Grasso's trip was not successful in turning the cash flow tide. Hence, Plan Colombia is proceeding apace to try to move narco deposits out of FARC's control and back to the control of our traditional allies and, even if that does not work, to move Citibank's market share and that of the other large US banks and financial institutions steadily up in Latin America.

Buy Banamex anyone?



__________________
A TAINTED DEAL http://www.motherjones.com/politics/1998/06/tainted-deal

 LA DEA; Murder of Kiki Camarena http://www.laweekly.com/news/how-a-dogged-la-dea-agent-unraveled-the-cias-alleged-role-in-the-murder-of-kiki-camarena-5750278  

"Several informed sources have told me that an appendix to this Report was removed at the instruction of the DOJ at the last minute. This appendix is reported to have information about a CIA officer, not agent or asset, but officer, based in the LA Station, who was in charge of Contra related activities. According to these sources, this individual was associated with running drugs to South Central L.A., around 1988. Let me repeat that amazing omission. The recently released CIA Report Vol II contained an appendix, which was pulled by the DOJ, that reported a CIA officer in the LA Station was hooked into drug running in South Central Los Angeles." Maxine Waters Oct, 1998
https://fas.org/irp/congress/1998_cr/h981013-coke.htm   

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maynard

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Reply with quote  #118 
> AOL Leader Meets Colombia Rebels
> > By JARED KOTLER Associated Press Writer
> > BOGOTA, Colombia (AP) -
Leftist guerrillas continued
> a running dialogue on the workings of international > capitalism Friday - this time with the > chairman emeritus of America Online. > > In meeting that took observers by surprise, Jim Kimsey > met in the rebel-held southern village of Los Pozos with > Manuel Marulanda, the founder and chief of the powerful > Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia, or FARC, > Colombian officials said. > > It was the latest in a series of unusual contacts between > business leaders and rebels who maintain 1960s-era > socialist rhetoric. The sessions are part of a government > effort to boost fledgling peace talks by exposing the FARC > - which earn huge profits off the drug trade and kidnappings > - to the outside world. > > Marulanda said ``he is very much interested in achieving peace,'' > the AOL chief told reporters after the meeting, which was also > attended by Colombian government officials and Joseph E. > Robert, who runs a Virgina-based investment firm. > > ``He understands, I think, that foreign investment is critical > to the prosperity of this country and I think is willing to negotiate > and to discuss possible solutions that will move this country into > the 21st century,'' Kimsey added. > > The two even exhanged baseball caps. Marulanda gave Kimsey > one in rebel camouflage. Kimsey gave Marulanda one emblazoned > with the AOL logo. > > He said he would urge other American businessmen to visit > Colombia, but doubts sagging foreign investment will rebound > until there is peace. > > Although the peasant-based FARC is seen as isolated from the > modern world, it hasn't shied away from the kind of technology > Kimsey helped develop. > > >From deep in the jungle, the 15,000-member rebel group post > communiques on the Internet, sends e-mails to journalists, and > uses computers to record finances and intelligence about potential > kidnapping victims. > > Increased private networking with the guerrillas is occurring despite > a U.S. government boycott on such contacts. > > The State Department cut off diplomatic contacts with the FARC > last year after a rebel unit abducted and killed three American > pro-Indian activists in Colombia. > > No new meetings are likely until the guilty rebels are brought to > justice, State Department spokesman James Rubin said Friday > in Washington. > > Asked why he met this time with the FARC, Kimsey said he > considered it a ``wonderful opportunity'' to support the peace process. > > Last July, New York Stock Exchange chairman Richard Grasso > met with senior FARC leaders in Colombia. And last month, rebel > leaders accompanied by government peace delegates conducted > a 23-day European tour also designed to expand the FARC's horizons. > > The delegation toured Scandinavia, Spain, Italy and Switzerland, > meeting with unions and business leaders to explore ways Colombia's > rich-poor gap could be bridged short of implementing socialism. The > rebels' nearly 36-year insurgency feeds off grinding rural poverty





Richard Grasso walks between trading floors of the NYSE near the close of trading, Friday, July 19, 2002. (Photo: AP)



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The "president of capitalism" touts shareholder democracy to armed revolutionaries....]
Financial Times -
June 28 1999
NYSE CHIEF MEETS COLOMBIAN GUERRILLAS
By Adam Thomson in Bogotá

Richard Grasso, chairman of the New York Stock Exchange, travelled to Colombia at the weekend to sell capitalism to the guerrillas of the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (Farc), a leftwing group that has a tradition of targeting US interests in Colombia. Mr Grasso spent several hours with Raúl Reyes, a Farc commander, in a guerrilla-controlled area to the south of the country. From July 7, the area is to become the venue for the first concrete peace negotiations between the 15,000-strong Farc and the Colombian government. "The message that we took to Commander Reyes is that Colombia is a country of great opportunities, and that foreign capital will look for those opportunities if there is stability," said Mr Grasso. Despite the imminent negotiations, Colombia's 35-year armed conflict is intensifying, and the resulting instability is worrying investors. In recent weeks, Moody's and Standard & Poor's, the US rating agencies, have indicated that the conflict could lead to the country losing its investment-grade rating. Mr Grasso, who emphasised that he was representing the private sector and not the US government, described his conversation with Mr Reyes as "warm" and "open". They discussed the world economy, globalisation and how developing markets were increasing their ownership of capital. "We told him that they [the Farc] must understand that the private sector and capital markets are very hopeful that the conversations which start in July produce and positive and lasting peace," he said. Mr Grasso invited Mr Reyes and Andrés Pastrana, Colombia's president, to visit the New York Stock Exchange to celebrate peace. -------




Wall Street Journal - June 28, 1999 ------------------------------------------------------------------------
BIG BOARD CHAIRMAN MEETS REBEL LEADER IN COLOMBIA IN EFFORT TO AID PEACE PROCESS
By Thomas T. Vogel Jr. and Mary Morrison
Staff Reporters of the Wall Street Journal

BOGOTA, Colombia -- The chairman of the New York Stock Exchange ventured into the jungles of southern Colombia to deliver a message of free markets to a leftist leader of the hemisphere's most powerful rebel group. Richard Grasso flew by helicopter Saturday to the tiny town of La Machaca in the middle of an isolated zone controlled by the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia, or FARC. Two other Big Board officials, Colombia's economy minister and several other government officials accompanied Mr. Grasso. The stock-exchange executive spoke for 90 minutes with Commander Raul Reyes, one of FARC's highest-ranking leaders. "We talked about economics, capital markets and how peace translates into economic opportunity for Colombia," said Mr. Grasso in an interview. Mr. Grasso was invited to visit Colombia by President Andres Pastrana after a spate of mass kidnappings and violence forced the president to cancel a visit to the Big Board earlier this month. "When I called to cancel the trip, Mr. Grasso asked me if he could do anything to help," recalled Mr. Pastrana yesterday. "So I asked him to come down and talk to these people about what's happening in the rest of the world." During the visit, the stock-exchange executive and the guerrilla leader talked about "how the peace process of Colombia is perceived on Wall Street," said Economy Minister Juan Camilo Restrepo, who served as translator for the meeting. The two men talked about "how Colombia's economy could grow more quickly and foreign investments would increase with peace," added Mr. Restrepo. "I gave him a tutorial on what's happened in the U.S. in terms of this democratization of capitalism," said Mr. Grasso. "One of the messages I wanted to emphasize is how we have a nation with almost 200 million people who own shares," explained Mr. Grasso. "With indirect ownership, literally everybody in America is a stockholder." Mr. Grasso said his words were well received. "It was a very good meeting overall." He said Mr. Reyes appeared to be "interested in learning what alternative investments could be made in Colombia once peace is achieved." Mr. Grasso added that the rebel commander "was very concerned about the narrow focus, the narrow perception that Colombia is purely looked upon as a narco-traffic economy ... he was much more in tune than you would have expected." The Big Board chairman also invited Mr. Reyes to visit the stock exchange. "He seemed reasonably intrigued," said Mr. Grasso. President Pastrana is pushing for a peace agreement with Colombia's guerrilla groups after nearly 40 years of conflict. The president is also campaigning for more foreign investment in Colombia to help end the nation's worst economic crisis since the 1930s. Origins of FARC FARC, formed in the early 1960s by communist guerrillas, is Colombia's largest and oldest guerrilla group. It is on the State Department's list of international terrorist groups. The U.S. government has said that it broke off all contacts with the rebel band after FARC guerrillas murdered three Americans in Colombia earlier this year. The group earns tens of millions of dollars a year from kidnapping, extortion and protection of Colombia's illegal drug trade. Over the past year, the group has handed Colombia's military a stunning string of humiliating defeats. In recent years, the leftist group's leaders have indicated a greater openness to free-market ideals as long as social justice is guaranteed. This isn't the first visit by a U.S. citizen to FARC territory. Just three weeks ago, Congressman William Delahunt, a Democrat from Massachusetts, met with Mr. Reyes in a similar visit to the region. "We are very aggressive in trying to pursue international markets and opportunities," explained Mr. Grasso in the interview. "The entirety of the Latin American landscape is a very promising one for us." Mr. Pastrana, who has met with FARC leaders several times himself, insisted that Mr. Grasso was in no immediate danger during the trip. "This was the president of capitalism" in FARC territory, said Mr. Pastrana. "He knew that I wasn't going to put him in any danger.


__________________
A TAINTED DEAL http://www.motherjones.com/politics/1998/06/tainted-deal

 LA DEA; Murder of Kiki Camarena http://www.laweekly.com/news/how-a-dogged-la-dea-agent-unraveled-the-cias-alleged-role-in-the-murder-of-kiki-camarena-5750278  

"Several informed sources have told me that an appendix to this Report was removed at the instruction of the DOJ at the last minute. This appendix is reported to have information about a CIA officer, not agent or asset, but officer, based in the LA Station, who was in charge of Contra related activities. According to these sources, this individual was associated with running drugs to South Central L.A., around 1988. Let me repeat that amazing omission. The recently released CIA Report Vol II contained an appendix, which was pulled by the DOJ, that reported a CIA officer in the LA Station was hooked into drug running in South Central Los Angeles." Maxine Waters Oct, 1998
https://fas.org/irp/congress/1998_cr/h981013-coke.htm   

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maynard

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Reply with quote  #119 

WHAT DID JOHN ROBERTS KNOW ABOUT THE ADAM COMMUTATION? Pakistani heroin smuggler served 5 years of 55 year sentence; freed by senior Bush and his Justice Department two days before Bill Clinton was sworn in. Pakistani heroin smuggler flown as quickly out of the country as the Bin Ladens and Saudis were a few days after 911.

Perhaps the strangest decision by the first Bush administration and its Justice Department, in which Roberts was a significant player as Deputy Solicitor General, was their January 18, 1993 decision to commute the tough sentence -- two days before Bush left office -- of convicted Pakistani heroin smuggler Aslam Adam. A resident of Karachi who had only been in the United States for less than a month, Adam was sentenced in 1985 to a 55 year Federal prison term after federal authorities caught him retrieving a package containing heroin sent from Pakistan to a Charlotte, North Carolina post office box. The package had been flagged by a US Customs Officer at JFK Airport in New York and a stakeout was laid in Charlotte to catch Adam when he picked up the package. It was reported at the time of Adam's commutation that he was involved in a CIA covert operation involving Pakistan. During 1985, the CIA, along with Saudi Arabia and Pakistan's ISI intelligence, was funding and training the Mujaheddin guerrillas fighting the Soviets in Afghanistan. One of the guerrilla leaders was Osama Bin Laden. Justice Department and Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA) officials, as well as Pakistan's ambassador to Washington, expressed bewilderment and surprise at Adam's pardon by Bush and the Justice Department. U.S. Judge Robert Potter (a tough sentencing judge nicknamed "Maximum Bob") said he didn't want Adam freed. In addition, upon Adam's pardon and quick release from Butner Federal Prison in North Carolina, he was taken by Federal agents to a waiting plane and flown to Pakistan. Prison warden K.M. Hawk was opposed to an earlier proposal to have Adam freed to serve his sentence in Pakistan. Bush never explained why he pardoned Adam. Bush White House officials directed inquiries to the Justice Department. Justice passed the buck back to the White House.

The comments by various parties involved in the Adam case:

"It's most unusual. There must have been some diplomatic aspect. I can't see President Bush making a cavalier move on the brink of leaving office in this fashion after what he's said about the war on drugs." -- Ken Andresen, the assistant U.S. attorney who prosecuted Adam.

"It's not good to be recommending clemency in cases of drug offenses." -- David Stephenson, Pardon Attorney of the US Justice Department.

"It may be that the Drug Enforcement Administration or the CIA wanted something from Pakistan -- and what they wanted will never see the light of day." - anonymous law enforcement official.

"I didn't know anything about it until I saw it in the paper." -- Judge Robert Potter.

"I don't know why the president commuted this man's sentence. Only the
president and his close advisers would know that." -- Thomas J. Ashcraft, US Attorney, Western District of North Carolina.

"I wish I had been as effective with President Bush as Mr. Adam." -- Pakistani ambassador to the United States Syeda Hussain.

"God bless Bush." -- Fatima Adam, Aslam Adam's mother.

"Drugs is the gravest threat facing our nation." -- President George H. W. Bush.

Source: "Freeing of drug smuggler baffles legal authorities," By John Monk, Gary L. Wright; Knight-Ridder Tribune News, The Houston Chronicle, March 28, 1993, p. A20.

Adam's name was the last on Bush's pardon/commutation list:

Aslam P. Adam

Commutation

1985

Conspiracy to possess with intent to distribute heroin, importation of heroin, and use of mail in committing felony, 18 U.S.C. § 2, and 21 U.S.C. §§ 841(a)(1), 846, 952(a), 960(b)(1)(A), 963, and 843(b)

__________________
A TAINTED DEAL http://www.motherjones.com/politics/1998/06/tainted-deal

 LA DEA; Murder of Kiki Camarena http://www.laweekly.com/news/how-a-dogged-la-dea-agent-unraveled-the-cias-alleged-role-in-the-murder-of-kiki-camarena-5750278  

"Several informed sources have told me that an appendix to this Report was removed at the instruction of the DOJ at the last minute. This appendix is reported to have information about a CIA officer, not agent or asset, but officer, based in the LA Station, who was in charge of Contra related activities. According to these sources, this individual was associated with running drugs to South Central L.A., around 1988. Let me repeat that amazing omission. The recently released CIA Report Vol II contained an appendix, which was pulled by the DOJ, that reported a CIA officer in the LA Station was hooked into drug running in South Central Los Angeles." Maxine Waters Oct, 1998
https://fas.org/irp/congress/1998_cr/h981013-coke.htm   

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maynard

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Reply with quote  #120 
Where is Luis Posada?
By Bill Weaver,
Posted on Tue Jul 19th, 2005 at 02:58:39 AM EST
Today we received mixed signals on the location of Luis Posada, the anti-Castro terrorist wanted in Venezuela for the bombing of Cubana Airlines Flight 455 in 1976. . .

Posada, last released from prison in Panama in 2004, is the Zelig of the Latin American world of spies and intrigue. He was involved with the Bay of Pigs attack, was a major player in Iran-Contra, an operative in the murderous Condor network that wiped out innumerable leftists in Latin America, worked with President Cerezo in Guatemala in attempting to keep the Guatemalan army at bay, and engaged in numerous attempts to assassinate Fidel Castro. Indeed, his last stint in prison before coming to the United States was for plotting Castro’s murder during a 2000 visit to Panama; Posada was arrested with 40 tons of explosives.

But for the last few decades, wherever Posada goes the specter of the Bush dynasty follows. At the time of the Cubana bombing, on October 6, 1976, George H.W. Bush was Director of the Central Intelligence Agency, and newly released records show that agency involvement with the bombing was greater than even suspected by many of the more cynical observers. It does not get any clearer than the CIA report of June 22, 1976, that stated, "a Cuban Exile extremist group, of which Orlando Bosch [a long-time partner of Posada] is a leader, plans to place a bomb on a Cubana Airline flight traveling between Panama and Havana." Bush senior was also Vice President of the United States when Posada “escaped” from a Venezuelan prison while being tried for the Cubana bombing. Posada resurfaced soon after his 1985 escape from Venezuela, as Ramon Medina, a chief player in the Iran-Contra affair,a grotesquerie hatched by the CIA and the Reagan-Bush Administration that helped fund itself by facilitating drug sales in the United States. In 1986, Bush family friend and lapdog, Elliot Abrams, lied stone-faced to the House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence about U.S. involvement in the "contra" affair, making sure to protect Bush senior:

"Mr. Stokes asked whether denial of U.S. involvement included the Vice President. Mr. Abram’s said Mr. Gregg of the Vice President’s staff had introduced Mr. [Felix] Rodriguez to Salvadoran Air Force officials in 1984 to serve as an adviser on air/ground operations. Mr. Rodriguez’ actions since that time were on his own."

Abrams has resurfaced as a chief adviser in the Bush junior administration. And Bush senior, as President, released Posada’s comrade-in-arms, Orlando Bosch, from federal detention in 1990. Now with the weight of all this history on him, and no doubt tremendous familial pressure, Bush junior must decide what to do with a 77-year-old terrorist who is really the living embodiment of a failed United States policy of decades past. The federal government transported Posada to El Paso, Texas, where he is to have a bond hearing on July 25.

We are unable to go into any further detail, but credible information has it that Posada is no longer in El Paso. Additionally, two separate calls to the detention facility supposedly holding Posada yielded differing information concerning his upcoming bond hearing. During a call this morning, employees said that the bond hearing set for the 25th will be accomplished electronically, with neither Posada nor his attorney to be present. Later in the day, however, a second call to the detention center yielded the information that Posada was “most definitely” at that facility and that he would be present for the bond hearing next Monday.

Bill Conroy, well known to regular readers of Narco News and the Narcosphere, said that he checked with sources on the inside and could not confirm that Posada had been moved. But one of his sources said that “it would not be a big surprise if Posada were moved. They could move him on a whim, claiming he was under threat or for some national security pretense. [The government] want[s] to control [Posada] as much as [it] can without killing him.”

If the U.S. is moving Posada around, it is in an effort to play a shell game with its own past. It must be difficult to know what to do with someone whose life and experience span U.S.-sponsored murder, deceit and lies perpetrated upon people and democracies, and who is a Bush family member by ideology, temperament, and disgust for law, if not by birth. Samuel Beckett once said that, “Habit is the ballast that chains a dog to his vomit.” We will soon find out what chains George W. Bush to Luis Posada.


http://narcosphere.narconews.com/story/2005/7/19/25839/6898




http://narcosphere.narconews.com/story/2005/7/25/23545/7557

Posada Carriles deportation case turns into Bay of Pigs sparnfarkel
By Bill Conroy,
Posted on Mon Jul 25th, 2005 at 11:05:45 PM EST
Accused terrorist Luis Posada Carriles failed to make his case to be set free on bond today. Posada, as you recall, has been in federal custody for a couple months now pending a ruling on his request for asylum.

Of even greater interest, however, is the fact that the Associated Press reports that the federal immigration judge hearing Posada’s case “asked lawyers involved in the deportation case … to provide briefs on whether the Bay of Pigs invasion could be considered an act of terrorism.”

That’s right, U.S. prosecutors and Posada’s attorneys will now have to duke it out over whether the U.S. government engaged in an act of terrorism against the Cuban government in the early 1960s. And the irony is that it will be to the benefit of U.S. prosecutors to argue that it was terrorism, since it would seem to bolster the government’s case against granting Posada asylum.

A federal immigration judge on Monday ordered that the 77-year-old CIA asset remain in federal detention in El Paso, where he has been held since May after being taken into custody in Miami. He is charged with illegally entering the United States.

Posada claims he entered the “land of the free” through Mexico. Other facts seem to indicate he may well have landed in Florida via a trip on a covert shrimp boat. After granting an interview to a Miami newspaper announcing his whereabouts in the Cuban community in Miami, he was taken into custody by federal agents and shipped to El Paso.

From the AP story:

Judge William A. Abbott also denied bond for Luis Posada Carriles, 77, a former CIA operative accused of orchestrating the 1976 bombing of a Cuban jetliner while in Caracas, Venezuela.

… Among the factors Abbott said he would consider in Posada's case was whether he had ever provided material support for acts of terror.

Recently declassified CIA documents show that the spy agency trained Posada in Guatemala in 1961 to participate in the failed Bay of Pigs invasion of Cuba, including explosives and weapons training. Posada, who rose to the rank of second lieutenant, was in the U.S. Army from March 1963 to March 1964 in Fort Benning, Ga.

Abbott said the sponsor of terrorist activity didn't matter, even if it were the U.S. government. He didn't elaborate, except to say he would ask the lawyers to provide briefs on the matter.

So is the judge in the case actually going to stand up to the Bush Administration and pry open Posada’s terrorist past before pronouncing judgment? If so, how long will it be before the judge is jammed up by U.S. “national security interests” — and Posada’s case transferred to a more friendly court?

Those cards have yet to be play out. But Posada’s attorney seems to be interested in this game of Texas Hold‘em as well, according to the AP report:

"I look forward to reading the government's response," said Matthew J. Archambeault, one of Posada's Florida-based attorneys.

After all, if Posada’s work for the CIA is deemed “terrorist activity,” by extension that means the CIA is a sponsor of terrorism

It does appear the strain of it all, and maybe the bad prison food, are starting to get to Posada.

More from the AP report:

Posada was mostly silent during Monday's hearing, occasionally conferring in Spanish with one of his lawyers. Appearing in court in a red jail uniform, with the outline of a bulletproof vest visible on his back, Posada's right temple and jaw were heavily bandaged from recent skin cancer surgery.

Of course, Posada’s attorneys are denying that their client participated in the Bay of Pigs invasion -- well, in lawyer talk anyway. His attorney, Archambeault, said Posada “did not actually participate in the failed invasion,” according to the AP report. But such wording leaves plenty of wiggle room for Posada to avoid perjury charges down the road, when it comes to light that he did play a role in the planning and coordination of the invasion.

Posada’s attorneys also are denying that their client had any role in another terrorist act, the 1976 bombing of a Cuban airliner. However, it seems even his longtime employer, the CIA, can’t back up Posada on that one.

From the AP report:

According to a declassified CIA document released last month, Posada said shortly before the deadly bombing that he and others would "hit a Cuban airplane." Venezuelan officials have said Posada was in Caracas when he allegedly planned the attack, which killed 73 people when the plane crashed off the coast of Barbados.

Finally, Posada has dropped his claim that he is a U.S. resident. His attorney says his client “didn’t want to burden the court with an issue he couldn’t win,” the AP reports.

So it sounds like Posada’s attorneys are zero for three at the plate by my count. The judge now wants to explore Posada’s ties to the Bay of Pigs invasion; even CIA documents point to the fact that Posada’s denials concerning the Cuban airline bombing don’t carry water; and now Posada is giving up on what had all along seemed a dubious claim to U.S. residency –- given the fact that he hadn’t lived in the United States (prior to his illegal entry) in decades.

So where’s the beef in his case? What does he deserve asylum from –- the justice due for his terrorist past?

Posada’s last hope is the political might of the anti-Castro Cuban community it seems, or at least that might explain why, as AP reports, that his “lawyer did say Posada would renew his request that the case be moved to Miami and elsewhere in Florida, where Posada has friends and relatives.”

But will Bush actually take the international political heat on this one to appease elements of the anti-Castro Cuban community in Miami? Not likely –- particularly because those votes can always be “fixed” in other ways.

And the Bush Administration is certainly not going to allow Posada, a Venezuelan citizen, to be turned over to the Venezuelan government –- which is seeking his extradition so that he can stand trial on charges that he masterminded the Cuban airliner bombing.

Posada avoided standing trial on the same charges 20 years ago by escaping from a prison in that South American country. If Posada is brought back for a return engagement, he would have the eyes of the world upon him –- and a stage for uncloaking a sordid tale of covert treachery stretching back some 45 years.

The Bush White House already has to be worried about what Posada might say in a U.S. courtroom. He is already threatening to testify at his next hearing in El Paso, slated for Aug. 29, the AP reports.

Posada even appears willing to open up on questions about terrorism.

From a separate report by Reuters:

Posada will "work with the government in good faith" to answer the terrorism question, said (Posada’s attorney) Archambeault. "Mr. Posada doesn't want the U.S. government to jump through hoops."

That will be a case of the fox asking the snake what he did with the chicken eggs.

Stay tuned. This game of Texas Hold‘em still has a few wild cards in play.

And in the mean time, can someone make sure Posada gets a cell without a window. Too much sunshine could be bad for his skin cancer.



Posada Hearing
                                Judge denies bond for accused terrorist Luis Posada Carriles

Monday, July 25, 2005 — Posada is a former CIA agent said to be trained for the Bay of Pigs invasion.

Posada has been in the federal detention facility in El Paso since his arrest in Miami in May for allegedly entering into the U.S. illegally.

He is accused of being involved in a number of terrorists acts including the 1976 bombing of a cuban airliner.

73 people were killed.

Posada is wanted in Venezuela for that bombing.

His lawyers were wondering why the judge would consider the Bay of Pigs invasion as an act of terrorism when it was funded by the United States.

Posada is seeking political asylum.

The judge denied a change of venue last month so his trial will start August 29th.

His lawyers say they will still ask for a change of venue to Miami so Posada can be closure to friends and family.

They say he has skin cancer and a heart condition.






http://www.miami.com/mld/miamiherald/news/world/cuba/12214263.htm?source=rss&channel=miamiherald_cuba

Posted on Mon, Jul. 25, 2005



POSADA CASE

Posada used fake I.D. in 2000 trip


Luis Posada Carriles was in Miami five years ago posing as a Salvadoran traveler, U.S. officials have learned.



achardy@herald.com

Cuban exile militant Luis Posada Carriles used a false Salvadoran passport to fly to South Florida in the spring of 2000 -- about six months before using the same passport to travel to Panama, where he was arrested in connection with an alleged plot to kill Cuban leader Fidel Castro.

Posada's April 26, 2000 trip to Miami, revealed in documents from the U.S. Department of Homeland Security, may become a point of contention during deportation proceedings that resume today for Posada, who has been accused of acts of terrorism.

Use of a false passport to enter the country is a deportable offense in its own right.

Posada, who escaped from a Venezuelan jail in 1985 and was freed from Panama after receiving a pardon, was taken into U.S. custody on May 17 after sneaking into South Florida this year. But the records filed in his deportation case in El Paso, Texas, raise questions about just how often the former CIA operative has visited America.

A travel record included as federal evidence against Posada shows he arrived at Miami International Airport on a flight from Central America on April 26, 2000 carrying a Salvadoran passport in the name of Franco Rodriguez Mena.

Records submitted for the current immigration case show ''Rodriguez Mena'' traveled to Miami ostensibly to catch a connecting flight to another country. But the record does not show him leaving.

Moreover, a separate record, obtained by The Herald, shows Rodriguez Mena classified as a ''violator,'' suggesting that he might have slipped illegally out of a transit lounge at MIA.

Matthew Archambeault, a Posada lawyer, told The Herald late Sunday that Posada confirmed to him over the weekend that he indeed traveled to Miami on April 26, 2000 -- but only to catch a plane to Aruba, and that he never left the transit lounge.

FEDERAL OFFENSE

So far, Posada has been accused only of being in the country illegally. But use of false documents is a federal offense that could result in a sentence of up to 25 years in prison if the false document was used for terrorism purposes. Attempting to enter the United States on a false passport also renders a traveler inadmissible and deportable.

U.S. government officials declined comment.

A motion filed by Posada's lawyers in immigration court last week questioned the relevance of citing the fake passport.

''Document fraud is not a particularly serious crime and would not be the type of crime that would make him ineligible for reception of a bond,'' the motion said.

In addition to the alleged misadventure in Panama, Posada has been accused of masterminding the 1976 bombing of a Cuban jetliner that killed 73 people and has been linked to a series of 1997 bombings at Cuban hotels.

The revelation that he came to South Florida once before without being discovered adds new details about his movements just prior to the alleged Panama conspiracy.

It came just months before Posada's fateful trip to Panama, where he was arrested with three other Cuban exile militants -- all of whom live in South Florida.

The four -- Posada, Guillermo Novo, Gaspar Jimenez and Pedro Remon -- were released in August after then-Panamanian President Mireya Moscoso pardoned them. Posada traveled to Honduras where he went underground and then arrived in Miami in late March, still in hiding. Novo, Jimenez and Remon were flown to Opa-locka in a leased private jet soon after being released in Panama.

One of the three, Remon, told the Herald Friday that he did not know Posada had been in the United States before March of this year.

''He may have just gotten on a different plane or something,'' Remon said of Posada's Miami visit. ``I didn't know that he was in here 2000. I never talked to Luis Posada in North American territory.''

Novo and Jimenez could not be reached for comment.

Posada's lawyers, in a motion filed last week, objected to the inclusion of the Rodriguez Mena travel record in the government's evidence package. They said it was irrelevant to the case. But the motion did not question the accuracy of the travel record.

TRAVEL RECORD

Posada's lawyers also objected to the inclusion of other Rodriguez Mena travel records which suggest that he might have flown to the United States on at least three other occasions -- in 1998, 1999 and once more in October 2000.

There are no corroborating immigration documents to support those trips, however.

The U.S. filing also includes investigative documents from El Salvador, where authorities issued an arrest warrant for Posada on grounds that he procured false documents in their country.

Posada once lived in Miami with a green card in the 1960s, but moved abroad. His lawyer plans to argue in the El Paso proceedings that he is still a resident, despite having been out of the country for decades.

Norma Morfa, a Miami spokeswoman for U.S. Customs and Border Protection, which oversees MIA passport control, said her agency could neither ``deny or confirm this information due to the case still being under investigation by U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement.''

Barbara Gonzalez, an ICE spokeswoman, said her agency is ``precluded from commenting on pending litigation.''




Posted on Sat, Jul. 23, 2005




http://www.timesleader.com/mld/timesleader/news/world/12207953.htm

Man convicted in jetliner bombing wants extradition for Posada




Knight Ridder Newspapers

(KRT) - Breaking 29 years of silence, one of two men convicted in the 1976 bombing of a Cuban jetliner that killed 73 people said in an exclusive interview that exile militant Luis Posada Carriles should be extradited to Venezuela to stand trial in the case.

But Freddy Lugo - who claims he was an innocent dupe in the bomb plot - denied that he made incriminating statements Venezuelan officials attribute to him in their application to have Posada sent to Caracas.

Posada, a former CIA operative who has been linked to a series of 1997 bombings at Cuban hotels, is in U.S. custody after sneaking into the country this year. He is seeking asylum in a case that largely hinges on the shadowy events of 1976 - the year that Lugo says changed his life forever.

Lugo told The Miami Herald that Posada should be returned to Venezuela because he had escaped from a Venezuelan jail before a case against him in the airliner bombing was resolved.

Posada escaped in 1985 - after an initial acquittal but while a prosecutor's appeal was pending. Two years later, a Caracas court acquitted Posada's associate, Cuban exile militant Orlando Bosch. But the court convicted Lugo and his friend Hernan Ricardo.

"He escaped from a Venezuelan jail," Lugo said during the hourlong interview. "He must come to finish serving his time here, like I did, being innocent."

In a June 10 statement as part of its extradition request, the Venezuelan Embassy in Washington, D.C., cited Lugo as a key witness against Posada. The statement said the Venezuelan government had delivered to the United States evidence that includes "the testimony of Freddy Lugo confirming his participation in the blowing up of the plane and of urgent calls made by Lugo and Ricardo to Posada Carriles shortly after the disaster, seeking his help."

That testimony has not been released to the public. But Lugo said of it: "It's false."

Bernardo Alvarez, the Venezuelan ambassador to the United States, said what matters legally in the case is Lugo's prior testimony.

"There are statements on the part of Freddy Lugo which are clear and consistent over the years," Alvarez said in an e-mail to The Herald Friday evening. "We do not know what Lugo said or why he said it to The Miami Herald, but we know what he told the authorities and this is consistent with the submitted evidence."

Posada told The Herald earlier this year that he didn't believe Lugo was involved in the bombing. "In my opinion, Hernan Ricardo may have been involved, although he always denied everything," he said. "Freddy Lugo was a fool."

Lugo still lives in Caracas, in a one-story whitewashed house in a working class neighborhood. It's surrounded by a 10-foot concrete wall. He says he makes his money driving a cab.

He lives with his sister, his son and his daughter-in-law and keeps a low profile.

During the interview at his home, Lugo immediately proclaimed his innocence. He also said that he did not know if Posada or the other men implicated in the attacks - Ricardo and Bosch - were guilty or innocent.

"I only know that I know nothing," Lugo said, speaking calmly while his family ate lunch in the kitchen. "I participated indirectly without knowing anything."

Alternately serious and jovial, often exhibiting subtle dark humor, Lugo portrayed himself as a scapegoat, an innocent bystander drawn into a plot that the other three may or may not have hatched without his knowledge.

"Journalists perhaps don't want to interview me because I don't have anything explosive to tell them," Lugo said, smiling.

Lugo and Ricardo were news photographers for the Caracas newspaper El Mundo at the time of the 1976 bombing. They were also part-time covert agents for DISIP, the Venezuelan state security agency.

One of the agency's top officials - before he retired and started his own private security agency - was Posada. Posada also owned a private security firm in Caracas that employed Ricardo - though just before the bombing, Posada reassigned him to serve as Bosch's chauffeur.

Lugo said that when he took a trip overseas with Ricardo in October 1976, he had no idea the plane was doomed. He said he went along because he wanted to buy camera equipment - and Ricardo had offered to pay for the plane tickets.

"What an expensive trip, right? It destroyed my life," he said.

Lugo and Ricardo left Caracas for Trinidad and Tobago, where they boarded the Cubana de Aviacion DC-8. They got off during a stopover in Barbados. Shortly after takeoff from Barbados, the plane exploded.

Lugo and Ricardo left Barbados in a hurry, Venezuelan court records say. Shortly after they reached Trinidad, they were arrested.

Along with Bosch and Posada, Lugo and Ricardo were tried in Venezuela and acquitted by a military court in 1980, but the case was then continued in a civilian court.

By 1987, Posada had escaped. Bosch was acquitted that year. Lugo and Ricardo were convicted and sentenced to 20 years - though in 1993 they were placed on supervised release.

Lugo said he had not had any contact with Ricardo since. Ricardo could not be reached for comment despite several attempts.

Posada's attorney in Caracas, Joaquin Chaffardet, and Posada both told The Herald they believe Ricardo is now out of Venezuela and working as an informant for the U.S. Drug Enforcement Administration.

DEA spokesman Garrison Courtney said the agency does not confirm whether someone is an informant.

According to official Venezuelan documents, Lugo told authorities that immediately after he and Ricardo learned the plane had exploded, Ricardo was both distraught and incredulous.

The Venezuelan account says Ricardo called himself the world's deadliest terrorist - deadlier even than Venezuela's notorious Carlos "The Jackal."

Venezuelan investigators said Lugo quoted Ricardo as saying: "Damn, Lugo, I am desperate and I feel like crying because I had never killed anyone. ... `The Jackal' may have his record as a great terrorist, but I surpassed him. What's more, I surpassed even the Palestinians in terrorism and now I am the one who has the record, because I am the one who blew up that thing."

Lugo told The Herald that he never heard Ricardo make any such statement.

"All those things are false," he said, adding that statements attributed to him during the investigation were fabrications by detectives "to advance their careers."

Lugo revealed a hint of bitterness toward Posada, Ricardo and Bosch, insinuating that he had been deliberately sucked into a sinister plot against Fidel Castro.

He said that during his time in Venezuelan prisons, he distanced himself from Posada, Ricardo and Bosch because he felt that associating with the three men would have made him appear guilty.

"I didn't want to have any relations with those people because that would compromise me more," he said. "I didn't have anything to do with pro-Castro groups or anti-Castro groups or any of those things." Likewise, he said, the strong moral support and legal assistance that Posada, Bosch and Ricardo received from Cuban exiles while in prison did not extend to him.

Now, Lugo said, he just wants to live the rest of his life quietly.

"I wander around the streets of Caracas relaxed," he said. "I don't have any problems or fear. I feel innocent down to the last bone in my body."

---

© 2005, The Miami Herald.

Visit The Miami Herald Web edition on the World Wide Web at http://www.herald.com

Distributed by Knight Ridder/Tribune Information Services.


__________________
A TAINTED DEAL http://www.motherjones.com/politics/1998/06/tainted-deal

 LA DEA; Murder of Kiki Camarena http://www.laweekly.com/news/how-a-dogged-la-dea-agent-unraveled-the-cias-alleged-role-in-the-murder-of-kiki-camarena-5750278  

"Several informed sources have told me that an appendix to this Report was removed at the instruction of the DOJ at the last minute. This appendix is reported to have information about a CIA officer, not agent or asset, but officer, based in the LA Station, who was in charge of Contra related activities. According to these sources, this individual was associated with running drugs to South Central L.A., around 1988. Let me repeat that amazing omission. The recently released CIA Report Vol II contained an appendix, which was pulled by the DOJ, that reported a CIA officer in the LA Station was hooked into drug running in South Central Los Angeles." Maxine Waters Oct, 1998
https://fas.org/irp/congress/1998_cr/h981013-coke.htm   

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http://www.parascope.com/mx/articles/garywebb/garyWebbSpeaks.htm

















__________________
A TAINTED DEAL http://www.motherjones.com/politics/1998/06/tainted-deal

 LA DEA; Murder of Kiki Camarena http://www.laweekly.com/news/how-a-dogged-la-dea-agent-unraveled-the-cias-alleged-role-in-the-murder-of-kiki-camarena-5750278  

"Several informed sources have told me that an appendix to this Report was removed at the instruction of the DOJ at the last minute. This appendix is reported to have information about a CIA officer, not agent or asset, but officer, based in the LA Station, who was in charge of Contra related activities. According to these sources, this individual was associated with running drugs to South Central L.A., around 1988. Let me repeat that amazing omission. The recently released CIA Report Vol II contained an appendix, which was pulled by the DOJ, that reported a CIA officer in the LA Station was hooked into drug running in South Central Los Angeles." Maxine Waters Oct, 1998
https://fas.org/irp/congress/1998_cr/h981013-coke.htm   

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(CONTINUED)


Question and Answer Session

Gary Webb: I've been instructed to repeat the question, so...

Voice From the Audience: You talked about George Bush pardoning people. Given George Bush's history with the CIA, do you know when he first knew about this, and what he knew?

Gary Webb: Well, I didn't at the time I wrote the book, I do now. The question was, when did George Bush first know about this? The CIA, in its latest report, said that they had prepared a detailed briefing for the vice president -- I think it was 1985? -- on all these allegations of contra drug trafficking and delivered it to him personally. So, it's hard for George to say he was out of the loop on this one.

I'll tell you another thing, one of the most amazing things I found in the National Archives was a report that had been written by the U.S. Attorney's Office in Tampa -- I believe it was 1987. They had just busted a Colombian drug trafficker named Allen Rudd, and they were using him as a cooperating witness. Rudd agreed to go undercover and set up other drug traffickers, and they were debriefing him.

Now, let me set the stage for you. When you are being debriefed by the federal government for use as an informant, you're not going to go in there and tell them crazy-sounding stories, because they're not going to believe you, they're going to slap you in jail, right? What Rudd told them was, that he was involved in a meeting with Pablo Escobar, who was then the head of the Medellín cartel. They were working out arrangements to set up cocaine shipments into South Florida. He said Escobar started ranting and raving about that damned George Bush, and now he's got that South Florida Drug Task Force set up which has really been making things difficult, and the man's a traitor. And he used to deal with us, but now he wants to be president and thinks that he's double-crossing us. And Rudd said, well, what are you talking about? And Escobar said, we made a deal with that guy, that we were going to ship weapons to the contras, they were in there flying weapons down to Columbia, we were unloading weapons, we were getting them to the contras, and the deal was, we were supposed to get our stuff to the United States without any problems. And that was the deal that we made. And now he double-crossed us.

So the U.S. Attorney heard this, and he wrote this panicky memo to Washington saying, you know, this man has been very reliable so far, everything he's told us has checked out, and now he's saying that the Vice President of the United States is involved with drug traffickers. We might want to check this out. And it went all the way up -- the funny thing about government documents is, whenever it passes over somebody's desk, they have to initial it. And this thing was like a ladder, it went all the way up and all the way up, and it got up to the head of the Criminal Division at the Justice Department, and he looked at it and said, looks like a job for Lawrence Walsh! And so he sent it over to Walsh, the Iran-contra prosecutor, and he said, here, you take it, you deal with this. And Walsh's office -- I interviewed Walsh, and he said, we didn't have the authority to deal with that. We were looking at Ollie North. So I said, did anybody investigate this? And the answer was, "no." And that thing sat in the National Archives for ten years, nobody ever looked at it.

Voice From the Audience: Is that in your book?

Gary Webb: Yeah.

Voice From the Audience: Thank you.

Audience Member #1: Well, first of all, I'd like to thank you for pursuing this story, you have a lot of guts to do it.

[Applause from the audience.]

Gary Webb: This is what reporters are supposed to do. This is what reporters are supposed to do. I don't think I was doing anything special.

Audience Member #1: Still, there's not too many guys like you that are doing it.

Gary Webb: That's true, they've all still got jobs.

[Laughter, scattered applause.]

Audience Member #1: I just had a couple of questions, the first one is, I followed the story on the web site, and I thought it was a really great story, it was really well done. And I noticed that the San Jose Mercury News seemed to support you for a while, and then all the sudden that support collapsed. So I was wondering what your relationship is with your editor there, and how that all played out, and when they all pulled out the rug from under you.

Gary Webb: Well, the support collapsed probably after the LA Times... The Washington [Post] came out first, the New York Times came out second, and the LA Times came out third, and they started getting nervous. There's a phenomenon in the media we all know, it's called "piling on," and they started seeing themselves getting piled on. They sent me back down to Central America two more times to do more reporting and I came back with stories that were even more outrageous than what they printed in the newspaper the first time. And they were faced with a situation of, now we're accusing Oliver North of being involved in drug trafficking. Now we're accusing the Justice Department of being part and parcel to this. Geez, if we get beat up over accusing a couple of CIA agents of being involved in this, what the hell is going to happen now? And they actually said, I had memos saying, you know, if we run these stories, there is going to be a firestorm of criticism.

So, I think they took the easy way out. The easy way out was not to go ahead and do the story. It was to back off the story. But they had a problem, because the story was true. And it isn't every day that you're confronted with how to take a dive on a true story.

They spent several months -- honestly, literally, because I was getting these drafts back and forth -- trying to figure out how to say, we don't support this story, even though it's true. And if you go back and you read the editor's column, you'll see that the great difficulty that he had trying to take a dive on this thing. And he ended up talking about "gray areas" that should have been explored a little more and "subtleties" that we should have not brushed over so lightly, without disclosing the fact that the series had originally been four parts and they cut it to three parts, because "nobody reads four part series' anymore." So, that was one reason.

The other reason was, you know, one of the things you learn very quickly when you get into journalism is that there's safety in numbers. Editors don't like being out there on a limb all by themselves. I remember very clearly going to press conferences, coming back, writing a story, sending it in, and my editor calling up and saying, well gee, this isn't what AP wrote. Or, the Chronicle just ran their story, and that's not what the Chronicle wrote. And I'd say, "Fine. Good." And they said, no, we've got to make it the same, we don't want to be different. We don't want our story to be different from everybody else's.

And so what they were seeing at the Mercury was, the Big Three newspapers were sitting on one side of the fence, and they were out there by themselves, and that just panicked the hell out of them. So, you have to understand newspaper mentality to understand it a little bit, but it's not too hard to understand cowardice, either. I think a lot of that was that they were just scared as hell to go ahead with the story.

Audience Member #1: Were they able to look you in the eye, and...

Gary Webb: No. They didn't, they just did this over the phone. I went to Sacramento.

Audience Member #1: When did you find out about it, and what did you...

Gary Webb: Oh, they called me up at home, two months after I turned in my last four stories, and said, we're going to write a column saying, you know, we're not going ahead with this. And that's when I jumped in the car and drove up there and said, what the hell's going on? And I got all these mealy-mouthed answers, you know, geez, gray areas, subtleties, one thing or another... But I said, tell me one thing that's wrong with the story, and nobody could ever point to anything. And today, to this day, nobody has ever said there was a factual error in that story.

[Inaudible question from the audience.]

Gary Webb: The question was, the editors are one thing, what about the readers? Um... who cares about the readers? Honestly. The reader's don't run the newspaper.

[Another inaudible question from the audience regarding letters to the editor and boycotts of the newspaper.]

Gary Webb: Well, a number of them did, and believe me, the newspaper office was flooded with calls and emails. And the newspaper, to their credit, printed a bunch of them, calling it the most cowardly thing they'd ever seen. But in the long run, the readers, you know, don't run the place. And that's the thing about newspaper markets these days. You folks really don't have any choice! What else are you going to read? And the editors know this.

When I started in this business, we had two newspapers in town where I worked in Cincinnati. And we were deathly afraid that if we sat on a story for 24 hours, the Cincinnati Inquirer was going to put it in the paper, and we were going to look like dopes. We were going to look like we were covering stuff up, we were going to look like we were protecting somebody. So we were putting stuff in the paper without thinking about it sometimes, but we got it in the paper. Now, we can sit on stuff for months, who's going to find out about it? And even if somebody found out about it, what are they going to do? That's the big danger that everybody has sort of missed. These one-newspaper towns, you've got no choice. You've got no choice. And television? Television's not going to do it. I mean, they're down filming animals at the zoo!

[Laughter and applause.]

Audience Member #2: I assume you have talked to John Cummings, the one that wrote Compromised, that book?

Gary Webb: I talked to Terry Reed, who was the principal author on that, yeah.

Audience Member #2: Well, that was a well-documented book, and I had just finished reading this when I happened to look down and see the headlines on the Sunday paper. And he stated that Oliver North told him personally that he was a CIA asset that manufactured weapons.

Gary Webb: Right.

Audience Member #2: When he discovered that they were importing cocaine, he got out of there. And they chased him with his family across country for two years trying to catch him. But he had said in that book that Oliver North told him that Vice President Bush told Oliver North to dirty Clinton's men with the drug money. Which I assumed was what Whitewater was all about, was finding the laundering and trying to find something on Clinton. Do you know anything about that?

Gary Webb: Yeah, let me sum up your question. Essentially, you're asking about the goings-on in Mena, Arkansas, because of the drug operations going on at this little air base in Arkansas while Clinton was governor down there. The fellow you referred to, Terry Reed, wrote a book called Compromised which talked about his role in this corporate operation in Mena which was initially designed to train contra pilots -- Reed was a pilot -- and it was also designed after the Boland Amendment went into effect to get weapons parts to the contras, because the CIA couldn't provide them anymore. And as Reed got into this weapons parts business, he discovered that the CIA was shipping cocaine back through these weapons crates that were coming back into the United States. And when he blew the whistle on it, he was sort of sent on this long odyssey of criminal charges being filed against him, etcetera etcetera etcetera. A lot of what Reed wrote is accurate as far as I can tell, and a lot of it was documented.

There is a House Banking Committee investigation that has been going on now for about three years, looking specifically at Mena, Arkansas, looking specifically at a drug trafficker named Barry Seal, who was one of the biggest cocaine and marijuana importers in the south side of the United States during the 1980s. Seal was also, coincidentally, working for the CIA, and was working for the Drug Enforcement Administration.

I don't know how many of you remember this, but one night Ronnie Reagan got on TV and held up a grainy picture, and said, here's proof that the Sandanistas are dealing drugs. Look, here's Pablo Escobar, and they're all loading cocaine into a plane, and this was taken in Nicaragua. This was the eve of a vote on the contra aid. That photograph was set up by Barry Seal. The plane that was used was Seal's plane, and it was the same plane that was shot down over Nicaragua a couple of years later that Eugene Hasenfus was in, that broke open the whole Iran-contra scandal.

The Banking Committee is supposed to be coming out with a report in the next couple of months looking at the relationship between Barry Seal, the U.S. government and Clinton's folks. Alex Cockburn has done a number of stories on this company called Park-On Meter down in Russellville, Arkansas, that's hooked up with Clinton's family, hooked up with Hillary's law firm, that sort of thing. To me, that's a story people ought to be looking at. I never thought Whitewater was much of a story, frankly. What I thought the story was about was Clinton's buddy Dan Lasater, the bond broker down there who was a convicted cocaine trafficker. Clinton pardoned him on his way to Washington. Lasater was a major drug trafficker, and Terry Reed's book claims Lasater was part and parcel with this whole thing.

Voice From the Audience: Cockburn's newsletter is called CounterPunch, and he's done a good job of defending you in it.

Gary Webb: Yeah, Cockburn has also written a book called Whiteout, which is a very interesting look at the history of CIA drug trafficking. Actually, I think it's selling pretty well itself. The New York Times hated it, of course, but what else is new?

Audience Member #2: Well I just wanted to mention that he states also -- I guess it was Terry Reed who was actually doing the work -- he said Bush was running the whole thing as vice president.

Gary Webb: I think that George Bush's role in this whole thing is one of the large unexplored areas of it.

Audience Member #2: Which is why I think Reagan put him in as vice president, because of his position with the CIA.

Gary Webb: Well, you know, that whole South Florida Drug Task Force was full of CIA operatives. Full of them. This was supposed to be our vanguard in the war against cocaine cartels, and if those Colombians are to be believed, this was the vehicle that we were using to ship arms and allow cocaine into the country, this Drug Task Force. Nobody's looked at that. But there are lots of clues that there's a lot to be dug out.

Audience Member #3: Thank you, Gary. I lost my feature columnist position at my college paper for writing a satire of Christianity some years ago, and...

Gary Webb: That'll do it, yeah. [Laughter from the audience.]

Audience Member #3: And I lost my job twice in the last five years because of my activism in the community, but I got a job [inaudible]. But my question is, I knew someone in the mid-'80s who said that he was in the Navy, and that he had information that the Navy was involved in delivering cocaine to this country. Another kind of bombshell, I'd like to have you comment on it, I saw a video some years ago that said the UFO research that's being done down in the southwest is being funded by drug money and cocaine dealings by the CIA, and that there are 25 top secret levels of government above the Top Secret category, and that there are some levels that even the president doesn't know about. So there's another topic for another book, I just wanted to have you comment...

Gary Webb: A number of topics for another book. [Laughter from the audience.] I don't know about the UFO research, but I do know you're right that we have very little idea how vast the intelligence community in this country is, or what they're up to. I think there's a great story brewing -- it's called the ECHELON program, and it involves the sharing of eavesdropped emails and cell phone communications, because it is illegal for them to do it in this country. So they've been going to New Zealand and Australia and Canada and having those governments eavesdrop on our conversations and tell us about it. I've read a couple of stories about it in the English press, and I read a couple of stories about it in the Canadian press, but I've seen precious little in the American press. But there's stuff on the Internet that circulates about that, if you're interested in the topic. I think it's called the ECHELON program.

Audience Member #4: I'm glad you brought up James Burke and his Connections, because there are a lot of connections here. One I didn't hear too much about, and I know you've done a lot of research on, was how computers and high tech was used by the Crips and Bloods early on. I lived in south LA prior to this, knew some of these people, and you're right, they had virtually no education. And to suddenly have an operation that's computer literate, riding out of Bakersfield, Fresno, on north and then east in a very quick period -- I'm still learning the computer, I'm probably as old as you are, or older -- so I'd like to hear something on that. The whole dislocation of south LA that occurred -- the Watts Festival, the whole empowerment of the black community was occurring beginning in the late '60s and into the early '70s and mid-'70s, and then collapses into a sea of flipping demographics, and suddenly by 1990 it is El Salvadoran-dominated. And that's another curious part of this equation as we talk about drugs.

Gary Webb: Well, that's quite a bevy of things there. As far as the sophistication of the Crips and the Bloods, the one thing that I probably should have mentioned was that when Danilo Blandón went down to South Central to start selling this dope, he had an M.B.A. in marketing. So he knew what he was doing. His job for the Somoza government was setting up wholesale markets for agricultural products. He'd received an M.B.A. thanks to us, actually -- we helped finance him, we helped send him to the University of Bogata to get his M.B.A. so he could go back to Nicaragua, and he actually came to the United States to sell dope to the gangs. So this was a very sophisticated operation.

One of the money launderers from this group was a macro-economist -- his uncle, Orlando Murillo, was on the Central Bank of Nicaragua. The weapons advisor they had was a guy who'd been a cop for fifteen years. They had another weapons advisor who had been a Navy SEAL. You don't get these kinds of people by putting ads in the paper. This is not a drug ring that just sort of falls together by chance. This is like an all-star game. Which is why I suspect more and more that this thing was set up by a higher authority than a couple of drug dealers.

Audience Member #5: Hi Gary, I just want to thank you for going against the traffic on this whole deal. I'm in the journalism school up at U. of O., and I'm interested in the story behind the story. I was hoping you could share some anecdotes about the kind of activity that you engaged in to get the story. For example, when you get off a plane in Nicaragua, what do you do? Where do you start? How do you talk to "Freeway" Ricky? How do you go against a government stonewall?

Gary Webb: The question is, how do you do a story like this, essentially. Well, thing I've always found is, if you go knock on somebody's door, they're a lot less apt to slam it in your face than if you call them up on the telephone. So, the reason I went down to Nicaragua was to go knock on doors. I didn't go down there and just step off a plane -- I found a fellow down in Nicaragua and we hired him as a stringer, a fellow named George Hidell who is a marvelous investigative reporter, he knew all sorts of government officials down there. And I speak no Spanish, which was another handicap. George speaks like four languages. So, you find people like that to help you out.

With these drug dealers, you know, it's amazing how willing they are to talk. I did a series while I was in Kentucky on organized crime in the coal industry. And it was about this mass of stock swindlers who had looted Wall Street back in the '60s and moved down to Kentucky in the '70s while the coal boom was going on, during the energy shortage. The lesson I learned in that thing -- I thought these guys would never talk to me, I figured they'd be crazy to talk to a reporter about the scams they were pulling. But they were happy to talk about it, they were flattered that you would come to them and say, hey, tell me about what you do. Tell me your greatest knock-off. Those guys would go on forever! So, you know, everybody, no matter what they do, they sort of have pride in their work... [Laughter from the audience.] And, you know, I found that when you appeared interested, they would be happy to tell you.

The people who lied to me, the people who slammed doors in my face, were the DEA and the FBI. The DEA called me down -- I wrote about this in the book -- they had a meeting, and they were telling me that if I wrote this story, I was going to help drug traffickers bring drugs into the country, and I was going to get DEA agents killed, and this, that and the other thing, all of which was utterly bullshit. So that's the thing -- just ask. There's really no secret to it.

Audience Member #6: I'd like to ask a couple of questions very quickly. The first one is, if you wouldn't mind being a reference librarian for a moment -- there was the Golden Triangle. I was just wondering if you've ever, in your curiosity about this, touched on that -- the drug rings and the heroin trade out of Southeast Asia. And the second one is about the fellow from the Houston Chronicle, I don't remember his name right off, but you know who I'm talking about, if you could just touch on that a little bit...

Gary Webb: Yes. The first question was about whether I ever touched on what was going on in the Golden Triangle. Fortunately, I didn't have to -- there's a great book called The Politics of Heroin in Southeast Asia, by Alfred McCoy, which is sort of a classic in CIA drug trafficking lore. I don't think you can get any better than that. That's a great reference in the library, you can go check it out. McCoy was a professor at the University of Wisconsin who went to Laos during the time that the secret war in Laos was going on, and he wrote about how the CIA was flying heroin out on Air America. That's the thing that really surprised me about the reaction to my story was, it's not like I invented this stuff. There's a long, long history of CIA involvement in drug traffic which Cockburn gets into in Whiteout.

And the second question was about Pete Brewton -- there was a reporter in Houston for the Houston Post named Pete Brewton who did the series -- I think it was '91 or '92 -- on the strange connections between the S&L collapses, particularly in Texas, and CIA agents. And his theory was that a lot of these collapses were not mismanagement, they were intentional. These things were looted, with the idea that a lot of the money was siphoned off to fund covert operations overseas. And Brewton wrote this series, and it was funny, because after all hell broke loose on my story, I called him up, and he said, "Well, I was waiting for this to happen to you." And I said, "Why?" And he said, "I was exactly like you are. I'd been in this business for twenty years, I'd won all sorts of awards, I'd lectured in college journalism courses, and I wrote a series that had these three little letters C-I-A in it. And suddenly I was unreliable, and I couldn't be trusted, and Reed Irvine at Accuracy In Media was writing nasty things about me, and my editor had lost confidence in me, so I quit the business and went to law school."

Brewton wrote a book called The Mafia, CIA and George Bush. It's hard to find, but it's worth looking up if you can find it. It's all there, it's all documented. See, the difference between his story and my story was, we put ours out on the web, and it got out. Brewton's story is sort of confined to the printed page, and I think the Washington Journalism Review actually wrote a story about, how come nobody's writing about this, nobody's picking up this story. Nobody touched this story, it just sort of died. And the same thing would have happened with my series, had we not had this amazing web page. Thank God we did, or this thing would have just slipped underneath the waves, and nobody would have ever heard about it.

Audience Member #7: I'm glad you're here. I guess the CIA, there was something I read in the paper a couple of years ago, that said the CIA is actually murdering people, and they admitted it, they don't usually do that.

Gary Webb: It's a new burst of honesty from the new CIA.

Audience Member #7: They'll murder us with kindness. In the Chicago police force, there were about 10 officers who were kicked off the police force for doing drugs or selling drugs, and George Bush or something... I heard that he had a buddy who had a lot of money in drug testing equipment, so that's one reason everybody has to pee in a cup now... [Laughter from the audience.] The other thing I found, there was a meth lab close to here, and somebody who wasn't even involved with it, he was paralyzed... And as you know, we have the "Just Say No to Drugs" deal... What do you think we can do to stop us, the People, from being hypnotized once again from all these shenanigans, doing other people injury in terms of these kinds of messages, at the same time they're selling. Because all this money is being spent for all this...

Gary Webb: I guess the question is, what could you do to keep from being hypnotized by the media message, specifically on the Drug War? Is that what you're talking about?

Audience Member #7: Yeah, or all the funds... like, there's another thing here with the meth lab, they say we'll kind of turn people in...

Gary Webb: Oh yeah, the nation of informers.

Audience Member #7: Yeah.

Gary Webb: That's something I have to laugh about -- up until I think '75 or '76, probably even later than that, you could go to your doctor and get methamphetamine. I mean, there were housewives by the hundreds of thousands across the United States who were taking it every day to lose weight, and now all the sudden it was the worst thing on the face of the earth. That's one thing I got into in the book, was the sort of crack hysteria in 1986 that prompted all these crazy laws that are still on the books today, and the 100:1 sentencing ratio... I don't know how many of you saw, on PBS a couple of nights back, there was a great show on informants called "Snitch." [Murmurs of recognition from the audience.] Yeah, on Frontline. That was very heartening to see, because I don't think ten years ago that it would have stood a chance in hell of getting on the air.

What I'm seeing now is that a lot of people are finally waking up to the idea that this "drug war" has been a fraud since the get-go. My personal opinion is, I think the main purpose of this whole drug war was to sort of erode civil liberties, very slowly and very gradually, and sort of put us down into a police state. [Robust burst of applause from the audience.] And we're pretty close to that. I've got to hand it to them, they've done a good job. We have no Fourth Amendment left anymore, we're all peeing in cups, and we're all doing all sorts of things that our parents probably would have marched in the streets about.

The solution to that is to read something other than the daily newspaper, and turn off the TV news. I mean, I'm sorry, I hate to say that, but that's mind-rot. You've got to find alternative sources of information. [Robust applause.]

Voice From the Audience: How can you say that it was all a chain reaction, that it was not done deliberately, and on the other hand say it has at the same time deliberately eroded our rights?

Gary Webb: Well, the question was, how can I say on one hand it was a chain reaction, and on the other hand say the drug war was set up deliberately to erode our rights. I mean, you're talking about sort of macro versus micro. And I do not give the CIA that much credit, that they could plan these vast conspiracies down through the ages and have them work -- most of them don't.

What I'm saying is, you have police groups, you have police lobbying groups, you have prison guard groups -- they seize opportunities when they come along. The Drug War has given them a lot of opportunities to say, okay, now let's lengthen prison sentences. Why? Well, because if you keep people in jail longer, you need more prison guards. Let's build more prisons. Why? Well, people get jobs, prison guards get jobs. The police stay in business. We need to fund more of them. We need to give bigger budgets to the correctional facilities. This is all very conscious, but I don't think anybody sat in a room in 1974 and said, okay, by 1995, we're going to have X number of Americans locked up or under parole supervision. I don't think they mind -- you know, I think they like that. But I don't think it was a conscious effort. I think it was just one bad idea, after another bad idea, compounded with a stupid idea, compounded with a really stupid idea. And here we are. So I don't know if that answers your question or not...

Audience Member #8: To me, the Iran-contra story was one of the most interesting and totally frustrating things. And the more information, the more about it I heard -- we don't know anything about it, I mean, if you look for any official data, they deny everything. And to see Ollie North, the upstanding blue-eyed American, standing there lying through his teeth, and we knew it... [Inaudible comment, "before Congress and the President"?] What galls me is that these people who are guilty of high crimes and misdemeanors are now getting these enormous pensions, and we have to pay for these bums. It sickens me!

Gary Webb: Right.

Audience Member #8: And I actually have a question -- this is my question, by the way, I know you have a thousand other questions [laughter from the audience] -- but the one that stays with me, and has always bothered me, was the Christic Institute, and I thought it was fantastic. And they were hit with this enormous lawsuit, and they had to bail out. This needs to be ["rehired"?] because they knew what they were doing, they had all the right answers, and they were run out of office, so to say, in disgrace, because of this lawsuit.

Gary Webb: The question was about the Christic Institute, and about how the Iran-contra controversy is probably one of the worst scandals. I agree with you, I think the Iran-contra scandal was worse than Watergate, far worse than this nonsense we're doing now. But I'll tell you, I think the press played a very big part in downplaying that scandal. One of the people I interviewed for the book was a woman named Pam Naughton, who was one of the best prosecutors that the Iran-contra committee had. And I asked her, why -- you know, it was also the first scandal that was televised, and I remember watching them at night. I would go to work and I'd set the VCR, and I'd come home at night and I'd watch the hearings. Then I'd pick up the paper the next morning, and it was completely different! And I couldn't figure it out, and this has bothered me all these years.

So when I got Pam Naughton on the phone, I said, what the hell happened to the press corps in Washington during the Iran-contra scandal? And she said, well, I can tell you what I saw. She said, every day, we would come out at the start of this hearings, and we would lay out a stack of documents -- all the exhibits we were going to introduce -- stuff that she thought was extremely incriminating, front page story after front page story, and they'd sit them on a table. And she said, every day the press corps would come in, and they'd say hi, how're you doing, blah blah blah, and they'd go sit down in the front row and start talking about, you know, did you see the ball game last night, and what they saw on Johnny Carson. And she said one or two reporters would go up and get their stack of documents and go back and write about it, and everybody else sat in the front row, and they would sit and say, okay, what's our story today? And they would all agree what the story was, and they'd go back and write it. Most of them never even looked at the exhibits.

And that's why I say it was the press's fault, because there was so much stuff that came out of those hearings. That used to just drive me crazy, you would never see it in the newspaper. And I don't think it's a conspiracy -- if anything, it's a conspiracy of stupidity and laziness. I talked to Bob Parry about this -- when he was working for Newsweek covering Iran-contra, they weren't even letting him go to the hearings. He had to get transcripts messengered to him at his house secretly, so his editors wouldn't find out he was actually reading the transcripts, because he was writing stories that were so different from everybody else's.

Bob Parry tells a story of being at a dinner party with Bobby Inman from the CIA, the editor of Newsweek, and all the muckity-mucks -- this was his big introduction into Washington society. And they were sitting at the dinner table in the midst of the Iran-contra thing, talking about everything but Iran-contra. And Bob said he had the bad taste of bringing up the Iran-contra hearing and mentioning one particularly bad aspect of it. And he said, the editor of Newsweek looked at him and said, "You know, Bob, there are just some things that it's better the country just doesn't know about." And all these admirals and generals sitting around the table all nodded their heads in agreement, and they wanted to talk about something else.

That's the attitude. That's the attitude in Washington. And that's the attitude of the Washington press corps, and nowadays it's even worse than that, because now, if you play the game right, you get a TV show. Now you've got the McLaughlin Group. Now you get your mug on CNN. You know. And that's how they keep them in line. If you're a rabble rouser, and a shit-stirrer, they don't want your type on television. They want the pundits.

The other question was about the Christic Institute. They had it all figured out. The Christic Institute had this thing figured out. They filed suit in May of 1986, alleging that the Reagan administration, the CIA, this sort of parallel government was going on. Oliver North was involved in it, you had the Bay of Pigs Cubans that were involved in it down in Costa Rica, they had names, they had dates, and they got murdered. And the Reagan administration's line was, they're a bunch of left-wing liberal crazies, this was conspiracy theory. If you want to see what they really thought, go to Oliver North's diaries, which are public -- the National Security Archive has got them -- all he was writing about, after the Christic Institute's suit was filed, was how we've got to shut this thing down, how we have to discredit these witnesses, how we've got to get this guy set up, how we've got to get this guy out of the country... They knew that the Christic Institute was right, and they were deathly afraid that the American public was going to find out about it.

I am convinced that the judge who was hearing the case was part and parcel to the problem. He threw the case out of court and fined the Christic Institute, I think it was $1.3 million, for even bringing the lawsuit. It was deemed "frivolous litigation." And it finally bankrupted them. And they went away.

But that's the problem when you try to take on the government in its own arena, and the federal courts are definitely part of its own arena. They make the rules. And in cases like that, you don't stand a chance in hell, it won't happen.

Voice From the Audience: But if you cannot get the truth in the courts, if you cannot write it in the papers, then what do you do?

Gary Webb: You do it yourself. You do it yourself. You've got to start rebuilding an information system on your own. And that's what's going on. It's very small, but it's happening. People are talking to each other through newsgroups on the Internet. People are doing Internet newsletters.

Voice From the Audience: Do you have a website?

Emcee: Let's use the mike, let's use the mike.

Gary Webb: The question is, do I have a website. No, I don't, but I'm building one.

[Inaudible question from the audience.]

Gary Webb: Well, let's let these people who have been standing in line...

[Commotion, murmuring. Someone calls out, "Please use the mike."]

Audience Member #9: When you mentioned prisons a moment ago, I couldn't help but remember that it is America's fastest-growing industry, the "prison industry" -- which is a hell of a phrase unto itself. But it seems that the CIA had people aligned throughout Central America at one point, and El Salvador, with the contras, and in Honduras and Nicaragua, and in Panama, Manuel Noriega...

Gary Webb: Our "man in Panama," that's right.

Audience Member #9: Yeah. But something went wrong with him, and he got pinched in public. And I'm interested to know what you think about that.

Gary Webb: The question is about Manuel Noriega, who was our "man in Panama" for so many years. What happened to Noriega is that -- I don't think it had anything to do with the fact that he was a drug trafficker, because we knew that for years. What it had to do with was what is going to happen at the end of this year, which is when control of the Panama Canal goes over to the Panamanians. If you read the New York Times story that Seymour Hersh wrote back in June of 1986 that exposed Noriega publicly as a drug trafficker and money launderer, there were some very telling phrases in it. All unsourced, naturally, you know -- unattributed comments from high-ranking government officials -- but they talked about how they were nervous that Noriega had become unreliable. And with control of the Panama Canal reverting to the Panamanian government, they were very nervous at the idea of having somebody as "unstable" as Noriega running the country at that point. And I think that was a well-founded fear. You've got a major drug trafficker controlling a major maritime thoroughway. I can see the CIA being nervous about being cut out of the business. [Laughter from the audience.]

But I think that's what the whole thing with Noriega was about -- they wanted him out of there, because they wanted somebody that they could control a little more closely in power in Panama for when the canal gets reverted back to them.

Audience Member #9: Was there much of a profit difference between Nicaragua and Panama as far as the drugs went?

Gary Webb: Well, what Noriega had done was sort of create an international banking center for drug money. That was his part of it. Nicaragua was nothing ever than just a trans-shipment point. Central America was never anything more than a trans-shipment point. Columbia Peru and Bolivia were the producers, and the planes needed a place to refuel, and that's all that Central America ever was. The banking was all done in Panama.

Audience Member #10: You talk about how they sat on their stories, the newspapers? Why did they suddenly decide to pursue the stories?

Gary Webb: Which stories are these?

Audience Member #10: The stories about the crack dealing and the CIA. Why did they suddenly decide that, well, actually...

Gary Webb: The question was -- correct me if I'm wrong -- the question raised the fact that the other newspapers didn't do anything about this story for a while, and then after I wrote it they came after me. Is that what you're asking?

Audience Member #10: Well, yeah, and then eventually the CIA admitted it... and I mean, why are people asking, it sat for a long time, and then suddenly everyone was on it. What was the turning point that made them decide to pursue it?

Gary Webb: The turning point that made them decide to pursue the story was the fact that it had gotten out over the Internet, and people were calling them up saying, why don't you have the story in your newspaper? You know, I don't think the subject matter frightened the major media as much as the fact that a little newspaper in Northern California was able to set the national agenda for once. And people were marching in the streets, people were holding hearings in Washington, they were demanding Congressional hearings, you had John Deutch, the CIA director, go down on that surreal trip down to South Central to convince everyone that everything was okay... [Laughter from the audience.] And all of this was happening without the big media being involved in it at all. And the reason that happened was because we had an outlet -- we had the web. And the people at the Mercury News did a fantastic job on this website.

And so, news was marching on without them. There's a professor at the University of Wisconsin who's done a paper on the whole "Dark Alliance" thing, and her thesis is that this story was shut down more because of how it got out than for what it actually said. That it was an attempt by the major media to regain control of the Internet, and to suggest that unless they're the ones who are putting it out, it's unreliable. Which I think you see in a lot of stories. The mainstream press gladly promotes the idea that you can't believe anything you read on the Internet, it's all kooks, it's all conspiracy theorists... And there are, I mean, I admit, there are a lot of them out there, but it's not all false. But the idea that we're being taught is, unless it's got our name on it, you can't believe it. So they can retain control of the means of communication anyway.

Audience Member #11: You mentioned Iran-contra, which was private foreign policy in defiance of Congress, which means it was a high crime. From there, we get more drugs, we get erosion of civil liberties and the loss of the Fourth Amendment, which you mentioned. And we have to get that back, because without it, we're just commodities to one another. So what I'd like to ask you is, what are you working on now? And do you have your own journalistic chain of reaction? Are you going to be doing something that connects back to this?

Gary Webb: The question is what am I doing now -- believe it or not, I'm working for the government. [Laughter from the audience.] I work for the California legislature, and I do investigations of state agencies. I just wrote a piece for Esquire magazine which should be out in April on another fabulous DEA program that they're running. Actually, part of it's based here in Oregon, called Operation Pipeline. That story is coming out in April, and Esquire told me they want me to write more stuff for them, they want me to do some investigative reporting for them, so I'll be working for them. And I'm putting together another book proposal, and a couple of other things. I'm not going to work for newspapers any more, I learned my lesson.

Audience Member #12: A year ago the editor of your newspaper was here to speak, sponsored by the University of Oregon School of Journalism. Before I got up here, I took a casual look around -- I don't know all of the members of the journalism faculty, but I didn't recognize any. We did have a student here who got up and asked a question. That leads to this question: I'd like, if you don't mind, to ask if there is someone from the University of Oregon journalism faculty here, would they mind being acknowledged and raising their hand?

Gary Webb: All right, there's one back there.

Audience Member #12: There is one. Okay. [Applause from the audience.] I'm pleased to see it. There is that one person. My point is, I think much of what you've said this evening constitutes an indictment -- and a valid indictment -- of the university journalism programs in this country. [Applause.] Most Americans and I believe -- and I'm interested in your reaction -- that it reinforces that indictment when we see, to that person's credit, that she is the only faculty member from our school of journalism to hear you tonight.

Gary Webb: I think the general question was about the state of the journalism schools. The one thing journalism schools don't teach, by and large, is investigative reporting. They teach stenography very well. That's why I consider most of journalism today to be stenography. You go to a press conference, you write down the quotes accurately, you come back, you don't provide any context, you don't provide any perspective, because that gets into analysis, and heavens knows, we don't want any analysis in our newspapers.

But you report things accurately, you report things fairly, and even if it's a lie you put it in the newspaper, and that's considered journalism. I don't consider that journalism, I consider that stenography. And that is the way they teach journalism in school, that's the way I was taught. Unless you go to a very different journalism school from the kinds that most kids go to, that's what you're taught. Now, there are specialized journalism schools, there are master's programs like the Kiplinger Program at Ohio State, that's very good.

So, I'm not saying that all journalism schools are bad, but they don't teach you to be journalists. They discourage you from doing that, by and large. And I don't think it's the fault of the journalism professors, I just think that's the way things have been taught in this country for so long, that they just do it automatically. I'd be interested in hearing the professor's thoughts about it, but that's sort of the way I look at things. I spent way too many years in journalism school. I kind of got shed of those notions after I got out in the real world.

[End of transcript.]

© ParaScope, Inc. 1999




__________________
A TAINTED DEAL http://www.motherjones.com/politics/1998/06/tainted-deal

 LA DEA; Murder of Kiki Camarena http://www.laweekly.com/news/how-a-dogged-la-dea-agent-unraveled-the-cias-alleged-role-in-the-murder-of-kiki-camarena-5750278  

"Several informed sources have told me that an appendix to this Report was removed at the instruction of the DOJ at the last minute. This appendix is reported to have information about a CIA officer, not agent or asset, but officer, based in the LA Station, who was in charge of Contra related activities. According to these sources, this individual was associated with running drugs to South Central L.A., around 1988. Let me repeat that amazing omission. The recently released CIA Report Vol II contained an appendix, which was pulled by the DOJ, that reported a CIA officer in the LA Station was hooked into drug running in South Central Los Angeles." Maxine Waters Oct, 1998
https://fas.org/irp/congress/1998_cr/h981013-coke.htm   

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maynard

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Reply with quote  #123 
The works of Professor Alfred Mc Coy are historically important in understanding the history of covert operations and drugs


The Politics of Heroin:
CIA Complicity in the Global Drug Trade


More Bad News

You think this is all "ancient history"? Think again. The current glut of pure white heroin entering this country has its roots in our undercover support of the Afghan rebell fight against Soviet Russia.

See: Dealing With the Deamon

It's now nearly 90 years since the first international attempts were taken to control ilicit drugs in 1909 at Shanghai. Today the world is facing levels of heroin production unprecedented in recent history, ten times higher than the last "plague" of the 1970's. Heroin has now become a global commodity insinuating its way into much of the third world and the emerging democracies of Eastern Europe.

Dealing with the Demon is a three part series which examines how this came to be and what can be done about it. Each film interweaves contemporary human stories with crucial scenes from the history of the drug trade which has now grown to become the second largest industry in the world.

This series provides the hidden background which is essential to understanding the global nature of the drug trade and the ongoing debate about what to do about ilicit drugs in society.

Filmed in fifteen different countries (in Asia, United States, Australia and Europe) at considerable risk to the filmmakers, Dealing with the Deamon is a compeling view of one of the darkest aspects of recent history.

The story that is revealed, follows the simple but expedient formula that drugs (and other long term problems like Islamic terrorism) took a back seat when the priority was winning a war against the evil Soviet Empire. At its more complex level, the story of heroin in the Golden Crescent involves connections between the CIA, the ISI, Mujahideen, the collapsed BCCI bank and Pakistan's nuclear weapons program.

Interview with Alfred McCoy, professor of Southeast Asian History at the University of Wisconsin, Madison; author of The Politics of Heroin: CIA Complicity in the Global Drug Trade
Part One
"The problem with America's failed chance at essentially reducing if not eliminating drugs as a problem was a contradiction between the needs of domestic policy and the national security state."

Part Two
"When the Americans moved into Indochina after the French departed in 1955, we picked up the same tribes, the Hmong, the same politics of narcotics, the politics of heroin, that the French had established. By the 1960s we were operating, particularly the CIA, in collusion with the major traffickers exporting from the mountains not only to meet the consumption needs of Southeast Asia itself, but in the first instance America's combat forces fighting in Vietnam and ultimately the world market."

Part Three
"Moving on to our fourth instance, one close to home, is the whole Iran-contra operation . . . All the personnel that are involved in that operation are Laos veterans. Ted Shackley, Thomas Clines, Oliver North, Richard Secord - they all served in Laos during [the] thirteen-year war. They are all part of that policy of integrating narcotics and being complicitous in the narcotics trade in the furtherance of covert action."

Part Four
Because of their mandate to stop communism or to run a secret army in Laos or to harass the Nicaragua government with the contra operation - because they've had a political covert action mandate - they have found it convenient to ally themselves with the very drug brokers the DEA is trying to put in jail. While you're working with the CIA you are untouchable. The CIA backs you up. There are instances of minor traffickers being arrested in the United States for importing drugs and the CIA will actually go to the local police and courts and get them off and out because oftentimes they threaten to talk, make trouble, so the CIA just gets them out.














__________________
A TAINTED DEAL http://www.motherjones.com/politics/1998/06/tainted-deal

 LA DEA; Murder of Kiki Camarena http://www.laweekly.com/news/how-a-dogged-la-dea-agent-unraveled-the-cias-alleged-role-in-the-murder-of-kiki-camarena-5750278  

"Several informed sources have told me that an appendix to this Report was removed at the instruction of the DOJ at the last minute. This appendix is reported to have information about a CIA officer, not agent or asset, but officer, based in the LA Station, who was in charge of Contra related activities. According to these sources, this individual was associated with running drugs to South Central L.A., around 1988. Let me repeat that amazing omission. The recently released CIA Report Vol II contained an appendix, which was pulled by the DOJ, that reported a CIA officer in the LA Station was hooked into drug running in South Central Los Angeles." Maxine Waters Oct, 1998
https://fas.org/irp/congress/1998_cr/h981013-coke.htm   

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maynard

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http://www.baltimorechronicle.com/072205Crumpacker.shtml


COMMENTARY:

WHO HAS WHAT TO HIDE ABOUT LUIS POSADA CARRILES?

by Tom Crumpacker

"For now we see as through a glass, darkly."
--St. Paul, I Corinthians 13:12


Luis Posada Carriles as he looks today. Posada was charged in Venezuela in the 1976 Cuban jetliner bombing that killed 73 people. By delaying extradition it looks as if the Bush Administration is desperate to keep right-wing secrets.
Luis Posada's immigration case is now set for hearing before a Homeland Security judge in Texas on Aug. 29. On May 21 Secretary Rice indicated the Homeland case might go on for many months and his extradition would be determined on its completion. With motions and appeals and paid lawyers, this might mean years. A provision in the 1922 US-Venezuela extradition treaty says the custodial state can keep the alleged criminal until its own proceedings against him arising from crimes committed there are completed.

But surely a minor "crime" such as a traffic ticket or a failure to report to Homeland Security on entry is not what was contemplated. And even if Posada could somehow convince the Homeland judges of the validity of his spurious residency and asylum claims (that he is a US resident although he has lived abroad for 30 years; that he is entitled to asylum here although he has murdered scores of innocent people), he still should be extradited now to Venezuela because his migration status has nothing to do with extradition for trial for his alleged crime, murdering 73 innocent Cubana flight 455 passengers in 1976.

Why not just send Posada to the extradition judge and be done with it? What's the reason for keeping him here?

So why not just send him to the extradition judge and be done with it? What's the reason for keeping him here? Delay for delay's sake? Aggravate the Venezuelan government? Weaken the US claim to be the world leader in its "war against terrorism"? None of these seem very convincing as motives, even for this Administration. According to recently declassified CIA reports ( National Security Archives, Book 153, FBI report 11/2/76 ), in custody after his Oct. 6, 1976 bombing of the Cubana civilian airliner, flight 455, Posada threatened through his co-conspirator Morales Navarette that if forced to talk, the Venezuelan government "would go down the tube" and there would be "another Watergate."


Luis Posada Carriles as he looked in 1976

George Bush Senior, CIA Director at the time of the Cubana bombing, had previously appointed Ted Shackley as his Deputy Director for Special Operations. Since Bay of Pigs, Shackley had been in charge of the JM/Wave Miami CIA station which had been training anti-Castro extremists for possible invasion, then demolitions (Posada ran the school), biological warfare and murderous incursions into Cuba. In 1976 CIA had urged several violent US anti-Castro groups to join together under one umbrella organization called CORU. It was led by Orlando Bosch and took credit for the Letelier murders in Washington, DC in September.

Bush Senior has said he was not with the CIA before being appointed director by President Ford in early 1976. Joseph McBride in an article in The Nation of July 16, 1988 wrote: "A source with close connections to the intelligence community confirmed that Bush started working for the CIA in 1960 or 1961, using his oil business for clandestine activities." There's a memo from FBI Director J. Edgar Hoover to the State Department dated Nov. 28, 1963 concerning information developed by the Miami FBI office about groups in Miami seeking to blame the JFK murder on the Cuban government. It says the information was orally furnished on Nov. 23 to "George Bush of the CIA." Bush Senior was in Dallas then. As was another CIA operative, Chauncey Holt (now deceased), who identified Posada as being in Dealey Plaza at the time of the murder.

Other sources, among them CIA agent Marita Lorenz, placed Orlando Bosch and Guillermo Novo there. The question arises whether their presence there can be dismissed as coincidence. After all, Bosch, Posada's accomplice in the Cuban airline bombing, was pardoned by President Bush Senior in 1990 against the strong objection of his own Justice Department, which had implicated him in more than 70 terrorist crimes. And Guillermo Novo and Posada were just last year pardoned on another bombing charge and released by the US-friendly outgoing president of Panama. Yet another anti-Castro extremist, Felix Rodriguez, who killed Ernesto Guevara and worked with Posada in the Iran-Contra supply network, has long been a Bush Senior personal friend.

It's apparent that Posada could supply many of the missing pieces of the puzzles of the last 45 years.

The official versions of Watergate and JFK’s murder don't make a lot of sense when one considers motivations of the supposed actors. It's now clear that Nixon ordered the burglary of Democratic National Headquarters in 1972. But what was he looking for at such great risk? In his book on Watergate, Staff Chief H. R. Haldeman wrote that when Nixon was caught on tape talking about the risk that a Watergate probe could "blow the whole Bay of Pigs thing," he was actually referring to the JFK murder, not the invasion of Cuba. As Vice President in 1960 (a political protégé of Senator Prescott Bush), Nixon had supervised the preparation of the invasion. It seems odd he would confuse these events if they were unrelated. Moreover, what could be "blown" about the Bay of Pigs that was not already known?

And why did Lee Harvey Oswald kill JFK? The Warren Commission and the subsequent Congressional committees could not come up with a motive. In an effort at the time of the murder to blame the Cuban government, a photo of Oswald was spread across US newspapers showing him on a New Orleans street holding a "Fair Play for Cuba Committee" sign. But why were there no other members of the New Orleans committee? Why did Oswald give the address of the committee as 544 Camp St., which was the side entrance for the offices of Sergio Arcacha Smith and Guy Banister, both rabid anti-Castro extremists? Why were anti-Castro Cubans often seen there? Why did Oswald spend much of his time there? Why was Allen Dulles, the CIA Director who planned the Bay of Pigs and was subsequently fired by JFK, put on the Warren Commission? Why did CIA misinform the Commission on so many key evidentiary matters? The official answers to these questions seem to be "blowin' in the wind." It's like a jigsaw puzzle with half the pieces missing.

In an oligarchy where the important decisions are made in secret by a power elite, where the mainstream media is used to manipulate rather than inform, it's often difficult for the public to distinguish actual from virtual reality.

In the fall of 1963, JFK was not relying much on CIA intelligence or opinions regarding Cuba. Negotiations (supposedly secret) were about to start between US and Cuba to possibly normalize relations. JFK's conditions were that Cuba distance itself from the Soviet Union and stop aiding revolutionary movements in Latin America, to which Castro seemed amenable.

A key part of Allen Dulles's Bay of Pigs plan was "Operation 40." They were 40 CIA agents, mostly gunmen, whose job was to kill the leading members of Cuba's government. Some, like Posada, had previously worked in enforcement for the Batista regime. Prior to the invasion they were waiting in Dominican Republic. Their boat took off for Cuba but turned around when informed the invasion was failing. They returned to the US, and, unbeknownst to JFK, Operation 40 continued on. For years and decades, with some changes in names and personnel.

Many of the original names kept appearing in connection with subsequent covert, violent CIA projects, such as Operation Mongoose, Operation Phoenix, the JFK murder, the regime changes in Chile, El Salvador, Nicaragua, the Watergate burglary, the bombing of Cubana flight 455, the Iran-Contra war, and Operation Condor which exterminated many South American progressives. Names like Luis Posada, Orlando Bosch, Felix Rodriguez, E. Howard Hunt, Frank Sturgis, Antonio Veciana, Guillermo Novo, Eugenio Martinez, Ricardo Morales, David Sanchez Morales, David Phillips, all members of the 40.

In an oligarchy where the important decisions are made in secret by a power elite, where the mainstream media is used to manipulate rather than inform, it's often difficult for the public to distinguish actual from virtual reality. It's apparent that Posada could supply many of the missing pieces of the puzzles of the last 45 years. He has friends in Miami and they have brought him here to resurface after 30 years. If he needed money or a place to hide comfortably, they could easily have provided him with such in another country. What we now know about his past is enough to say that he and his friends could be going public with his knowledge of CIA operations as a threat or extortion chip, perhaps to affect future US policy toward Cuba. This would explain why his legally required extradition is being delayed.


Tom Crumpacker, a retired lawyer and member of the Miami Coalition to End US Embargo of Cuba, writes from Austin, Texas. He may be reached at crump8@aol.com.


Copyright © 2005 The Baltimore Chronicle. All rights reserved.



__________________
A TAINTED DEAL http://www.motherjones.com/politics/1998/06/tainted-deal

 LA DEA; Murder of Kiki Camarena http://www.laweekly.com/news/how-a-dogged-la-dea-agent-unraveled-the-cias-alleged-role-in-the-murder-of-kiki-camarena-5750278  

"Several informed sources have told me that an appendix to this Report was removed at the instruction of the DOJ at the last minute. This appendix is reported to have information about a CIA officer, not agent or asset, but officer, based in the LA Station, who was in charge of Contra related activities. According to these sources, this individual was associated with running drugs to South Central L.A., around 1988. Let me repeat that amazing omission. The recently released CIA Report Vol II contained an appendix, which was pulled by the DOJ, that reported a CIA officer in the LA Station was hooked into drug running in South Central Los Angeles." Maxine Waters Oct, 1998
https://fas.org/irp/congress/1998_cr/h981013-coke.htm   

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maynard

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Posts: 1,192
Reply with quote  #125 
From Robert Parry's Consortium website
http://www.consortiumnews.com/
http://www.consortiumnews.com/archive/crack.html
Robert Parry is a retired Associated Press and Newsweek writer

Archive
Contra Crack Series

CIA's Anti-Drug Message for Kids
The CIA wants American families to know that it's fighting the war on drugs, but the real story isn't quite so simple or so pretty. By Martin A. Lee. March 4, 2001

CIA Admits Tolerating Contra-Cocaine Trafficking
House Intelligence Committee buries admissions in new contra-cocaine report. By Robert Parry. June 8, 2000

Hyde's Blind Eye: Contras & Cocaine
The chief House manager’s double standards on scandal. By Dennis Bernstein & Leslie Kean. December 14, 1999

Contra-Cocaine: Falling Between the 'Crack'
Congress has taken the Nicaraguan contra-cocaine scandal back behind closed doors, even though the CIA admitted serious wrongdoing in a public report. By Robert Parry. June 18, 1999

L.A.'s Other Coke Pipeline
The CIA’s contra-cocaine investigation reportedly stumbled upon a new drug pipeline into Los Angeles, with a CIA veteran of the contra war implicated. By Robert Parry. December 29, 1998

The Contras’ Narco-Terrorists
The Hitz report describes how some U.S.-trained veterans of the terror wars against Fidel Castro’s Cuba turned to drug trafficking in the 1970s and reappeared as contras supporters in the 1980s. October 15, 1998

Special Report: CIA’s Drug Confession
In a shocking new report, CIA Inspector General Frederick Hitz confirms long-standing allegations that drug traffickers pervaded the Nicaraguan contra war. Hitz found evidence in the CIA’s own files connecting key contras and contra backers to major trafficking organizations, including the Medellin cartel. One thread of evidence even led into Ronald Reagan’s National Security Council where the contra war was overseen by Lt. Col. Oliver North. October 15, 1998

The NYT’s New Contra Lies
The New York Times, “the newspaper of record,” has altered the historical record, again, to protect the Nicaraguan contras and the paper’s own bad reporting. October 1, 1998

John Hull's Great Escape
CIA-linked farmer John Hull skipped Costa Rica to avoid a drug trial -- and got help in his escape from DEA operatives. August 2, 1998

Special Report: Contra-Cocaine -- Justice Denied
A new Justice Department report reveals that the Reagan-Bush administrations knew much more about Nicaraguan contra-drug trafficking. The CIA also blocked investigators who got too close. But the Justice report still denigrates witnesses, such as smuggler Jorge Morales, and keeps the cover-up alive. August 2, 1998

The NYT's Contra-Cocaine Dilemma
For a dozen years, The New York Times mocked allegations that the Nicaraguan contras were implicated in cocaine trafficking. Finally, the nation's 'newspaper of record' is admitting that there was something to the story after all. But the Times is still letting the CIA put its spin on the scandal -- and the Times still doesn't want to confess its own guilt. July 23, 1998

Reality Bites Back: Contra-Coke Proof
Incoming CIA Inspector General Britt Snider must decide how to release an explosive report confirming long-held suspicions that the Nicaraguan contra operation smuggled cocaine. The report implicates the CIA and casts a dark shadow over the war run by the late CIA director William Casey and White House aide Oliver North. July 9, 1998

Two New Contra-Coke Books
Two new books are throwing down the gauntlet -- again -- to the CIA on the issue of drug trafficking. July 9, 1998

Listen to Bob Parry & Gary Webb Discussing New Contra-Cocaine Report on "Democracy Now."
July 20, 1998

Contra-Coke: Evidence of Premeditation
A memo reveals how CIA Director William J. Casey engineered a legal change in 1982 that spared the spy agency from a legal requirement to report on drug smuggling by agents. The memo, released by Rep. Maxine Waters, is evidence that Casey anticipated cocaine trafficking by the Nicaraguan contras. June 1, 1998

Contra Cocaine: Bad to Worse
The CIA has issued part one of its long-awaited Nicaraguan contra cocaine report. While the spy agency hopes everyone will just read the executive summary, the fine print of the report shows that the drug trafficking was a severe problem. (2/16/98)

Contra-Crack Guide: Reading Between the Lines
The CIA and the Justice Department are clearing themselves of wrongdoing on alleged Nicaraguan contra-crack sales. Yet, while the verdicts are public, the actual evidence is still under wraps. And reporter Gary Webb has lost his job. (1/5/98)

Hung Out to Dry: 'Dark Alliance' Series Dies
Under pressure from the Big Media, San Jose Mercury News editors pulled reporter Gary Webb off the contra-drug story. But in a first-person account, Webb's co-author in Nicaragua warns about dangers to others who worked on the story. (6/30/97)

CIA, Contras & Cocaine: Big Media Rejoices
The nation's leading newspapers celebrated a column by a San Jose Mercury News editor, backing away from last year's series linking the Nicaraguan contras to the nation's 'crack' epidemic. But the evidence of contra drugs remains, as do questions about the big media's hostility toward the decade-old story. (6/2/97)

CIA & Cocaine: Agency Assets Cross the Line
The CIA faces a new drug-trafficking embarrassment with the Miami indictment of a Venezuelan general who worked with the CIA on narcotics issues. But the problem goes far deeper, all the way down to the spy agency's Cold War roots. (3/17/97)

Contra-Crack: Investigators vs. Brickwall
Maxine Waters tracks CIA-contra-crack suspicions. (2/3/97)

Contra-Crack: Contra Crack Controversy Continues
A new report backs the allegations and chastises the big papers. (1/6/97)

Contra-Crack: CIA, Drugs & National Press
When a West Coast paper published new evidence linking the CIA-managed Nicaraguan contra rebels to cocaine smuggling, the Washington press rallied to the spy agency's defense -- and pummeled the out-of-step journalists. (12/23/96)

Contra-Crack: The Kerry-Weld Cocaine War
While Sen. John Kerry led the fight to expose the contra-crack drug trade, Gov. Bill Weld stalled. (11/11/96)

Contra-Crack: Contra-Crack Story Assailed (Part 1)
The Washington Post rushes to the CIA's defense. (10-28-96)

Contra-Crack: Contra-Crack Story Assailed (Part 2)
The Washington Times' Pro-Contra beat goes on. (10-28-96)

Contra-Crack: Blacks Angered by Contra-Crack
A published report of CIA-backed crack cocaine dealing in black communities across America has touched a raw nerve among black leaders. (9-30-96)


Archive
October Surprise 'X-Files' Series

The Original Eight-Part Series

The Russian Report
What the KGB knew about the October Surprise mystery, but the American people didn't. (12-11-95)

The Ladies Room Secrets
How historic secrets about this political era were recovered from a remote Capitol Hill wash room. (12-21-95)

Bill Casey's Iranian
What FBI wiretaps captured about secret payments from BCCI and a Bush-connected lawyer to an Iranian "double-agent."(12-31-95)

Follow the Money
How some of the world's most secretive and powerful players joined forces to fix the pivotal 1980 election. (1-15-96)

Saddam's 'Green Light'
What a "top secret" report reveals about the origins of the bloody Iran-Iraq War. (1-31-96)

Where's Bill Casey
How the national news media and Congress "debunked" the October Surprise allegations by adopting bogus alibis for Bill Casey. (2-14-96)

Bush & a CIA Power Play
What CIA veterans and former CIA director George Bush did to regain The White House in the 1980s. (2-29-96)

Lies Spun into History
How absurd alibis became part of the October Surprise historical record. (3-14-96)

More Recent Updates

David Rockefeller & 'October Surprise' Case
Election 1980 was a turning point in American political history, but how the Republicans exploited Jimmy Carter's humiliation over the Iranian hostage crisis to ensure Ronald Reagan's victory is still little understood. Nor do the American people know the background roles in the "October Surprise" case played by David Rockefeller, the Shah of Iran's banker, and his many powerful friends. Adapted from Secrecy & Privilege. Posted April 15, 2005

Rockefeller Aide's Tie to 'October Surprise'
Some of the most intriguing documents found in the files of the House 'October Surprise' Task Force relate to the role of Joseph Verner Reed, one of Chase Manhattan Bank Chairman David Rockefeller's top aides. According to an FBI agent's notes, Reed tried to stonewall the investigation of alleged Republican interference in President Carter's 1980 Iran-hostage negotiations. The Reed documents were never released to the American people but were found by reporter Robert Parry in a Capitol Hill storage room. Part of our new Document Archive. Posted April 12, 2005.

Russian Report on 'October Surprise' Case
For the first time, we are posting the "confidential" Russian government report about the 1980 "October Surprise" case. The report -- a rare case of Moscow cooperating with the United States on an intelligence investigation -- asserts that Reagan-Bush campaign officials did secretly negotiate with Iranian leaders behind President Carter's back. Posted April 5, 2005

Arafat & the Original 'October Surprise'
Skeletons of an election controversy past -- the alleged Reagan-Bush "October Surprise" scheme of 1980 -- have surfaced, as a top aide to Palestinian leader Yasir Arafat describes a secret meeting between the PLO and a key Republican. The Arafat aide says the Republican sought the PLO's help in sabotaging President Carter's efforts to free 52 American hostages in Iran. November 2, 2004

Russia's Prime Minister & 'October Surprise'
Boris Yeltsin’s nominee for Russia’s new prime minister wrote a secret report in 1993, confirming the 1980 ‘October Surprise’ charges and implicating top Republicans in a hostage plot with Iran. Sergey Stepashin sent the explosive report to the U.S. Congress, but the extraordinary document was hidden. By Robert Parry. May 14, 1999

Earl Brian: Reagan's 'Scandal Man' Off to Jail
In the early 1990s, the word of Ronald Reagan's friend Earl Brian helped debunk two major scandals. But now, Brian's credibility has collapsed with his federal fraud conviction. (8/25/97)

October Surprise: Finally, Time for the Truth?
Seven years ago, Jamshid Hashemi, an Iranian businessman and CIA operative, broke his silence about the October Surprise controversy. Now, with more and more public figures corroborating parts of the story, Jamshid Hashemi is revealing new details about this ultimate dirty trick and the CIA. (5/5/97)

October Surprise: Time for Truth? (Part 2)
The enduring mystery of George Bush and alleged Paris meetings with Iranians in 1980: Did he go or did he stay? (5/19/97)




archive.gif (2361 bytes)

Imperial Bush
A closer look at the Bush record -- from the war in Iraq to the war on the environment

2004 Campaign
Will Americans take the exit ramp off the Bush presidency in November?

Behind Colin Powell's Legend
Colin Powell's sterling reputation in Washington hides his life-long role as water-carrier for conservative ideologues.

The 2000 Campaign
Recounting the controversial presidential campaign

Media Crisis
Is the national media a danger to democracy?

The Clinton Scandals
The story behind President Clinton's impeachment

Nazi Echo
Pinochet & Other Characters

The Dark Side of Rev. Moon
Rev. Sun Myung Moon and American politics

Contra Crack
Contra drug stories uncovered

Lost History
How the American historical record has been tainted by lies and cover-ups

The October Surprise "X-Files"
The 1980 October Surprise scandal exposed

International
From free trade to the Kosovo crisis

Other Investigative Stories

Editorials


__________________
A TAINTED DEAL http://www.motherjones.com/politics/1998/06/tainted-deal

 LA DEA; Murder of Kiki Camarena http://www.laweekly.com/news/how-a-dogged-la-dea-agent-unraveled-the-cias-alleged-role-in-the-murder-of-kiki-camarena-5750278  

"Several informed sources have told me that an appendix to this Report was removed at the instruction of the DOJ at the last minute. This appendix is reported to have information about a CIA officer, not agent or asset, but officer, based in the LA Station, who was in charge of Contra related activities. According to these sources, this individual was associated with running drugs to South Central L.A., around 1988. Let me repeat that amazing omission. The recently released CIA Report Vol II contained an appendix, which was pulled by the DOJ, that reported a CIA officer in the LA Station was hooked into drug running in South Central Los Angeles." Maxine Waters Oct, 1998
https://fas.org/irp/congress/1998_cr/h981013-coke.htm   

0
maynard

Registered:
Posts: 1,192
Reply with quote  #126 
For more information contact:
Tamara Feinstein
(202) 994-7219 / tfeins7i@gwu.edu
November 22, 2000: To mark the resignation of Alberto Fujimori from his post as President of Peru, the National Security Archive, a non-governmental foreign policy documentation center at George Washington University, today posted on the World Wide Web a collection of declassified U.S. documents on Vladimiro Montesinos – referred to as “Fujimori’s Rasputin.” The documents show that as early as October 1990, U.S. army intelligence analysts were already referring to Fujimori as “in the hip pocket of the National Intelligence Service (Servicio Inteligencia Nacional –SIN),” and as “particularly influenced by Vladimiro Montesinos.” In a report titled “Who is Controlling Whom” high-level Peruvian army officers described to U.S. intelligence analysts this “extraordinary…situation in which the intelligence apparatus is in effect running the state.” These early remarks are of particular note, since the current presidential crisis stems directly from scandals surrounding Montesinos, who is reportedly in hiding somewhere in Peru while Fujimori sent in his resignation from Japan.
Update

May 10, 2001: The National Security Archive recently received responses to FOIA requests we sent out earlier this year on Vladimiro Montesinos. These new documents focus on Montesinos’ early career and links with the United States in the 1970s. These documents deal with the unauthorized trip to the United States that Montesinos made in September 1976 and his later arrest, detention and cashiering from the army in 1977.

Click here to see the 1970s documents

Another new document focuses on the aftermath of the failed November 1992 coup attempt made by the military against President Fujimori. The document alleges that Montesinos supervised and participated in torture sessions attempting to force coup plotters to name opposition politicians as co-conspirators.

Click here to see the 1992 document


State Department
Human Rights
Reports on Peru

1994

1995

1996

1997

1998

1999

The documents posted today were obtained through Freedom of Information Act requests made by journalist Jeremy Bigwood, who earlier this year donated them to the Archive. These documents shed some light on Montesinos’ involvement in human rights violations and corruption scandals, but also demonstrate the amount of information being currently withheld on this subject by the U.S. government. According to Peter Kornbluh, who analyzes Latin America at the Archive, the Clinton Administration "could, and should, make a major contribution to the truth of Montesinos’s career, as well as to the future of Peruvian democracy, by expeditiously declassifying the U.S. holdings on Montesinos." Kornbluh said that U.S. agencies have vast amounts of secret documentation that would serve as essential evidence in any proceedings against Montesinos for human rights abuses and graft. The Archive, which has led campaigns to declassify secret U.S. documents on Guatemala, Chile, El Salvador and elsewhere in Latin America, said it would press for full disclosure of hundreds of U.S. records on Montesinos, including CIA documents on covert relations with President Fujimori's disgraced intelligence chieftain. The Archive is set to file dozens of Freedom of Information Act requests on Montesinos and his ties to the United States.
An independent non-governmental research institute and library located at the George Washington University, the Archive collects and publishes declassified documents obtained through the Freedom of Information Act. The Archive won the 1999 George Polk Award, one of U.S. journalism’s top prizes, for – in the words of the citation – “piercing the self-serving veils of government secrecy, guiding journalists in search for the truth and informing us all.” The Archive’s recent campaigns on Guatemala and Chile have led to the declassification of tens of thousands of documents. In the case of Guatemala, these document were used to support the work of the human rights investigations of the U.N. Historical Clarification Commission (CEH).

(There are more documents in the Peru collection available at our offices. For further information, please contact Tamara Feinstein, Research Associate for the Peru Project, at (202) 994-7219 or tfeins7i@gwu.edu.)

__________________________________________________________________________
Document 1:
Army Intelligence and Threat Analysis Center, Counterintelligence Periodic Summary [Extract], Who is Controlling Whom?, October 23, 1990, Secret, 3 pp.
This document written at the beginning of President Fujimori’s administration, already implies that Vladimiro Montesinos is controlling the government. It reports that Montesinos first ingratiated himself to Fujimori by defending Mrs. Fujimori in a court case revolving around shady real estate deals and that he provided advice to Fujimori on how to conduct his presidential campaign. According to the document, a group of retired military officers have already come forward to highlight the dangers of Montesinos’ influence. These generals insist that, “the Peruvian CIA cannot dominate the Peruvian state,” and imply the army might “intervene and ‘decapitate’ the intelligence structure at some point.”

Document 2:
Army Intelligence and Threat Analysis Center, Counterintelligence Periodic Summary [Extract], Peru: Does Fujimori’s Unofficial Advisor Control the Peruvian National Intelligence Community?, July 27, 1991, Secret, 3 pp.
While Fujimori insists Montesinos is merely his personal legal advisor, Montesinos is clearly more than that. This document suggests that Montesinos has influenced high presidential appointments in the civilian and military sectors of the government. In addition, this report notes that Peruvian General Luis Palomino Rodriguez warned the U.S. defense attaché that Montesinos had intentions to frustrate U.S-Peruvian counter-drug efforts.
Document 3:
Updated,
May 10, 2001
Origin Unknown, Peru: Military Unease Growing, December 23, 1992, Classification Unknown, 1 pp.
NOTE: This document is in Adobe PDF format
The Department of Defense’s Joint Intelligence Command released this document on April 5, 2001 in response to a FOIA request made by Jeremy Bigwood. This document focuses on the aftermath of the failed November 1992 coup attempt made by the military against President Fujimori. The document reveals growing discontent within the military over the treatment of the coup plotters. The Peruvian Army appears “rife” with rumors that several coup plotters have been tortured and have been transferred to the civilian prison “Canto Grande”, due to fears that armed forces sympathizers would help them escape if they were placed in military prison. Vladimiro Montesinos reportedly supervised torture sessions attempting to force coup plotters to name opposition politicians as co-conspirators, and he is accused of delivering some of the blows himself. The document notes that while the Army has officially denied torture allegations, “the use of torture is plausible.”
Document 4:
U.S. Embassy (Lima) Cable, Army General Denies Providing Information on La Cantuta to Robles, June 1, 1993, Secret, 5 pp.
General Rodolfo Robles Espinoza, once the third most powerful man in the Peruvian army, based part of his claims that General Commander of the Army Nicolás de Bari Hermoza Rios and Montesinos were involved in the creation and operation of a death squad on alleged conversations with one time head of the Army Intelligence Directorate, General Willy Chirinos. According to Robles, during his brief tenure at army intelligence, Chirinos learned of the existence of a death squad under the direction of Vladimiro Montesinos. This death squad was responsible for the massacres at La Cantuta and Barrios Altos. Fearing that the existence of a death squad would inevitably embarrass the army, Chirinos urged that it be disbanded. Montesinos, however, ordered that it remain intact. Robles goes on to claim that Chirinos was dismissed as head of army intelligence after making this recommendation. Chirinos, in statements published in Lima newspapers denies that he spoke to Robles about La Cantuta, or the existence of a death squad connected with Montesinos. The large section excised at the end of this document might possibly reveal embassy commentary on the validity of these claims.

Document 5:
DEA Report of Investigation, Corrupt Officials, Sensitive, August 27, 1996, 1 p.
The Drug Enforcement Agency begins investigations into accusations by drug trafficker Demetrio Chavez-Penaherra (aka “Vaticano”) that Montesinos accepted $50,000 a month in bribes. This document notes that Montesinos was a well-known defense lawyer for narco-traffickers before becoming Fujimori’s advisor. This document not only reveals that the DEA was investigating Montesinos for these specific charges, but that they also had a previous file on him prior to this investigation.

Document 6:
Army Intelligence and Threat Analysis Center, Counterintelligence Periodic Summary [Extract], Peruvian Intelligence Service Accused of Political Espionage, December 16, 1996, Secret, 3 pp.
This document describes an overseas SIN intelligence network, managed by Vladimiro Montesinos and staffed by 17 retired military officers, whose objective is to monitor the activities of opposition elements abroad. This network is active in Bolivia, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Ecuador, South Korea and the US and responds directly to “presidential requirements” including “weapons acquisitions and disinformation”.

Document 7:
U.S. Southern Command Information Paper, Purpose: To Inform the [Commander-in-Chief] on the Validity of General Robles’s Allegations against Montesinos, January 6, 1997, Classification Unknown, 1 p.
This document once again exposes allegations regarding Montesinos’s relation to the “La Colina” death squad, which employs tactics of torture and extra-judicial executions. It also notes that Montesinos has been compared to sinister figures such as “Rasputin, Darth Vadar, Torquemada and Cardinal Richelieu.”

Document 8:
U.S. Southern Command Biographic Sketch, Vladimiro Montesinos Torres, August 5, 1996, Classification Unknown, 2 pp.
This is the full version of the heavily excised document used as a header for this briefing book. It clearly reveals the large amount of material already being withheld from the public.
Return to Electronic Briefing Books

Retun to National Security Archive Main Page



Vladirimo Montesinos Reader

Alberto Fujimori on the campaign trail
Source: Thomas Muller
Alejandro Toledo campaigning in Arequipa, April 2001

Digging into the Dirt

Here are some reports from the National Security Archive about the ugly tactics of Montesinos, Fujimori's blind trust and the human rights abuses of the military, reports of which found their way into U.S. government documents.



http://www.narconews.com/montesinosgroup.htmlMay 22, 2001

Narco News 2001

Citigroup &

Montesinos, Inc.

"Private Banking" for Montesinos Family

Protection for U.S. Favored Drug Traffickers

The Selective White Collar Drug War

Special to The Narco News Bulletin

By Al Giordano

May 22, 2001

An investigation by the daily La Republica of Peru revealed that among the clients of Citibank's controversial "Private Banking" program was found the wife and two daughters of Peruvian strongman-turned-fugitive Vladimiro Montesinos.

As recently as 1998, Citibank is found on the Montesinos clan's money-laundering route of more than $18 million U.S. dollars, according to La Republica.

That year, Maria Trinidad Becerra Ramirez, wife of Montesinos, and their two daughters, Samantha and Silvana Montesinos Torres, ordered a complex routing of $18,643,276 dollars through the following banks: Luxembourg Societe Anonyme; Midland Bank Public Lmt.; The Royal Bank of Scottland-U.K; Schweizerische Volks Bank Zurich; Bank of America National Trust & Savings Association; Popular Bank of Florida (today, BAC Florida Bank, branch in Buffalo N.Y); Comerica Bank USA; Unicredito (Italy); Royal Bank of Canada; Midstate Bank & Trust Co (Washington); Union National Bank & Trust Co.; Banco Paribas (France); Weston Compagnie de Finance Et D'investissement(Suisse); and Citibank Private Bank.

Citibank Private Bank conducts Private Banking for wealthy clients. As SUNY Binghamton professor James Petras, a global expert on money laundering, explained in La Jornada of Mexico City last week (and published in English on The Narco News Bulletin):

"Private Banking is a sector of a bank which caters to extremely wealthy clients ($1 million deposits and up). The big banks charge customers a fee for managing their assets and for providing the specialized services of the private banks. Private Bank services go beyond the routine banking services and include investment guidance, estate planning, tax assistance, off-shore accounts, and complicated schemes designed to secure the confidentiality of financial transactions. The attractiveness of the "Private Banks" (PB) for money laundering is that they sell secrecy to the dirty money clients."

Montesinos certainly fits the profile of an "extremely wealthy client" who needed secrecy. But by 1998 it was well-known even to casual observers of Peru politics that Montesinos, an advisor to then-president Alberto Fujimori who controlled the feared state security apparatus, had frequently and publicly been accused of involvement in embezzlement, corrupt activities, narco-trafficking and grave acts of torture and violations of human rights.

Still, the appearance, specifically, of Citibank Private Bank on this money-laundering trail suggests that none of those accusations concerned Citibank, arguably the most powerful bank on the planet.

In fact, prior to that 1998 adventure in laundering $18 million dollars by the Montesinos family, Citibank had instructed its bankers to keep a special vigilance over Latin American political leaders, reports Money Laundering Alert:

"In September 1997, in the aftermath of the scandal over how it handled the stolen fortune of Raul Salinas de Gortari, brother of the former Mexican president, Citibank adopted a written policy that established "special criteria for approval of accounts for public figures." It requires various levels of approval, reporting and the maintenance of special records, including "Opening Diary Notes."

The La Republica investigation, published last November, revealed that Citbank International's offices in Great Britain held $322,720 - nearly a third of a million dollars - for a key Montesinos ally in the Peruvian military: General Luis Delgado de La Paz. And that this deposit, too, was made after the new "special criteria" was enacted by Citibank for accounts of public figures:

"Sources confrm that in Latino bank there were documents that confirmed those deposits, made in 1998… Delgado de La Paz is the title holder of two accounts, one in Citibank International, in London, for $322,720 dollars, and another in Credit Suisse, for $188,200 dollars."

De La Paz had been in the news in 1998 - the same year he made the deposit - in Peru after Montesinos promoted him to the logistical command of the Peruvian military.

In mid-2000, due to the reluctance of the Fujimori regime in Peru to back the $1.3 million Plan Colombia military intervention in neighboring Colombia, U.S. officials turned against the dictator they had helped to install, had favored and protected for eight years prior. It was Peru correspondent Peter Gorman who first suggested in the January 1, 2001 edition of The Narco News Bulletin, that the downfall of Fujimori and his enforcer Montesinos was a "bloodless coup" engineered by Washington and Langley not because of their drug trafficking activities or gross human rights violations, but because they would not go along with the Plan Colombia program.

A secret videotape transcribed and made public on May 14th of this year by La Republica in the Peru capital of Lima, and translated to English by Narco News this week, precisely confirmed that rift between the Peruvian and U.S. officials.
Montesinos had made thousands of secret videotapes of meetings he had with Peruvian leaders and U.S. officials, many of which are in his control even while he hides as an international fugitive, which explains the reluctance of officials in both countries to capture him; last Fall, when Montesinos escaped to Panama, he released a photograph of himself in front of some of those videos, as a warning of what might become public upon his capture.

In the "Vladi-Video #1487," made on April 21, 1999, Montesinos explains to a Peru television executive his government's difference with the Americans:

"The only alternative that the Americans have in order to solve the problem of Colombia, is the invasion... They are preparing half a million Marine infantry troops in order to invade Colombia and they asked us for the President to make declarations because they could not say it themselves… When the infantry of the Marines does enter, what are they going to make the FARC and the drug dealers do? They are going to come to Perú. And if we don't close the border now and adopt security measures, we will bring the problem here."

He who lives by the videotape dies by the videotape, and it was precisely the astonishing public release of one of Montesinos' videotapes by his political opponents (how they got it remains a mystery) in which Montesinos bribes a member of Peru's congressional opposition, that led to Montesinos' loss of control. He fled the country and his former sponsor, President Fujimori, named a special prosecutor, Jose Carlos Ugaz, to investigate his former right hand man.

According to the daily Clarin of Argentina last November 5th, Jose Carlos Ugaz, in no time at all, easily obtained evidence of the Montesinos money-laundering trail. Facts that the vast global empire of Citibank, previously, had no incentive to know about their Montesino family and friends accounts:

"The prosecutor said that he will investigate not only the bank accounts in Switzerland, but others that he also had, according to information obtained by Clarin, in Atlantic Security Bank, Bank of New York, Republic National Bank, Florida Bank, Midstate Bank & Trust Company, Citibank Private Bank and the Central Counties bank, as well as other banks in Panama, the Cayman Islands, Trinidad and Tobago.

"In the majority of the mentioned banks, the accounts would be in the name of Montesinos' wife, Trinidad Becerra Ramirez, and it is suspected that they are also in the name of one of the sisters of the ex-advisor, Karelia Montesinos Torres, married with the ex-strategic chief of the Second Military Region, General Luis Cubas Portal."

Again, Citibank appears through its Private Banking division.

And from here we begin to arrive at the unspoken public policy scandal to come over the behavior of Citibank and other financial giants in the United States when it comes to laundering the ill-gotten gains of Latin American dictators and businessmen: Citibank's declarations of "special criteria" and vigilance over public figures is only selectively applied according to the current political positions of the U.S. government.

As long as Montesinos was an "intelligence asset" of the CIA and U.S. government, Citibank and the other U.S. banks knew they could safely look the other way without provoking the attention of the authorities who, supposedly, prosecute illicit money laundering.

It was only when Montesinos fell out of favor with U.S. authorities that Citibank made any move against his vast money-laundering operation. U.S. law enforcers moved on a key Montesinos "bagman" only weeks after the November 2000 downfall of Fujimori, and just a few months after Montesinos went underground, both having lost the support of the United States.

The March 2001 issue of Money Laundering Alert included a sub-section titled:

Montesinos "bagman" a Citibank customer

And it reported:

Now, another of its (Citibank's) foreign "public figure" customers, Victor Venero Garrido, a Peruvian military official, whom the FBI says was a "most trusted bag/straw man" for Montesinos, has had his Citibank accounts and large cashiers checks seized by the U.S. on money laundering and other grounds. On January 26, the FBI arrested him in Miami as a foreign fugitive as he tried to withdraw funds from Citibank.

Money Laundering Alert called Montesinos' operation a "Far-reaching laundering scheme," noting that:

Montesinos allegedly moved $75 million between 1998 and 2000 through other accounts to diverse businesses in several countries. Fujimori fled Peru in December shortly after Montesinos escaped. The president took refuge in Japan, his ancestral home, which refuses to honor Peru's extradition request because of Fujimori's previously undisclosed dual nationality.

The Justice Department and FBI have initiated a bi-coastal effort to find and seize the fortune Venero allegedly deposited in California and Florida banks. Federal court orders freezing his accounts have been obtained in both states on laundering and other grounds (Title 18, USC Sec. 981(b)(4)). "We think there are more assets to be found," said Judy Orihuela, an FBI spokeswoman.

The FBI says Venero recently deposited about $15 million at Citibank in Miami, and had four Citibank cashiers checks and six from Hacienda Bank, of California, when arrested. The FBI believes Venero had up to $1 million in a Sanwa Bank account and $250,000 in Northern Trust, which advertises itself as "The Private Bank."

The military pension fund scheme, the U.S. says, involved kickbacks to Venero from Peruvian banks where he had deposited millions in fund dollars. The FBI says he stole over a hundred million dollars from the fund. Neither he nor Montesinos has yet been charged with a U.S. crime.

And Money Laundering Alert concludes that part of Montesinos' fortune comes from "Alleged drug trafficking":

In Peru, the corruption allegations against Fujimori and Montesinos go far beyond misappropriation and shady business deals. They allegedly netted up to $45 million from deals with, and payoffs from, Pablo Escobar, the late Colombian drug lord, according to his brother, Roberto, who is now in a Colombian prison. Montesinos allegedly had agreed to give safe passage to Escobar's drug-laden planes at Peru airstrips.

And yet, it was not until after Montesinos' fall from grace with U.S. authorities that Citibank moved against his money-laundering operation, by alerting federal authorities to the accounts of the "bagman," Venero.

Reuters reported this Spring that Venero opened his Citibank account in 1998, but that Citibank claims that "nothing seemed out of place" with his deposits of $15 million U.S. dollars in the Miami branch:

NEW YORK, March 28 (Reuters) - A high-ranking Peruvian official, Victor Alberto Venero-Garrido, opened a bank account at Citibank in Miami in 1998, and moved about $15 million through it until January this year, when the U.S. Federal Bureau of Investigation arrested him.

As Latin Americans often opened dollar-denominated bank accounts in the United States to protect their savings and stocks from inflation in their home countries, nothing seemed out of place -- at first.

But Citibank, a unit of financial services firm Citigroup Inc. and other banks with Venero-Garrido's money gradually noticed unusual activity in the accounts and alerted the authorities, law enforcement officials said.

Whatever the "special criteria" boasted about by Citibank officials (including by former Citicorp CEO John Reed in his 1999 testimony before a Congressional committee investigating drug money laundering), "nothing seemed out of place" with Venero's accounts to Citibank officials, said law enforcers.

Yet, it was a matter of public information that Venero controlled Peru's police and military pension funds, and that he was closely allied with Montesinos.

Reuters adds that the Venero millions, before they reached Citibank, were "surreptitiously removed from Peru through banks in the Cayman Islands. He used wire transfers to deposit funds in to the account, opened accounts under corporate names and even used relatives to deposit money from Peru, according to sources close to the investigation… Ultimately, the funds wound up at a number of U.S. banks and brokerages," including, "Citibank, where Venero-Garrido had a personal banker although he was not a private bank client."

Earlier this year, the Miami Herald reported that there was, indeed, plenty "out of place" with Venero's activities, including within Florida, and yet none of this seemed "out of place" to Citibank officials - at least while Montesinos still enjoyed the banking of the U.S. government.

The Herald reports on Venero:

His South Florida homes were bought in cash for a combined $666,400 in 1995, Miami-Dade County records show.

The luxury Surfside condo in Champlain Towers East, 8855 Collins Ave., was purchased in his name. The house, a two-story, 2,500-square-foot home in the Three Lakes development, 13365 SW 151st Ter., was deeded to his wife, Luz Elena Nazar Loayza.

In a 1997 deal, the condo was transferred to Vialve Company Ltd., a corporation registered in the Cayman Islands. Records list Venero as the company director. A year later, the house was transferred to the same company. No money was involved in either transaction, real estate documents show.

On Dec. 4, 2000, the properties were transferred again, this time to a company in the British Virgin Islands called Coral Row Group, according to real estate records. The company's local address: Mail Boxes Etc. on Southwest Eighth Street.

Again, we see the selectivity of Citibank's "special criteria" regarding public officials, enacted in 1997 after the scandal erupted around the bank's laundering of illicit funds for the family of former Mexican President Carlos Salinas de Gortari.

Citibank began doing business with Venero in 1998, after the "special criteria" for "public figures" was put into force. The public official, Venero, head of the state pension funds in Peru, had already bought a $666,400 South Florida home "in cash," but "nothing seemed out of place" to Citibank. He transferred his condo to a Cayman Islands company that listed him as the director, and later a house to the same; "no money was transacted," but, to Citibank, "nothing seemed out of place."

All this occurred before Citibank gave Venero a personal banker (who, despite the oft-stated duty to "know your client" apparently was unconcerned with the source of his funds or the nature of his Florida property ownership) and accepted $15 million dollars in deposits from this government functionary from Peru.

The Miami Herald also reports that, while a Citibank client with his own personal banker there, Venero had a scrape with the law last Summer:

Venero, who was in the United States on a tourist visa, didn't live in either home for very long, neighbors said.

In fact, on a July 2000 visit to the United States, he stayed in Room 1076 at the Fontainebleau Hotel, a Miami Beach Police report said. Officers showed up at his room after someone reported screams. They found Venero's girlfriend, Lourdes Muñoz, on the bed with a bloody nose.

Venero, who told police Muñoz's face had accidentally struck his elbow while his arms were raised, was hauled off to jail, along with $2,500 in his Versace billfold. The charges were dropped.

A month later, the Montesinos video scandal hit, he soon went underground, Fujimori soon fled to Japan, and only after that did U.S. officials take action against Venero, arresting him on January 26, 2001.

Venero must have intuited that the jig was up: In December 2000, as Fujimori fled, according to the Herald, he disappeared. That's when his Citibanker said he lost contact with him. And Venero changed his address to a "Mail Boxes, Etc." storefront mailbox in the British Virgin Islands.

Federal officials told the Herald they began surveillance upon Venero's house in South Florida "last year." They were not specific on the date, but the first identification of Venero by a neighbor came in December. Certainly, there had been no All Points Bulletin on Venero last July when he was apprehended by local police after bloodying his girlfriend's nose in a hotel room. Although an immigrant on a tourist visa, he was allowed to walk free: In Miami, a virtual bee hive of federal immigration officials.

But Montesinos and Fujimori were still in power then, and their bagmen and money-launderers could still count with immunity and impunity from U.S. authorities. It was in the following months that they fell. Then, and only then, did the "special criteria" kick in.

When it comes to Citibank - and other U.S. banks - this is really about an unwritten "very special criteria": Individuals who are "intelligence assets" of the U.S. government may launder millions. And the banks will compete for their business.

It is only when foreign politicians fall out of favor with U.S. authorities that the law suddenly applies.

Like the larger drug war for which it stands, government and business "controls" on money laundering represent a hypocritical policy. That policy has nothing to do with combatting drugs, but, rather with persecuting the powerless while protecting the powerful.

And when it comes to politically favored strongmen across our América like Vladimiro Montesinos, his bagmen, and his family, as long as they obey the larger official agendas of globalization, repression against social movements for true democracy and justice, and support for Plan Colombia and similar interventions, U.S. officials have their own "special criteria." They look the other way.



__________________
A TAINTED DEAL http://www.motherjones.com/politics/1998/06/tainted-deal

 LA DEA; Murder of Kiki Camarena http://www.laweekly.com/news/how-a-dogged-la-dea-agent-unraveled-the-cias-alleged-role-in-the-murder-of-kiki-camarena-5750278  

"Several informed sources have told me that an appendix to this Report was removed at the instruction of the DOJ at the last minute. This appendix is reported to have information about a CIA officer, not agent or asset, but officer, based in the LA Station, who was in charge of Contra related activities. According to these sources, this individual was associated with running drugs to South Central L.A., around 1988. Let me repeat that amazing omission. The recently released CIA Report Vol II contained an appendix, which was pulled by the DOJ, that reported a CIA officer in the LA Station was hooked into drug running in South Central Los Angeles." Maxine Waters Oct, 1998
https://fas.org/irp/congress/1998_cr/h981013-coke.htm   

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http://ist-socrates.berkeley.edu/~pdscott/index.html
B.7e Peter Dale Scott and Jonathan Marshall) Cocaine Politics: Drugs, Armies, and the CIA in Central America. Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1998. pp. vii, 263. Electronic edition, available in netLibrary Private Collection.




[ C. V. | New and Recent | Iraq, al-Qaeda | Selected Writings | Complete Bibl ]


Peter Dale Scott, a former Canadian diplomat and English Professor at the University of California, Berkeley, is a poet, writer, and researcher. He was born in Montreal in 1929, the only son of the poet F.R. Scott and the painter Marian Scott. He is married to Ronna Kabatznick; and he has three children, Cassie, Mika, and John, by a previous marriage to Maylie Marshall.

His prose books include The War Conspiracy (1972), The Assassinations: Dallas and Beyond (in collaboration, 1976), Crime and Cover-Up: The CIA, the Mafia, and the Dallas-Watergate Connection (1977), The Iran-Contra Connection (in collaboration, 1987), Cocaine Politics: Drugs, Armies, and the CIA in Central America (in collaboration, 1991, 1998), Deep Politics and the Death of JFK (1993, 1996), Deep Politics Two (from JFKLancer, 1995), and Drugs Oil and War (Lanham, MD: Rowman and Littlefield, March 2003) Click here to read the Preface to this book. (I am often asked about the availability of my out-of-print War Conspiracy; the five most relevant chapters are reprinted in this book.)

 

His chief poetry books are the three volumes of his trilogy Seculum: Coming to Jakarta: A Poem About Terror (1989), Listening to the Candle: A Poem on Impulse (1992), and Minding the Darkness: A Poem for the Year 2000. In addition he has published Crossing Borders: Selected Shorter Poems (1994). In November 2002 he was awarded the Lannan Poetry Award.

An anti-war speaker during the Vietnam and Gulf Wars, he was a co-founder of the Peace and Conflict Studies Program at UC Berkeley, and of the Coalition on Political Assassinations (COPA).

 

His poetry has dealt with both his experience and his research, the latter of which has centered on U.S. covert operations, their impact on democracy at home and abroad, and their relations to the John F. Kennedy assassination and the global drug traffic. The poet-critic Robert Hass has written (Agni, 31/32, p. 335) that "Coming to Jakarta is the most important political poem to appear in the English language in a very long time."

A Note to Visitors:
See my special Webpage on Al-Qaeda, Osama bin Laden, and Iraq
, updated July 30, 2005.

A Note to Visitors, July 19, 2005

For three years I have neglected this website, having concentrated on finishing my new book, The Road to 9/11. It is now time to begin posting selected excerpts from my book. Watch for postings here or on my 9/11 page.

THE ROAD TO 9/11 (excerpt from forthcoming book, 2005)

"Al Qaeda, U.S. Oil Companies, and Central Asia" (July 19, 2005)

 

A Note to Visitors, July 24, 2000:

I want to thank those who have visited either the prose or the poetry sections of my website. I would also like to invite both groups of readers to check out what I have posted about my new book, Minding the Darkness, which appeared in October 2000 from New Directions.

Rightly or wrongly, I believe Minding the Darkness to be my most important book. It is certainly the book on which I have worked the longest, having begun it in 1990. Working on it helped me refine my thinking about the central notions of Deep Politics, as I mention in passing on p. 22 of that book.

Click here to learn more about Minding the Darkness. Those interested in my writings on drugs in particular should look at the option From IV.i which concerns the Fed, the CIA, and the role of drug-trafficking in diminishing balance-of-payments crises. (I read from this section in my speech on drugs and the CIA at the June 2000 CIA Drugs Symposium that was broadcast over Alternative Radio and NPR in December 2000.)

Click here for a brief summary of how my poem handles the current 9/11 crisis of "secular capitalism...facing the theocratic alternative of shariah and jihad" (p. 240).

If you have any comments or questions, I would be glad to hear from you at pdscottweb@hotmail.com.







PETER DALE SCOTT: CURRICULUM VITAE

Born Montreal, January 11, 1929. Married (1) Mary Elizabeth Marshall, June 16, 1956 (divorced, 1993): three children (Catherine Dale, Thomas, John Daniel). Married (2) Ronna Kabatznick, July 14, 1993. A Canadian citizen.

Education and Teaching:

B.A. (McGill University, Montreal), 1949. First Class Honors in Philosophy, Second Class Honors in Political Science.
Studied six months at Institut d'Etudes Politiques, Paris; and two years at University College, Oxford (1950-1952).
Ph.D. in Political Science (McGill), 1955. Dissertation on The Social and Political Ideas of T.S. Eliot.

1952-1953. Teacher at Sedbergh School, Montebello, Quebec.
1955-1956. Lecturer, Department of Political Science, McGill University.
1961-1966. Speech Department, University of California, Berkeley: Lecturer (1961); Acting Assistant Professor (1962); Assistant Professor (1963).
1966-1994. English Department, University of California, Berkeley: Assistant Professor (1966); Associate Professor (1968); Professor (1980). Retired 1994.

Professional Service

Foreign Service Officer, Canadian Department of External Affairs, 1957-1961: Twelfth and Thirteenth Sessions, United Nations General Assembly, 1957, 1958; Canadian Embassy in Warsaw, Poland (1959-1961); United Nations Conference on Statelessness (Geneva, 1959); United Nations Conference on Diplomatic Intercourse and Immunities (Vienna, 1961)
Senior Fellow, International Center for Development Policy, Washington, D.C., June-November 1987.

Fellowships

Canadian Social Sciences Research Council, 1956-57. Guggenheim Fellow, 1969-1970.

Honors and Awards

International Center for Development Policy, Freedom Award, 1987.
Finalist, Canadian Governor-General's Award for Poetry, 1988.
Reed Foundation Poetry Chapbook, Dia Art Foundation, 1989.
Writer in Residence, University of Toronto, Fall 1992.
Honorable Mention, Mencken Awards, Best Book, 1992.
Sylvia Meagher Award, Coalition on Political Assassinations, 1996.
JFK Pioneer Award, JFKLancer, 1997.
Resident, Bellagio Study Center, Aug.-Sept. 1997.
Lannan Poetry Award, 2002 (with Alan Dugan).
Lannan Writing Residency, Marfa, TX, March-April 2004






http://www.sfgate.com/cgi-bin/article.cgi?file=/chronicle/archive/2000/06/19/ED58466.DTL

OPEN FORUM

What Will Congress Do About New CIA-Drug Revelations?

Peter Dale Scott

Monday, June 19, 2000

 

CONGRESS WILL shortly have to decide whether to bury or deal with explosive new revelations that the Central Intelligence Agency protected major drug traffickers who aided the Contra army in Central America. These new findings go far beyond the original stories which gave rise to them by Gary Webb in 1996.

Webb had alleged that cocaine from two Contra-supporting traffickers, Norwin Meneses and Danilo Blandon, had helped fuel the national crack epidemic. The resulting political firestorm brought promises of a full investigation. After an unprecedented review of internal CIA and Justice Department files, three massive reports, totaling almost 1,000 pages, were released by the inspectors general of the CIA (Fred Hitz) and Justice Department (Michael Bromwich).

The new revelations confirmed many of Webb's claims. Meneses and Blandon were admitted to have been (despite previous press denials) ``significant traffickers who also supported, to some extent, the Contras.'' For years they escaped prosecution, until after support for the Contras ended.

Meanwhile the reports opened the doors on worse scandals. According to the reports, the CIA made conscious use of major traffickers as agents, contractors and assets. It maintained good relations with Contras it knew to be working with drug traffickers. It protected traffickers which the Justice Department was trying to prosecute, sometimes by suppressing or denying the existence of information.

This protection extended to major Drug Enforcement Agency targets considered to be among the top smugglers of cocaine into this country. Perhaps the most egregious example is that of the Honduran trafficker Juan Ramon Matta Ballesteros. Matta had been identified by the DEA in 1985 as the most important member of a consortium moving a major share (perhaps a third, perhaps more than half) of all the cocaine from Colombia to the United States. The DEA also knew that Matta was behind the kidnapping of a DEA agent in Mexico, Enrique Camarena, who was subsequently tortured and murdered.

A public enemy? Yes. But Matta was also an ally of the CIA. Matta's airline, SETCO, was recorded in U.S. files as a drug-smuggling airline. It was also the chief airline with which the CIA contracted to fly supplies to the Contra camps in Honduras. When the local DEA office began to move against Matta in 1983, it was shut down. Though Matta's whereabouts were well- known, the United States did not arrest and extradite him until 1988, a few days after Congress ended support for the Contras.

At Matta's first drug trial, a U.S. attorney described him as ``on the level of the top 10 Colombian drug traffickers.'' We now learn from the CIA Hitz reports that, in the same year, 1989, CIA officials reported falsely, in response to an inquiry from Justice, that in CIA files ``There are no records of a SETCO Air.'' CIA officers appear also to have lied to Hitz's investigators about who said this.

There appears to have been a broad pattern of withholding information from the Justice Department. For example, when Justice began to investigate the drug activities of two Contra supporters, CIA headquarters turned down proposals that CIA should interview the two men. The reason in one case was that such documentation would be ``exactly the sort of thing the U.S. Attorney's Office will be investigating.''

The House Committee on Intelligence received this information, and chose to deny it. According to a recent committee report, ``There is no evidence . . . that CIA officers . . . ever concealed narcotics trafficking information or allegations involving the Contras.''

Just as dishonestly, the committee found that ``there is unambiguous reporting in the CIA materials reviewed showing that the Nicaraguan Democratic Force (FDN) leadership in Nicaragua would not accept drug monies and would remove from its ranks those who had involvement in drug trafficking.'' In fact, the Hitz reports contained a detailed account of drug-trafficking by members of the main FDN faction, the September 15th League (ADREN). Those named included the FDN chief of logistics. According to the Hitz Reports, ``CIA also received allegations or information concerning drug trafficking by nine Contra-related individuals in the (FDN) Northern Front.'' This included credible information, corroborated elsewhere, against leaders such as Juan Ramon Rivas, the Northern Army chief of staff. Yet CIA support for the FDN continued, through a period when aid to any drug-tainted Contra organization was forbidden by statute.

In short, the House Committee Report is a dishonest coverup of CIA wrong-doings, what one might expect from a committee chaired and staffed by former CIA officers.

As committee member Congresswoman Nancy Pelosi, D-S.F., said in a hearing two years ago, ``This is an issue of great concern in our community.'' Will she, and other like-minded representatives, repudiate this flimsy attempt to silence that concern with falsehoods?''

The answer may depend on the voters: Will they object as strongly as before?

Peter Dale Scott was an expert witness before the Citizens' Commission on U.S. Drug Policy. Scott will participate in a panel discussion on U.S. drug policy at The Independent Institute in Oakland on Wednesday. To attend, please call the Institute at (510) 632-1366.

Page A - 19



__________________
A TAINTED DEAL http://www.motherjones.com/politics/1998/06/tainted-deal

 LA DEA; Murder of Kiki Camarena http://www.laweekly.com/news/how-a-dogged-la-dea-agent-unraveled-the-cias-alleged-role-in-the-murder-of-kiki-camarena-5750278  

"Several informed sources have told me that an appendix to this Report was removed at the instruction of the DOJ at the last minute. This appendix is reported to have information about a CIA officer, not agent or asset, but officer, based in the LA Station, who was in charge of Contra related activities. According to these sources, this individual was associated with running drugs to South Central L.A., around 1988. Let me repeat that amazing omission. The recently released CIA Report Vol II contained an appendix, which was pulled by the DOJ, that reported a CIA officer in the LA Station was hooked into drug running in South Central Los Angeles." Maxine Waters Oct, 1998
https://fas.org/irp/congress/1998_cr/h981013-coke.htm   

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http://independent.org/events/transcript.asp?eventID=27#03

The War on Drugs: Who is Winning? Who is Losing?
June 21, 2000
Peter Dale Scott, Jonathan Victor Marshall, Alexander Cockburn

Contents

Introductory Remarks by David Theroux

Good evening, ladies and gentlemen, my name is David Theroux and I’m the President of the Independent Institute. I’m delighted to welcome you to our Independent Policy Forum this evening. As many of you know who have been with us before, we hold these events roughly monthly on many different major public policy issues.

This evening’s program is titled “The War on Drugs: Who is Winning? Who is Losing?” I want to take this opportunity to thank some people who helped us with this evening’s program. One is Mondavi Winery who were kind enough to donate the wine and See’s Candies who donated the truffles. Also The Customer Company is a co-sponsor of our policy forum program, this one and many of the others.

For those of you also new at the Institute, hopefully, you got a copy of the packet when you registered. You’ll find information about our program, membership, publications, and so forth in there. The Independent Institute is a rather unusual organization. It’s a non-profit academic public policy research institute. And we produce many books some of which you may have seen upstairs. We also produce a quarterly journal called The Independent Review.

The current issue is this one, which is available, but also some of you may be interested, if you’re seriously interested in the issue of the war on drugs, in some of the past issues. This was one of the early issues [Fall, 1996]. It goes back to the first year of our operation for the journal and has really a seminal piece on the origins of the current war on drugs during the Reagan Administration. And it’s a piece that I’d highly recommend. Another one that I’d recommend is this issue, here, for those of you interested in the issue of privacy and how that might relate to some of these topics.

The results of the work that we produce, in general, are published as books and in The Independent Review and in other studies. And we’ve organized many conference and media programs based on that work. Our interest is to get beyond what most people consider to be left and right, hopefully, to get to a more accurate assessment of the nature of politics, of economics, of political economy domestically and internationally. And we’re interested in serious-minded people who can develop information that contributes towards that.

I also wanted to point out another study that we did, which I hope we have up here, let’s see—anyway there are copies upstairs, it’s called Illicit Drugs and Crime and it’s by one of our research fellows whose name is Bruce Benson, who’s also the author of this book called To Serve and Protect, which also deals in part on the drug war.

Another study that we did that relates to this is this book called Taxing Choice, and it deals with the issue of the use of taxation and prohibition as a way to control populations in different ways. Many people are not aware of the fact that the Harrison Act, when it was first passed, was actually an excise tax. It was an excise tax on opiates and other drugs. It was only later converted into a prohibition, and part of the reason was allegedly that the excise tax, which engendered a black market in those substances, resulted in the usual crime that people would see, and that then led to calls for even more Draconian measures that led to outright prohibition.

In your packet, also, there’s a flyer on this evening’s program. Here’s a copy of the study that I just mentioned by Benson. In the packet, there’s also a flyer on this evening’s program which also lists another upcoming event, which is actually a broadcast of our previous event, which will be this weekend on C-SPAN.

Some of you I recognize were here last month for the program we did with Robert Stinnett and his book, Day of Deceit. Day of Deceit is a book that’s been out for about six months from the Free Press. Stinnett is a former journalist with the Oakland Tribune and he was the person who spent about 16 years, was determined to try and get the actual documents that related to the build up to the Pearl Harbor attack that led to the U.S. involvement in the European and Pacific War in the 1940s. And the story that he has to tell is pretty provocative, to say the least. Anyway, that will be broadcast this weekend on Saturday and Sunday.

For this evening, we’re very pleased to have three distinguished authors, experts on an issue that is of widespread interest. It affects people dramatically in a whole range of areas. It touches on economics, it touches on law, it touches on political issues, it touches on U.S. Foreign Policy. It’s really an amazing issue once you start looking at it.

And we’re delighted to be featuring two books. The first one is the book, Whiteout, which is now out in softcover from Verso. We’re delighted that Alex Cockburn, one of the co-authors, is here. Unfortunately his co-author, Jeffrey St. Clair, couldn’t make it for personal reasons. The other book that we’re featuring is Cocaine Politics, which is from the University of California Press, and both of its authors are here: Peter Dale Scott, who’s Professor Emeritus of English from the University of California, Berkeley, and Jonathan Marshall, who is former Economics Editor at the San Francisco Chronicle. So I hope that each of you can get copies of those books before you leave.

Before we begin, I’d like to share a few recent news events, and those of you who are familiar with these events, I apologize for mentioning them again, but I think they’re somewhat germane. This past Wednesday Governor Ben Cayetano of Hawaii signed a bill decriminalizing the use of medical marijuana. Although similar laws have been passed, as many of you know, in seven states and the District of Columbia, Hawaii is the first state where the laws were enacted by a State Legislature rather than a ballot initiative as it was in California. Recent polls have found that 73 percent of Americans favor legalizing the medical use of marijuana, yet the federal government has yet to recognize any of these actions on the state level.

Number two, despite this trend, also this past week, the crusading medical marijuana activist, Peter McWilliams, suddenly died. The 50-year-old McWilliams was the author of numerous very popular personal growth and self help books, as well as collections of poetry and photography, but he may be best known for his influential book Ain’t Nobody’s Business If You Do. He, like so many others who were suffering from AIDS, had found that using marijuana was highly effective in reducing the nausea caused by the AIDS drug he was taking. However although Prop. 215, the California Medical Marijuana Initiative, passed overwhelmingly, federal drug and tax agents stormed his home and offices on December 17th, 1997, confiscating all of his manuscripts and equipment and effectively shutting down his publishing business. He self-published his book.

As his battle with federal authorities dragged on, McWilliams’ home life and health deteriorated to say the least. Barred from using Prop. 215 or evidence of the value of medical marijuana as defenses in a Federal courtroom, he was forced to plead guilty. Awaiting sentencing and forbidden to use marijuana by the court, McWilliams was unable to hold down his AIDS medication. As a result his viral count soared and he spent long hours in bed fighting nausea. Being unable to work, he defaulted on bankruptcy payments and then lost his home. His subsequent death was caused by choking as a result of his nausea.

Number three. Many of you are probably familiar with the recent article in The New Yorker by the investigative reporter and author, Seymour Hersh, that has raised serious questions about American actions at the end of the Gulf War, including allegations that American troops fired on hundreds of disarmed Iraqi prisoners, many of whom were wounded, and others who were trying to surrender. In one of these accounts, the forces under the command of General Barry McCaffrey moved his forces to deliberately provoke a battle with retreating Iraqi forces who were already following Allied guidelines on how to withdraw from the war zone.

McCaffrey has denied every one of these accounts. However, ABC News has since reported that perhaps as many as 200 to 300 of the surrendering Iraqis, who had been disarmed in an area known to hold disarmed prisoners, were shot and killed by a group of 14 Bradley fighting vehicles which suddenly appeared and opened up and fired on them. The Bradleys were from the 1st Brigade of the 24th Infantry Division under the command of General McCaffrey. To this day, the Army has not even interviewed the crews of all the Bradleys and those who submitted statements have denied that the incident had occurred. In fact, Colonel John LeMoyne, Commander of the 1st Brigade, has claimed that “… none, zero, soldiers. The Iraqi soldiers were never shot at ever at that point. None of us, hundreds and hundreds of us, ever saw a body. None of us.” Meanwhile one of the soldiers involved in the disarming of the Iraqi soldiers has produced an audio tape recording of the entire incident.

No doubt General McCaffrey’s particular leadership during the Gulf War was a major reason for his being named drug czar by President Clinton. [laughter] War on drugs is a war on people. And who better to head up such a war than the old General himself.

For decades now the U.S. Government has waged a relentless war on the use of marijuana, opiates and many other substances, yet illicit drugs today are more plentiful than ever. How could that be?

The war on drugs is global in scope. It has cost who knows how many billions of dollars. The war has produced mandatory bank deposit disclosures, government surveillance, civil asset forfeiture laws, prison overcrowding is an understatement, encryption software restrictions, rampant police and political corruption, the wholesale trampling of constitutional liberties by the DEA, CIA, FBI, INS and other agencies.

The format of our program tonight will be to have each of our speakers speak for about 15 minutes. Afterward we’ll open it up for Q&A. And so let’s begin.

Our first speaker is Alexander Cockburn, born and raised in Ireland. He is a syndicated columnist for the Los Angeles Times, co-editor of CounterPunch, and we have copies here that Alex kindly brought. Oh,—I guess it’s the current issue of CounterPunch—the recent issue and everyone is, until we run out, welcome to take copies. He’s also a columnist for The Nation. He graduated with honors from Oxford University in 1963 with a degree in English Literature and Language. After two years as an editor of the London based Times Literary Supplement, he worked with the New Left Review and the New Statesman.

A permanent resident of the US since 1973, Alex wrote for many years for the Village Voice about the press and politics. Since then he’s contributed to many publications including the New York Review of Books, Harper’s, The Atlantic and the Wall Street Journal, where he held a position or he held—actually, he actually authored a regular column for 10 years through the 1980s.

In addition to his book with Jeffrey St. Clair which I just mentioned, called Whiteout, he’s the author of many, many other books including: Corruptions of Empire, The Fate of the Forest, Nightwatch Over Nature, The Golden Ages In Us, and on and on. I’m very pleased to introduce Alex Cockburn. [applause]

Alexander Cockburn

Thank you very much, David. I do like these—he mentioned trying to get beyond right and left. I think there are things that separate right and left, but I think there are many areas and many topics where people who might come out of different chunks of the political spectrum can really talk. Drugs is one of them. Anti-war activities is another. I think the current debate over hate crimes is something that might bring people from the Libertarian end and from the left end together. And I think we are in a period of flux, hopefully creative flux, in our political life.

I come from the left end of the spectrum and there is no one (no people) more dedicated to staying in their own quarters [laughter] and not putting their heads over the parapet too much than people on the left. And that’s true of other crowds as well, and anything that gets people out and shakes them up a bit, in my estimation, is to be applauded and I think the Libertarian end and the Independent Institute should be congratulated for doing that. And the more we do it, the better we’ll be off.

So here we are talking about “the drug war, who’s winning, who’s losing?” And we’ll answer the question, I think, right away, and then you can all leave. [laughter] The state is winning, the state. Other people are losing. The rationale ultimately for drug wars is the interest of the state.

You’re looking at three authors here who’ve done books, which have discussed extensively the role of intelligence agencies, the CIA, in facilitating participating in covering up for, or sponsoring the trafficking in illegal drugs. And Peter Dale Scott will go into some of the minutiae of that later on.

But one thing should be made clear, I think, is that from my point of view, the thing to remember—occasionally there’s a misleading phrase: the CIA, a rogue agency. It’s not. It doesn’t do things by and large without the absolute sanction and OK of the government. So when the CIAs is doing those things with drugs, it is operating as an executive agency of government.

And I would like to remind people that the history of government roles in advancing the sale and smuggling of drugs is a very ancient one. I won’t go back through it, but the British, of course, attacked China in the 19th Century in two wars to insure that they could sell opium in China. Savage wars in the interest of the free market. That was a drug war to make the Chinese accept—the Chinese Emperor and his government were opposed. They said, “we don’t want this drug destroying our people.” The British said, “well, it’s the free market, buddy.” And they went at it.

From the very inception of the CIA, and in the years before the CIA was created in this sort of Second World War period, there was an intimate association between U.S. intelligence agencies and criminal organizations in smuggling drugs into this country.

There were structural reasons for that. To wit, that intelligence agencies have a need for criminal elements to do some of the dirty work they don’t want to do themselves. By and large criminal organizations and intelligence agencies are right wing, pro-capitalists, anti-insurgency, anti-left. Their interests are very often common. And so you can go through postwar history from the association of Naval Intelligence and the OSS—this is before the CIA was created with Luciano and the Mafia—to the earliest days of the CIA and the Nationalist Chinese to Southeast Asia. The association of the agency with drug smuggling, trafficking producing gangs. Their need to recruit workers from small tribes, hill tribes in the Burmese Triangle, those identity of interest which led to direct connivance and assistance and oversight by the Central Intelligence Agency into bringing drugs into this country.

You can take that history forward through Afghanistan. You can take it to Burma. You can take it with Kosovo. Right now the U.S. Senate is debating an aid bill. They’re looking at about a billion, the House, I think, passed 1.8 billion dollars, to send military supplies, which they’re obviously already sending illegally as it is. This is, so to speak, only a formal imprimatur on to what is undoubtedly happening already. You’ll recall that for many years they said there were only 56 U.S. advisors in El Salvador and about a few years ago they said well, actually it was several thousand. [laughter] Not one word did they ever say about personnel abroad in this passage around the world can ever be believed for one second. Ever. Under no circumstances should you ever believe anything of that nature when articulated by the U.S. Government. It’s not worth the paper it’s written on.

What are the structural objectives of this? Well, obviously, the drug war abroad is a counter-insurgency war. It’s another method of repressing threats to empire, threats to the American interests. It’s a way of fortifying the allies of the U.S. abroad. The rationale, for example, in Colombia: they think there might be some resistance if they say this is a straight counter-insurgency; people might say well, you know, another Vietnam for God’s sake, you really going to get into that? So they’ve done it more and more under the rationale of the knockout terrorist gangs, combining all the bugaboos. You have the bugaboo of drugs. You have the bugaboo of terrorists. And you roll them all into one. And that’s what we’re waging war on.

General McCaffrey who, as David pointed out, is pretty much a certified war criminal. I mean not a big one, a middle-sized war criminal. [laughter] I mean we’ve got several bigger ones around, let’s face it. But I’d be astounded actually, even by our degenerate standards, the lack of commotion, and was extremely well argued, well researched, I thought, irrefutable piece by Seymour Hersh in The New Yorker magazine. It has raised a remarkably little stir. He then said General McCaffrey, war criminal. General McCaffrey, drug czar and war criminal, maybe part of the working title for the job in future. [laughter]

So—and we can see what will clearly happen, now. The stage is being set up for our drug war in Colombia. The latest issue of CounterPunch, not quite out, actually has a very good story now. They’re now already unleashing bio-war on the Colombian cocoa growers. A bio-war that may easily affect yams which spill over from the cocoa. It would be an absolute ecological catastrophe. For those of us who like to feel that we’re in the post-cold war phase, and that’s an encouraging sign, they’re actually using former Soviet biotechnicians to make their various biotoxins in the form of Soviet Union. It’s an encouraging sign of how we’ve moved on to a more global approach to the world’s problems. That’s Colombia.

Domestically, and that’s, I think, an area where Mr. Marshall will review the domestic costs, what has the function of a drug war been? It’s clearly been to repress and control. Social repression, social control of what a French historian once described as the dangerous classes or the potentially dangerous classes.

I don’t know how many people here have had an opportunity to read the findings of the so-called Reconciliation Commission in South Africa. An amazing and horrifying saga of what the Apartheid Government was doing, very often with CIA connivance, by the way, and active support, in its war against South African black people. A large part of it—they had a very extensive program of trying to make sure that the townships had a constant supply of drugs of one sort or another. They saw the socially pacifying function of drugs. They also explored greatly the mind altering function of drugs, which is an area, of course, that the CIA was deeply involved within from the late ‘40s on.

Government agencies have always been completely obsessed with the utility of drugs as a method of social control. Social persuasion. Social control. Rationale for increased policing. And the costs, and Jonathan will enumerate them, he told me before that he was going to, his specific area, have been gigantic as we all know. We have a vast prison population. A huge number of people in there for non-violent drug crimes. We have the attrition of civil liberties. We have all the rationales which David briefly mentioned. From spying, encryption, you name it. Governments love rationales like that. There are other ones they use. Terrorism by the way is one that’s shackled at the ankle with the drug wars, another way of destroying civil liberties and constitutional protections.

So the State has been waging these drug wars since, I guess, the first war in the Bay area against the Chinese in the 1870s when they passed a law against opium smoking, which allowed them to expel, summarily, the Chinese they brought over to build the railroads, dig the mines, and the rest of it. And they wanted to get rid of them because there was an economic depression, and so what did they do? They had a drug law aimed specifically at the Chinese. For the middle class people, all our great grandparents who were sipping their little tonics, at least my great grandmother did, all the various little opiates that people had, they were not brought in. There was a disproportion there. And that was the first, one of the first drug wars we had.

So where are we in this drug war? There’s obviously widespread public disillusion and dismay about it. I think most people, at some level—first of all there’s the sheer number of casualties in the drug war, which probably means that most people know someone, have heard of someone, a relative of someone, who’s doing time in a penitentiary somewhere. Maybe not so much in the upper rungs of society, but certainly in the lower rungs of society.

And I think, on the one hand, we have an increasingly berserk administration of the war by McCaffrey and forces. There’s hardly a day goes out—we’ve just discovered that the drug czar’s office says when people visit the drug site, and their computers are promptly sort of invaded by some little bug type thing designed and put in by the public relations firm that handles the White House drug czar’s business. You read this on almost a daily basis.

On the other hand, when resolutions or the action of the Hawaiian Legislature come up, there’s clearer support for a different way. People aren’t dumb. They know perfectly well that all of this enforcement has not reduced by a kilogram, by an ounce, the amount of cocaine arriving in this country.

I was living in Key West when the first Bush drug laws came in. Key West, in those days, was a marijuana town with all the relaxed attitude that marijuana implies. And then, of course, the laws meant that the smugglers had to produce smaller packets to make it easier for themselves, so they went to cocaine. And Key West went to hell as a result, I have to say.

But people know when they read that the Feds have seized, or the LAPD, or someone has seized 18 tons of cocaine in a warehouse, they think if they seized that how much is getting into this country? Brilliant speech, please keep going. [laughter] [applause] You almost never get that from a guy. [laughter]

So I think people are ready for anything. They’re ready to say give it a different way. Anyone coming forward with proposals will get a ready reception, I think. This is the wrap-up, don’t worry, David. We have on the ballot now in California an initiative which purports to emphasize the treatment side as opposed to the incarceration side for drug offenders. Actually I wrote myself a critique of it, because I think it’s not particularly well thought out. Because I think there is something that may be, and I’ll leave this as a thought for you, drugs are, I believe and I may differ from people here, a social—there can be a major social problem. Booze can be a social problem. Families that are screwed up by alcohol aren’t pretty sights. It’s a public health issue.

As we hopefully move towards recognition of the drug problem, of people afflicted by drug addiction, by families cursed by problems arising from drug addiction, as we face what are the correct and sensible ways of dealing with this, I think we’re in a very important stage of policy formation, to use a rather pompous phrase. And I think, sometimes, I fear what will happen, of course, is that people will be so maddened by the drug war, they’ll say to hell with the whole goddamn thing. Tear all the laws down, but you will be left with a problem. How do you deal with that problem?

I think personally the drug courts, such that I know of them, are pretty good. People may have different ideas, but I think as we look at these various aspects of drug wars we shouldn’t forget that one. It is our bounded duty first of all to attack the rationalization and use of drug laws by the state, and, secondly, to think what is the socially responsible way of dealing with the drug problem as a social issue and a health issue. Thank you. [applause]

David Theroux

Thank you, Alex. I don’t want to cut you back, but to get everybody in and then get to the Q&A, I’m afraid I have to.

Our next speaker is Peter Dale Scott. Peter’s a former Canadian diplomat. As I mentioned earlier, he’s Professor of English Emeritus at the University of California, Berkeley. Peter’s been an anti-war speaker since during the Vietnam war period and during the US/Iraqi war. He was a co-founder of the Peace and Conflict Studies Program at the University of California, Berkeley and the Coalition on Political Assassinations.

In addition to his book with Jonathan Marshall, which I’ve mentioned, Cocaine Politics, his other prose books include: The War Conspiracy, The Assassinations: Dallas and Beyond, Crime and Cover-up: The CIA, The Mafia and The Dallas Watergate Connection, The Iran-Contra Connection which was also co-authored with Jonathan, Deep Politics and the Death of JFK and Deep Politics 2. Peter is also renowned in his work in poetry. He’s the author of a trilogy, “Seculum,” Coming to Jakarta, Listening to the Candle, and Minding the Darkness; and also, Crossing Borders.

I also want to point out that he’s brought with him copies of a new study that he’s completed, which brings the Cocaine Politics book analysis up to date, and there are copies upstairs, for those of you who would like to purchase a copy, and I recommend it. So I’m very please to introduce Peter Dale Scott. [applause]

Peter Dale Scott

Thank you very much, David. Thank you for mentioning that I’m a poet. I’d like to begin by saying that sometimes it’s helpful to be a poet and look at what’s going on in society, because as a poet I believe metaphors are important, very important. In fact, most of you wouldn’t believe how important I think they are.

And we have a metaphor here, “the war on drugs,” which is perhaps the most dangerous and pernicious metaphor that we have afoot in our society today. Imagine if we had a different metaphor. Say, if we’re talking about a society that is addicted or a society that is sick or something, it would point us in a completely different direction.

If we talk about a war on drugs we have to figure out who are going to be our warriors, people like General McCaffrey, and who are we going to fight. And essentially, the primary targets of this war on drugs have been teenagers in this country and peasants abroad. We’ve talked about a national security threat here as if we’re threatened by peasants in Bolivia, and we have turned life upside down in Third World countries, and it has been accompanied by increasing violence.

We know about the violence at home, the SWAT teams, the search and seizure. It’s unsafe to go out in certain neighborhoods at night, not because there are criminals, but because there are these DEA/SWAT teams that may come, force you down on the ground, totally ignore your human rights, and so on. It’s even worse in the Third World.

So I think if we could end this terrible metaphor—war on drugs—it would set us on a better course. But of course that’s really asking for a structural change in this society, because that metaphor is rooted in a society that reaches to violence to solve problems.

I’m going to talk quite a lot about the CIA today but I want to agree not exactly but roughly with what Alex said. This is not just the story of the CIA. I’m going to be talking a lot about recent revelations, starting with Gary Webb in 1996 about—Let me just ask now, how many people know something about what Gary Webb said in 1996? Well that’s very helpful, because then I won’t tell you something that you already know.

Audience Member

Who’s Gary Webb? [laughter]

Peter Dale Scott

We’ll get to this in a moment. What Gary Webb was talking about, the CIA’s army, the Contras, and how Contras were continuously aligning themselves in one way or another with drug traffickers, and how this radically increased the flow of drugs, primarily cocaine, into this country.

But I want to say that the problem is not just the CIA here. It is a U.S. Government policy and it wasn’t—other agencies also involved, the military, the DEA and then certain private elements, which were relatively low scale in the Contra era, but which we should really focus on because they’re becoming extremely important in our new millenium as we go off to fight wars in Kosovo and Colombia.

Anyway, the primary decision which led, I think, to this unholy alliance between the Contras and drug traffic, was made in the White House. In fact, it was probably made by some of Reagan’s electoral backers. We had an extraordinary number of war criminals from Central America who turned up at Reagan’s Inaugural in 1981, because a lot of money from Latin America flowed into his electoral coffers, and he had promised and he delivered a war against the left, particularly in Nicaragua. And the first alliance was made with Argentina.

Well, it was no secret that the way Argentina ran these things, it was their modus operandi, was to fund their foreign covert operations from the drug traffic. So we made a decision to ally ourselves, initially it was not going to be primarily Americans on the ground, it was going to be the Argentines who would have run it, but Americans came down to be liaison, and the first people that they made contact were various military figures in Central America, all of whom had connections to drugs. This was before the CIA took over from the Argentines after the Falkland Wars. The Falkland Islands War in which, eventually, America decided it had to side with Britain rather than Argentina, and that led essentially to the withdrawal of the Argentines from the Contra scene.

But it was just one phase, as Alex had said, in a continuous practice of when you want to go and stir up trouble, mischief, violence abroad, you ally yourself with people who are powerful in those regions of the Third World. And time after time after time these powerful people, the people who have the funds, the people who have the troops on the ground have been local drug traffickers. This was the case in Central America.

Now a lot of this has been admitted but the usual defense in the national press was, well, yes, we did have these unfortunate alliances, but it didn’t make much of a difference to what’s happening in the United States. This is absolutely false, and I would like to start with the example of Afghanistan.

In 1979, which is the year that I’m afraid to say [President] Carter and his national security advisor, Brezhinsky, whom I went to college with, decided to back guerillas in Afghanistan who already had heroin labs. It was not secret about how they were supporting themselves. We made that decision in 1979. How much of their heroin was coming to this country? None.

By 1984, and this is according to Reagan’s State Department, 54 percent of the heroin coming into this country was coming from the Pakistani/Afghan border. It was coming from those same heroin labs that I’ve just been talking about. And actually the trucks that took CIA materiel and assistants and advisors up into the region, were the same trucks that brought the heroin back out. So it went to 54 percent. So you can’t say that it’s not a problem.

I’m going to talk in a minute or two about a single CIA asset in Central America, one Ramon Matta-Ballasteros, who was a trafficker in Honduras, which was, by coincidence, where the heart of the CIA-backed Contra effort was. And the CIA used his airline, SETCO, to supply the FDN camps. That was the main Contra faction in Honduras. So that the CIA was protecting Matta-Ballasteros.

Was this a big problem? You bet it was, because the DEA at this time had already pinpointed a single cartel which they said was responsible for maybe a third to a half of the cocaine coming into this country. When they first made the estimate, they saw four big people in the cartel, three of whom were Colombian and one was Matta-Ballasteros—a Honduran who spent a good deal of his time in Colombia. But by 1985, they had decided that Matta-Ballasteros was the most important of the four.

And by 1985, the DEA had another reason to hate Matta-Ballasteros and to want to get him, which was the murder of one of their agents in Mexico, Enrique Camarena. And in the end Matta-Ballasteros was brought to this country and convicted, not of the murder but of the kidnapping. Because they had tapes of the meeting in which they heard Matta-Ballasteros meeting in Mexico, and this gives you a clue to what Mexico is like, with not only a bunch of the top drug traffickers, others also of whom these drug traffickers supported the Contras in various ways, but also top police officials from Mexico City, including one who was named the Chief of Mexico City Police years after this happened and years after he had been identified by the DEA as one of the people who were there, and this was under the supposed Reform Administration of President Salinas de Gortari.

So when I’d say that the people on the scene are part of the problem, the right-wing elements, and the way those societies have become organized is a way which incorporates drug traffickers into the ruling structure of those countries.

The Sandinistas in Nicaragua tried to put an end to that largely because the Guardia Nacionale under Samosa was so deeply implicated with the drug traffic, with prostitution, with all of the leading criminal operations in Nicaragua, that even the Bishops had united to say “please do something to end this kind of regime.” So, ironically, you had a lot of church people backing the Sandinistas, and the drug people, of course, trying to restore the status quo ante as soon as possible, and the consistent policy of the U.S. Government. But, here I do have to say, the CIA, in particular, was to back the elements of the old national guard who had been involved in these traffics for a long time. To make them predominate over other reformists who, like Edin Pastora, who became alienated from the Sandinistas, wanted to join an anti-Sandinista effort but wanted nothing to do with the criminals in the FDN which was the CIA’s faction, which was the Guardia Nacionale faction. And a good deal of the very complicated Contra politics of the 1980s, is the CIA trying to force the old Guardia Nacionale and Enrique Bermudez, in particular, down the throats of a much more complicated scene on the anti-Sandinista side, many of whom wanted nothing to do with that.

Well now we come to the Gary Webb allegations. Who was Gary Webb? If you want to know, if you really don’t know who Gary Webb is, you should buy this book upstairs. [laughter]

Audience Member

He was a reporter for the San Jose . . . if you had identified him by his, what he did, I’d know.

Peter Dale Scott

Yes, he was. He had stories in the San Jose Mercury in August, 1986, which alleged, in sum, that there had been two drug traffickers, Norwin Meneses and Danilo Blandon, both Nicaraguans, who had met Enrique Bermudez, the head of the FDN, way back in 1981 just as all of this was getting started. And Enrique Bermudez had said—and this is conceded by Blandon—“the end justifies the means. You will find a way to support us.” And even Meneses who says—Blandon says, yes he did say that. Meneses said, “no, I never heard anything like that.” But even Manassas said, “yes, we worked out an arrangement whereby we would support the Contras.” Well, who was Meneses at the time? [He was] the number one drug trafficker from Nicaragua, and everybody knew it, and certainly Bermudez knew it.

So that was how all of this got started. And Meneses sold the cocaine wholesale, very wholesale to Blandon; Blandon sold it to a black [man] called Ricky Ross, who was responsible for turning it into crack and selling it in South Central L.A. And Gary Webb relied very heavily on a story in the Los Angeles Times from two years earlier that had called Ricky Ross the “king of crack.” It was a story by a man called Jesse Katz. And he said if there was ever anyone who was responsible for the crack epidemic in this country it was Ricky Ross. Well, Ricky Ross, at that time, was getting most of his cocaine from Blandon, who was getting his cocaine from Meneses.

And then the next thing that Webb said, and it turned out to be true, was that as long as there were Contras, the law enforcement people, although they knew everything about what Blandon and Meneses were doing, they couldn’t touch them. They were untouchable. And it was only after the Contra support effort ended with a Congressional vote in 1988 that finally the U.S. authorities moved against Blandon. They got Blandon to become an informant and they set up, and that’s the word, Ricky Ross. So the black dealer at the bottom of the totem pole, Ricky Ross, ended up with a life sentence, which he’s serving now. Blandon was let off for this heroic act of turning in one of the people he sold to. And Meneses was never touched by the Americans at all, but he went back to Nicaragua and was caught flagrante delicto with a load of heroin by the Nicaraguans and was arrested there. And in Nicaragua, the press called him “El Rey De La Cocaina”—the king of cocaine. Nice people. Whoops, I have two minutes. Whoa.

Well. Now I’m going to have to change what I was going to say. How many people, those of you who do know about Gary Webb, know that the House Committee on Intelligence recently produced a report which says there’s nothing to his stories? How many people knew that? How many people saw my op-ed in the Chronicle on Monday? It’s the same people largely.

Well, I’m very concerned about this because the only time that the American people really became aware that something terrible is being done to them, and CIA policies and government policies are a factor in this terrible thing, was over these Gary Webb stories. They were not perfect. I could have criticized; I did criticize one or two things in them myself. But in its broad outline, everything that I’ve reported to you today from what he said has been admitted not only by the Department of Justice in their “Inspector General’s Report” but even by the CIA. The CIA Inspector General, Fred Hitz, did two reports totaling about 700 pages or so.

I mean it’s heavy slogging through, it but I have slogged through it and I have summarized them in here [laughter] and the summaries of those reports are pretty mealy-mouthed. But the contents of the reports reveal things like, well, we come back to Matta-Ballasteros for example. The Justice Department came over and said to the CIA, “what do you have on this airline SETCO?” And they sent back a flat out lie. They said, “there are no records of a SETCO Air.” And not only did they lie way back then, but when Fred Hitz was trying to find out who wrote this, everyone said “it wasn’t me, it was that guy” and this guy said, “well, yes, I wrote it but I never heard of SETCO.” And then the third guy said, “well the second guy actually used to go to the SETCO Headquarters quite often.”

So there was lying not only then, there was lying in the last couple of years and those of you who remember John Deutsch in South Central L.A., he said “if we find any wrongdoing those people will be punished, I promise you.”

Audience Member

They were liars.

Peter Dale Scott

So the promise is still there. And it’s up to people, like the people in this room, whether a House report that comes in, it’s full of lies, I list the lies in my book. They say that no one in the FDN would never have taken any drug monies. The Hitz Report is full. It names the names of FDN leaders who were suspected of drug trafficking. There was a statutory requirement to suspend aid to any group whose members had been found to be guilty of drug trafficking. And the FDN was certainly true of this in that statutory period, but the CIA went blindly ahead.

So the question is, whether people, like the people in this room, will insist on the truth coming out, on their being a factual accounting. We don’t have the whole of the Hitz Reports yet. The second report looks into Southern Air Transport, which may have been the biggest drug trafficker of all, a former CIA proprietary. And there’s only one page in the Hitz Report, because I think they’ve censored the rest. So we need to get those reports and, believe me, we need to get Congresswoman Nancy Pelosi, who’s name is on this report, to repudiate this report. The Chair of her Committee was a former CIA officer. The Chief of Staff. How did she ever accept a Chief of Staff, a former CIA officer who spent 13 years working with those heroin—trafficking Afghan guerillas I was just talking about? How does somebody like that end up being in charge of a report that whitewashes the CIA?

And let me just say, echoing something Alex said, this is my last sentence, may be a long one, but it’s my last sentence [laughter]. If we don’t stop this thing here at home, we are going to see a war on drugs destabilize the whole of Central America, which achieved peace in the 1980s by keeping U.S. troops out; and now we’re sending them back in under the guise of the war on drugs and Colombia is going to be another Vietnam if we don’t stop it by stopping the lie on which it is based. And I could say so much more about that, but maybe we’ll come back to that in the questions. Thank you. [applause]

David Theroux

Thank you. Thank you, Peter. I should mention that in the packets that, if you’ve got a packet, there is a copy of Peter’s, the Op-Ed we placed in the San Francisco Chronicle on Monday that Peter wrote. And if you don’t have it, we can get a copy for you. Our third speaker—pardon me?

Peter Dale Scott

Did you get a copy for me?

David Theroux

Sure.

Our third speaker as I mentioned earlier is Jonathan Marshall, former Economics Editor of the San Francisco Chronicle. He also authored the weekly column on Economics at the Chronicle. He received his Bachelor’s Degree in History with distinction. Phi Beta Kappa from Stanford University. And Masters Degree in American History with honors from Cornell University.

Jonathan has been studying the drug traffic and drug policy issue for many years. As a college student he published a pioneering [paper], it’s called “The Study of the Development of the Opiate Traffic in Nationalist China,” which shed new light on the origins of the U.S. intelligence complicity in the world narcotics business as far back as World War II. When he was at Stanford, he worked with the historian Bart Bernstein, who’s also one of the advisors to our journal, The Independent Review.

As editorial page editor of the Oakland Tribune, he wrote a noted series of editorials, which won a very distinguished award I should mention, calling for serious consideration of drug legalization, a position that was widely condemned by then U.S. Attorney Joseph Riccionelli. Mr. Riccionelli was later exposed as the U.S. Attorney who, at the CIA’s request, returned $36,000 that had been seized from a supporter of the Nicaraguan Contras who was a major defendant in one of the West Coast’s biggest cocaine cases.

As a reporter for the San Francisco Chronicle, Jonathan wrote investigative stories that uncovered drug trafficking crimes by a leading Israeli Cabinet Member and by Nicaraguan [drug] trafficker and Contra supporter who already been mentioned—Norwin Meneses, who was later the subject of, as Peter said, Gary Webb’s exposé in the San Jose Mercury News.

Among other books, including Cocaine Politics, Jonathan is co-author of The Iran-Contra Connection, and author of the book on drug policy Drug Wars: Corruption Counter-insurgency and Covert Operations in the Third World, a book which is more relevant, we believe, today than ever, in light of the Clinton Administration’s apparent determination to, indeed, turn Colombia into what could become another Vietnam.

I’m also pleased that Jonathan was involved in a book project that I organized back in the early ‘80s that was published called Dealing With Drugs, and for which we won our International Book Award. I’m glad to present Jonathan Marshall. [applause]


__________________
A TAINTED DEAL http://www.motherjones.com/politics/1998/06/tainted-deal

 LA DEA; Murder of Kiki Camarena http://www.laweekly.com/news/how-a-dogged-la-dea-agent-unraveled-the-cias-alleged-role-in-the-murder-of-kiki-camarena-5750278  

"Several informed sources have told me that an appendix to this Report was removed at the instruction of the DOJ at the last minute. This appendix is reported to have information about a CIA officer, not agent or asset, but officer, based in the LA Station, who was in charge of Contra related activities. According to these sources, this individual was associated with running drugs to South Central L.A., around 1988. Let me repeat that amazing omission. The recently released CIA Report Vol II contained an appendix, which was pulled by the DOJ, that reported a CIA officer in the LA Station was hooked into drug running in South Central Los Angeles." Maxine Waters Oct, 1998
https://fas.org/irp/congress/1998_cr/h981013-coke.htm   

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Jonathan Marshall

Thank you, David. There are really, I think, broadly defined, two drug problems in the United States. One is the problem of drug misuse, frequently termed “drug abuse,” which was a strange term. The thought of us abusing these drugs, but as Alex said there is a real problem there. It’s a medical and social problem. Very real. There are people who die from drugs. There are people who are born with drug problems, so called “crack babies” and so on.

But the other problem, which I think is every bit as large and much more easily controllable, is the enormous social problem from what we call drug enforcement, and it’s really better, I think, thought of as drug prohibition. No one is really making war on drugs. They’re making war on people. People who take drugs. People who engage in the commerce around drugs and so on.

And the nature of this so-called drug war is to abet violence in our society, corruption, the promotion of organized crime and vast underground markets, the diversion of ever increasing resources in the criminal justice system and military agencies to this fight, the enormous environmental harm that was alluded to in the Third World, where drug crops are grown and where U.S. programs are involved in wholesale spraying and use of toxins and viral agents and other things to destroy crops.

On to the enormous medical harm caused by the diversion of these markets into underground channels, where unscrupulous dealers cut drugs with unknown agents and so forth. And addicts use dirty needles promoting the AIDS epidemic, and a number of other enormous health problems.

Another enormous casualty of this so called drug war is one, that’s, I think, common to all wars, and that is truth. The kind of lying and hypocrisy that has been talked about by my predecessors on this panel are really endemic to this whole war on drugs, and have been, just pervaded the entire government approach.

I want to talk today a little bit about some of the domestic consequences of the war on drugs that I think are forcing a lot of people to rethink the social costs and the kind of wisdom of continuing crime policies.

The first point – I remember first learning in school about the scientific method, and how you test hypotheses. And when they are clearly disproven you move on and try another hypothesis. For decades we’ve been experimenting—we’ve been testing the hypothesis that law enforcement would somehow diminish the availability of drugs and, thus, the social acceptance of drugs. It seems to me that’s a hypothesis that’s been clearly disproven.

Just to take an example, from 1985 to 1995 the Federal Drug Control budget increased from about $2.5 billion to more than $13 billion—a pretty healthy rise. Over the same period, the percentage of high school seniors who said that marijuana was easily available rose from 85 percent to 90 percent, and it’s continued to rise. Similarly, the fraction of seniors who said heroin was easily available, rose to about a third in 1988 from about 19 percent in 1979.

Looking abroad, the expenditure of over $600 million in counter-narcotics programs in Colombia, which is soon to be dwarfed by the Clinton Administration’s proposed massive interventions, from 1990 to 1998, led to Colombia replacing Peru and Bolivia as the major source of cocaine in Latin America. Now there was a great victory for law enforcement.

The biggest test of drug availability is a simple economic one. What’s the price? And there, the evidence is pretty compelling that the price of drugs has fallen dramatically. A gram of cocaine cost only $44 in 1998 on the street, down from $191 in 1981. Heroin prices had been $1,200 per gram in 1981. They fell to only $318 per gram. In fact, heroin became so cheap that people started smoking it. So, in effect, traffickers are saying when supply goes up, price goes down; and supply has gone up plentifully.

Anyone who thinks for even a couple of minutes about the issue of drug interdiction to which we spend countless billions of dollars will quickly realize what a hopeless task it is and what a fundamentally dishonest task it is. The United States has 20,000 kilometers of coast line, more than 7,500 miles of border with Mexico and Canada. No army in the world could keep drugs out.

(inaudible)—border people can produce methamphetamines in their bathtubs. Indeed a single suitcase of phentanol, which is a synthetic opiate, would be enough—it’s so powerful, a suitcase full could basically supply the entire U.S. addict population for a year. So drug interdiction is at it’s heart. The only reason we buy drugs from abroad is because of cheap labor. It’s cheaper to produce it abroad. But if the price went up a little bit we’d produce it at home. It’s called “import substitution.”

So what are some of these social costs? Some of these have been alluded to, for example, the enormous erosion of civil liberties. When you look at almost every Supreme Court case that has eroded Fourth Amendment protections against searches and seizures, almost invariably, they involve drug searches. And the reason is simple. There’s no victim around to tell the police a crime occurred. The only way the police can find out that a crime occurred is by seizing property, invading people’s cars, their homes, and so forth, on minimal cause to find evidence of a crime.

I think it’s an interesting statistic that in 1996, 71 percent of all wire taps were authorized for state and federal narcotics enforcement. In contrast only 2.8 percent of wire taps were for kidnapping, extortion, larceny, theft, loan sharking, usury and bribery combined.

And lastly, just one little point, those of you who remember Watergate, the infamous “plumber’s squad,” which was at the heart of the Nixon operations, actually had it’s origins as an extra-constitutional White House-led anti-narcotics squad which became adept at breaking and entering, and then was put to other uses.

We’re all aware of Third World corruption. Corruption has been quite pervasive in the United States as well, due to the millions and billions of dollars available by traffickers to corrupt law enforcement. Half of all police officers convicted as a result of FBI-led corruption cases between 1993 and 1997, were for drug related offenses.

One of the most obvious social costs of the war on drugs are clogged jails and prisons. In 1973, there were 300,000 arrests for drug law violations. By 1996, that number had risen to 1.5 million—a five fold increase thanks to the war on drugs over that period. Three quarters of those arrests were for simple possession of a controlled substance, not even for sale or manufacturing of the drugs.

By 1995, a quarter of all adults serving time in jails and prisons were there for drug law violations. The growth in the prison population from 1985 to 1995, over 80 percent of that increase, was due to drug convictions. And so on it goes. By the late ‘90s, the cost of incarcerating all the people who are there simply for drug crimes had risen to about $9 billion a year. But if all this were really doing a lot to decrease real crime and make people feel safer, there might be a point in spending all that money. But many authorities have found quite the contrary, and two economists who David mentioned earlier, Bruce Benson and David Rasmussen, have actually studied the data, and they show that the diversion of law enforcement to fighting drug crimes away from other more significant violent crimes, has actually led to a reduction in law enforcement of things like murders, assaults, etc. The kinds of crimes most people feel threatened by.

And numerous other authorities remind anyone who cares to listen, that crimes that are induced by drug-altered states are far more common with alcohol than they are with illicit drugs, that people get thrown behind bars for life.

But the ideology of the war on drugs has been so penetrating and so pervasive and so rigidly enforced by the government, that even credible experts have been silenced. And the most notable case I think are medical experts who, to take an example that David mentioned earlier, overwhelmingly medical experts agree that there are important medical uses for cannabis—reducing nausea from chemotherapy or AIDS drugs is a classic example—and there are many others. And yet the Federal Government has systematically, and this includes the Clinton Administration, suppressed even government reports from medical authorities. The Institute of Medicine, and many others, have had reports suppressed, because drug czars believe that this role, somehow, will weaken our resolve to fight the war on drugs.

Similarly, the Federal Government bitterly resists needle swapping programs. Roughly half of all AIDS cases in the United States result from intravenous drug use and the passing of contaminated needles. Every study on the book shows that clean needle programs would reduce the incidence of this horrible epidemic, but the White House refuses to budge on the issue.

Similarly countries in Europe, Australia, and so on are much freer in their use of methadone programs to help opiate addicts, and these programs are usually suppressed in the U.S. Government.

Treatment programs receive very little support in total fraction of government resources in the so-called war on drugs. And one report by the Substance Abuse Mental Health Services Administration showed that about half of the need for treatment goes unmet in the United States. And this comes despite overwhelming evidence the treatment is effective, not only in reducing drug use and in reducing crimes committed by addicts, but also even in such things as treatment that tends to reduce welfare use by 10 percent, increase employment 20 percent a year after treatment. So there’s a whole range of areas that are improved by treatment programs.

Treatment, of course, costs far less than imprisonment. To imprison a drug criminal costs on the order of close to $25,000 a year, compared to treatment costs of about $2,000 to $6,000 a year.

The Rand Corporation, which no one can view as a group of softies, estimated in the mid-‘90s that a dollar invested in drug treatment produced social returns on that investment of about $7.50, because of the reduction in crime and other sorts of problems. By contrast, they found that a dollar invested in controlling drugs in Third World source countries result in a social loss of 85 cents. A dollar invested in interdiction resulted in a social loss of 68 cents. A dollar invested in domestic law enforcement led to a loss of 48 cents. These are pretty compelling numbers. Normally, one would expect fiscal conservatives to care about such numbers, but we don’t see much of that from our current leadership.

Well, what are the alternatives? The most radical one, which is almost never discussed is, because people are afraid of the “L” word, is legalization. And this is, indeed, a fairly radical proposal. It would, based philosophically on the notion that people have the right to make choices about their own lives as long as they aren’t fouling up other people’s lives.

And I don’t want to push the legalization argument here too strongly, but I think there are a couple of facts worth remembering. One is that before 1914, drugs were largely legal, and there was not a gigantic addict population. There were people taking these little elixirs that Alex was referring to. Mostly, they were functioning members of society. No one really knows for sure how many addicts there were, but some estimates put it as low as about quarter of a million. Certainly the United States had a sustained period of economic growth throughout this whole period of drug legalization.

Some recent work by economists who’ve studied the effect of changing prices on drug demand estimated the decriminalization of cocaine might lead to about 260,000 new users, and decriminalization of heroin might lead to about 47,000 new heroin users. These would certainly create social or medical problems. I’d hardly consider those numbers to be radically undermining of our society.

Probably, a more politically palatable alternative is often named “harm reduction.” The notion here is to reduce the kind of wholesale incarceration of small-time drug users to promote treatment as an alternative. It seems kind of criminal when there are people begging for treatment that society doesn’t provide slots for them. That would condone the medical uses of drugs where prescribed by doctors, that would permit kind of hard-core drug users to receive heroin or methadone without resorting to black markets and the dangers of contaminated drugs, and so on.

Programs like this are not just theoretical. They’ve been tried in Europe and Switzerland, in Holland, and so forth. And careful scientific studies of the results have shown remarkably good effects. They don’t show that drug use stops in these countries. They show that the kind of ancillary social harm that comes from enforcement is enormously reduced. That crime is reduced. That the health effects of drug use are enormously reduced. And that the problem becomes manageable rather than a severe social problem.

I think there is hope in that a growing number of Americans are beginning to look to examples abroad of programs like this. There’s hope in the fact that even stalwarts of the drug war from the Reagan era, like George Schultz, have started talking about drug legalization. A growing number of people are giving—are lending a certain intellectual respectability to this. You see them at the Hoover Institution, National Review magazine, some people on the left, and that gives me hope that ultimately the American people will be able to change policy, but it is an extraordinarily hard fight against, as Alex said, very entrenched state interests in maintaining the drug war as it is for some very pernicious reasons. Thank you. [applause]

David Theroux

Thank you, Jonathan. We’d like to open it up to your questions. If you just wait for Carl, who has the microphone and – OK.

Audience Member #1

I’d like to ask this question of Jonathan: Is he encouraged with a proposed policy that candidates for the Police Department, no longer have their prior drug arrests as a relevant factor in becoming police officers? In other words, police officers who’ve served time for drug offenses will now be enforcing the drug law. Wouldn’t that make them more compassionate in their application? [laughter]

Jonathan Marshall

I’m not terribly hopeful, though. There seem to be two schools of thought as the baby boom generation which, many of whom took drugs in their youth or early adulthood, move into positions of power. Some of them are perhaps more compassionate and see the hypocrisy of brutal crackdowns on others who have engaged in activities really no more severe than they did in their youth.

The other reaction is to try to forget about their own past, as Al Gore seems to have managed and others. And become “holier than thou” in this drug war, if you’ll pardon my mixed metaphor. One of the problems with the police is that the incentive structure the police face [relies] heavily [towards] supports [of] the war on drugs, and that goes to things like asset forfeiture laws which directly support the growth of police departments.

And indeed some of the economists I mentioned have shown that what the rise in the drug war in the mid-‘80s was directly related to Federal law, which shared proceeds from asset forfeitures with local police departments. Lo and behold, it’s not very surprising that they followed their incentives. And so unless those incentives are changed, I’m not too hopeful that the change in the mix of police officers will help.

Audience Member #2

Well, we just started to talk about incentives, and I don’t think there’s been a real discussion about money. If you could apply the term “follow the money” to any of your points of views would you have something to say about that phrase “follow the money” as it relates to the global drug threat?

Peter Dale Scott

If I’d had time, I would have talked about the international flows of money. Twice, once in the early ‘80s and, again, in the mid-‘90s, Mexico was on the point of defaulting on all its loans, and in fact, announced that it would. And, twice, the American Government came through with emergency loans. I think in the Clinton case, it was done overnight; really, $40 billion. That money was lent on the assumption that it would be repaid.

In the first case, in the early ‘80s, the CIA actually did a study on how much of Mexico’s foreign exchange earnings come from drugs. And the answer is actually reproduced photographically, their report in James Mills’ book, The Underground Empire. They ran two countries together which sort of fudges it a bit. They said these foreign exchange earnings of just two countries, Colombia and Mexico, probably 75 percent come from drugs.

Well, if, supposing Mexico had defaulted. Supposing they hadn’t had that 75 percent coming from drugs. Three or four of your top banks in this country would have been technically bankrupt. So you have to ask, what does a bank president think about drugs coming through Mexico?

The second example is in 1994; the figures this time come from the Mexican side. The Mexican Attorney General reported $28 billion of foreign exchange earnings—we’re not just talking the money here—but the important thing: money that you can pay back to the United States; $28 billion from drugs, probably more than the sale of all other commodities, such as oil for example, combined.

Now I tested this on a vice president of a very well known bank—I don’t want to put her on the spot—but a bank that was definitely exposed in this debt situation. She didn’t know about the 1980s, but when I began to talk about the 1990s, she cut me off and she said, “oh, that was drug money.” So the banks know that’s how they’re getting their banks. The one country that never had to reschedule its debts in the 1980s in Latin America was Colombia. [laughter]

David Theroux

Alex, did you want to say something?

Alexander Cockburn

Oh, no, I was going to say it’s been absolutely marvelous to follow down the years the U.S. press which reports these sting operations of Mexican banks, and the incredible silence they’ve kept on the fact that U.S. banks have been deeply involved in money washing, as indeed [Ramon} Milan-Rodriguez, who’s now serving in a Federal penitentiary who was a money washer accountant for the Medellin Cartel. He was arrested in the U.S., I think carrying at the time $10 million. And he had spreadsheets showing how much money he was bringing in. Contributions made to various political campaigns. My brother made a film for WGBH on it. Milan-Rodriguez—very articulate, well-educated bloke, talked about it, but, again, it’s one of those subjects that you run across quite frequently where no matter how often it’s pointed out or said in slightly non-official publications—it will always stay off the official agenda.

David Theroux

Other questions? Gentleman over here?

Audience Member #3

Yeah. Speaking of Mexico, for the first time it looks like they have a horse race for the presidential election. Is there anything out there that suggests that the Vicente Fox and PAN will be any less corrupt than de Prede?

Peter Dale Scott

I’m not really an expert on Mexico, but I gather that PAN some time ago sort of, just like PRI, dissolved into two factions. One with the so-called bureaucrats who run the so-called dinosaurs, who were—the bigger drug traffickers were the dinosaurs side. Although I must say the Salinas de Gortari family seems to have done pretty well, as bureaucrats, out of this. And the PAN also is split into the people who genuinely oppose this whole system in PAN, who I gather are not major players. And then people like Fox, who have learned how to play the game. And the people I talked to are not sure that it’s really going to be terribly different if Fox is elected, and it seems quite likely that he will be.

Jonathan Marshall

Actually, can I just add?

There’s sometimes a rather arrogant supposition on the part of U.S. authorities and U.S. press that all it takes is some order from a head of state who’s really not corrupt to stop the drug traffic. If you read occasional accounts in the New York Times or elsewhere about what happens to those brave but rather foolhardy Mexican drug agents who aren’t corrupt and you end up beheaded. And I won’t go through all the grizzly details, but a Mexican president can’t just order an end to the drug traffic. With the billions of dollars at stake, it’s so central to their economy, as Peter said. These are structural problems. They will never be solved by simply a change of government or a wish to end corruption.

Audience Member #4

What I don’t understand is how with a General as the head of the war on drugs, we constantly violate one of the principles of war that the military men are taught, which is to reinforce success and abandon failure. [laughter]

____: Vietnam (inaudible).

David Theroux

Anyone want to comment on that?

____: That’s a good question. That’s a good question.

____: We don’t understand the (inaudible).

Alexander Cockburn

Well, it comes down to what you define as success. If success is counter-insurgency abroad and social control at home, then you could argue the drug war is a success on those terms. [applause]

Peter Dale Scott

Can I add to that? And this is from our book Cocaine Politics, that the military realized after Vietnam, that foreign engagements were going to be very unpopular. And they actually scratched their heads. “How can we sell foreign engagements to the American people?” And a man called Gragglestein, a Colonel, Marine, Special Forces Commander, Colonel, said that the way to sell it to the American people is to declare that the enemy are narco-terrorists. And we quote about a paragraph on page one—if those of you who bought the book Cocaine Politics, page 198, you can see how this—he said, “This will give us the moral high ground and we’ll silence our opponents.”

This actually goes back to 1974 when, up until then, the United States had been voting every year [to give] aid to police forces in Latin America. When the facts came out about the amount of torture that the people we had trained were inflicting on their people, Congress terminated that kind of police assistance. But the same year they, other people said, “well, we can start giving drug assistance to the same countries,” and the amount of drug assistance that was voted was roughly equal to the amount of police assistance which had just been cancelled. So it’s been hypocrisy from the very beginning. But I think Alex’s point is a good one. The main objective is to keep the military in this, and also, police, by the way and for that matter, in this kind of business (inaudible).

Audience Member #5

As much as I appreciate this analysis of the symptoms of the drug war, I must observe and ask your comment on this. I feel that the Prohibition or whatever, or a crusade against whomever, has been the great political success of the last thousand years, whether we look at the Crusades, whether we look at the Spanish Inquisition, or whether we look at the Prohibition of alcohol, Prohibition itself is a runaway political success. It is the means, the operative means, by which we give the lie to Abraham Lincoln—

David Theroux

Do you have a question?

Audience Member #5

This is a question. I ask for your comments on this. I’m being a little provocative. Abraham Lincoln said you couldn’t fool all the people all the time, but now we can fool enough of the people enough of the time. May I ask for comments on that please?

Peter Dale Scott

Well I don’t want to do all the talking, but the Crusades were a way of keeping a totally dysfunctional class of warrior-knights going for a little bit longer than they should have. [laughter] I think the kings liked the Crusades because it got the warrior-knights off your own land and onto somebody else’s land. But I hardly see it as a very progressive element.

Spain really suffered for the Inquisition, which drove the creative middle class elements out of Spain and turned what, at the time, was probably the most progressive country in Europe into the most backward in a matter of 300 years.

So these are analogies we should think about very seriously but they’re not—you can’t put them under the rubric of success stories.

Jonathan Marshall

Politically they were.

Audience Member #5

Yeah, he will.

David Theroux

It’s true. They have, obviously prohibition has existed and the question is why and how do we deal with it?

Audience Member #6

My question is –

David Theroux

Well, this, I’m sorry, this gentleman here.

Audience Member #7

Thank you. My question is to all three speakers. I’d like a definition of state, that is, how did this great American country get so corrupt? And the second part of that question is: what is your opinion on sort of the unifying hypothesis put forward by L. Fletcher Prouty to account for the post, at least part of what’s happening in the post-war period?

David Theroux

Anyone take that first?

Audience Member #8

Could you give the speakers a mic?

David Theroux

Yeah, they have them.

Alexander Cockburn

Well, I was using the state in the sense of the combination of interests, who hold the power, exercise the power of coercion and governorship in the sense of the dominant class as represented by government, which is it’s executive committee, which all Marxists will recognize as the tag from the radical past. I can’t remember what L. Fletcher Prouty said. I don’t believe most of what L. Fletcher Prouty says, so I mean I think I’d probably disagree with whatever he did say [laughter] although I don’t want to; I mean he’s the secret team guy in a way, yeah.

I always think the team is open. It’s not secret. I think I might differ with my trusted colleagues here. But people talk about secret government. I think it’s fairly obvious who the villains are; their faces appear in the newspaper every day. Where is secrecy needed? They’re there. We can look at them all the time.

Audience Member #9

Whom are you labeling?

Alexander Cockburn

Well, I think Fletcher Prouty—the thesis, by and large, is that there is a covert team running the show. It’s a slight—I think a cousin of the idea that the CIA is a rogue agency—that there are forces at work. I mean, it’s a long strain in analysis, whether it’s the Freemasons or this or the Jews or [laughter] somebody is doing it and we don’t know who they are.

I tend to generally disagree with that and say that the people who you think are running the show, by and large, you can identify them. You can identify the class interests. You can identify the economic interests and there they are. And you don’t need to scuffle under the bed and find a Freemason or a secret Teamster or whoever it is. [laughter] Because we know they’re there.

Peter Dale Scott

I actually wrote a book on this subject called Deep Politics, and I must be a fairly bristly character because I managed to disagree with people like Alex Cockburn on the one hand who said, it’s all perfectly obvious, there’s a structure there. And I also managed to disagree explicitly with Fletcher Prouty who says there is a secret team who is, or a secret government, managing everything behind the scenes.

I do believe that there are, what I call deep political considerations here. But part of the problem is that there are certain things that go on in our society that we don’t want to talk about. And one of them, which Alex did talk about, but most people don’t, is that the CIA has been in bed with criminals from the time it got started. Local police forces, it’s often the same thing, that a very convenient way to run parts of the city that you have trouble getting into is to tolerate the existence of organized gangs who do it for you, and if they’re selling cocaine, heroin, they’d rather have—let me tell you, this is a fact, they’d rather have heroin dealers in South—cocaine dealers in South Central LA than have Black Panthers, that’s for sure. [laughter] And this is not a joke.

So what ends up is that things are going on that we do not acknowledge and we do not talk about, and believe me our present drug crisis in this country is something which we never talk about honestly. If you see a politician get on a TV camera talking about drugs, you can expect it’s going to be empty rhetoric, because very often that politician may have a partner in a law firm who helped get him elected because of the amount of business he was bringing the people who are part of the drug trade.

So I just can sum it up. It’s not a secret team that’s somehow outside of the system. It definitely is the system, but not all of the system is up there on the TV camera for you to look at. And if you look into the financing of parties and things like that, that drives that home.

Jonathan Marshall

If I could just actually just emphasize that. I think there’s a kind of happy middle ground there. Much as Peter said, and I think a great example is when the Justice Department in the early 1990s made a deal with the CIA, literally saying that the CIA did not have to inform the Justice Department about crimes being committed by its agents, or people the CIA was working with. This is about as blatant, hypocritical act, at the very time that the Reagan Administration was proclaiming the war on drugs, the Justice Department was explicitly letting off the hook, all the people working with the CIA.

So we had not a cabal in the CIA doing this but the Justice Department doing it. The CIA was acting in accordance with Reagan Administration policy. It was all being done in secret, lest this offend the American people. But the even bigger irony is now that it’s public, how many newspapers have reported this. I think Alex may have written a column on this taking the L.A. Times to task and—

Audience Member

It was published in the L.A. Times.

Jonathan Marshall

But it wasn’t the news pages of the L.A. Times or other papers telling us this. So that’s the kind of mind-boggling scandal of my former profession that’s rather heartbreaking.

Audience Member #11

My question is or please remind me what the participation at the end of Prohibition because I’m curious how much corruption as drawn back in the ‘30s as we have now, and somehow it’s (inaudible) and public opinion was changed.

Alexander Cockburn

People have mentioned Prohib—I think it was, sorry—the changed atmosphere just before the second World War, right, and the fact that, I mean I’d like to put a defense of Prohibition, let’s face it. [laughter] Jonathan said that when drugs were legal was a period of growth. But what about the ‘20s, period of unparalleled growth and ebullience in American society accompanied by Prohibition.

Health. In terms of health, Prohibition was rather a success actually. I’ll give you some examples. Cirrhosis of the liver was running at 16 per hundred thousand in 1900, By 1930, after a period of Prohibition, it was down to 8.2 and then since Prohibition was re-appealed, by 1968 it was up to 19. TB in 1870, per hundred thousand, there were 460 people with TB. In 1900, it was 264 and Prohibition was a tremendous success because people—a lot of people obeyed the law and didn’t drink which meant that their nutrition was better, their vulnerability to disease sank, and by 1930, TB was down to 68 per hundred thousand.

Now I don’t want to issue a defense of Prohibition because it gave rise to the Kennedy family and that’s—[laughter]—a rising argument just by itself against Prohibition. But it does go back, it does go back to the point I tried to make before, that booze was a huge problem. Prohibition was a coercive instrument and it was obviously flouted. It led to widespread contempt for the law. It led to the corruption of police departments. It led to Universal Pictures. It led to all sorts of things. And Camelot. Well, it did. Jules Stein founded Universal and Jules Stein was a bandleader with Capone, who you know, flourished during the band-era Prohibition rackets. Hollywood did well out of this.

But the point is twofold. And, again, I think it has to be thought of. What is an element of coercion that’s necessary in drug treatment? This goes back to the issue of drug courts, drug therapy, and too, how much coercion is necessary? And, two, if you regard Prohibition as on the one hand, you can, it’s been—you think I’m being provocative, but epidemiologists have made, like Ayre, have made very sound defenses of Prohibition, saying it was a great social health experiment. I kid you not. Because on the stats, I gave you a few, you can go on with that. You have to, therefore, see these problems of addiction as public health problems, and I suggested that we’re coming into an era where we need to be very sophisticated and clearheaded about what we’re really talking about here.

Peter Dale Scott

I think it would be very good for us to study what happened at the end of Prohibition. I don’t totally disagree with what Alex just said, but I think two factors that [come into] play. One was that the amount of, the emergence of organized crime as a phenomenon with some rather spectacular shootouts towards the end of Prohibition. But perhaps even more important was the sudden deflation with the collapse of the stock market. And the stock market was really revived by the laundering of Prohibition money into the stock market, which now meant that the Prohibition players were players in, not on the dark side of the economy but at the center of the economy. And of course, when the decision was made to legalize alcohol, people like the Kennedy’s became major distributors in the new thing. So it was a way of saying, okay, well, we’ve tried fighting it, now let’s all work together to get the American economy going again.

Audience Member #12

But we could just say what this very day, the Seagram—another fortune made by Prohibition, the Seagram fortune, has just been bought by a Belgium working utility.

David Theroux

This gentleman, the next one?

Audience Member #13

I’d like to ask a question about all of the money you talked about. How much of this money’s got into our political parties, our court systems and also our international corporations? Have they benefited from this big drug war?

Peter Dale Scott

Well, we certainly know of individual drug traffickers who, people who convict—I want to be clear here, people convicted of cocaine trafficking, like Lionel Martinez, a very big contributor to Bush, Sr. and Jeb Bush in Florida. And I think that’s just the tip of the iceberg, frankly. Usually, it’s done through secondary and third parties, but not in the case of Lionel Martinez.

And then, I like the example of Fahad Azima, who’s airline, Global International, was involved in Iran/Contra, who was also involved with these heroin-trafficking Afghan guerillas. He not only gave to Clinton and to Gore, but just to be safe, he also gave to Fred Thompson, who was supposed to be investigating this whole thing from the Republican side. [laughter]

Jonathan Marshall

Well, but I would just add that one can always find individual cases of these contributions, and some may have led to political influence to protect an individual from time to time. I’m not sure these contributions have a systemic or structural effect. And the second point I would like to make is, the drug money flows are indeed probably huge, if you add it up around the world. But I think it’s a little misleading to conclude from that, that somehow the world economy is propped up, or the U.S. economy in particular, is propped up by the drug traffic. If demand for drugs ended, people would be demanding other products, other services, other forms of entertainment. The money would flow someplace else. So there are a lot of distorting effects of the drug traffic and particularly, drug prohibition but I don’t think it’s quite as systemic as some people say.

David Theroux

This gentleman right here. And then we’ll get back here.

Audience Member #14

Along this line of following the money, the effects of the drug trafficking on the political process. Do you feel that drug traffickers, the big cartels, actually, are opposed or in favor of the war on drugs?

Alexander Cochburn

Oh, I’m sure they’re in favor of it. Every time I read a very depressing testimony to Congress by a man called Andy Messing, who’s somebody you should watch the National Security Defense Foundation. He said it’s wrong to call this a war because we’re never going to win. Let’s call it a conflict, and let’s accept that all we’re going to do is reduce supply by 10 or 15 or 20 percent. That’s a good thing, he said.

Well, another way of putting it is that we’re going to stay in this conflict to keep the price up. So—and if there wasn’t a war and the price went down, then it wouldn’t be the profitable enterprise that it is now.

Jonathan Marshall

I thought many of the Colombian cartel leaders though actually were seeking a sort of non-violent end to the war. I think they thought they were in a good position probably to dominate illegal drug traffic.

Peter Dale Scott

Yeah, but I think they were also prepared to get out of the drug traffic. They have made their billions.

Jonathan Marshall

I don’t know. Making your billions rarely stops people from wanting to make more billions. I think—

Peter Dale Scott

Like the Bromfmans who go into entertainment.

Alexander Cockburn

Right.

David Theroux

We have time for one more question.

Audience Member #15

This, I’ll get a little heavy, but basically it looks—can I ask you if there’s any way we can deal with the drug traffic and the systemic money that flows through it, as well as the arms traffic and the mendacity and everything else? I think we’re totally addicted to it, not just the system and not just the guys at the top, or the secret government, but you and I and everybody else. I don’t see any way to turn this thing around without a huge amount of societal dislocation and I think you should look at that?

Peter Dale Scott

Well, I think we live in a society in which the whole drug trade has become part of the support of that society, but I think it’s a very sick one, and I think it’s vulnerable at the point that they have to rise to it. That’s why I, maybe I’m putting too much emphasis on this, but the lies in this House Committee Report are so crass and so frightened. I might say that I feel that they feel they’re on the point of being exposed.

I can tell you this. That if one American in a hundred would read the Hitz Reports and read the Frommige Department of Justice Report, there would be a political movement to demand a restructuring of the relationship between our intelligence agencies and criminal forces in the Third World. And I think we need that. I think we can only have democracy when people know how things are being done. We cannot have a democracy when everything is covert and we are fighting a war in Colombia with MPRI and Dine Corp., which are private corporations people have never heard of. But if we get all this out and expose it, that is the only way I see how we can turn it around and we have to.

Alexander Cockburn

You say addiction, I mean, as a couple of examples of the way a drug problem flows into another problem. I’ve lived a lot of the time in Humboldt County. [laughter] Now, where hippies grow dope, ranchers grow dope. Why do ranchers grow dope? There’s long-term agricultural economic depression. Ranchers don’t get too much money for their calves. Why don’t they get money for the calves? Because the bulk of the money in the beef trade is made by the processors. The [profits] lie with beef processors. The price for a rancher of a calf has barely gone up in 20 years. All the price of beef in the supermarket has barely gone down. Where’s the money going? It’s going to the middle guy. What is one of the consequences? Most ranchers in Humboldt or Mendicino [Counties] or around there will grow some dope to supplement their income.

It’s an economic necessity in the same way that if you denude South Central L.A. of any manufacturing facility and the only employment of opportunity there, or in North Richmond here in the Bay Area, is dealing in drugs. If there’s no other job, then you’ve got a drug problem. So these problems then flow into larger social problems. And one of the baneful effects of the drug war is it’s cast in this rigid perspective without seeing all the endless ramifications of larger social dislocation, which is very often as simple as how can you get by in the small rural community.

Cocaine; you can go to any small town in America and see in an economic depression which restaurants are surviving because they’re washing through drug money. That’s how it works. You have to look at these larger pictures all the time, and then a drug problem becomes an economic justice problem.

Jonathan Marshall

I would also, oh, at least, I would disagree with the assumption of the question that the drug trade or our addiction to drugs is so deeply rooted that it would be wrenching to—

Audience

The money—drugs and guns and things of this sort (inaudible)

Jonathan Marshall

Yeah. Well, I don’t think that the money from the illicit gun trade is all that enormous. I think that, the reality is, I think Milton Friedman made this observation, no doubt others have too, but the power of special interest groups is often inversely proportional to their size. The reason is that small ones have very concentrated interests and focus their lobbying power, their political power or even covert power very effectively. Large groups tend to be more diffused and it’s harder really to satisfy their needs.

I think the interest groups who benefit most from the war on drugs are fairly small. I think if we ended, say, our program of trying to control the destiny of Third World countries and intervening through their military and police forces in guerilla wars, we would be better off, not worse. There would be less wrenching dislocation if we stayed out of Colombia than if we go in and create another Vietnam. There would be less wrenching dislocation if we moved towards treating drug problems as medical and social problems rather than law enforcement and military problems. So I think we have everything to gain and very little to lose.

David Theroux

One thing I might just add to what Jonathan just said was that many of the economists that we work with are from the so-called public choice school of economics, who point out that politics is a contest. It’s a competition among interest groups to gain control of the police power to be used in coercive measure to benefit themselves. Essentially to enrich themselves, as opposed to obtaining wealth through voluntary means. And the nature of politics is that those that benefit directly are going to be a small number who can benefit from very modest changes, and they can diffuse the cost to the public through taxes and liability and any other cost, or ways of essentially distributing these costs that result. But I do think, on the positive side, it’s important to recognize that it’s only been a very relatively small number of years when this movement, for example, medical marijuana has come into being and now has 70+ percent popular support.

To me, the problem as far as how we get between the situation now and [where] we’d like to be, is largely one of information. Not only of information, but the public still by and large believes the official pronouncements of the DEA and other entities are indeed serving the public. My view is that even if the DEA is run by angels, it would be anti-social because of the nature of the way government institutions operate, partly as the public choice economists point out.

In any event, I want to take this opportunity to thank all of our panelists [loud applause] and those of you who have not gotten their books, Cocaine Politics and Whiteout, there are copies upstairs. They’d be delighted to autograph them for you. If you’re not our mailing list, please give us your address and so forth. If you have further questions, I’m sure the authors would be happy to address those as well. And thank you. We hope to see you again next time. Good night.

END




__________________
A TAINTED DEAL http://www.motherjones.com/politics/1998/06/tainted-deal

 LA DEA; Murder of Kiki Camarena http://www.laweekly.com/news/how-a-dogged-la-dea-agent-unraveled-the-cias-alleged-role-in-the-murder-of-kiki-camarena-5750278  

"Several informed sources have told me that an appendix to this Report was removed at the instruction of the DOJ at the last minute. This appendix is reported to have information about a CIA officer, not agent or asset, but officer, based in the LA Station, who was in charge of Contra related activities. According to these sources, this individual was associated with running drugs to South Central L.A., around 1988. Let me repeat that amazing omission. The recently released CIA Report Vol II contained an appendix, which was pulled by the DOJ, that reported a CIA officer in the LA Station was hooked into drug running in South Central Los Angeles." Maxine Waters Oct, 1998
https://fas.org/irp/congress/1998_cr/h981013-coke.htm   

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ANALYSIS: THE HOUSE INTELLIGENCE COMMITTEE RESPONSE TO THE WEBB ALLEGATIONS

The following excerpt is Chapter IV of Drugs, Contras and the CIA: Government Policies and the Cocaine Economy: An Analysis of Media and Government Response to the Gary Webb Stories in The San Jose Mercury News (1996-2000), by Peter Dale Scott

Chapter Four. The Response By Congress

In February 2000 the House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence issued its own Report on the charges first brought forward by Gary Webb’s stories in the San Jose Mercury News. The Committee conducted its own interviews to supplement its review of the two CIA IG Reports (Hitz I and II) and the DOJ IG Report. The Committee claimed to have used Webb’s own articles and his book, Dark Alliance as “key resources” in focusing and refining their investigation (HR 2).

This Report represents a further episode in the on-going national debate stirred up by Gary Webb’s stories, rather than a useful resolution of that debate. Webb polarized this country into two outraged factions, an elite faction offended by Webb’s references to the CIA, and a public infuriated by Webb’s revelations of government favors to major drug dealers.

The House Committee [HPSCI], to no one’s surprise, has once again revealed its allegiance to the first faction. It barely addresses what Webb actually wrote, and misrepresents even the few sentences from which it quotes. Instead it focuses, over and over, on what it calls the “implications of the San Jose Mercury News” (HR 5), or “the government conspiracy theories implicit in the 'Dark Alliance' series” (HR 5). Although the Report contains a few valid criticisms, its major arguments are flawed by misrepresentations and systematic falsehoods.

MISREPRESENTATIONS:

Here is the Committee’s version of what Webb wrote:Among other things, the series stated that CIA assets were responsible, during the 1980’s, for supplying cocaine to South Central Los Angeles.  The cocaine operation, according to the articles, was part [sic] of the Nicaraguan Democratic Force (FDN), and it was masterminded by CIA assets who were using the sale of this cocaine to finance the Contra movement. The articles stated that these individuals met with “CIA agents both before and during the time they were selling the drugs in L.A.” (HR 6)

A Committee footnote to the last sentence adds, erroneously, that “From the context in which the term ‘agent’ is used, it is apparently meant to refer to CIA staff employees.”

The Report then shifts from Webb’s alleged statements to what he “suggested:" Although the articles did not specifically state that the CIA was directly involved in cocaine trafficking, the series suggested that the CIA condoned the trafficking.

For this “implication” the Report musters one credible piece of evidence:

For months the San Jose Mercury’s internet web page introduced the articles with a title page that presented an individual lighting a crack cocaine pipe superimposed over the official seal of the CIA, clearly demonstrating an intent to link the CIA with cocaine trafficking. (HR 6)

This bit of web sensationalism was indeed responsible for much of the furor in response to Webb’s articles. The San Jose Mercury News was right to withdraw it. But, as the Committee should have known, the web logo was not part of the series; and Gary Webb in particular had nothing to do with it.

The Report’s one effort to quote the Report itself is blatantly illogical. “The articles left readers with the impression that the CIA was responsible for the spread of cocaine in South Central Los Angeles,” it argues (HR 43), and then supports this claim with a citation from Gary Webb whose statement about the CIA is quite different:

For the better part of a decade, a San Francisco Bay Area drug ring sold tons of cocaine to the Crips and Bloods street gangs of Los Angeles and funneled millions in drug profits to a Latin American guerrilla army run by the  U.S. Central Intelligence Agency, a Mercury News investigation has found.                                   

One can question whether the cocaine amounted to “tons;” one can question whether the profits amounted to “millions;” one can even question (and the Report does, vigorously) whether the Contras amounted to an “army.” But the connections presented in this sentence have been validated by the DOJ investigation, which found that the two main dealers, Norwin Meneses and Danilo Blandon, were, as the Report concedes, “significant dealers who supported the Contras” (HR 11).  The DOJ also corroborated Webb’s claim that the government knew of the two men’s drug trafficking, but never moved against them until after the Contra program ended.

Nothing in Webb’s sentence, or any other part of Webb’s stories, stated or implied that either Meneses or Blandon were themselves “CIA agents” or “CIA assets.” The only people named as “CIA agents” (Webb never used the term “assets”) were the Contras’ military chief Enrique Bermudez, and the Contra political leaders Adolfo Calero (who Webb called a “CIA operative”) and Marcos Aguado.

Elsewhere I have faulted Webb for using the term “CIA agent” too loosely.  Enrique Bermudez is not known to have been a “CIA agent” (as opposed to “CIA asset,” “client,” or “invention”). But Aguado has been said in sworn testimony to have presented himself as a CIA agent (Scott and Marshall 113). Calero, by most informed accounts, was a long-time CIA agent.

Webb was unambiguously referring to Bermudez and Calero when he claimed that Meneses and Blandon “met with CIA agents both before and during the time they were selling the drugs in L.A.” And unquestionably they did. Blandon confirmed to the Committee what Webb had claimed: that in 1981 he and Meneses met Bermudez in Honduras, and that Bermudez had urged the two men (at this time only Meneses was a prominent drug dealer) to support the Contras, adding that “the end justifies the means.” Blandon disputed only Webb’s interpretation that Bermudez was sanctioning a drug traffic: “It didn’t mean that he told us, go on, sell drugs” (HR 26). (Meneses denied that Bermudez used the phrase at all, but confirmed that Bermudez gave him “instructions about generating support for the Contra cause;” HR 22.)

It is equally certain that both Meneses and Blandon met with Adolfo Calero. Webb documented this with a photograph of Meneses and Calero together, The Report claims that Webb presented the photo “as evidence that there was an association between the CIA and drug trafficking,” and it calls “this type of ‘proof’...fallacious” (HR 3). What nonsense! Webb presented the photo as evidence that Calero and Meneses met.

Webb reported the eyewitness account of a former Contra supporter, “David Morrison,” that Calero and Meneses met frequently; and also that (as “Morrison” told the FBI in 1987) Calero’s FDN faction of the Contras had “become more involved in selling arms and cocaine for personal gain than in a military effort.”

“Morrison” tipped Webb to his central allegation, that (in the Committee’s words) “attempts by law enforcement entities to investigate and prosecute...Meneses...were ‘stymied’ by ‘agencies of the U.S. government’” as long as the Contras were in existence (HR 6).

Amazingly, the Committee does not address this claim in their Findings, presumably because they knew it was correct. The DOJ confirmed that Meneses was investigated but never arrested on drug charges from 1980 to 1989; and even (as Webb had noted) that “Meneses was able to enter the United States repeatedly, despite the various investigations of him for drug trafficking” (DOJ 187). The Committee virtually suppresses this corroboration in its summary of the DOJ Inspector-General’s Report, saying merely that “there was uncertainty within the DOJ concerning whether to prosecute Meneses or use him as a witness in other cases” (HR 11).  This is a very tepid way of acknowledging that a well-known and “significant” drug dealer moved freely without fear of arrest.

FALSEHOODS:

The Committee’s determination to exonerate the government and invalidate Webb leads them to make a number of statements that can only be called falsehoods. These falsehoods are not random. On the contrary, they add up to a coherent but false picture that has been the CIA’s fallback account of Contra drug trafficking since 1985. In sum, the Committee tries to corroborate the claim of CIA Task Force Chief Alan Fiers, testifying in 1986, that “there was a lot of cocaine trafficking around Eden

Pastora...None around FDN, none around UNO”—the successive names for the Bermudez-Calero faction of the Contras (HR 213; cf. Hitz II, para 242).(The Independent Counsel for Iran-Contra concluded that Fiers had committed perjury in other statements which he made to Congress. Fiers pleaded guilty to two lesser counts; Walsh 263.)

Falsehood #1: The FDN Leadership Avoided Drug-Trafficking:

In the Committee’s words, there is unambiguous reporting in the CIA materials reviewed showing that the FDN leadership in Nicaragua would not accept drug monies and would remove from its ranks those who had involvement in drug trafficking. (HR 44n)

A more honest summary of the Hitz reports would acknowledge that they contained a detailed account of drug-trafficking by members of the main FDN faction, ADREN, alias the 15th of September Legion. Those named included the FDN Chief of Logistics (Hitz II, paras 181, 187, 194, 542). Hitz I reports that a key figure in the so-called “Frogman” drug case claimed to have personally delivered drug profits to FDN leader Aristides Sanchez, saying that the money was from Aristides’ brother Troilo—a known drug-trafficker and source for the “Frogman” cocaine (Hitz I, para 270).

The Committee received, and even reprinted, the Hitz II Summary finding that “CIA also received allegations or information concerning drug trafficking by nine Contra-related individuals in the [FDN] Northern Front, based in Honduras” (Hitz II Summary para 17; HR 169). This included credible information, corroborated elsewhere, against Adolfo Calero’s brother Mario Calero, the chief purchasing agent, and Juan Ramon Rivas, the Northern Army Chief of Staff (Hitz II, paras 550-52, 560-72).

A CIA HQ cable in November 1986 described Mario Calero as “a symbol to our critics of all that is perceived to be rotten in the FDN” (Hitz II, para 557). At this time there was a statutory requirement to cut off “funding to any Contra group that retained a member who ‘has been found’ to engage in drug smuggling” (Hitz II Summary, para 33; HR 175).

Falsehood #2: The Kerry Senate Subcommittee found that the U.S. Government cut off aid to Pastora’s faction, because of its involvement in drug-trafficking.

Let us quote the Committee exactly on this false claim, which is central to their overall argument:

The [Kerry] Subcommittee...noted that all U.S. assistance to the [Pastora] Southern Front Contra organization (ARDE) was cut off on May 30, 1984 because of the involvement of ARDE personnel in drug trafficking.

As we shall see, this is a double falsehood. The May 1984 cutoff of aid to Pastora was not because of drug trafficking, and the Kerry Committee never “noted” that it was.

If we turn to the page in the Kerry Report cited by the House Committee, we find the following:

After the La Penca bombing of May 30, 1984, all assistance was cut off by the CIA to ARDE, while other Contra groups on both fronts continued to receive support from the U.S. government through a variety of channels.  The United States stated that its cut-off of ARDE was related to the involvement of its personnel in drug trafficking. Yet many of the same drug traffickers who had assisted ARDE were also assisting other Contra groups that continued to receive funding. Morales, for example, used Geraldo [sic] Duran as one of his drug pilots, and Duran worked for Alfonso Robelo and Fernando “el Negro” Chamorro, who were associated with other Contra groups” [i.e. the Calero-Bermudez faction] (Kerry Report, 52).

In other words, the Kerry Report discredited the government claim that aid to Pastora was cut off in May 1984 because of drug trafficking. In fact, the Report went on the repeat the claim of a Pastora aide, Karol Prado, that the CIA was manipulating drug trafficking allegations to discredit Pastora and his supporters. The Report then supported this claim with an entry from Oliver North’s diary (7/24/84), “get Alfredo Cesar on Drugs” (Kerry Report, 53).

Prado’s claim has been endorsed by a number of books (e.g. Honey 365, Scott para 82). It was repeated to the House Committee by Pastora himself (HR 21-22).However

the Committee found no evidence to support Pastora’s claims....On the contrary, interviews with CIA officials and a review of the CIA’s operational correspondence from that period reveal that the CIA began to distance itself from Pastora and his organization because it had received information that Pastora and members of his group were involved with drug trafficking.” (HR 22)

What the CIA officials told the Committee is demonstrably untrue. Aid to Pastora was cut off “in May 1984” (HR 21), after Pastora had rejected a CIA ultimatum to merge his organization with the FDN led by Bermudez and Calero. The relevant allegations of drug trafficking around Pastora date from after, not before, this cutoff. Joe Fernandez, the former CIA Station Chief in Costa Rica, told the HPSCI that

CIA immediately sought to sever its relationship with Pastora when it was determined that Morales was involved in narcotics trafficking and that Pastora had access to some of Morales’ illicit funds. (HR 19)

But this determination was made in October 1984, four months after the aid cutoff. In the words of Hitz II,

The cutoff of U.S. funding led associates of Pastora to begin looking for alternative sources of funds. In October 1984, CIA began receiving the reporting mentioned earlier that Southern Front leaders allied with Pastora had agreed to help Miami-based trafficker Jorge Morales bring drugs into the United States in exchange for his material and financial help to the Southern Front. (Hitz II, para 221; cf. para 225)

The CIA made a final termination of its relationship with Pastora two weeks later, completing the break that began with the aid cutoff in May (Hitz II, para 232).

The Hitz II chronology, though enough to disprove the claim that drug allegations led to the aid cutoff, does not tell the full story. According to the Kerry Report, Morales’ financial help also went to former associates of Pastora (like Fernando Chamorro and Alfonso Robelo) who under CIA pressure had defected from Pastora and joined with the FDN in a new, allegedly united UNO.

Thus the CIA use of the Morales story is duplicitous. They used the Morales connection to discredit Pastora, both at the time and later to the House Committee. Yet the CIA, even though it was getting reports on the Morales operation from Morales’ two top Contra contacts, never reported to anyone about the connections of Morales and his pilot Duran to those (like Fernando Chamorro and Alfonso Robelo) in its preferred UNO faction.

Hitz II corroborates that Adolfo “Popo” Chamorro and Octaviano Cesar, the two Contra leaders receiving funds from Morales until 1986, had by then broken with Pastora and joined a rival faction, the CIA-preferred BOS (Hitz II, paras 245, 331). Hitz II also reveals that a source for the October 1984 drug accusations against Pastora, Harold Martinez, left Pastora for the BOS, where he was later identified as a drug trafficker (Hitz II, paras 424-25). Even the tepid Hitz II summary confirms that whereas the CIA broke off contact with Pastora in October 1984, it “continued to have contact through 1986-87 with four of the individuals involved with Morales”—i.e. with Chamorro and Cesar (Hitz II Summary, para 14; HR 168-69).

The relative candor of Hitz II is wholly suppressed in the House Committee Report, which reverts to the 1980s cover story:

Several senior CIA managers [interviewed by the Committee] could recollect only a single instance of narco-trafficking by Contra officials....based on these reports, CIA program managers severed U.S. support to this Contra faction [i.e.  Pastora’s] (HR 42).

It is possible that the Committee did hear this falsehood, but that is no excuse for transmitting it.

The Committee did interview Adolfo “Popo” Chamorro, who readily admitted his involvement with the confessed drug trafficker George Morales (HR 24). Chamorro told the Committee “that his cousin, Octaviano Cesar [widely reported from other sources to have been a CIA agent; Scott and Marshall 113] asked permission from the CIA to proceed with an operation involving Morales” [i.e. the drug operation]” (HR 24).

It is highly revealing of the Committee’s aims and method that, after hearing that Cesar had requested CIA permission before proceeding in an operation with a drug dealer, it did not interview Cesar. (Cesar had earlier reported to the Kerry Committee that he reported to CIA about his deal with Morales, and Hitz II [para 332] confirms that Cesar gave a full account of it to CIA Security.)

This is a matter of the greatest seriousness. A US government witness, Fabio Carrasco (one of Morales’ pilots) gave sworn testimony that on instructions from Jorge Morales he personally delivered “several million dollars” in 1984-85 to Southern front Contra leaders Octaviano Cesar and Adolfo “Popo” Chamorro (NSA Packet [47]). This represented payment for “between five and seven” drug

shipments under the Morales-Chamorro deal, amounting in all to between 1,500 and 2,800 kilos of cocaine; p. [51].

Carrasco and another pilot testified that they understood the flights had CIA protection, and it is clear that they were able to fly into customs-controlled airports without interference. In addition Morales, just like Meneses, was able to enter and leave the United States without difficulty, even though he was under indictment for drug offenses at the time (Scott paras 78-92).

FALSEHOOD #3: CIA officers never concealed narcotics trafficking.

This falsehood is so outrageous that, once again, it should be quoted:

CIA reporting to DOJ of information on Contra involvement in narcotics trafficking was inconsistent but in compliance with then-current policies and regulations. There is no evidence, however, that CIA officers in the field or at headquarters ever concealed narcotics trafficking information or allegations involving the Contras. (HR 42)

In fact CIA officers did take steps to prevent what the CIA knew about Contra drug-trafficking from reaching the DOJ.  In 1987 the Miami U.S. Attorney’s office was investigating drug allegations concerning two Cuban Contra supporters, Felipe Vidal and Moises Nunez, as well as their seafood company Ocean Hunter.  When a CIA officer proposed to debrief Vidal about these matters, he was overruled, on the grounds that “narcotics trafficking relative to Contra-related activities is exactly the sort of thing that the U.S. Attorney’s Office will be investigating” (Hitz II, para 522). A similar proposal to debrief Nunez was likewise overruled (Hitz II, para 491).

The cover-up involved acts of commission as well as omission.  In July 1987 CIA lawyers transmitted a request from the Miami U.S. Attorney’s office for “any documents” concerning Contra-related activities of Ocean Hunter.  The Department of Operations advised the CIA lawyers that “no information had been found regarding Ocean Hunter,” although such information existed (Hitz II, para 528). Concerning the drug-suspected airline SETCO, owned by Class One narcotics trafficker Juan Ramon Matta Ballesteros, and used by CIA to supply FDN camps in Honduras, CIA officials reported falsely, in response to an inquiry from Justice, that in CIA files “There are no records of a SETCO Air.” CIA officers appear also to have lied to Hitz investigators about this matter (Hitz II, paras 820-23).

This protection of drug traffickers expressed itself in other ways as well. A CIA cable discouraged CIA counternarcotics efforts against a major trafficker, Alan Hyde, on the grounds that Hyde’s connection to CIA “is well documented and could prove difficult in the prosecution stage” (Hitz II, para 953). CIA headquarters gave orders that DEA Agents not pursue a drug investigation of a Contra pilot that would have risked exposure of CIA Contra support operations at Ilopango Airport(Hitz II, para 451).

The Committee appears to have been aware that CIA officers did withhold information from Justice. What else can explain the comically restricted language of its official Finding Number Six:

CIA officers, on occasion, notified law enforcement entities when they became aware of allegations concerning the identities or activities of drug traffickers” (HR 44).

This seems to concede that “on occasion” they did not. Such a finding is about as helpful as if the FBI, after investigating a suspect, found that “on occasion” he was nice to people.

One cannot agree with the Committee that such withholding of information was “in compliance with then current policies and regulations.” It is true that the Reagan Justice Department had exempted CIA officers from the legal requirement to volunteer to the DOJ what they knew about drug crimes.  It did not however give them permission to withhold information about drug crimes, or to lie about them.

The Committee claims that narcotics trafficking was not a high priority in the 1980s:

Narcotics trafficking today is arguably our most important national security concern....This was not the case during the Contra insurgency, and the CIA’s counternarcotics reporting record from that time is mixed at best” (HR 38-39).

It is abundantly obvious that in the 1980s narcotics trafficking was not an important national security concern of the CIA. But in downplaying its importance, the CIA substituted its own priorities for those of the nation. President Reagan himself, in 1986, signed a directive declaring drugs to be a national security threat (Scott and Marshall 2). In a White House address, he also called on the American people to join him in a national crusade against drugs (Los Angeles Times, 8/5/86).

CONCLUSIONS:

The House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence Report is an important document, one deserving the attention and close scrutiny of the American public. It is important for what it tells us, not about the CIA, but about the Committee itself. The Committee was originally created to exert Congressional checks and restraints on the intelligence community, in accordance with the spirit of the Constitution. For some time it has operated instead as a rubber stamp, deflecting public concern rather than representing it. It is however possible that never before  has such a dishonest and deceptive document, on such an important subject, been approved without dissent by the full membership of the Committee.

What is particularly disappointing is that the CIA and DOJ Inspector Generals’ Reports, although limited and in some ways flawed, represented a new level of candor in admitting that journalistic accounts of Contra drug-trafficking were grounded in real problems.  Rarely has the public waited so attentively for a response from the HPSCI, just as perhaps never before had there been so much interest in an HPSCI public hearing.

I am told that, at the public town hall meetings in Los Angeles where Julian Dixon and other members of the panel were present, the American people were promised open hearings. In fact the one open hearing (on Hitz I) was held so suddenly that even a concerned Congresswoman learned of it only after the hearing began. The May 25, 1999 hearing on Hitz II and the DOJ Report was closed. Congress should now be pressured to take steps to ensure that the promise of an open hearing is fulfilled, preferably in another Committee.

For the HPSCI’s record on drug trafficking by CIA assets has been constantly abysmal. We know now that in the 1980s the Chairman of the HPSCI, Lee Hamilton, was regularly receiving reports from the CIA about Contra-related drug trafficking (Hitz II, e.g. paras 237, 287, 308,1099). Yet, as Chair of the House Iran-Contra Committee, Hamilton commissioned a staff memo which alleged, falsely and dishonestly, that “reams of testimony from hundreds of witnesses...developed no evidence which would show that Contra leadership was involved in drug smuggling. (Iran-Contra Report, 631, Scott paras 178-87). Bill McCollum, who as member of the HPSCI had also received such reports, endorsed the lying memo. He is still an active member of the HPSCI.

This latest deception cannot be written off as an academic or historical matter. The CIA’s practice of recruiting drug-financed armies is an on-going matter. It appears to have begun when Sicilian mafiosi, some of them freshly deported from U.S. prisons, were used to attack and kill the Communists who threatened to win an election in Sicily.  Using Laotian hill people whose sole cash crop was opium, the CIA recruited an entire army numbering tens of thousands.

At the same time as the Contras, the CIA was arming and advising heroin-trafficking guerrillas in Afghanistan. Its preferred leader, Gulbuddin Hekmatyar, became for a period one of the leading heroin suppliers in the world. In the last few years, the CIA has helped promote the Kosovo Liberation Army, many of whose leaders and arms are known to have been financed by Kosovar drug-trafficking.

No one can pretend that these practices have not contributed to our national drug crisis. In 1979, when the U.S. first established contact with heroin-trafficking guerrillas in Afghanistan, no heroin from the so-called Golden Crescent on the Afghan-Pakistan border was known to reach the United States. By 1984, according to the Reagan Administration, 54 percent of the heroin reaching this country came from the Afghan-Pakistan border.

The CIA’s drug scandals are not confined to its allegedly unmanageable guerrilla armies.  In March 1997 Michel-Joseph Francois, the CIA-backed police chief in Haiti, was indicted in Miami for having helped to smuggle 33 tons of Colombian cocaine and heroin into the United States. The Haitian National Intelligence Service (SIN), which the CIA helped to create, was also a target of the Justice Department investigation which led to the indictment. (San Francisco Chronicle, 3/8/97). A few months earlier, General Ramon Guillen Davila, chief of a CIA-created anti-drug unit in Venezuela, was indicted in Miami for smuggling a ton of cocaine into the United States. According to the New York Times, “The CIA, over the objections of the Drug Enforcement Administration, approved the shipment of at least one ton of pure cocaine to Miami International Airport as a way of gathering information about the Colombian drug cartels.” (New York Times, 11/3/96). The total amount of drugs smuggled by Gen. Guillen may have been more than 22 tons.

So the HPSCI Report should be taken as an occasion for both Congressional and national action. Reforms of the Intelligence Committees are urgently needed, to create greater space between the Committee and the bodies they are supposed to oversee. (Porter Goss, the current HPSCI chairman, is a former CIA officer, while George Tenet, the current CIA Director, is a former member of the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence staff.)

Porter Goss’s true agenda is revealed by his selection in 1997 of another former CIA officer, John Millis, to be Chief of the HPSCI Staff. In 1997 it was obvious that the HPSCI would be called on to make an objective evaluation of the Gary Webb allegations. However Millis had served for thirteen years as a case officer supplying covert CIA aid to the heroin-trafficking guerrillas in Afghanistan—an analogous and contemporary alliance between the CIA and known drug-traffickers (New York Times, 6/6/00). At least one of the airlines involved in the Afghan support operation, Global International Airways, was also named in connection with the Iran-Contra scandal (Los Angeles Times, 2/20/97).

The most immediate national priority should be to demand an accounting for what happened from the present members of the HPSCI. Their constituents should inform them and their personal staffs of the reasons why this Report is unacceptable and should be rejected.

[The full 50 page report, with index and bibliography is available for $14.95 + 3.00 s&h at http://www.suppressedwriters.com]


__________________
A TAINTED DEAL http://www.motherjones.com/politics/1998/06/tainted-deal

 LA DEA; Murder of Kiki Camarena http://www.laweekly.com/news/how-a-dogged-la-dea-agent-unraveled-the-cias-alleged-role-in-the-murder-of-kiki-camarena-5750278  

"Several informed sources have told me that an appendix to this Report was removed at the instruction of the DOJ at the last minute. This appendix is reported to have information about a CIA officer, not agent or asset, but officer, based in the LA Station, who was in charge of Contra related activities. According to these sources, this individual was associated with running drugs to South Central L.A., around 1988. Let me repeat that amazing omission. The recently released CIA Report Vol II contained an appendix, which was pulled by the DOJ, that reported a CIA officer in the LA Station was hooked into drug running in South Central Los Angeles." Maxine Waters Oct, 1998
https://fas.org/irp/congress/1998_cr/h981013-coke.htm   

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Deep Politics III by Peter Dale Scott

OVERVIEW: THE CIA, THE DRUG TRAFFIC, AND OSWALD IN MEXICO

December 2000

[Note to reader: Although this chapter precedes the rest, it should be regarded as more of a Concluding Overview than an Introduction. Those approaching this material for the first time should probably begin directly with Chapter One. Those already familiar with the issues raised should probably begin with this chapter, and use it as a guide to refer to the rest of the book.]

Kryptocracies, Kryptonomy, and Oswald: the Mexican CIA-Mob Nexus

Those who have spent years trying to assess the role of the Kennedy assassination in US history are accustomed to the debate between structuralists and conspiratorialists. In the first camp are those who argue, in the spirit of Marx and Weber, that the history of a major power is determined by large social forces; thus the accident of an assassination, even if conspiratorial, is of little historical import. (On this point Noam Chomsky and Alex Cockburn agree with the mainstream US media they normally criticize.)

At the other end of the spectrum are those who talk of an Invisible Government or Secret Team, who believe that surface events and institutions are continuously manipulated by unseen forces. For these people the assassination exemplifies the operation of fundamental historical forces, not a disruption of them.

For years I have attempted to formulate a third or middle position. To do so I have relied on distinctions formulated partly in neologisms or invented terms. (I apologize for this: neologisms, like conspiracies, are not to be multiplied beyond necessity.) Thirty years ago I postulated that our overt political processes were at times seriously contaminated by manipulative covert politics or parapolitics, which I then defined as "a system or practice of politics in which accountability is consciously diminished."[1] In Deep Politics and the Death of JFK, I moved towards a less conspiratorial middle alternative. I discussed instead the interactions of what I called deep political processes, emanating from plural power sources and all only occasionally visible, all usually repressed rather than recognized. In contrast to parapolitical processes, those of deep politics are open-ended, not securely within anyone's power or intentions.

In 1995 I brought out Deep Politics II, which I thought of at the time as a case study in deep politics: how secret U.S. government reports on Oswald in Mexico became a reason to cover up the facts about the assassination of JFK. But it was also a specialized study, since in this case most of the repressed records of events, now declassified, occurred within the workings of the CIA, FBI, military intelligence, or their zones of influence. It was hence largely a study in parapolitics. It verged into deep politics only near the end, when it described how a collaborating Mexican agency, the DFS (Direcciòn Federal de Seguridad) was deeply involved in the international drug traffic. Deep Politics, in contrast, looked continuously at the interaction between government and other social forces, such as the drug traffic.

Both books represented an alternative kind of history, or what we may perhaps call parahistory. Parahistory differs from history in two respects. First, it is an account of suppressed events, at odds with the publicly accepted history of this country. (One might say that history is the record of politics; parahistory, the record of parapolitics.) Second, parahistory is restored from records which were themselves once repressed. In short, parahistory is a reconstructed account of events denied by the public records from which history is normally composed.[2] Thus the parahistory of Oswald in Mexico tells of events, not just ignored by official histories, but at odds with the official record: i.e. officially suppressed and denied.

A key example concerns a tape of someone calling himself "Lee Oswald," talking on a Soviet Embassy phone about having met a consul there by the name of Kostikov, a KGB agent. As we shall see, this tape should have been preserved and investigated as a prime piece of evidence to frame Oswald as an assassin. We have documentary evidence that one day after the President's murder this tape was listened to by FBI agents in Dallas, who determined that the speaker was in fact not Lee Harvey Oswald. Yet almost immediately this event was denied by other reports, including cables claiming -- falsely -- that the tape had already been destroyed before the assassination.

A brief but important digression here about history. Most people assume that "history" simply refers to what has happened but is now gone. In fact the dictionary reminds us that the word (cognate to the word "story") refers primarily to a narrative or record of events, and only after that to "the events forming the subject matter of history."[3] What of events whose records are destroyed or falsified? These dictionary definitions seem to assume that what is true is also what is recorded.

There is thus a latent bias in the evolution of the word "history" that is related to the structuralist, rationalist assumptions referred to in my first paragraph. It is no accident that, with respect to Oswald in Mexico, historians as a class have opposed the parahistory we shall unfold here. History has always been the way a culture chooses to record and remember itself; and it tends to treat official records with a respect they do not always deserve. We shall return to the role of history in our concluding section.

Deep Politics II only verged from parahistory into deep political history when (as we shall see) it situated actions and reports from the CIA in Mexico City in the social context of actions of a sister agency (the Mexican Federal Security Directorate, or DFS ) which was deeply enmeshed in the unrecorded operations of the Mexican-U.S. drug traffic. Note the methodological distinction here. Parahistory can be partly recovered by the disclosure of previously repressed records. Deep political history must attempt to reconstruct what happened in areas where there are few if any records at all.

It is reasonable to talk about the CIA records in this book as repressed, as so many of them were never allowed to reach even the Warren Commission. Thus neither the Commission nor the American public were allowed to hear allegations that Oswald had had sexual relations with one or two employees of the Cuban Embassy in Mexico City, that at least one of these liaisons (with Silvia Durán) had been part of an international Communist plot against Kennedy, and that Durán had admitted this (albeit under torture) in response to questions from the Mexican DFS or secret police.

More importantly, the CIA and FBI conspired to suppress a major clue to the existence of a pre-assassination conspiracy. This was that an unknown person had falsely presented himself as Lee Oswald in a phone call to the Soviet Embassy in Mexico City. The FBI initially reported that the person making the recorded call "was not Lee Harvey Oswald" (AR 249-50). Later the FBI and CIA conspired, swiftly and clumsily, to conceal both the falsity of the impersonation and the fact that FBI agents had exposed the falsehood by listening to the tape. The Warren Commission learned nothing about these two facts.

It is important to understand that this suppression was entirely consistent with intelligence priorities of the period. This important clue had been planted in the midst of one of the most sensitive CIA operations in the 1960s: its largest intercept operation against the telephones of an important Soviet base. One can assume that this clue was planted by conspirators who knew that the CIA response would be to suppress the truth. As a result the CIA protected its sources and methods (in accordance with the responsibilities enumerated in its enabling statute). The result was obstruction of justice in a crime of the highest political significance.

In an open society, all of the Oswald facts and allegations would have reached the Warren Commission, whether or not they were true. The absence of objective evaluation and review allowed these facts and allegations about Oswald in Mexico to become enabling instruments of power: first to create the Warren Commission, and later to curtail its investigations.

The power of these covert agencies to control US politics through the manipulation of truth is only one more reason for us to refer to them as kryptocracies, agencies of government which (in contrast to conventional bureaucracies) operate secretly and are not accountable for their actions and procedures. At this stage, I shall refer to kryptocracies in the plural, to make it clear that I am not talking about some single omnipotent Secret Team. On the contrary, we shall see in Part Three of this book that different kryptocracies or intelligence agencies, and even different branches within these agencies, were in conflict with each other over the matters raised by Lee Harvey O/swald.

The point is rather that, in major powers like the United States, bureaucratic behavior, which in principle is publicly recorded and accountable, is in some respects determined by the kryptocratic behavior at its center, which is not As we shall see in the following pages, one of the important sources of the kryptocracies' power is their ability to falsify their own records, without fear of outside correction.

But even if we concede the autonomy of kryptocracies, how important are they in determining the course of history? I believe the evidence in this book will justify a limited answer to this question: the kryptocracies, and the CIA in particular, were powerful enough to control and defuse a possible crisis in U.S. political legitimacy. They did so by reinforcing an unsustainable claim: Oswald killed the President, and he acted alone.

Kryptocracies and the Kryptonomy (International Drug Traffic)

But the power of kryptocracies to influence history became even greater when, as we shall see, they acted in concert with forces allied to the powerful international drug traffic. Most people are unaware of the size of this unrecorded drug economy. In 1981 U.S. Government analysts estimated that the annual sales volume of illicit drugs exceeded half a trillion dollars.[4] The total of legitimate, recorded international trade, in all commodities, was in the order of one trillion dollars, or twice the estimate for drugs. While estimates of the unrecorded drug traffic remain questionable, it is obvious that this traffic is large enough to be a major factor in both the economic and political considerations of government, even while it does not form part of recorded economic statistics.

For this reason, I propose the word kryptonomy, to name this unrecorded, illicit, but nonetheless important shadow economy. It is no accident that kryptocracies and the kryptonomy work in concert. The kryptonomy is so large, and so powerful, that governments have no choice but to plan to manage it, even before attempting to suppress it.[5]

There is a third factor contributing to the invisible alliance of kryptocracies and the kryptonomy: the power of the independently wealthy, and of the banks that cater to them. Informed observers of American politics have more than once commented to me that most of the hundred wealthiest people in the US know each other, and in addition often have connections to both the CIA and to organized crime. There is no shortage of anecdotal examples: James Angleton of CIA Counterintelligence delivering the sole eulogy at the small private funeral of Howard Hughes, or Joseph Kennedy Sr. being a point-holder in the same casino (the Cal-Neva) as Sam Giancana.[6] More relevant to the milieu of the JFK assassination is the example of Clint Murchison, Sr. Murchison paid for the horse-racing holidays of FBI Director J. Edgar Hoover at the same time as he sold stakes in his investments to mob figures like Jerry Catena, and enjoyed political influence in Mexico.[7]

These connections are no accident. More often than not the extremely wealthy became that way by ignoring or bending the rules of society, not by observing them. In corrupting politicians, or in bypassing them to secure unauthorized foreign intercessions, both the mob and the CIA can be useful allies. In addition drug profits need to be laundered, and banks can derive a significant percentage of their profits by laundering them, or otherwise bending or breaking the rules of their host countries.[8] Citibank came under Congressional investigation after having secretly moved $80 million to $100 million for Raul Salinas de Gortari, brother of former Mexican president Carlos Salinas.[9]

When operating within their guidelines, kryptocracies are less powerful than generally believed. Likewise the power of the biggest drug traffickers is not autonomous, but depends on their government connections. But when kryptocracies and kryptonomy work in concert, as they must to sustain the status quo, they share in a source of deep political influence that affects us all. A good example of this is the collaboration in Mexico, between the CIA and the corrupt DFS, to influence history by presenting false stories about Oswald. But it would be wrong to think of the CIA-DFS collaboration as a simple alliance.

One of the most crime-ridden CIA assets we know of is the Mexican DFS, which the US helped to create. From its foundation in the 1940s, the DFS, like other similar kryptocracies in Latin America, was deeply involved with international drug-traffickers. By the 1980s possession of a DFS card was recognized by DEA agents as a "license to traffic;" DFS agents rode security for drug truck convoys, and used their police radios to check of signs of American police surveillance.[10] Eventually the DFS became so identified with the criminal drug-trafficking organizations it managed and protected, that in the 1980s the DFS was (at least officially) closed down.[11]Thus the CIA-DFS alliance was at best an uneasy one, with conflicting goals. The CIA’s concern was to manage and limit the drug traffic, while the DFS sought to manage and expand it.

Management of the drug traffic takes a variety of forms: from denial of this important power source to competing powers (the first and most vital priority), to exploitation of it to strengthen the existing state. There now exists abundant documentation that, at least since World War II, the US Government has exploited the drug traffic to finance and staff covert operations abroad. Perhaps the most conspicuous example is the massive paramilitary army organized and equipped by the CIA in Laos in the 1960s, for which drugs were the chief source of support. This alliance between the CIA and drug-financed forces has since been repeated in Afghanistan (1979), Central America (1982-87), and most recently Kosovo (1998).

It is now fairly common, even in mainstream books, to describe this CIA exploitation of the drug world as collaboration against a common enemy. For example Elaine Shannon, in a book written with DEA assistance, speaks as follows of the CIA-DFS alliance:

DFS officials worked closely with the Mexico City station of the US Central Intelligence Agency and the attaché of the the Federal Bureau of Investigation. The DFS passed along photographs and wiretapped conversations of suspected intelligence officers and provocateurs stationed in the large Soviet and Cuban missions in Mexico City....The DFS also helped the CIA track Central American leftists who passed through the Mexican capital.[12]

But it is important to remember that such alliances were often first formed in order to deny drug assets to the enemy. In Mexico as in Asia, just as in the US "Operation Underworld" on the docks of New York City, the US Government first began its drug collaborations out of fear that drug networks, if not given USG protection, would fall under that of some other foreign power.

"Operation Underworld," like its Mexican equivalent, began after signs that the Sicilian Mafia in New York, like the drug networks Latin drug networks of Central and South America, were being exploited by Axis intelligence services. The crash program of assistance to Kuomintang (KMT) drug networks in post-war Southeast Asia was motivated in part by a similar fear, that these networks would come under the sphere of mainland Chinese influence.

Thus it would be wrong to portray the CIA-drug alliance, particularly in Mexico, as one between like-minded allies. The cooperation was grounded in an original, deeper suspicion; and, especially because dealing with criminals, the fear of betrayal was never absent. This was particularly true of the DFS when guided by Luis Echeverría, a nationalist who in the late 1960s developed stronger relations between Mexico and Cuba. Some have questioned whether the increased Cuban-Mexican relations under his presidency (1970-76) were grounded partly in the drug traffic, overseen by his brother-in-law.[13]

Even in 1963 the fear of offending Mexico's (and Echeverría's) sensibilities led the CIA to cancel physical surveillance of a Soviet suspect (Valeriy Kostikov); the CIA feared detection by the DFS, who also had Kostikov under surveillance.[14] By the 1970s there were allegations that the CIA and/or FBI were using the drug traffic to introduce guns into Mexico, in order to destabilize the left-leaning Echeverria government.[15]

This is perhaps the moment to point out another special feature of the US-DFS relationship in Mexico. Both the CIA and FBI (as Shannon noted, and as we shall see) had their separate connections to the DFS and its intercept program. The US effort to wrest the drug traffic from the Nazi competition dated back to World War II, when the FBI still had responsibility for foreign intelligence operations in Latin America. Winston Scott, the CIA Station Chief in Mexico City, was a veteran of this wartime overseas FBI network; and he may still have had an allegiance to Hoover while nominally working for the CIA.[16] We shall see that on a key policy matter, the proposed torture of Oswald's contact Silvia Durán, Scott allied himself with the FBI Legal Attache and the Ambassador, against the expressed disapproval of CIA Headquarters.

What is particularly arresting about this CIA-mob nexus that produced false Oswald stories, is its suggestive overlay with those responsible for CIA-mob assassination plots. Key figures in the latter group, such as William Harvey and David Morales, did not conceal their passionate hatred for the Kennedys. It is time to focus on the CIA-mob connection in Mexico as a milieu which will help explain, not just the assassination cover-up, but the assassination itself.

The Exemption of Kryptocracies from the Rule of Law

From other sources, we learn more about the autonomy of these kryptocracies, especially the CIA. It was almost by accident that the public learned of a secret agreement, in violation of a Congressional statute, whereby the CIA was exempted from reporting crimes of which it was aware to the Justice Department. This agreement was so secret that for almost two decades successive Attorneys General were unaware of it.[17] (My understanding is that the agreement arose from a "flap" in Thailand, where a CIA officer who was about to report on the local drug traffic was murdered by another, who was working with it.)[18]

Although this agreement was temporarily ended under the Ford Administration, a new secret Memo of Understanding under Reagan again lifted the obligation to report the criminal acts of CIA assets who were drug-traffickers. I have argued elsewhere that these covert agreements have been significant factors in augmenting the flows of heroin and cocaine into this country.

Obviously a memo from the Reagan Administration is of little relevance to the Kennedy assassination. But it is of extreme relevance that a prior agreement was in force from the mid-1950s to the mid-1970s, exempting the CIA from a statutory requirement to report any criminal activity by any of its employees or assets. This agreement, drawn up under Eisenhower and eventually rescinded under Gerald Ford, was so secret that the Attorneys General under JFK and LBJ (including Robert Kennedy) were never informed of it.[19] We can assume however that the agreement was known to those CIA officers who suppressed an important clue that would have led to their Soviet intercept program, and thereby obstructed a proper investigation of President Kennedy's murder.

This exemption from a statutory obligation might be considered anomalous, except that in one form or another the CIA has enjoyed such exemptions for most of its history.

Oswald, Russia, and Cuba: How the Managed Oswald Stories Led to the Warren Commission

As noted earlier, the DFS played a central role, along with the CIA, in the management of conspiratorial stories about Oswald in Mexico, including the false Oswald-Soviet intercept. The key to this procedure, as I argued in Deep Politics, was a two-fold process. Phase One put forward the phantom of an international plot, linking Oswald to the USSR, to Cuba, or to both countries together. This phantom was used to invoke the danger of a possible nuclear confrontation, which induced Chief Justice Earl Warren and other political notables to accept Phase Two, the equally false (but less dangerous) hypothesis that Oswald killed the President all by himself.

This book affords a close-up look of the genesis of the Phase-One story, and how it was first promoted and then defused by the CIA. Michael Beschloss has revealed at, at 9:20 AM on the morning of November 23, CIA Director John McCone briefed the new President. In Beschloss' words: "The CIA had information on foreign connections to the alleged assassin, Lee Harvey Oswald, which suggested to LBJ that Kennedy may have been murdered by an international conspiracy."[20] It would be wrong however to think that the CIA cover-up was limited to defusing this Phase-One impression of an international conspiracy. The CIA, by covering up the falsity of the alleged Oswald phone call to the Soviet Embassy, actually helped strengthen a spurious supposed link between Oswald and an alleged Soviet assassination expert, Valeriy Kostikov.

It is not certain whether the conspiracy McCone referred to on November 23 involved Cuba or the Soviet Union. Beschloss's account implies that McCone's "information" concerned Oswald's alleged visit in September 1963 to the Soviet Embassy in Mexico City:

A CIA memo written that day reported that Oswald had visited Mexico City in September and talked to a Soviet vice consul whom the CIA knew as a KGB expert in assassination and sabotage. The memo warned that if Oswald had indeed been part of a foreign conspiracy, he might be killed before he could reveal it to U.S. authorities.[21]

Johnson appears to have had this information in mind when, a few minutes after the McCone interview, he asked FBI Director J. Edgar Hoover if the FBI "knew any more about the visit to the Soviet embassy."[22]

But widely scattered clues, to be explored in this book, suggest that the US Government was thinking of a Cuban connection to Oswald even before the Soviet one. Already on November 22 the FBI was reporting a claim never mentioned in CIA records: that the false Oswald-Soviet phone call was made by Oswald while telephoning "from the Cuban Embassy."[23]

FBI Agent James Hosty, who handled the Oswald file in Dallas, has written that he learned later from two independent sources that at the time of Oswald's arrest,

fully armed warplanes were sent screaming toward Cuba. Just before they entered Cuban airspace, they were hastily called back. With the launching of airplanes, the entire U.S. military went on alert.[24]

These planes would have been launched from the U.S. Strike Command at McDill Air Force Base in Florida. We have a cable from U.S. Army Intelligence in Texas, dated November 22, 1963, telling the Strike Command (falsely) that Oswald had defected to Cuba in 1959 and was "a card-carrying member of the Communist Party."[25] As discussed below, these allegations are incompatible with the present Phase-Two account of Oswald's life, but were corroborated at the time. At 4:00 PM on the afternoon of November 22, Hoover told Bobby Kennedy that Oswald "went to Cuba on several occasions, but would not tell us what he went to Cuba for."[26] (There is nothing in FBI files on Oswald, as released to the public, to suggest either that Oswald had visited Cuba, or that he had been interrogated about such visits by the FBI.)

We know from other sources that Bobby Kennedy, on the afternoon of November 22, was fearful of a Cuban involvement in the assassination. Jack Anderson, the recipient of much secret CIA information, suggests that this concern may have been planted in Bobby's head by CIA Director McCone.

When CIA chief John McCone learned of the assassination, he rushed to Robert Kennedy's home in McLean, Virginia, and stayed with him for three hours. No one else was admitted. Even Bobby's priest was turned away. McCone told me he gave the attorney general a routine briefing on CIA business and swore that Castro's name never came up....Sources would later tell me that McCone anguished with Bobby over the terrible possibility that the assassination plots sanctioned by the president's own brother may have backfired. Then the following day, McCone briefed President Lyndon Johnson and his National Security Advisor McGeorge Bundy. Afterward McCone told subordinates -- who later filled me in -- what happened at that meeting. The grim McCone shared with Johnson and Bundy a dispatch from the U.S. embassy in Mexico City, strongly suggesting that Castro was behind the assassination.[27]

Such dispatches did emanate from the Mexico City embassy, although we know of none as early as November 23. Three days later the Ambassador, Thomas Mann, the CIA Station Chief, Winston Scott, and the FBI Legal Attache, Clark Anderson, enthusiastically promoted wild allegations that Oswald's act had been plotted and paid for inside the Cuban Embassy (see Chapter IV).[28] We know that McCone was wedded to this story, and continued to share it confidentially even after its narrator, the Nicaraguan double agent Gilberto Alvarado, had first recanted it on November 30 (see Chapter VIII).

The Early Oswald-Cuba Information Gap

The publicly released CIA record shows no trace of any linkage between Oswald and Cuba from Mexico until late November 23, long after McCone saw the President. But as we shall see this absence is itself suspicious, indeed hard to believe. There are too many loose clues that CIA Headquarters already had heard more about Oswald and Cuba than the purportedly complete record of CIA cables would account for. This would suggest that the record has been smoothed over to efface any trace of a credible Cuban implication.

For example, one of the CIA officers in Mexico City who worked on the pre-assassination Oswald file "was certain that a second cable reporting Oswald's contacts with the Cuban Embassy had been sent to Headquarters prior to the assassination."[29] But there is no surviving CIA trace of any reason on November 22 to link Oswald, or the assassination, to Cuba, or possibly covert action against Cuba.

The FBI, in contrast, has now released a November 22 memo that already linked Oswald to the Cuban Embassy in Mexico:

By Secret teletype dated 10/10/63 CIA advised...that a sensitive source on 10-1-63 had reported that Lee Oswald contacted the Soviet Embassy...inquiring whether the Embassy had received any news concerning a telegram....(The Legal Attache in Mexico advised 11-22-63 that this was a telephone call made from the Cuban Embassy to the Soviet Embassy and a transcript thereof is being forwarded.)"[30]

There is no known corroboration for the Legal Attache's claim on November 22 that the call was made from the Cuban Embassy. However this early mention of the Cuban Embassy suggests that the FBI in Mexico City may indeed have had its own sources of information, including both intercepts and informants. (It is now officially admitted that the CIA had penetration agents inside the Cuban Embassy, and the FBI may have as well.)[31]

Perhaps the strongest indication of deeper FBI knowledge is a CIA memo of December 11; this argued against the public release of the first FBI report on the case, "because the Soviets would see that the FBI had advance information on the reason for Oswald's visit to the Soviet Embassy."[32] Advance information???

It is commonplace now to attribute the cover-up to early reports about Oswald and Cuba. For example, Anderson suggests that a cover-up was ordered by Johnson himself, on the basis of what McCone told him on November 23 about Mexico City. According to Anderson, McCone argued that

Nikita Khrushchev was on the ropes inside the Kremlin, humiliated over backing down...during the Cuban missile crisis. [This was indeed true, as his ouster in 1964 would show.] If Castro were to be accused of the Kennedy assassination, Americans would demand revenge against Cuba, and Khrushchev would face another Cuban crisis....This time he might do something reckless and provoke a nuclear war, which would cost forty million lives. It was a staggering figure that the new president repeated to others.[33]

Telephone transcripts in the LBJ Library confirm that LBJ used this argument to coerce Senator Richard Russell into serving on the Commission.[34] Chief Justice Earl Warren told William Manchester that Johnson persuaded him to lead the Warren Commission by raising the same threat of war against Castro and Khrushchev: "Why, if Khrushchev moved on us, he could kill 39 million in an hour."[35]

The Manipulation or Management of the Mexico Oswald Stories

Whatever the details, we see how important were CIA stories about Oswald's foreign involvements in securing a Commission committed from the outset to the finding that Oswald acted alone. The CIA's role might be defensible if the information were objective and well-grounded. But as this book will show, the stories of Oswald's Cuban involvements were virtually worthless. The two main sources for them, Silvia Durán and Gilberto Alvarado, both changed their stories repeatedly, under the threat or actual application of torture by the Mexican secret police. Alvarado actually recanted his story, as the Warren Commission was informed; however the Warren Commission did not learn that Alvarado claimed to have been told that, if he did not recant, he would be hung by his testicles.[36] And the supposed objective record of intercepted phone calls by Oswald is, as we shall see, just as seriously flawed.

In the days after the murders in Dallas, the U.S. was flooded with dubious stories, most of them swiftly discredited, linking Oswald to either a Cuban or Soviet conspiracy. Those which most preoccupied the FBI and CIA all came out of Mexico. These stories exhibited certain common characteristics.

1) They all came either directly from an intelligence source, or from someone in the hands of an intelligence agency. Nearly always, the agency involved was the Mexican DFS or secret police. The DFS, along with the Nicaraguan intelligence service, which was also a source, were under CIA tutelage.

2) The stories changed over time, to support either a pro-conspiratorial hypothesis (Phase One), or a rebuttal of this (Phase Two).

3) The Warren Commision was led to believe that the Phase-One stories were without basis. In fact a number of unresolved anomalies suggest that behind them was some deeper truth, still not revealed.

4) As just noted, the two main sources, Silvia Durán and Gilberto Alvarado, gave varying stories while detained by the DFS. Of the two, Durán was actually tortured, and Alvarado reportedly threatened with torture. Far from regretting this use of torture, the Ambassador, Thomas Mann, the CIA Station Chief, Winston Scott, and the FBI Legal Attache, Clark Anderson, argued strenuously, in the face of Washington's expressed disapproval, for Durán's arrest and rearrest by the DFS, and that DFS torture be used again.[37]

In retrospect, these stories should not have been taken seriously. In fact the CIA was able to rely on them, not as a source of truth, but as a source of coercive influence over the rest of government. It will I think help us to understand what was going on if we refer to the stories, not as "information" or even as "allegations," but as managed stories. We shall defer until later chapters the question of who were the ultimate managers -- the DFS, U.S. officers in Mexico, or (as I shall argue) higher authorities in Washington.

The full history is complex and confused, with many unanswered questions. But nearly all of these managed stories, along with others outside Mexico to be discussed later, resolve into this simple pattern of a Phase One/Phase Two evolution.

1) Silvia Durán's managed story:

Luis Echeverría, the Mexican Minister of Gobernaciòn (which directed the DFS), told Winston Scott on November 23 that Silvia Durán had given a "written statement attesting to two visits by Oswald."[38] According to the sequence of documents in Oswald's 201 file, no written statement from Durán's DFS interview reached CIA Headquarters until November 28, after Langley had asked for it on November 27.[39]

There is however evidence that the CIA HQ received a written Durán statement, not in the Oswald 201 file, from a back channel.[40] Already on November 24 we find a cable from John Scelso at Headquarters, who has already read it: "After analyzing all the [cable] traffic and reading the statement of Silvia Duran, one important question still puzzles us."[41] Even earlier, on November 23, the CIA opined in a Headquarters memo to the FBI that Oswald probably wanted a Soviet visa first, then a Cuban transit visa while waiting for it. The memo added that "This is also the conclusion reached by Silvia Duran, the Mexican national employee of the Cuban Embassy who dealt with OSWALD."[42] Durán could indeed easily have voiced this opinion, but there is nothing in the Oswald 201 file that indicates how CIA HQ could have known this.

It seems likely that the 10-page written Durán statement sent on November 27 was designed to replace an earlier, suppressed statement referred to in the CIA cable of November 23. Summarizing the contents of this statement, the cable repeated the Phase-One allegation that Oswald said he was a "Communist and admirer of Castro."[43] But what the CIA found worthy of reporting on November 23 (that Oswald said he was a Communist) has disappeared from the November 26 10-page written statement, as later from two subsequent differing versions of Durán's November 23 interview, all of them Phase Two.[44]

None of the Phase-One or Phase-Two versions mention what Silvia told the Cuban Ambassador after her release: that the DFS asked her "if she had personal relations and even if she had intimate [i.e. sexual] relations with him." (In his phone call reporting this to the Cuban President, overheard by the CIA, the Ambassador also commented on the bruises inflicted on Durán during the interview.)[45]

From whatever source, rumors of a Duran-Oswald sexual relationship were soon floating through the US Embassy in Mexico City in the first week after the assassination, when they were heard by an FBI agent, Larry Keenan, who had been sent down by Washington.[46] A Cuban exile who was also a CIA agent, Salvador Diaz Verson, claimed to have heard in the offices of the Mexico City newspaper Excelsior, on November 25, that the DFS had learned from Durán that Oswald "had contacted DURAN, and had stayed in her home in Mexico City."[47] (Silvia Durán herself testified that the DFS had given the results of her first interrogation to Excelsior, where a version of them was published.)[48]

As late as 1967 Durán reportedly told a CIA agent, LIRING-3, that in her November 23 interrogation she had been "interviewed thoroughly and beaten until she admitted that she had an affair with Oswald."[49] CIA Station Chief Win Scott later reported on this Phase-One allegation as a fact, "the fact that Silvia Durán had sexual intercourse with Lee Harvey Oswald on several occasions when the latter was in Mexico City."[50]

A decade later Durán confirmed to the House Assassinations Committee staff that she had been questioned about sexual relations with Oswald, which she linked to the claim that "we were Communists and that we were planning the Revolution."[51]

all the time they tell me that I was a Communist...and they insisted that I was a very important person for...the Cuban Government and that I was the link for the International Communists -- the Cuban Communists, the Mexican Communists and the American Communists, and that we were going to kill Kennedy, and I was the link. For them I was very important.[52]

We shall see that the theory of an international Communist assassination conspiracy, with the Oswald-Durán relationship at its center, was one propounded by Durán's cousin-in-law, Elena Garro de Paz, who was already in DFS custody. Durán blamed her "cousin" [i.e. Garro] for her arrest by the DFS.[53]

Whatever the details, there is a conspicuous contrast between the Phase-One accounts of this November 23 interview, beginning with the missing "written statement" of November 24, and the extant Phase-Two accounts.[54] None of the extant versions mention either a conspiracy or a sexual relationship. Yet a State Department officer later told Secretary of State William Rogers that he had heard from the Deputy Chief of the CIA Station (Alan White) that the DFS had indeed interrogated Silvia Durán about the substance of the Garro allegations.[55]

The credibility of the Durán allegations is still further complicated by the hints and rumors, explored in the Lopez report, that Silvia Durán "may have been a source of information for either the CIA or the Mexicans."[56]

2. Gilberto Alvarado's managed story:

Another version of the Garro sexual assassination conspiracy theory was put forward on November 25 by an agent of Nicaraguan dictator Somoza. In brief, Oswald was supposed to have volunteered in the Cuban Embassy to kill President Kennedy; and to have received $6,500 in cash for the job (in front of Alvarado, a stranger). Alvarado's claim also overlapped in vivid particulars with the Garro story, even to such details as Oswald's companions (a tall thin Negro with reddish hair, a blonde-haired hippie with a Canadian passport), and the intimate embrace he received from a girl inside the Embassy.[57]

There was an inherent problem with Alvarado's story, so grave that it raises questions why Alvarado was ever treated with such seriousness by the US Embassy in Mexico. This is that Alvarado claimed to have seen Oswald in the Cuban Embassy on September 18, a date when (as the FBI quickly established) Oswald was still in New Orleans. This problem vanished when Alvarado amended the date to September 28.[58] This happened to be exactly the date which the CIA (falsely, I shall argue below) placed Oswald in the Cuban Embassy. Given the extent of bad faith misreporting by the CIA about Oswald in the Cuban Embassy, we have to ask if this "correction" of Alvarado's story had not been inspired by his CIA or DFS interrogators.

The Phase-One Alvarado story was also soon retracted, and replaced by a Phase-Two denial. On November 30 the DFS told the CIA "that Alvarado has signed a statement saying that his story of seeing Oswald inside the Cuban Embassy is completely false." This information was immediately forwarded to CIA headquarters, who in turn forwarded it to the White House.[59] This tied up the "lead being pursued in Mexico," which, as Hoover told LBJ on November 29, delayed the FBI's hope "to have the investigation wrapped up" by that time.[60]

There is more to the Alvarado story. As we have seen, he had retracted his retraction by December 3, claiming it was obtained under threat of DFS torture. Alvarado subsequently underwent a lie detector test by a technician from Washington, and failed it.[61]

The essential point is that there was both a Phase-One and a Phase-Two version of the managed Alvarado story, which alternated in close synchrony with the political needs of the moment. As the Washington Post has noted, a Phase-One version of the Alvarado story reached Lyndon Johnson soon before he coerced Warren into accepting the Chairmanship of the Warren Commission:

Later that afternoon [at 4:30 PM] November 29, Johnson asked Warren to come to the White House. It was around this time that Johnson received a call [at 1:40 PM] from Hoover updating the investigation. The "angle in Mexico is giving us a great deal of trouble," Hoover said. Oswald had not been in Mexico on Sept. 18, as Alvarado had [originally] said, but Alvarado had now changed the date to Sept. 28, a day Oswald was known to have been there.[62]

It is not known if Johnson brought up the Alvarado story when pressuring Warren. Certainly other cables had reached the White House on the same day, which weakened rather than increased the likelihood of Cuban involvement. A CIA cable to the White House at 1:30 PM had notified the White House that the Mexicans interviewing Silvia Durán now believed she had been involved only with visas.[63] A cable at 4:15 told the White House that Alvarado did not recognize a photo of Durán, and the Mexicans now doubted his story.[64] From the CIA's record, it would appear that it was Johnson, rather than the CIA, who selectively screened the data to secure Earl Warren's compliance.

The Alvarado story in its brief and varied career was quintessentially managed, and manageable. Deeply flawed from the outset by an impossible alleged date, it was turned up, and then turned off, to meet the changing needs of his managers. There are indications that the Mexico City Station knew from the outset that the Alvarado story was false, and may indeed have planted it. According to a later report from CIA HQ to the Warren Commission,

Alvarado was known to CIA as a former informant of a Central American security service and to have been used to penetrate communist guerrilla groups. He said that he was in Mexico City still working for his service, trying to get himself accepted by the Cubans as a communist so they would take him to Cuba for guerrilla training.[65]



__________________
A TAINTED DEAL http://www.motherjones.com/politics/1998/06/tainted-deal

 LA DEA; Murder of Kiki Camarena http://www.laweekly.com/news/how-a-dogged-la-dea-agent-unraveled-the-cias-alleged-role-in-the-murder-of-kiki-camarena-5750278  

"Several informed sources have told me that an appendix to this Report was removed at the instruction of the DOJ at the last minute. This appendix is reported to have information about a CIA officer, not agent or asset, but officer, based in the LA Station, who was in charge of Contra related activities. According to these sources, this individual was associated with running drugs to South Central L.A., around 1988. Let me repeat that amazing omission. The recently released CIA Report Vol II contained an appendix, which was pulled by the DOJ, that reported a CIA officer in the LA Station was hooked into drug running in South Central Los Angeles." Maxine Waters Oct, 1998
https://fas.org/irp/congress/1998_cr/h981013-coke.htm   

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But in the initial cable to HQ about Alvarado, he was identified only as a Nicaraguan who "claims he awaiting false Mexican documentation prior receiving sabotage training Cuba."[66] The author of this cable, "M.C. Choaden," has been identified by ARRB staff as David Phillips, a specialist in disinformation who, as the Lopez Report noted, later lied significantly about his role in the CIA's investigation of the JFK assassination.[67]

In a second cable, using a different pseudonym ("L.F. Barker"), David Phillips reported that Alvarado had admitted he was a member of the Nicaraguan Secret Service, but saw that as no reason to question his story. On the contrary, Phillips described Alvarado as a "young, quiet, very serious person, who speaks with conviction."[68] As late as November 27, Ambassador Mann reported that the CIA ("CAS") officer interviewing Alvarado (presumably David Phillips) "was impressed by Alvarado."[69] Still later, as noted above, Alvarado modified his story to bring the date of his Oswald observance exactly into line with the date, September 28, when the CIA (wrongly) believed Oswald to have been there.

It should be understood that the Nicaraguan Secret Service, like other intelligence networks in Mexico and Central America, worked closely with the CIA. It later emerged that the CIA in Managua had already prepared several reports of which Alvarado, while in the Nicaraguan Secret Service, was the ultimate source.[70] Thus the FBI seems to have got it right when in its own reports it described Alvarado as a "source of CIA's" or "CIA source."[71]

The most important part of this CIA connection is that, in Nicaragua exactly as in Mexico, the CIA's intelligence sources were grounded in the kryptonomy. It has been known for some time that the CIA's chief asset in Nicaragua was the leadership of the corrupt National Guard, which has been called "one of the most corrupt military establishments in the world.[72]

We now learn that Alvarado, the "CIA source," reported "directly to General Gustavo Montiel, Chief of the Intelligence Service of the Nicaraguan Army."[73] As we shall see, Montiel was later denounced as a principal in a "massive car theft ring" run by Norwin Meneses, described in other CIA cables as "the kingpin of narcotics traffickers in Nicaragua."[74] We shall return to this striking similarity between these CIA assets -- Montiel in Nicaragua, Nazar Haro in Mexico -- that both were said to be involved in networks dealing simultaneously in massive car smuggling and in narcotics.

Given the known ambiguities about Alvarado's double identity as an intelligence agent, one can easily fault the leaders of the US Embassy in Mexico (Ambassador Mann, Station Chief Scott, and FBI Legat Anderson), for claiming that "there appears to be a strong possibility that a down payment was made to Oswald in the Cuban Embassy here."[75] But it is not clear that the management of the Alvarado story was integral to the Kennedy assassination plot. It is clear that the CIA was and is hiding something about Oswald and the Cuban Embassy. The Alvarado story might have been no more than a convenient diversion: a chance to focus attention on a different (and false) narrative.

3. The Elena Garro de Paz managed story.

One reason the Alvarado story could be endorsed vigorously by CIA Station Chief Scott was that it was corroborated in small details by other Phase-One stories, also from intelligence sources, and later similarly retracted.[76] One of these corroborative stories was directly attributed to "a CIA man in Dallas," who allegedly told reporter Jerry O'Leary that Oswald returned from Mexico "with $5,000 which he did not have when he went into Mexico." O'Leary telephoned this information to FBI Headquarters.[77] The FBI account of this event commented, "In other words, the CIA man in Dallas leaked information to O'Leary."[78] However a CIA cable the next day reported from Mexico the rumor that Oswald had deposited $5000 in the United States after he got back from Mexico, and attributed the story to "an ODENVY [FBI] man named Clark."[79]

No Phase-One allegation corroborated Alvarado more closely than that of the well-known right-wing Mexican writer Elena Garro de Paz. She claimed she had been present at a party where she had heard a Communist discussion of Kennedy, in which "they came to the conclusion that the only solution was to kill him."[80] She had also seen Oswald with the same people at a party given by Rubén Durán, the brother-in-law of Silvia Durán, "who she later learned was Oswald's mistress while he was here." In accounts given to the American Embassy in 1965, she linked Oswald to the same striking companions as did Alvarado: "a Latin American Negro man with red hair" and someone with "long blond hair."[81]

When I wrote about the Garro allegations in 1993, I discounted them, on the grounds that Alvarado's story of a "Negro with reddish hair" had already been published in September 1964 in the Warren Report.[82] I now think it much more likely that some version of the Garro story had reached the DFS, or been planted by them, in the days following the assassination. No one disputes Garro's story that the DFS took her into protective custody between November 23 and November 30. Her story would explain why on the same day the DFS arrested, not only Silvia, but her husband Horacio, sister-in-law Lydia Durán, and brother-in-law Rubén Durán and his wife Betty (all placed by Garro in Oswald's presence at the incriminating party).[83] It would also explain why, on November 23, the DFS was grilling Silvia so aggressively about her sexual affair and Communist plotting with Oswald.[84] Finally it would explain why Silvia on November 23 attributed her arrest to her cousin [i.e. Garro] whom she "does not like."[85]

The management of the Garro story was different from those of Silvia Durán and Alvarado. It was a Phase-One story from start to finish; as it never reached Washington through the usual CIA channels, so there was no need to reshape or retract it. The management consisted of keeping her in DFS custody, at a time when FBI personnel should have been interviewing her.[86]

4. The Management of the False Oswald Intercepts -- October 1:

It has been customary to contrast the fluid, changing stories about Oswald from human sources with the allegedly "hard," objective reports of Oswald himself talking, or being discussed, in intercepts obtained from a tap on Mexican phone lines into the Soviet Embassy.[87] However this intercept record is deeply flawed, and in part almost certainly falsified. In addition to containing false information, the intercepts share two other features with the managed stories discussed above. They supplied the changing need for first Phase-One and then Phase-Two stories. And they too reached the CIA via the Mexican DFS, the most likely candidate to have falsified them. (Although it is customary to talk of "CIA intercepts," the initial tapping and taping were handled by the DFS.)

It is helpful to consider the intercepts in the chronological order in which they reached CIA Headquarters. We see then that the intercepts can be divided into two categories: two early Phase-One intercepts, hinting that Oswald was part of an international Communist conspiracy, and a host of later Phase-Two intercepts, clarifying that Oswald's sole purpose for visiting the Soviet and Cuban Consulates was in connection with obtaining a Cuban visa.

We have already referred to the suggestive Phase-One character of the first intercept, the only one forwarded to Washington before the assassination. This linked the name of Lee Oswald to a Soviet Consul, Kostikov, whom the CIA later identified (at least for a time) as a KGB Agent from Department Thirteen, specializing in assassinations. The cable deserves to be quoted verbatim:

Acc[ording] LIENVOY [the CIA's phone intercept program] 1 Oct 63, American male who spoke broken Russian said his name Lee Oswald (phonetic), stated he at Sovemb on 28 Sept when spoke with Consul whom he believed be Valeriy Vladimirovich Kostikov. Subj asked Sov guard Ivan Obyedkov who answered if there anything new re telegram to Washington. Obyedkov upon checking said nothing received yet, but request had been sent.[88]

Almost certainly this speaker was not the Lee Harvey Oswald who visited the Soviet Union, and spoke relatively fluent Russian. No less an authority than J. Edgar Hoover advised Lyndon Johnson of this by telephone on the morning of November 23: "We have up here the tape and the photograph of the man who was at the Soviet embassy, using Oswald's name. That picture and the tape do not correspond to this man's voice, nor to his appearance."[89] Audio tapes for these LBJ phone calls have been preserved at the LBJ Library. However nothing of this conversation can be heard on the relevant tape; it would appear to have been erased.[90]

Hoover's reasons for saying this were laid out in a Letterhead Memorandum sent out on the same day to the President and to the Secret Service:

The Central Intelligence Agency advised that on October 1, 1963, an extremely sensitive source had reported that an individual identified himself as Lee Oswald, who contacted the Soviet Embassy in Mexico City inquiring as to any messages. Special Agents of this Bureau, who have conversed with Oswald in Dallas, Texas, have observed photographs of the individual referred to above and have listened to a recording of his voice. These Special Agents are of the opinion that the above-referred-to individual was not Lee Harvey Oswald."[91]

Other FBI cables and memoranda confirm that the tape was indeed flown up on a US Navy plane from Mexico City to Dallas, where FBI agents confirmed the voice was not Oswald's.

John Newman has shown in detail how this initial candor was obfuscated by subsequent clumsy attempts by the Mexico City CIA to assert, falsely, that the tape, and others like it, had been erased.[92] By noon EST November 23, the Mexico City CIA Station had cabled headquarters to say that "Station unable compare voice as first tape erased prior receipt second call" (on October 1).[93] This false claim was soon abandoned. A headquarters memo reports that by 7 AM EST November 24, headquarters knew that the first tape had been reviewed, and the voice found to be identical with that in the other intercepts.[94] Ann Goodpasture, who handled the intercepts in the Mexico City CIA station, has confirmed that she herself commented on an internal document that the voices on the first and other intercepts had been compared (by “Feinglass,” [Tarasoff] the responsible translator) before the assassination.[95]

Later on the same critical day of November 23, the CIA reverted to a second false cover story: that all the Oswald intercept tapes had been erased by that time, not just the first. The FBI notified its Dallas office that evening that “With regard to the tapes [deletion] referred to herein, CIA has advised that these tapes have been erased and are not available for review."[96] This crucial lie (concealing the existence of evidence which could have led to a conspirator in the assassination) was repeated the next day in a cable from CIA Mexico City to headquarters: “HQ has full transcripts all pertinent calls. Regret complete recheck shows tapes for this period already erased.”[97]

However contemporary CIA documents suggest that comparisons of the voices on the tapes had been made, including tapes only listened to after November 22.[98] I do not accept this as conclusive evidence of the survival of the pre-assassination tapes, because (as I shall argue shortly), nothing said by the CIA about these alleged Oswald intercepts can be accepted as certain. What is certain is that in April 1964 two members of the Warren Commission staff, William Coleman and David Slawson, visited the Mexico City CIA Station and listened to the pre-assassination tape of the man identifying himself as “Lee Oswald.”[99] So the tape certainly existed on November 23, when FBI agents are supposed to have listened to it. And the rebuttal that the tapes had been destroyed is certainly false.

In 1976 the staff of the Church Committee discovered the evidence that the October 1 tape had been listened to, revealing the role of an Oswald impersonator; and they reported also the ensuing cover-up. Their staff report, only recently released, noted cogently as follows:

On November 25, 1963 – some two days after Dallas cabled the Bureau that the tapes had been erased – Bureau supervisor Burt Turner cabled legat stating: “If tapes covering any contact subject [Oswald] with Soviet or Cuban embassies available forward to Bureau for laboratory examination. Include tapes previous reviewed Dallas if they were returned to you.”[100]

But this explosive staff report was ignored in Book V of the Church Committee’s Final Report, which purported to review the performance of the intelligence agencies in the investigation of the assassination of President John. F. Kennedy [101] In a misleadingly detailed chronology of CIA and FBI behavior on November 23 and 24, 1963, the central problem of the October 1 tape in Dallas is ignored altogether.[102]

The cover-up was perpetuated, in a more sophisticated manner, by the House Select Committee on Assassinations. Its report stated, no less than three times, that no "recording of Oswald's voice" was ever "received" or "listened to" in the United States.[103] This language is a lawyer's subterfuge: what was received and listened to was precisely not a recording of Oswald's voice.[104]

In contrast to other "benign" "Phase-Two" cover-ups of a false Oswald-Soviet link, this cover-up in November 1963 can only be called sinister. The October 8 intercept cable was the strongest single piece of evidence for an illusory Oswald-Soviet assassination conspiracy. By concealing its falsity, the CIA and FBI did not just keep alive the illusion. More importantly, they obstructed the pursuit of the most important available clue at that time of a high-level assassination conspiracy.

Digression: The October 1 Kostikov Intercept and the November 9 "Kostin" Letter

This clue did not stand alone. It dovetailed with a letter, purportedly from Oswald, which was mailed from Irving, Texas on November 12 to the Soviet Embassy in Washington. In this letter, the writer spoke of "my meetings [sic] with comrade Kostin in the Embassy of the Soviet Union, Mexico City." The letter also alluded suggestively to the lack of time there "to complete our business." Even more alarmingly, the author revealed knowledge that the Consul in the Cuban Embassy had been "replaced."[105] (The CIA confirmed later that Consul Azque "was scheduled to leave in October but did not leave until November 18.")[106] And finally the writer spoke of speaking with Dallas FBI Agent James Hosty on November 1, a claim which would cause considerable post-assassination embarrassment to the FBI at the very highest levels.[107]

The Warren Commission accepted the genuineness of this letter, largely because of corroborating evidence in the form of a rough draft, said to be in Oswald's handwriting, which Ruth Paine allegedly discovered and then after the assassination gave to James Hosty.[108] The Soviets however considered the letter to be a fake. In a post-assassination analysis they observed that the letter was typed, whereas all of Oswald's other correspondence had been in his own handwriting. As the Soviet Ambassador pointed out at the time, the tone was also quite dissimilar to anything Oswald had communicated before; it gave "the impression we had close ties with Oswald and were using him for some purposes of our own."[109]

I myself suspect that neither the letter nor the rough draft were genuine. There is no evidence that Oswald had plural "meetings" with Kostikov; I doubt that he had any. There is only one slight passing reference to the question of Oswald’s and Marina’s possible return to the Soviet Union, which had been the sole topic of their urgent appeals to the Washington Consulate in July.[110] It is surprising that there is no reference whatsoever to the Consulate’s rejection, just one month earlier in October, of Marina’s application to return to the Soviet Union.[111]

What is particularly suspect about the November 9 Kostin letter is its timing. After being intercepted by the FBI on its way to the Soviet Embassy in Washington, the letter was summarized and communicated to Dallas, where the news arrived on November 22. Hosty thus only learned of it right after the assassination. Had he learned earlier, Oswald might have been put under surveillance; and the assassination could not have unfolded as it did.

As for the rough draft, I believe that it was composed, as well as discovered, after the assassination: to corroborate, and also neutralize, the dubious Kostin letter. The "draft" pointedly converts the typed letter's Phase-One language ("time to complete our business") into an innocuous description of Kostikov's role ("time to assist me").[112]

Quite independently, and for different reasons, the researcher Jerry Rose also argued that "the typed version was generated before the handwritten one," the latter designed "to create proof that Oswald had written the letter."[113] Among other things, Rose pointed out that six words spelt incorrectly in the "final" typed version, are in fact spelt correctly in the "draft"; while there are no misspellings in the "draft" that are corrected in the "final" version.[114] It is worth adding that virtually all the evidence that arrived separately to the authorities from the Paine household -- the Walker note, the pristine Mexican bus ticket -- is suspect.[115]

The Kostikov intercept, and the supporting Kostin letter, were and remain two of the most incontrovertible clues of a pre-assassination conspiracy. The CIA and FBI conspired together to suppress the known fact that the voice of the intercept was not Oswald's; and the CIA, at least, saw this as an operational matter.[116] The CIA's behavior here was in accordance with its agreement with the Department of Justice. Its priority was to protect its sources and methods -- in this case, one of its most secret and important intercept operations. By prior agreement, it put this priority ahead of the pursuit of justice -- in this case, the major political crime of the century.

The FBI handling of the Kostin letter was also deficient. Ruth Paine claimed that it had been typed on her typewriter; but apparently this claim was never tested, as it should and easily could have been. Whoever did have control of the originating typewriter (I personally doubt that it was Ruth Paine's) should be considered a prima facie suspect in the murder conspiracy.[117]

4. The Management of the False Oswald Intercepts -- September 28:

The second intercept forwarded to Washington, at 2 PM EST on November 23, must have seemed even more indicative of a mysterious relationship between Oswald, the Cubans, and the Soviets. Keep in mind that at this stage the cables to Washington had not yet indicated that Oswald's visits to the two Embassies were in pursuit of a visa:

On 28 Sep 63 Silvia Duran Cuban Emb called Sov Consul saying Northamerican there who had been Sov Emb and wish speak with Consul. Uniden Northamerican told Sov consul quote "I was in your Emb and spoke to your consul. I was just now at your Emb and they took my address." Sov Consul says, "I know that." Uniden Northamerican speaks Russian "I did not know it then. I went to the Cuban Emb to ask them for my address because they have it" Sov Consul "Why don't you come again and leave your address with us It is not far from the Cuban Emb". Uniden Northamerican "Well, I'll be there right away."[118]

This strange intercept might have appeared credible if the DFS had truly heard from Silvia Durán in her first interview (as alleged by Salvador Diaz Verson) that Oswald "had stayed in her home in Mexico City."[119]

Nevertheless, as discussed below, this alleged intercept is even more improbable than the first. Both the Soviet and the Cuban Embassies were closed to the public on September 28, a Saturday. Durán has consistently testified that she made only one phone call on Oswald's behalf, on Friday September 27; and that she did not see Oswald again on Saturday (3 AH 49-51). MEXI 7023 notes further that the unidentified Northamerican "spoke terrible, hardly recognizable Russian;" as already noted, Oswald was relatively fluent in Russian.

In 1993 a new witness claimed that, although the Soviet Embassy was closed to the public on Saturday, Oswald was indeed admitted there. This witness was Oleg Nechiporenko, a Soviet KGB official who claimed to taken part in a Saturday morning meeting in the Embassy with Oswald and also Kostikov.[120] However Nechiporenko also denied strenuously, on videotape, that there could have been any phone calls into the Soviet Embassy on September 28; because the switchboard was closed.[121]

The September 28 "address" intercept, is even more than the October 1 "Kostikov" intercept, an important clue as to the perpetrators of the Kennedy assassination. It is possible that on October 1, the Soviet phone and CIA intercept program were exploited by an outsider, about whom we know only that his Russian was bad.[122] If Durán and Nechiporenko are correct, however, the alleged "address" intercept of September 28, did not occur at all, at least in its purported form of a phone call to the Soviet Embassy. In this case we would have a strong clue that conspirators to frame Oswald in a Phase-One conspiracy existed within the LIENVOY intercept process, either in the CIA, or (as I shall suggest) within the DFS.

Let me summarize the arguments that the "address" intercept of September 28 was a fake through and through:

1) Both the Cuban Consulate and the Soviet Consulate were closed on September 28.

2) Silvia Durán has testified repeatedly that on September 28 Oswald was not in the Cuban Consulate, where their voices are alleged to have been overheard (3 AH 49-50).

3) Oleg Nechiporenko of the Soviet Embassy is the chief source supporting the claim that Oswald was in the Soviet Embassy on September 28. Yet he has stated, on video, that the telephone switchboard was closed on September 28, and that there could have been no phone conversations on that day.

4) The voice said to be Oswald's was reportedly that of the first "Kostikov" intercept, and if so not that of the Dallas Lee Harvey Oswald.[123]

Response to the Phase-One Intercepts

It was in response to these two intercepts, but especially the second, that the CIA Station Chief moved unilaterally to have the Mexican DFS arrest Silvia Durán:

Silvia DURAN, the girl who put Oswald in touch with the Soviet Embassy, is a Mexican citizen. It is suggested that she be arrested as soon as possible by the Mexican authorities and held incommunicado until she can be questioned on the matter. She lives at Bahia de Morlaco #74. Her mother lives at Ebro # 12. Her brother [i.e. brother-in-law Rubén Durán] lives at Herodoto #14."[124] Note that the CIA already had information on both Silvia and Rubén Durán, and may have been responsible for the latter's arrest as well.[125]

Four days later this second intercept was being characterized by Win Scott in Phase-Two language:

A telephone call...by Silvia DURAN who puts on an unidentified norteamerican man who tells the Soviet that he was just at their Embassy and wants to give them his address. The Soviet tells him to return to the Embassy with the address.[126]

But the ominous importance attached to it originally is reflected in the tone of the questions the CIA (apparently CIA station chief Scott in Mexico) prepared on November 24 or 25:

Was the assassination of President Kennedy planned by Fidel CASTRO Ruz; and were the final details worked out inside the Cuban Embassy in Mexico?....

Did the Cuban Embassy furnish him a place to stay in Mexico City? It is reliably reported that OSWALD did not know his address in Mexico City, but the Cuban Embassy did know his address in Mexico City....

If CASTRO planned that OSWALD assassinate President Kennedy, did the Soviets have any knowledge of these plans?[127]

That Scott formulated these questions on November 25 suggests that he already contemplated the rearrest and reinterview of Silvia Durán (as he and Ambassador Mann, along with the FBI attache, formally requested one day later).[128] Indeed the ominous questions may have contributed to Durán's rearrest, after they were read on the night of November 25 to the President of Mexico.[129] If so, the apparently fortuitous arrival of Alvarado on November 25 fit into a project already formed in the mind of the Mexico Chief of Station.

The Arrival of the Phase-Two "Visa" Intercepts

Meanwhile, late on November 23 (according to Oswald's 201 file), Washington received its first Phase-Two version of why Oswald had visited the two Embassies. About five hours after the second Phase-One cable arrived, Washington read for the first time additional intercept transcripts suggesting that someone ("probably Oswald") had sought Durán's help in getting a Cuban transit visa in order to go to the Soviet Union.[130] This more benign alternative was soon corroborated by the first report we have of Durán's statement after being arrested.[131]

It is often assumed that the Phase-Two "visa" intercepts corroborate the Phase-Two testimony from Silvia Durán about Oswald's desire for a visa. In one respect, this is not true. Early reports of Silvia Durán's testimony say that the Soviets said on the phone that Oswald's case "would have to be referred to Moscow."[132] This accords with the language typed on to Oswald's visa application, that the Soviets said "that they had to wait for authority from Moscow."[133] But the transcript of the alleged Durán phone call at 4:26 PM on September 27 has the "outside man" (i.e. the Soviet official) saying, just as clearly, "we have to await the approval of Washington" ("deben de esperar la contestacion de Washington").[134] The reference to Washington here alludes back to, and puts a Phase-Two spin on, the reference in the Phase-One Kostikov intercept, when Oswald allegedly asked "if there anything new re telegram to Washington."[135] It cannot however be reconciled with the Durán testimony and the visa application. Either the intercept or the testimony (if not both) has to be false.

The belated appearance of these Phase-Two intercepts (about a visa) poses some very embarrassing questions about the CIA's performance. Station Chief Win Scott later wrote in his autobiographical manuscript, Foul Foe, that

Lee Harvey Oswald became a person of great interest to us during this 27 September to 2 October, 1963 period...[In] the Warren Commission Report [p. 777] the erroneous statement was made that it was not known until after the assassination that Oswald had visited the Cuban Embassy!...Every piece of information concerning Lee Harvey Oswald was reported immediately after it was received....These reports were made on all his contacts with both the Cuban Consulate and the Soviets.[136]

The Lopez Report gathered corroborating reports, principally from the two Russian translators, that Oswald was already of interest to the CIA Station before the October 1 intercept, and that Oswald (as Scott wrote elsewhere) had asked the Soviet Embassy for financial assistance. If such an explosive "assistance" intercept ever existed, official traces of it have now disappeared.[137]

Scott’s claim of pre-assassination reporting on Oswald in the Cuban Embassy, never officially admitted or revealed, is corroborated also by Ray Rocca’s deposition in 1978 to the House Select Committee.[138]Cumulatively these reports are further evidence that cables about Oswald in the Cuban Embassy reached headquarters by a back channel. This strengthens the hypothesis, to be explored in Chapter VIII, that there was a pre-assassination CIA operation involving Oswald and Cuba. Such an operation, at least in its Mexico City aspects, would almost certainly have been directed by David Phillips.

As noted elsewhere, there are other signs that pre-assassination knowledge involving Oswald and the Cuban Embassy has been suppressed. For some reason the FBI already associated Oswald with the Cuban Embassy in a memorandum of November 22, based on a phone call from the Legal Attache in Mexico City.[139]

But Scott's claim in his manuscript is hard to reconcile with his reaction to the second Phase-One intercept (about Oswald's going to the Cuban Embassy for his address). If Scott did already know about intercepts linking Oswald to a visa application, there is no excuse for his having linked the address intercept to a Cuban assassination plot. If he did not know about the visa intercepts, it would appear that these Phase-Two intercepts were post-assassination fabrications, created ex post facto as part of a CIA cover-up.



__________________
A TAINTED DEAL http://www.motherjones.com/politics/1998/06/tainted-deal

 LA DEA; Murder of Kiki Camarena http://www.laweekly.com/news/how-a-dogged-la-dea-agent-unraveled-the-cias-alleged-role-in-the-murder-of-kiki-camarena-5750278  

"Several informed sources have told me that an appendix to this Report was removed at the instruction of the DOJ at the last minute. This appendix is reported to have information about a CIA officer, not agent or asset, but officer, based in the LA Station, who was in charge of Contra related activities. According to these sources, this individual was associated with running drugs to South Central L.A., around 1988. Let me repeat that amazing omission. The recently released CIA Report Vol II contained an appendix, which was pulled by the DOJ, that reported a CIA officer in the LA Station was hooked into drug running in South Central Los Angeles." Maxine Waters Oct, 1998
https://fas.org/irp/congress/1998_cr/h981013-coke.htm   

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The Importance of the Managed Oswald Stories

Most critics have given only passing attention to the role of the Oswald Mexico stories in the aftermath of the Kennedy assassination. The Phase-Two accounts of his visit to the Embassies (to obtain a visa), because of their abundant corroboration, are almost universally accepted, even by severe critics of the Warren Commission narrative.[140] It is not my intention at this point to challenge the Phase-Two version, except to urge caution in accepting it. As we shall see in Chapter Ten, the CIA and FBI have also managed the visa story told by Silvia Durán on November 23, editing and re-editing this story on at least four different occasions.

I do wish to argue that these managed stories, fleeting and insubstantial though they are, were of central importance in determining the outcome of the Kennedy assassination investigation. In succeeding years, furthermore, the discredited Phase-One stories have been revived to manipulate public opinion, even after the CIA and FBI had agreed on a Phase-Two interpretation of Oswald's movements in Mexico City.

Two of the key figures to keep the Phase-One stories alive in the early stages were CIA Counterintelligence Chief James Angleton, and his subordinate Raymond Rocca, C/CI/RAG (Research and Analysis Group). In late January 1964 Rocca sent a memo to the Warren Commission with a section on Kostikov, with a last sentence containing a new reason to suspect a suspicious Kostikov-Oswald connection:

Kostikov is believed to work for Department Thirteen of the First Chief Directorate of the KGB. It is the department responsible for executive action, including sabotage and assassination. These functions of the KGB are known within the Service itself as “Wet Affairs” (mokryye dela). The Thirteenth Department headquarters, according to very reliable information, conducts interviews or, as appropriate, file reviews on every foreign military defector to the USSR to study and to determine the possibility of using the defector in his country of origin. [141]

This last sentence so concerned another Counterintelligence officer in Soviet Russia Division that he dictated a memo to file concerning it.

I called Tom Hall [CI/RAG] to inquire about the source of the statement included in the last sentence of para 17 of Rocca’s memo. Rocca called me sometime later and said that the source was AELADLE [Anatoliy Golitsyn, Angleton’s preferred Soviet defector]. It seems that he made the statement to C/CI [Angleton], who, himself, drafted and inserted the sentence in question.[142]

This is one of the rare occasions when Angleton himself is visible in the JFK record. Note that he calls his preferred KGB defector “very reliable;” this was at a time when another KGB defector with a Phase-Two message, Yuri Nosenko, had been isolated by Angleton from the Warren Commission and confined in a specially-constructed room.[143]

The opposing views of an Oswald-KGB relationship had by now produced, among other things, a battle between two KGB defectors, each with their supporters. This conflict ultimately contributed to a showdown in 1974, when CIA Director Colby fired Angleton and reconstructed the Counterintelligence staff. In the wake of Angleton’s departure the CIA conducted an internal review of its JFK assassination records, releasing some of them to the Church Committee and later the House Committee on Asassinations. At the same time watered-down Angletonian innuendos about Oswald and Kostikov were leaked to the public, notably in the 1978 book Legend, by Edward J. Epstein.[144]

To this day both Phase-One and Phase-Two versions are trotted out from time to time. These control public perceptions of the Kennedy assassination and seize the debate from genuine critics who have less access to the media. In November 1976, for example, David Phillips of the CIA Station gave a new conspiratorial Phase-One spin to the intercepts. At a time when student activists were pressuring Congress to reopen an inquiry into the Kennedy assassination, former Warren Commission member David Belin countered with a proposal for an inquiry to see if there was "there is any credible evidence of a foreign conspiracy."[145] Backing this demand was a lengthy secret memorandum written in 1975 by Angleton’s deputy, Ray Rocca, the CIA liaison to the Rockefeller Commission.

Phillips lent strength to this Phase-One alternative by telling the Washington Post, falsely, that he had authored the Mexico City cable on the first intercept; and that Oswald had told the Soviets, "I have information you would be interested in, and I know you can pay my way to Russia."[146] But there was nothing about this alleged offer in Phillips' memoir published two years later: a Phase-Two account that admitted someone else had written the cable.[147]

Privileged authors, those who (unlike the rest of us) are able to interview CIA officers and quote from unreleased classified documents, continue to dominate the U.S. media with their dance between Phase-One and Phase-Two accounts of Oswald. Gus Russo, for example, writes of the "tantalizing leads about a possible Cuban conspiracy with Lee Harvey Oswald."[148] He claims, very misleadingly, that "The CIA was unsuccessful...in preventing the arrest" of Silvia Durán, which (although opposed by the CIA in Washington) had in fact been ordered by CIA Station Chief Scott. Referring to the questions prepared by Scott about possible Cuban or Soviet involvement, he calls them the "most critical questions surrounding the assassination." Russo states, against the available evidence, that "Duran's Mexican interrogators chose not to ask" them.[149] To assert this, he has to overlook the contrary testimony of Durán herself, partially corroborated by a CIA informant (LIRING-3), whom Russo cites elsewhere as "a CIA contact viewed as very reliable by the agency."[150]

The opposite Phase-Two stance in this propaganda duet is assumed by Gerald Posner. Posner dismissed the claims of Alvarado ("now so discredited that few repeat his story"), five years before Russo would re-open questions of why the claims of this "young Nicaraguan" were so "quickly disregarded."[151] Posner found Garro's story "highly unlikely," and unsupported.[152] Russo faulted the CIA in Mexico (i.e. Scott) for reaching "the wrong conclusion," when it reported that "[The fact] that Sylvia Duran had sexual intercourse with Lee Harvey Oswald...adds little to the case."[153] With both of these books receiving rave reviews from the New York Times, it is hard for the American public to look behind this ballet of bestsellers, and discern the actual dynamics of case management.

The Intercepts, the Cover-Up, and the Assassination Plot

With the wholesale releases of the cable traffic in the 1990s, there is more and more recognition that the CIA and FBI, in the days after the assassination, engaged in a cover-up. Richard Mahoney reports that Bobby Kennedy, on November 29, asked Hoover if Oswald had been "connected with the Cuban operation [Mongoose] with money;" and received only a guarded reply, "That's what we're trying to nail down now."[154] According to Mahoney,

It was obvious...to anyone in the know that the CIA, in particular Allen Dulles, a Warren Commission member, had covered up the CIA's violent relationship with anti-Castro Cubans and the fact that Oswald, as Senator Schweiker later said, "had the fingerprints of Intelligence all over him."[155]

Even Gus Russo, whose book is throughout a defense of CIA integrity, concedes that the CIA withheld information that "could have given the public the misperception that the Agency had a relationship with Oswald."[156] But according to Russo, Dulles' cover-up activities on the Warren Commission were intended chiefly to protect Bobby Kennedy, rather than the CIA.[157] "A full disclosure of Mexico City matters," Russo argues, "would have bared the Kennedys' plans to murder Fidel Castro....Such a disclosure would certainly have diminished JFK's mystique as an innocent martyr."[158]

Both of these two variant explanations focus on a cover-up designed to cover up anti-Castro assassination plotting in 1963: plotting in which both CIA personnel (certainly) and Bobby Kennedy (possibly) were involved. But neither Mahoney nor Russo point out the degree to which the 1963 post-Mongoose plotting involved the sources and managers of the Oswald Mexico City stories.

The Sources of the Stories and the ZR/RIFLE Assassination Project

In the pages to follow, I shall show how Staff D, the small CIA unit responsible for SIGINT (signals intelligence), and thus for electronic intercept operations, was also the unit which housed the CIA's ZR/RIFLE assassination project.[159] The Mexican DFS, which supplied the raw intercept data to the CIA in Mexico City, also overlapped in many ways with the Cubans and organized crime personnel picked for the CIA-mafia anti-Castro assassination plots.[160]

It is possible that the special circumstances in Mexico City explain why the CIA's generic assassination project, ZR/RIFLE, was housed within the Staff D's intercept operations. ("ZR" normally prefixed the cryptonym for a intercept program.) In his hunt for killers, ZR/RIFLE chief William Harvey searched for individuals with criminal connections.[161] The Mexico City intercept operation against the Soviet Embassy was by far the largest and most important CIA intercept program anywhere in the world.[162] And the DFS, the local intelligence service on which the CIA relied to man its listening posts, was probably the intelligence service with the profoundest links to the international drug traffic and to American organized crime.

For example, the brother-in-law of Luis Echeverría Alvarez, in 1963 the main liaison between Win Scott and the DFS, was Rubén Zuno Arce, who during Echeverría's term as President of Mexico emerged as a top drug trafficker, eventually jailed for the murder of a DEA agent (Los Angeles Times, 3/25/93). Such direct family links between Mexican politicians and the drug traffic were unfortunately not uncommon.

Here is the gist of the DFS-drug-organized crime relationship, as set out in Chapter X of this book:

The DFS was involved in the LIENVOY intercept project and probably manned the listening posts. The DFS may have been assisted in this LIENVOY project by Richard Cain, an expert telephone tapper and adjunct to the CIA-Giancana [ZR/RIFLE] assassination connection, when he was in Mexico City in 1962 as a consultant to a Mexican Government agency. Richard Cain at the time was also part of that Dave Yaras-Lennie Patrick-Sam Giancana element of the Chicago mob with demonstrable links to Jack Ruby in 1963, and the HSCA speculated that Cain may have been part of the 1960-61 CIA-Mafia plots against Castro. [Cain's CIA file, according to a later CIA memo, "reflects that...in 1963...he became deeply involved in the President Kennedy assassination case.][163]

Since 1995 new releases from Cain’s FBI file have revealed that the file identified Cain not with the CIA or its Bay of Pigs Cuban Front the FRD, but as “a former United States Army Military Intelligence Officer.[164]

Unmistakably Staff D, the small secretive part of CIA in which the CIA-Mafia plots were housed, controlled the LIENVOY intercept intake inside the Mexico City CIA station (Ann Goodpasture, the responsible officer, was a member of Staff D). If Richard Cain trained and possibly helped recruit the Mexican LIENVOY monitors, then the CIA-DFS LIENVOY collaboration would present a matrix for connecting the CIA's internal mishandling of Oswald information to the behavior of Ruby and other criminal elements in Dallas. It would also put the CIA-Mafia connection, through Staff D, in a position to feed to the CIA the false intercept linking a false Oswald to a suspected Soviet assassination expert (Kostikov), the intercept that became a major pretext for creating a Warren Commission to reach the less dangerous conclusion of a lone assassin.

There are contextual corroborations of this matrix. Both Ruby and the DFS had links to the Mexico-Chicago drug traffic, dating back to the 1940s. The DFS and the Mexican drug traffic became increasingly intertwined after 1963; the last two DFS Chiefs were indicted, for smuggling and for murder; and the DFS itself was nominally closed down in the midst of Mexico's 1985 drug scandals.[165]

To this we should add that Nicaraguan security forces, to whom Alvarado reported, were also deeply implicated under Somoza in the international drug traffic. Indeed military intelligence officers from Mexico to Panama in this period recurringly exhibited the same pattern: involvement with each other, with the drug traffic, and with the CIA.[166]

Involvement with drug-trafficking was associated with other criminal activities, notably the smuggling of stolen U.S. cars. We shall see in Chapter Ten that Miguel Nazar Haro, a key DFS official who was also a CIA asset, was indicted in California as part of a a $30 million car theft ring.[167]

We have seen that Alvarado himself was part of this milieu. As CIA cables reveal, his reports on Communists for Nicaraguan intelligence reached the CIA through his superiors. And the man to whom he reported, Gustavo Montiel of Nicaraguan Military Intelligence, was accused years later of being behind a "massive car theft ring" in the 1970s, which was run by another undercover informant against subversives, Norwin Meneses Canterero.[168] Norwin Meneses became the key figure in a Contra-drug connection exposed by Gary Webb; CIA cables released in connection with Webb's charges confirm that already in the Somoza era Meneses "was called the kingpin of narcotics traffickers in Nicaragua."[169] Yet Meneses was able to move in and out of the United States with impunity in the Contra period. This immunity aroused suspicions in law enforcement circles that Meneses enjoyed CIA protection, just as undoubtedly the CIA intervened to remove Nazar Haro from the list of DFS agents indicted in California for car smuggling.[170]

It is highly unlikely that Scott and the other CIA Station officers were unaware of the corruption with which they were dealing, but of which their cables mention nothing. Indeed Scott was a personal beneficiary, having accepted from his friend Miguel Nazar Haro a Cadillac for his personal use.[171]

New Revelations about Staff D, the DFS, and ZR/RIFLE

There are new revelations which strengthen the importance, in the ZR/RIFLE assassination nexus, of the Mexico City connection between Staff D and the DFS. The first is the importance of Mexico City to Staff D operations globally. As already noted, Mexico City was the site of the largest CIA intercept operations around the globe, as it afforded the CIA the opportunity to target one of the largest KGB outposts outside of the Soviet bloc.[172] Anne Goodpasture, who supervised the intercept operations in the Mexico City station, was a member of Staff D. She was also a co-author of the suspect cable naming Oswald and Kostikov, MEXI 6453, which I have characterized as evidence of a conspiracy.

As Chief of Covert Action in the Mexico City CIA Station, and later as Chief of Cuban Operations, David Phillips oversaw these intercept operations. Simultaneously he held a second operational responsibility in the Special Affairs Staff, which in 1963 was co-ordinating all covert operations (including assassinations) against Castro. Some of these anti-Castro Cuban assets were based in Mexico City, and two of these in particular have been linked to the Kennedy assassination.

The first is Isidro (or Eusebio) Borja, the Mexican –born Cuban military chief of the exile group DRE, the Directorio Revolucionario Estudiantil. At the 1995 meeting in Nassau between Cuban and American students of the assassination, the Cubans reported that according to their files Borja was back in Mexico in 1962-63, as an asset of Phillips. This is quite credible, given Borja’s Mexican background, plus the DRE’s role in propaganda activities for the Bay of Pigs, for which Phillips was responsible.[173]

The Cubans, who had seen a photograph of Borja also suggested that Borja might have been the alleged Mexican observed in the photographs of Oswald leafleting in New Orleans.[174] More relevant in my view is Borja’s responsibility for the DRE’s military arms procurement program in 1963, which brought the DRE to Dallas and possible contact (according to a book by Ray and Mary La Fontaine) with both Oswald and Jack Ruby.[175] Of particular interest is the fact that arms were being supplied by a Captain of the U.S. Army at Fort Hood (Capt. George Nonte), the army base in Texas which for some reason maintained an intelligence file both on Oswald and his alias “A.J. Hidell.” [176] I shall have more to say about this DRE program, which impinged on the assassination in Chicago as well as Dallas, in Chapters XIV-XVI.###

The second of Phillips’ anti-Castro Cuban assets was Bernardo de Torres, the assassination suspect referred to by Gaeton Fonzi as “Carlos.” [177] De Torres also developed close relationships with the DFS and has been accused of smuggling drugs out of Mexico with the knowledge of Nazar Haro. [178]

Bernardo de Torres has further been established as a contact of David Sanchez Morales.[179] Morales was a CIA officer and killer who "was well known as the Agency's top assassin in Latin America." He also openly described Kennedy's conduct during the Bay of Pigs operation "as traición (betrayal)."[180] According to a friend, Morales once ended an anti-Kennedy tirade with the words, "Well, we took care of that son of a bitch, didn't we?"[181]

Since the 1950s Morales' career had closely paralleled that of his friend David Phillips: in Caracas, on the Guatemala operation, on the Bay of Pigs, and by 1963 at the JM/WAVE station. Two witnesses have stated that when Morales was stationed at JM/WAVE in Miami, and Phillips in Mexico City, "Morales would frequently travel from... Miami to Mexico City."[182] Two of Morales' friends said that Morales spoke of having taken part in the killing of Che Guevara (1967), and also of "a leader of the government in Chile" (either General Schneider in 1970 or President Allende in 1973).[183] The former assassination at least would have been while under the direction of David Phillips, who was in charge of the CIA's program to prevent Allende from assuming office.[184]

But in 1963 Morales was also meeting with the former principals of the ZR/RIFLE plots, William Harvey and John Rosselli, for purposes which are unexplained, and were possibly unauthorized.[185] Rosselli, an associate of Richard Cain from Chicago, had been the principal mob participant in the ZR/RIFLE project to assassinate Castro.[186] But by 1963 Harvey, after infuriating both Robert Kennedy and CIA Director McCone, had been taken off anti-Castro operations and reassigned as CIA Station Chief in Rome. The FBI had Rosselli under close observation in 1963; and allegedly overheard him and Harvey indulge themselves "by saying nasty things about Bobby Kennedy."[187]

Another significant revelation is the presence in William Harvey's ZR/RIFLE files of Harold Meltzer, who in the 1940s helped build up the Mafia's Mexico City drug connection.[188] According to Richard Mahoney,

In 1975, the Church Committee catalogued Harvey's ZR/RIFLE files and found the dossier of one Harold Meltzer, whom Harvey had described as "a resident of Los Angeles with a long criminal record." What the ZR/RIFLE memo did not say was that Meltzer was a longtime collaborator and sometime shooter for Rosselli. Who, if not Rosselli, would have introduced him and vouched for him to Harvey? It was yet another indication that the alliance between Harvey and Rosselli went far deeper than the one-shot joint venture to kill Castro. What sealed their relationship was a venomous hatred of the Kennedys, and their collaboration in the sensitive art of murder.[189]

And what Mahoney does not mention is that both FBN and FBI files linked the Mexican drug connection to Jack Ruby. Ruby's contacts with Mexican drugs are first reported in 1948, but seem to have been reactivated in 1963. At least one old collaborator of Meltzer in the Mexican drug traffic, Paul Roland Jones, contacted Ruby in Dallas just before the assassination.[190]

It is clear that throughout 1963, members like David Morales of the CIA’s Special Affairs Staff, designated to co-ordinate operations against Castro (including new assassination projects), maintained contact with Cuban and other enemies of the Kennedys. What has become clear only recently is that David Phillips, when he acquired his second role in the fall of 1963 as Chief of Cuban Operations in Mexico City, now answered in this capacity to the Special Affairs Staff.[191] Phillips was in effect rejoining the officers he had worked with on the Bay of Pigs in 1961, at which time he had been responsible for propaganda operations against the newly-created Fair Play for Cuba Committee.[192]

From about October 1 to October 9 Phillips made a quick trip, authorized by the Special Affairs Staff, to Washington and then Miami.[193] On October 1 the Mexico City CIA station also sent a cable directing that a diplomatic pouch, sent on October 1 to Washington, should be held in the registry until picked up by “Michael C. Choaden” (i.e. Phillips) presently TDY (temporary duty) HQS.”[194][195] The date October 1 catches our eye, inasmuch as it is the date of the alleged Oswald-Kostikov intercept. One is also struck by Phillips’ presence in the Miami JMWAVE station from October 7-9. There are reports that Rosselli, who had good standing in the JMWAVE station, met on two occasions in Miami in early October with Jack Ruby.[196]

Phillips’ trip coincides curiously with a significant change in the contents and handling of Oswald’s 201 file. Up to late September 1963, incoming documents about Oswald had been referred to the CI/OPS and SR/CI (Soviet Russia/Counterintelligence) desks.[197] But there was a new addressee for the next Oswald document, an FBI Report of September 24 from New Orleans about Oswald’s arrest in August 9 after distributing Fair Play for Cuba leaflets. This was “Austin Horn” of SAS/CI (replacing the usual SR/CI), whose name appears next to the date stamp “8 Oct 1963.” This exclusion of SR/CI, coupled with the initial exclusion of the report (entitled “Lee Harvey Oswald”) from Oswald’s 201 file, helps explain how an unwitting member of the SR/CI staff (Stefan Roll) could clear an outgoing cable that stated, falsely, that

“Latest HDQS info [on Oswald] was ODACID [State Department] report dated May 1962 [!] saying ODACID had determined Oswald is still US citizen and both he and his Soviet wife have exit permits and Dept State had given approval for their travel with their infant child to USA.[198]

Of the six officers responsible for drafting and signing this important cable, only one, Jane Roman of CI/LS (Counterintelligence/Liaison), had seen the incoming FBI report of September 24 that disproved their text. In Chapter III### we shall investigate the probability that this dishonest cable was part of a CIA/CI operation.

Who was this “Austin Horn” who was privileged to see documents on Oswald denied to those who were drafting cables about him? We shall postpone to a later chapter the possibility, as yet still uncertain, that “Austin Horn” may in fact be David Phillips.

Whether he is or not, David Phillips is the one man who seems to cover all aspects of the CIA-Oswald operation and cover-up in 1963. David Phillips even had one friend, Gordon McLendon, in common with Jack Ruby. McLendon, a sometime intelligence officer and Dallas owner of radio stations, had known Phillips since both men were in their teens. (The two men would in the the 1970s join in forming the Association of Retired Intelligence Officers.) McLendon was close to two other wealthy men in Dallas who have attracted the attention of JFK researchers, Clint Murchison and Bedford Wynne.[199]

What has not yet been explained is why McLendon, whom Ruby described as one of his six closest friends, embarked on a sudden and surprising trip with his family to Mexico City in the fall of 1963.[200]

Conclusion: Kryptocracies, Kryptonomy, and History

By looking closely at the Mexico Oswald stories, and particularly at their genesis in the corrupt drug-linked Mexican DFS, we have learnt more about the CIA role in covering up important clues about the Kennedy assassination. But we have also seen an example of how the CIA, as a kryptocracy, interfaces with the covert but highly organized international drug economy, or what we have called kryptonomy.

Such interactions between kryptocracy and kryptonomy are widespread among major powers, and by no means limited to the CIA. The interactions are mutually beneficial: what the former gains in extra-governmental powers, the latter gains in protection and even (in the Mexican case) institutional status.

With respect to the assassination, I would propose that a coherent investigation of what happened should look closely at both sides of this interface: correlating the genesis of the false Oswald intercepts in the DFS with the pre-assassination behavior of mob-linked figures with connections to the Mexican drug traffic, like Richard Cain, Harold Meltzer, and Jack Ruby. It will I think prove relevant that key figures on the kryptocracy side, notably William Harvey and James Angleton, had direct or indirect links to the Mexican kryptonomy.[201]

But we should also pause to consider what this effective interface between kryptocracy and kryptonomy means for history. With respect to the Kennedy assassination, it meant that the limited resources of the kryptocracies to suppress embarrassing events were allied to the resources of the kryptonomy -- in this case the international drug traffic -- which as is well known included assets skilled in, and already recruited for, assassination. This combination would indeed have been powerful enough to redirect the structural institutions of our society.

It also presents a crisis for our society's normal intellectual procedures. As we have seen, history is defined in dictionary terms as a narrative or record of what is known. A successful assassination plot, by contrast, represents an interruption of this record by the unrecorded, the unknown. Thus the defense of succeeding political legitimacy becomes indistinguishable from a defense of the integrity and dominance of the historical record. This defense propels people to trivialize the assassination as an accident, the work of a "lone nut."

Those of us who genuinely wish to see overt, rational forces prevail in the world must reject such a superficial and spurious defense of our institutions. The ideal embraced by our society, that it be based on truth and openness, is not a cynical cliche, but a real condition for our institutional health. The pursuit of leads hinted at in this essay may seem frustratingly difficult, esoteric, and above all slow. But to abandon this pursuit is to break faith with the American dream, indeed the dream of enlightenment itself.



[1] Peter Dale Scott, The War Conspiracy, 171.

[2] There are previous examples where the actual events of American history are at odds with the public record. Allen Dulles represented the conventional view of John Wilkes Booth when he represented Booth to the Warren Commission as a loner, ignoring both the facts of the case and what is known now of Booth's secret links to the Confederate Secret Service (Scott, Deep Politics, 295; cf. Tidwell, William A., with James O. Hall and David Winfred Gaddy, Come Retribution: the Confederate Secret Service and the Assassination of Lincoln. [Jackson: University Press of Mississippi, 1988]).

[3] American Heritage Dictionary, s.v. "history."

[4] James Mills, The Underground Empire: Where Crime and Governments Embrace (New York: Dell, 1986), 1139.

[5] For a candid account of how KMT China was torn between management and suppression of the opium traffic, see Alan Baumler, "Opium Control versus Opium Suppression: The Origins of the 1935 Six-Year Plan to Eliminate Opium and Drugs," in Opium Regimes: China, Britain, and Japan, 1839-1952, ed. Timothy Brook and Bob Tadashi Wakabayashi (Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press, 2000), 270-91. Baumler notes how "The opium trade was a vital source of income and power for most of the colonial and national states of East and Southeast Asia" (270). I believe this state of affairs is less restricted, and has changed less, than his choice of terms implies.

[6] These and other examples in Sally Denton and Roger Morris, The Money and the Power: The Rise and Reign of Las Vegas and Its Hold on America, 1947-2000 (New York: Knopf, 2001), 185,290, etc.

[7] Peter Dale Scott, Deep Politics and the Death of JFK, 207, 218-19.

[8] For an instructive example involving Citicorp, America’s largest bank, see Robert A. Hutchison, Off the Books (New York: William Morrow, 1986). This Citicorp scandal (one involving double bookkeeping and tax evasion rather than drugs) was richly documented by first the SEC staff and then a Congressional Hearing, yet it was successfully suppressed through political influence.

[9] New York Times, 11/11/99: A Senate Committee “subpoenaed Citibank for transcripts of conversations among its private bankers on March 1, 1995, the day after Mr. Salinas had been arrested for murder. He has been convicted and is in prison in Mexico. In one conversation, the head of Citibank Private Bank, Hubertus Rukavina, asked whether Mr. Salinas's money could be moved from trust accounts in London to Switzerland, which has strict secrecy laws, according to the transcript.”

[10] Peter Dale Scott and Jonathan Marshall, Cocaine Politics, 39.

[11] Chapter XII; Peter Dale Scott, Deep Politics and the Death of JFK, 104-05.

[12] Desperados, 180.

[13] Cf. Mills, Underground Empire, 840-43, 550.

[14] MEXI 7041 24 November 1963; NARA #104-10015-10070.

[15] Mills, Underground Empire, 549-50; cf. Kruger, The Great Heroin Coup, 178-79.

[16] Cf. Scott, Deep Politics and the Death of JFK, 107-08.

[17] Samuels, Dorothy J., and James A. Goodman, "How Justice Shielded the CIA," Inquiry (October 18, 1978), 10-11. Discussion in Peter Dale Scott, Drugs, Contras and the CIA: Government Policies and the Cocaine Economy. An Analysis of Media and Government Response to the Gary Webb Stories in the San Jose Mercury News (1996-2000) (Los Angeles: From the Wilderness Publications, 2000), pp. 39-40. Samuels and Goodman summarize a little-noticed Report from the House Committee on Government Operations that I (even with the help of university librarians) have so far been unable to locate in Congressional Research Service indices. I have however located a second, follow-up report: U.S. Cong., House, Committee on Government Operations, Justice Department Handling of Cases Involving Classified Data and Claims of National Security. 96th Cong., 1st Sess.; H. Rept. No. 96-280. Washington: GPO, 1979.

[18] I know of no adequate published account of this murder and cover-up. There is a veiled account of the "flap" in John Ranelagh, The Agency: the Rise and Decline of the CIA (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1986), 221.

[19] Peter Dale Scott, Drugs, Contras and the CIA: Government Policies and the Cocaine Economy (Los Angeles: From the Wilderness Publications, 2000), 2, 12, 39-40.

[20] Michael Beschloss, ed., Taking Charge: The Johnson White House Tapes, 1963-1964 (New York: Simon & Schuster, 1997), 22.

[21] Beschloss, 23n, citing the National Archives. To my knowledge, no other researcher has yet discovered this memo.

[22] Beschloss, 23.

[23] FBI Memo of November 22; NARA #124-10027-10395; 62-109060-lst nr 487; RB95; PS 75-1.

[24] James P. Hosty, Jr., Assignment: Oswald (New York: Arcade Publishing, 1996), 219.

[25] Peter Dale Scott, Deep Politics and the Death of JFK (Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press), 1966), 275; Deep Politics II, 80-85.

[26] Hoover memo of 11/22/63 (4:01 PM) to Tolson, Belmont, Mohr, etc.; reproduced at http://www.jfklancer.com/backes/newman/documents/hoover/Hoover_RFK.JPG

[27] Jack Anderson, with Daryl Gibson, Peace, War, and Politics: An Eyewitness Account (New York: Tom Doherty Associates, 1999), 115-16.

[28] MEXI 7072 262113Z; NARA #104-10015-10368; PS#71-54.

[29] Lopez Report, 174-75. On November 22 a State Department cable from Mexico City, announcing that Mexico had closed its U.S. border in response to the assassination, was distributed inside the Mexico City CIA Station to only three people. The two first were the Station's Chief, Winston Scott, and Deputy Chief, Alan White. The third was David Phillips, in charge of covert action against the Cubans (NARA #104-10015-10309: State Cable 269 of 22 November 1963).



__________________
A TAINTED DEAL http://www.motherjones.com/politics/1998/06/tainted-deal

 LA DEA; Murder of Kiki Camarena http://www.laweekly.com/news/how-a-dogged-la-dea-agent-unraveled-the-cias-alleged-role-in-the-murder-of-kiki-camarena-5750278  

"Several informed sources have told me that an appendix to this Report was removed at the instruction of the DOJ at the last minute. This appendix is reported to have information about a CIA officer, not agent or asset, but officer, based in the LA Station, who was in charge of Contra related activities. According to these sources, this individual was associated with running drugs to South Central L.A., around 1988. Let me repeat that amazing omission. The recently released CIA Report Vol II contained an appendix, which was pulled by the DOJ, that reported a CIA officer in the LA Station was hooked into drug running in South Central Los Angeles." Maxine Waters Oct, 1998
https://fas.org/irp/congress/1998_cr/h981013-coke.htm   

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[30] FBI Memo from Branigan to W.C. Sullivan (Turner); (NARA #124-10027-10395; 62-109060-lst nr 487; RB95; PS 75-1). Cf. Mexico FBI memo 105-3702-12, 11/23/63: "On 10/1/63, a person calling from the Cuban Embassy, Mexico City, to the Soviet Embassy, and speaking very bad Russian, identified himself as LEE OSWALD."

[31] As recently re-released, the Lopez Report talks of reporting on Silvia Durán "from one of the Station's penetration agents, LI[redaction, "crypt"], at the Cuban embassy" (Lopez Report, 199; cf. 154). For other evidence, see Chapter VIII, 101.

[32] Scelso memo of 11 December 1963 to Deputy Director (Plans), "Plans for the GPFLOOR Investigation;" NARA #104-10018-10103; PS #62-167. Cf. Newman, 406.

[33] Anderson, 116.

[34] [LBJ:] "We've got to take this out of the arena where they're testifying that Khrushchev and Castro did this and did that and kicking us into a war that can kill forty million Americans in an hour" (Beschloss, 67).

[35] Manchester, 717; Washington Post, 11/14/93.

[36] MEXI 7203 (NARA #104-10016-10020).

[37] TX-1915 of 23 Nov 1963 (NARA #104-10015-10055, PS#64-28: "Silvia Duran, the girl who put Oswald in touch with the Soviet Embassy"); MEXI 7029 232048Z (NARA #104-10015-10091, PS#78-94); MEXI 7072 262113Z (NARA #104-10015-10368, PS#71-54).

[38] MEXI 7046 of 23 November; NARA #104-10015-10274; PS#70-172.

[39] JKB[enedum] letter of 26 Nov with report in Spanish of Durán interview; under covering letter 27 November; NARA #104-10015-10189, -10190; PS#63-97. Cf. MEXI 7105 27 Nov (10-page Durán statement coming to Washington by hand 28 Nov); NARA #104-10015-10416 PS#74-34.

[40] Evidence for a Counterintelligence back channel is presented in Chapter II###. In her 1995 ARRB deposition, Ann Goodpasture confirmed (p. 39) that “I think there was what they called back channel, but I don't know the details of it.

[41] DIR 84920 of 24 November; NARA #104-10015-10064; PS 73-30.

[42] CSCI-3/778,826 NARA #104-10004-10257, 102-514)

[43] Ibid.

[44] See Chapter X. ###

[45] Edited transcript of November 26 phone call between Cuban President Oswaldo Dorticos and Cuban Ambassador Joaquin Hernandez Armas; NARA #104-10015-10007 PS#73-3: "They asked her... did she have personal relations with him -- including intimate relations -- and she denied them all....She has black and blue marks on her arms, which she said she got during the interrogation process. They were squeezing her arms" (p. 12). On December 10 a CIA HQ report "translated" Hernandez as follows: "he says that Mexican police bruised Silvia DURAN's arms a little shaking her to impress her with the importance of his questions" (XAAZ-17958 10 Dec 63; Summary of Oswald case prepared for briefing purposes; NARA #104-10018-10040 PS#62-142).

[46] Personal interview with Larry Keenan.

[47] 26 WH 411. Diaz Verson's CIA cryptonym was AMPALM-26 (MEXI 7776 of 14 Jan 1964, NARA #104-10404-10089, p. 2).

[48] 3 AH 87.

[49] Dispatch HMMA-32243 of 13 June 1967, covering TX-1937 of 26 May 1967; Chapter IV, 38.

[50] Dispatch HMMA-32243 of 13 June 1967, covering TX-1937 of 26 May 1967; Chapter IV, 38.

[51] 3 AH 86; Chapter IV, p. 38

[52] 3 AH 91; cf. 3 AH 86. Note that the DFS exempted the Soviets from their hypothetical conspiracy, as did Ambassador Mann (Summers, 441).

[53] MEXI 7054 241837Z; NARA #104-10015-10082 PS#64-77.

[54] See Chapter X.

[55] 3 AH 292-93.

[56] Lopez Report, p. 200. "The Committee cannot definitely resolve whether Silvia Duran was a Mexican or American intelligence agent or source" (p. 201).

[57] A.C. Plambeck memo of 25 November re Alvarado; NARA #104-10015-10301 PS#70-96. Also MEXI 7069 262037Z; NARA #104-10015-10366 PS#71-43 (Canadian hippie).

[58] Hoover –LBJ phone call, 11/29/63; Beschloss, 53. I have been unable to find any cable which documents the change in Alvarado’s testimony, which may have been conveyed to Washington by telephone.

[59] MEXI 7168 of 30 Nov 1963; NARA #104-10025-10177; PS#62-110.

[60] AR 244; Scott, Deep Politics, 38.

[61] MEXI 7289 070145Z; NARA #104-10017-10030 PS#72-71. A confused Alvarado accepted the negative results of the polygraph, stating "that he had utmost confidence" in it.

[62] Washington Post, November 23, 1993; cf. Beschloss, 53. In a memorandum of the same day Hoover noted that it was Johnson, not Hoover, who initiated the call (3 AH 476). The call logs of the LBJ Library (available on its website) indicate that the call was from Hoover to Johnson. The September 28 date coincided exactly with the date the Mexico City CIA Station believed Oswald to have been in the Cuban Embassy. I shall argue later that in fact he was not in the Embassy on that Saturday (when the Embassy was closed), even though someone using his name was creating that impression.

[63] DIR 85714 291631Z; NARA #104-10015-10224.

[64] DIR 85744 291915Z; NARA #104-10015-10228.

[65] Warren Commission Document 347, p. 12.

[66] MEXI 7067 of 26 November; NARA #104-10015-10297; PS #70-102.

[67] Lopez Report, 127-28.

[68] MEXI 7069 of 26 November; NARA #104-10015-10366; PS #71-43, RB95. The identity of "Barker" with Phillips is revealed by comparing the role of "Barker" in the CIA cable reporting the Eldon Hensen story (MEXI 5448 of 20 July 1963; NARA #104-10015-10044; PS #66-14) with Phillips' first-person narration of it (The Night Watch, 126-28). Hensen was another American who in July 1963 attempted to contact the Cuban Embassy in Mexico City, but was foiled by Phillips (Newman 363-63; Phillips, 126-28). The CIA later reported that for some unexplained reason the cable about Hensen was included in Oswald's pre-assassination 201 file (Newman, 506). If this is true it would indicate that Phillips had a hitherto unexplained relationship to the Oswald story before the assassination.

[69] MEXI 7104 of 27 November; NARA #104-10015-10191; PS #63-114.

[70] CIA Cable MANA (Managua) 4609 of 26 November; NARA #104-10015-10362 RB96A.

[71] 3 AH 595 (FBI memo of December 12, 1963); Mexico City serial MC 105-3702-22 (Legat Cable to HQ of November 26, 1963).

[72] Richard Millett, Guardians of the Dynasty (Maryknoll, NY: Orbis Books, 1977), 251; Webb, Dark Alliance, 52; Scott, Drugs, Contras, and the CIA, 15.

[73] Attachment to CIA Memo of 12 December 1963 from DDP to FBI, "Mexican Interrogation of Gilberto Alvarado;" NARA #104-10018-10043; PS 74-16.

[74] Webb, 55-56 (Montiel); Scott, Drugs, Contras, and the CIA, 15 ("kingpin").

[75] MEXI 7072 of 26 November, p. 4; #104-10015-10350 PS#78-13.

[76] For example a Mexican credit investigator, Pedro Gutierrez, wrote on December 2 to President Johnson that he had seen a Cuban in the Embassy count out dollars to an American, whom he later recognized as Lee Harvey Oswald (Coleman-Slawson Memorandum, 11 AH 161; cf. 24 WH 633, Summers, 444, Posner 194.) Another example is the swiftly retracted claim that Luisa Calderon of the Cuban Embassy, whom Alvarado allegedly saw kiss Oswald, had prior knowledge of the Kennedy assassination. (AR 454, 4 AH 181, 11 AH 494).

[77] FBI Memo of 27 November from DeLoach to Mohr, FBI File 62-109060-1571.

[78] The "CIA man in Dallas" presumably refers to J. Walton Moore, an acquaintance if not associate of Oswald's friend and patron George de Mohrenschildt. Both de Mohrenschildt and his wife Jeanne have claimed that Moore had pre-assassination knowledge of Oswald (Summers, Conspiracy, 226-28).

[79] DIR 85654 281520Z; NARA #104-100154-10438; PS#73-128. "Clark" is presumably the FBI Legal Attache Clark Anderson, who joined with Scott and Mann in calling for the rearrest and "cracking" of Silvia Durán to corroborate the Alvarado story. In discrediting the rumor of the $5000 deposit, the CIA cable said that "ODENVY [FBI] here has just affirmed they never heard this story," a claim hard to reconcile with the FBI memo just quoted.

[80] 3 AH 300.

[81] 3 AH 300, Memo of conversation with Elena Garro de Paz; cf. 3 AH 297; Lopez Report, 217. The Garro story , like those of Durán and Alvarado, was a malleable and changing one. I have conflated the most prominent Phase-One details.

[82] Scott, Deep Politics, 123; citing WR 307.

[83] The CIA originally reported that Silvia was arrested at home with husband and members of family who were having a party (MEXI 7054 of 24 Nov 1963; NARA #104-10015-10082; PS#64-55). A CIA version of Silvia's November 23 interview (described in Chapter Ten as "DFS-2") repeated that these others had all been picked up with Silvia because they were dining with her at Rubén Durán's home at the time of her arrest. The FBI version of the same interview ("DFS-4") indicated otherwise, that Silvia, Horacio, and Lidia were at Silvia's home, while Rubén and his wife were dining at their own home. See JKB Memo and attachment of 26 November, 1963, p. 7; NARA #104-10015-10190 (DFS-2); 25 WH 637 (DFS-4). In her 1978 HSCA interview Silvia testified that Rubén had already been arrested before she went to his house from her own and was arrested in turn (3 AH 81).

[84] Silvia's account of such interrogation (3 AH 86, 91) was earlier corroborated, as we have seen, by a State Department officer's claim to have heard from CIA Station Deputy Chief Alan White that the DFS interrogated Silvia on details of the Garro story (3 AH 292-93).

[85] MEXI 7054 of 24 Nov 1963; NARA #104-10015-10082; PS#64-55.

[86] There is no proof that Garro shared her story in 1963. However in October 1964, when a version of the Garro story was first entered into the CIA Oswald file which we possess, Winston Scott noted that the "Garros [Elena and her daughter] have been talking about this for a long time" (Mexico City CIA TX-1928 n.d. (5 Oct 64); NARA #104-10016-10031; PS#72-109).

[87] See for example AR 249-50; Summers, Conspiracy, 373.

[88] MEXI 6453 of 9 Oct 090043Z; NARA #104-10015-10047; PS#62-59; 4 AH 212. The CIA Station later supplied an allegedly verbatim transcript of this conversation. In this transcript the person identifying himself as Oswald did not mention Kostikov as the cable suggested; he merely replied affirmatively when Obyedkov suggested that Kostikov was the Consul who had been spoken to on Saturday (Lopez Report 79; PS #19-52). Was this transcript in fact a later Phase-Two rewrite to neutralize the Phase-One cable? This possibility seems less far-fetched when we see how the only other alleged Oswald allusion to Kostikov, the Phase-One "Kostin" letter of November 9, was similarly neutralized by the later presentation of a dubious alleged "draft," also Phase-Two.

[89] Phone call from Hoover to LBJ, 10:01 AM, 11/23/63 (Beschloss 23; Newman 520).

[90] Rex Bradford, "The Fourteen-Minute Gap," Kennedy Assassination Chronicles, Spring 2000, 28-32.

[91] Letterhead Memo from Hoover to James J. Rowley, Secret Service, 11/23/63; AR 249-50; cf. FBI #62-109060-1133, in Holmes papers at NARA #104-10419-10022. (The drafter is SA Fletcher D. Thompson of Criminal Division, who on the next day flew to Dallas with SA Richard Rogge, to prepare memoranda on deaths of Kennedy and Oswald: 3 AH 465, 478, 479). Discussion below, pp. 11, 25; Scott, Deep Politics and the Death of JFK, 41-45.

[92] Address to November 1999 JFKLancer Conference, available on line at http://www.jfklancer.com/backes/newman.

[93] MEXI 7023 231659Z (11:59 AM EST November 23), NARA#104-10015-10124.

[94] “SUMMARY of Relevant Information on Lee Harvey OSWALD at 0700 on 24 November 1963,” NARA #104-10015-10359, PS 62-137. Reprinted in Hosty, Assignment Oswald, p. 289. Cf. CIA Memo of 11/23/63 to FBI, CSCI-3/778,826, NARA # 104-10004-10257, PS 64-5: “Voice comparisons indicated that the `North American’ who participated in several of these conversations is probably the person who identified himself as Lee OSWALD on 1 October 1963.”

[95] Ann Goodpasture comment on newspaper column by Robert S. Allen and Paul Scott (10/21/64) preserved in Mexico City Oswald file; NARA #104-10125-10001. See December 1995 ARRB Interview of Anne Goodpasture, p. 140: Q. “So did Mr. Feinglass then make that identification prior to the assassination?” A. Prior to the assassination and prior to Sylvia Duran's arrest. Q. Yes is the answer? A. Yeah.”

[96] FBI Cable of 11/23 from Eldon Rudd to SAC, Dallas; FBI file MX 105-3702-12. Eldon Rudd was of course the FBI agent who reportedly had flown up the tapes the day before. In 1995 Ann Goodpasture told the ARRB that she thought Rudd “may have carried the tape dub [copy].” She suggested that the ARRB interview Rudd: “I think he refused to talk to the House Committee [on Assassinations] because he was a Congressman at that time” (ARRB Interview of Ann Goodpasture, 12/95, p. 146).

[97] MEXI 7054 2401837Z (1:37 PM EST November 24); NARA #104-10015-10082; PS 64-77. The day before, at 2:11 PM EST, the station had reported it was “probable that Oswald conversation LIENVOY tapes erased” (MEXI 7024 23911Z, NARA #104-10015-10125).

[98] E.g. CIA Memo to FBI of 23 November 1963, CSCI 3-778/826, NARA #104-10004-10257: "Voice comparisons indicated that the `North American' who participated in several of these conversations is probably the person who identified himself as Lee OSWALD on 1 October 1963."

[99] ARRB Counsel Jeremy Gunn in ARRB Deposition of Anne Lorene Goodpasture, December 1995, p. 147: "Q. I have spoken with two Warren Commission staff members who went to Mexico City and who both told me that they heard the tape[,] after the assassination obviously.”

[100] Church Committee Staff Memo of 3/5/76; NARA #157-10014-10168.

[101] U.S. Cong., Senate, Select Committee to Study Governmental Operations, Final Report, Book V, The Investigation of the Assassination of President John F. Kennedy: Performance of the Intelligence Agencies; 94th Cong., 2nd Sess., Report No. 94-555.

[102] Ibid., p. 102. The Report is dated April 23, 1976; it is possible that the 3/5/76 memo was prepared too late for inclusion.

[103] AR 250.

[104] Chapter I, 11.

[105] Warren Commission Exhibit 15, 16 WH 33.

[106] WR 310; WCE 3126.

[107] The importance of the alleged Kostikov-Kostin material was underlined in his autobiography by former FBI Director Clarence Kelley (Kelley, p. 293): "William C. Sullivan, assistant director in charge of security in Washington, was probably the highest FBI official, at that point, to review the Oswald file. What he discovered there must have astounded him. He read the data on the meeting between Oswald and Kostikov (Sullivan would have known exactly who Kostikov was), surmised the Cuban connection, viewed the CIA surveillance data on the Soviet embassy in Mexico City, studied FBI wiretaps involving Oswald and Kostikov, then read the November 9 follow-up letter from Oswald to the Soviet embassy in Washington. This information, it would surely have struck him, had such dire international implications that the White House must be informed immediately."

[108] WR 309-11; WCE 103, 16 WH 443; cf. 3 WH 14, 97; James Hosty, Assignment Oswald, 40-41, 85-86. [Priscilla McMillan, 401 ZZ]. Hosty claims that he received the draft on November 23, but this is uncorroborated. The draft does not form part of the inventory of items retrieved on that day from Ruth Paine's residence and typed three days later in the FBI office (24 WH 332-37). Hosty gives an elaborate explanation of why this draft was not filed by him in the regular way, but segregated in an envelope (Hosty, 85-86; Curt Gentry, J. Edgar Hoover, 546). An alternative explanation would be that knowledge of Oswald's Mexico trip, still classified because of its origin from a CIA intercept program, had not yet been shared with the Dallas police.

[109] Ambassador Dobrynin in AP story, "Soviets Suspected Oswald Letter a Fake"; Boston Globe, 8/6/99, A8. This Soviet reaction was also headlined in Canadian newspapers, but omitted from George Lardner's account of the recently released "Yeltsin documents" in the Washington Post, 8/6/99. The full text is in Yeltsin Documents, p. 91; LS no. 0692061-26 Washington to Moscow cable of 27 November 1963: “This letter was clearly a provocation: it gives the impression we had close ties with Oswald and were using him for some purposes of our own. It was totally unlike any other letters the embassy had previously received from Oswald. Nor had he ever visited our embassy himself. The suspicion that the letter is a forgery is heightened by the fact that it was typed, whereas the other letters the embassy had received from Oswald before were typewritten.” Cf. p. 91: “The embassy had suspicions about this letter the moment it arrived: either it was a forgery or was sent as a deliberate provocation. The embassy left Oswald's letter unanswered.”

[110] Warren Commission, CE 7-14 (16 WH 10-32); CE 986 (18 WH 501-35).

[111] Yeltsin Documents, LS no. 0692061-8, Washington Embassy Cable 1967-1968 to Moscow, 23 November 1963. The cable notes that Marina’s application had been rejected by a Foreign Ministry letter of October 7,1963. The cable does not explicitly say that this information had been forwarded (as one would expect) to Marina, and there is no trace of such notification in the Warren Commission release of the Consulate-Oswald correspondence (WCE 986, 18 WH 501-35). But, whether the Oswalds had received news of the rejection or not, it is hard to believe that a genuine Oswald letter to the Consulate would pay such marginal attention to the issue.

[112] The Phase-Two draft is thus exactly analogous to the Phase-Two Kostikov intercept transcript indicating that Oswald had not in fact spoken of Kostikov (as the earlier Phase-One Kostikov intercept cable had suggested). Both Phase-Two documents purported to be earlier; but both in fact entered the record later. Even the draft had alleged corroboration, in the form of a handwritten draft which Ruth Paine allegedly made and gave to FBI Agent Bardwell D. Odum after the assassination. It too was withheld from the regular inventory of Oswald evidence (Hosty, 86). Ruth Paine testified about making this copy (3 WH 15, 52), but for unexplained reasons it (unlike the draft) was not introduced as a Warren Commission Exhibit (cf. 3 WH 52).

[113] Jerry Rose, The Fourth Decade, November 1999, 5. I had not seen this article until after writing my own comments.

[114] Ibid. Rose also pointed to real problems with the date of the postmark on the typed letter, and the unlikelihood that Oswald, having concealed the typed letter from Ruth Paine, would then leave his "draft" on her desk for her to pick up afterwards (cf. 3 WH 13-15).

[115] Both the Walker note and the Mexican bus ticket were retrieved from the pages of books in Ruth Paine's house, both just when they were needed to fill gaps in the reconstructed Phase-Two account of Oswald's life. See Marrs, Crossfire, 261 (Walker note); Scott, "Some Familiar Faces Reappear in Monicagate." Pacific New Service, January 26, 1998 (ticket). (Other suspect evidence would include the silver Mexican coin, Spanish-English dictionary, silver bracelet for Marina, and postcards from Mexico City, all of which Ruth Paine confirmed seeing together in Marina's drawer; 3 WH 13).

[116] We see evidence of this in the cover-up cable that the CIA sent to Mexico City shortly after noon on November 23. The cable reported the FBI as saying "that photos of man entering Soviet Embassy which MEXI sent to Dallas were not of Lee Oswald;" it said nothing about the voice on the tape which the FBI had also shown not to be Oswald's (DIR 84888 231729Z; NARA #104-10015-10115 PS#64-121). The cable had an unusual releasing officer: William P. Hood, WH/COPS. Hood was the Chief of Operations for Western Hemisphere Division. More importantly, Hood was a senior Counterintelligence Officer who had been involved for some time on a highly sensitive case, a possible Soviet mole who had leaked information about the CIA's secret U-2 program. Before the assassination, William Hood had signed as Authenticating Officer for the misleading HQ cable in response to news of the Kostikov intercept (DIR 74830 of 10 October 1963; NARA #104-10015-10048; PS #62/65). I have argued elsewhere that Oswald and his files were manipulated as part of the search for this mole. See Chapter XI, "Oswald and the Hunt for Popov's Mole."

[117] Ruth Paine gave false or misleading testimony on a number of matters, but usually to corroborate a Phase-Two interpretation of events.

[118] MEXI 7023 231659Z; NARA #104-10015-10124 PS 73-43.

[119] 26 WH 411.

[120] Oleg M. Nechiporenko, trans. Todd B. Bludeau, Passport to Assassination, (New York: Birch Lane/Carol, 1993), 75-81; see discussion in Deep Politics II, 12-15.

[121] "Interview with a KGB Colonel: Peter Dale Scott interviews Col. Oleg Nechiporenko in Dallas" (videotape). Prevailing Winds Research, #884, $19.95 (http://prevailingwinds.org/videomain.html).

[122] According to a later CIA note, the monitors of the call said that the "caller (who called himself Oswald) had difficulty making himself understood both (as I recall) in English and in Russian" (Handwritten note on Scott D. Breckinridge Memo for the Record of 12 December 1976; NARA #104-10095-10001; PS 62-197).

[123] Chapter II, 14-16; Chapter X, 125.

[124] TX-1915 of 23 Nov 1963; NARA #104-10015-10055 PS#64-33. Cf. MEXI 7029 232048Z; NARA #104-10015-10091 PS#78-94, in which Scott reports that he has suggested to the Mexicans that they arrest Durán, citing an earlier cable (MEXI 7025) with the full texts of the two Phase-One intercepts.

[125] Scott's error in describing Rubén Durán as Silvia's brother, rather than brother-in-law, is consistent with, and may have derived from, Garro's recurring habit of describing the Duráns (as opposed to Rubén Durán's wife) as her "cousins" (3 AH 295, 297, 305). Scott also supplied a wrong address for Silvia, who told the DFS she lived at 143, Calles de Constituyentes. This may explain why the DFS went first to Herodoto #14, and only arrested Silvia when she arrived there.

[126] TX-1907 of 27 Nov 1963; NARA #104-10015-10428, PS#78-37.



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"Several informed sources have told me that an appendix to this Report was removed at the instruction of the DOJ at the last minute. This appendix is reported to have information about a CIA officer, not agent or asset, but officer, based in the LA Station, who was in charge of Contra related activities. According to these sources, this individual was associated with running drugs to South Central L.A., around 1988. Let me repeat that amazing omission. The recently released CIA Report Vol II contained an appendix, which was pulled by the DOJ, that reported a CIA officer in the LA Station was hooked into drug running in South Central Los Angeles." Maxine Waters Oct, 1998
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[127] Memo of 24 or 25 November 1963, "Subject: Lee Harvey OSWALD, also known as Lee Harry OSWALD; Alex HIDELL; Harvey Oswald LEE." Cf. Edward Jay Epstein, Legend (New York: McGraw Hill, 1978), 250; Gus Russo, Live By the Sword (Baltimore: Bancroft Press, 1998), 344. The memo is undated and unsigned, but is aware of Oswald's death on November 24. It mentions nothing about the claims made by Alvarado on November 25, which were included in a list of questions compiled by Scott for the Mexicans to ask after Durán's second arrest (MEXI 7124 282116Z; NARA #104-10016-10010 PS#72-124).

[128] MEXI 7072 262113Z; NARA #104-10015-10368.

[129] Cover sheet to memo, in Scott's handwriting with initial: "Read to President on night of 25/XI/63 -- S." The Washington Post (November 14, 1993) concludes that the memo was read to President Johnson, but this is most unlikely. The Church Committee agrees that the person informed was "a senior Mexican government official" (Schweiker-Hart Report, 28).

[130] MEXI 7033 of 23 November 232246Z; NARA #104-10015-10094 PS#66-41.

[131] MEXI 7046 of 23 November 240419Z; NARA #104-10015-10075 PS#64-48.

[132] DIR 85758 291945Z; NARA #104-10015-10229 PS#73-73.

[133] Oswald visa application; 3 AH 129; 25 WH 814.

[134] MEXI 7033 232246Z; NARA #104-10015-10094; PS #66-43.

[135] MEXI 6453 Oct 090043Z; NARA #104-10015-10047 PS#62-59.

[136] Winston Scott, Foul Foe, ms. (retrieved for the CIA after Scott's death in 1971 by James Angleton), 268-69; Newman, Oswald and the CIA, 415-16; HSCA, Lopez Report, 125. Scott's claim is supported by a CIA memo written in 1975 by CIA Counterintelligence Chief George Kalaris, successor to James Angleton:

There is also a memorandum dated 16 October 1963 from [redacted] COS Mexico City...concerning Oswald's visit to Mexico City....Subsequently there were several Mexico City cables in October 1963 also concerned with Oswald's visit to Mexico City, as well as his visits to the Soviet and Cuban Embassies.(Memo of 18 Sept 1975, FOIA #1187-436; Newman, Oswald and the CIA, 415).

[137] Lopez Report, 82-88. Cf. Newman, 369-77.

[138] Ray Rocca deposition of 7/17/78 to HSCA, pp. 82-83. Rocca’s remarks may explain why the House Assassinations Committee reported from testimony that the connection between Oswald and the Cuban consulate "had in fact been made in early October 1963" (AR 249n).

[139] FBI Memorandum of 22 November from W.A. Branigan to W.C. Sullivan; NARA #124-10027-10395; FBI 62-109060-lst nr 487; RB95; PS 75-1.

[140] Among those who accept the Phase-Two version as real are Newman (pp. 356-57), and Russell (pp. 492-94).

[141] Warren Commission Document 347 of January 31, 1964, p. 10, emphasis added.

[142] Lee H. Wigren, C/SR/CI/R[esearch], Memo to File of 4 February 1964; NARA #104-10003-10004.

[143] Summers, Conspiracy, 194-99; AR 101-02.

[144] Epstein, Legend, 16, 237: “The FBI knew through a double agent that Kostikov …was a high-level officer of the Thirteenth Department of the KGB, heavily involved in controlling saboteurs….[T]he Thirteenth Department…was involved with planning sabotage and other violent acts.”

[145] New York Times, November 23, 1975. In first moving the resolution for a House Select Committee on Assassinations, Congressman Downing, the future HSCA Chairman, supported his case by referring to the Kostin letter, and to the CIA's identification of Kostikov as a member of the KGB's "Liquid Affairs Department, whose responsibilities include assassination and sabotage" (Congressional Record, House, September 17, 1976, H10360).

[146] Washington Post, November 26, 1976; Russell, p. 494; Scott, Deep Politics II, Chapter VIII, p. 97. Further support for a Cuban conspiracy was dredged from CIA files for David Belin by Raymond Rocca, a former member of the CI Counterintelligence staff under James Angleton (e.g. NARA #157-10011-10072: Memo of 5/20/75 of David Belin on Castro and assassination plots, citing Ray Rocca).

[147] Phillips, Night Watch, 139.

[148] Russo, Live By the Sword, (Baltimore: Bancroft Press, 1998), 459.

[149] Russo, 344.

[150] Russo, 219; cf. Durán, 3 AH 86, 91; LIRING-3, Chapter IV, p. 38. The New York Times Book Review found Russo's book "compelling, exhaustively researched and evenhanded."

[151] Posner, 194; Russo, 345.

[152] Posner, 191n.

[153] Russo, 219. (Russo does not quote the words, "The fact.")

[154] Richard D. Mahoney, Sons and Brothers, 303.

[155] Mahoney, 336; citing Schweiker in Fonzi, The Last Investigation, 31.

[156] Russo, 218.

[157] Russo, 363.

[158] Russo, 218.

[159] Chapter II ###

[160] Chapter X.###

[161] Church Committee, Alleged Assassination Plots Involving Foreign Leaders; Interim Report, Senate, 94th Cong., 1st Sess., Report No 94-465, 182.

[162] Scelso Deposition to HSCA, 5/16/78, NARA #180-10131-10330, 1-140: "the performance of the Mexico City support apparatus, as we call surveillance, photo-surveillance, phone taps and so forth, was unequalled in the world. There is nothing like it anyplace else in the world."

[163] Chapter X, 117, 132.###

[164] FBI HQ 105-93264-3, NARA #124-90059-10087 SAC Chicago to Director, 2-17-61: “CIA on 2-10-61 advised that subject is not connected with CIA or FRD;” FBI HQ 105-93264-3, NARA #124-90059-10111: SAC Chicago LHM of 11/02/60, 3 (“Army Military Intelligence officer”).

[165] Chapter X, p. 117.###

[166] Cocaine Politics, 65 and passim.

[167] Chapter X, 135###; Washington Post, 3/28/82 ($30 million).

[168] Gary Webb, Dark Alliance, 54-56. Cf. CIA Memo to Papich of 12/12/63; NARA #104-10018-10043 PS#74-16 (Alvarado-Montiel).

[169] Hitz Report, I, para 100; Scott, Drugs, Contras, and the CIA, 19.

[170] Webb, Dark Alliance, 200-05 and passim (Meneses-CIA); Scott and Marshall, Cocaine Politics, 36 (Nazar Haro protected).

[171] Scott, Deep Politics, 105.

[172] David Atlee Phillips, Nightwatch, 113-14.

[173] 10 AH 81 (DRE); Phillips, The Night Watch, 88.

[174] December 1995 Nassau Conference, Proceedings; http://cuban-exile.com/doc_026-050/doc0027-3.htm, http://cuban-exile.com/doc_026-050/doc0027-4.htm. Photo is Warren Commission Bringuier Exhibit No. 1, 19 WH 173. For more on Oswald and the DRE, see Chapter IX###.

[175] Ray and Mary La Fontaine, Oswald Talked: The New Evidence in the JFK Assassination (Gretna, LA: Pelican Publishing, 1996), 288-99, etc.

[176] Ray and Mary La Fontaine, Oswald Talked, 277, 283-88, etc.

[177] Fonzi, The Last Investigation, 232-239, etc.

[178] Scott and Marshall, Cocaine Politics, 35; Fonzi, 232-239.

[179] Noel Twyman, Bloody Treason, 700-02 (Bernardo de Torres-Morales).

[180] Richard D. Mahoney, Sons & Brothers: The Days of Jack and Bobby Kennedy (New York: Arcade Publishing, 1999), 135.

[181] Fonzi, 390.

[182] Twyman, Bloody Treason, 451.

[183] Twyman, 454-57.

[184] Ranelagh, The Agency, 515-20. Phillips confirms the assignment in his autobiography (The Night Watch, 220-21); he also describes describes "El Indio" (Morales) as someone whom he met on the Guatemalan operation, "but was to work with in other operations over the years" (p. 49).

[185] Twyman, Bloody Treason, 438-40 (Harvey-Morales-Rosselli).

[186] The CIA Inspector-General's Report on the subject said that "after Harvey took over the Castro [assassination] operation, he ran it as one aspect of ZR/RIFLE (IG Report, 40-41; Church Committee Interim Report, 182). Harvey thus took over the CIA contact with Rosselli "as part of Project ZR/RIFLE" (Interim Report, 188).

[187] Warren Hinckle and William Turner, Deadly Secrets, 213.

[188] Scott, Deep Politics and the Death of JFK, 141-45.

[189] Mahoney, 269.

[190] Scott, Deep Politics, 141-43. Among the anonymous reports received by the Dallas Police Department after the assassination was one linking Ruby to an international ring smuggling cars and narcotics. (I am grateful to Michael Parks for this information.)

[191] ARRB Deposition of Anne Lorene Goodpasture, December 1995, p.67: “we were all advised that he was head of the [Cuban] task force.” Task Force W, which directed Operation Mongoose against Castro in 1962, was renamed the Special Affairs Staff in early 1963.

[192] Newman, Oswald and the CIA, 236-43.

[193] DIR 73214 of 4 Oct 63: “Mr David Phillips, newly appointed Chief PBRUMEN [Cuba] Ops in MEXI will arrive 7 October EAL FL 655 for two days consultations WAVE” (NARA #104-10046-10003). WAVE was the SAS field station in Miami.

[194] Almost certainly there could have been nothing relevant to the October 1 intercept in a pouch the same day in Wasington. However there could have been materials pertinent to the alleged but missing intercepts of Oswald in the Cuban Embassy. Cf. supra at footnote ###, also Chapter IX###.

[195] MEXI 6344 011831Z, PS 61-1. The full text of the cable is as follows: “Bulk materials under TN 251905, Pouch number 4083, pouched one October to be held in registry until picked up by Michael C. Choaden presently TDY HQS.”

[196] Scott, Deep Politics, 117-18.

[197] NARA #104-10015-10045, cover sheet to FBI Hosty Report of 9/10/63; in Newman, 501. William Potocki of CI/OPS initialed this cover sheet on September 25.

[198] DIR 74830 of 10 Oct 1963, NARA # 104-10015-10048, p. 2. The CIA tried to conceal this trickery from the Warren Commission by giving the September 24 FBI memo a forged FBI transmittal slip, dated “November 8,” and burying the memo in the November section of the 201 file (Warren Commission Document 692). But the CIA cover sheet (not seen by the Warren Commission) shows clearly that the FBI memo was received in the CIA on October 3, and seen by Jane Roman on October 4. The forged FBI transmittal slip was re-released by the CIA in May 1992, and was published in the Sckolnick edition of this release (p. 112). It has disappeared from the CIA’s 1993 release of the same 201 file, but can be seen in Newman’s book on page 503. The nature of the forgery is this: the CIA took a genuine FBI transmittal slip dated “Nov 8 1963” and added to it the CIA registry number (“DBA-52355”) of the 9/24/63 FBI. The cover sheet to the same document (NARA #104-10015-10046; Newman , 502) has a date stamp showing that it was received by CIA on October 3.

[199] Scott, Deep Politics, 206-18, 226-27, 288-90, etc. Gerald Patrick Hemming, an ex-Marine Soldier of fortune involved with anti-Castro Cubans, has hinted that both Murchison and McLendon were present at a July 1963 meeting in the Dallas Petroleum Club, at which Hemming declined an alleged proposal to assassinate President Kennedy (Twyman, 699, 745).

[200] 20 WH 39 (Ruby). The information about the McLendon family trip I owe to Mary Ferrell, a close friend of some of McLendon’s children.

[201] For William Harvey, see the Rosselli-Meltzer connection noted above. Angleton spoke at some length about Harvey-Rosselli contacts in his depositions by the HSCA (p. 87). But John "Scelso," Chief of the CIA's Western Hemisphere/Mexico Branch, also testified to the HSCA about Angleton's "ties to organized crime," and specifically about protection he supplied against RFK's investigation of the skim from Las Vegas casinos (organized principally by Meltzer's patron Meyer Lansky). See HSCA, Subcommittee Executive Session, May 16, 1978, Testimony of John Scelso, NARA #180-10131-10330, 167-69.





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"Several informed sources have told me that an appendix to this Report was removed at the instruction of the DOJ at the last minute. This appendix is reported to have information about a CIA officer, not agent or asset, but officer, based in the LA Station, who was in charge of Contra related activities. According to these sources, this individual was associated with running drugs to South Central L.A., around 1988. Let me repeat that amazing omission. The recently released CIA Report Vol II contained an appendix, which was pulled by the DOJ, that reported a CIA officer in the LA Station was hooked into drug running in South Central Los Angeles." Maxine Waters Oct, 1998
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"Several informed sources have told me that an appendix to this Report was removed at the instruction of the DOJ at the last minute. This appendix is reported to have information about a CIA officer, not agent or asset, but officer, based in the LA Station, who was in charge of Contra related activities. According to these sources, this individual was associated with running drugs to South Central L.A., around 1988. Let me repeat that amazing omission. The recently released CIA Report Vol II contained an appendix, which was pulled by the DOJ, that reported a CIA officer in the LA Station was hooked into drug running in South Central Los Angeles." Maxine Waters Oct, 1998
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Connection Still Being Ignored?
by Dennis Bernstein and Robert Knight
9/22/1996 - The Baltimore Sun
9/22/1996 - The Herald Leader

DEA Agents Accuse American Spies
of Spying on them
by Dennis Bernstein and Robert Knight
9/12/1996 - JINN Pacifica News Service

Pentagon Document Scores Risks of DU Used in Gulf War and Bosnia
By Dennis Bernstein
1/1/1996 - Jinn Magazine

Mississippi Burning
by Dennis Bernstein and Ron Nixon
7/17/1996 - San Francisco Bay Guardian

FBI Agents Downplay Civil Rights Aspects of Black Church Burnings
by Dennis Burnstein and Ron Nixon
6/13/1996 - JINN Magazine - Pacifica News Service

Mumia Abu-Jamal: Broadcasts Spiked?
by Dennis Bernstein
4/10/1996 - San Francisco Bay Guardian

King Alfonse
by Dennis Bernstein
2/21/1996 - San Francisco Bay Guardian

Haiti, Drugs and the CIA
by Dennis Bernstein
12/6/1995 - JINN Magazine - Pacifica News Service

LSD Sentencing on Trial in the Supreme Court
by Dennis Bernstein and Thea Kelley
12/6/1995 - JINN Magazine - Pacifica News Service

Covert Action Rides Again
by Dennis Bernstein
11/1/1995 - San Francisco Bay Guardian

The Life and Times of William Moses Kunstler
Interview by Dennis Bernstein & Julie Light
10/1995 - Zmag

Isabel Allende Interview
3/1995 - Mother Jones

The Gulf War Comes Home
by Dennis Bernstein and Thea Kelley
3/1995 - The Progressive

Haiti's Nightmare: The Cocaine Coup and the CIA Connection
by Paul DeRienzo
Apr-Jun 1994 - The Shadow no. 32

Liberated Kuwait
by Dennis Bernstein and Larry Everest
9/9/1992 - San Francisco Bay Guardian

U.S. Hires Drug Dealer to Deal Humanitarian Aid
by Peter Shinkle and Dennis Bernstein
5/4/1988 - San Francisco Bay Guardian

Report Links NSC With Costa Rica Drug Mystery
by Peter Shinkle and Dennis Bernstein
12/2/1987 - San Francisco Bay Guardian

An Uncompromising Look at the Government's Role in the Drug Trade
by Peter Shinkle and Dennis Bernstein
11/18/1987 - San Francisco Bay Guardian

Contra Resuppliers Who Did Not Testify: Part II
by Peter Shinkle and Dennis Bernstein
9/30/1987 - San Francisco Bay Guardian

Witnesses Who Were Absent: Part I
by Peter Shinkle and Dennis Bernstein
9/23/1987 - San Francisco Bay Guardian

Three Committees Track Down Smuggled Drugs, Not Smoking Gun
by Dennis Bernstein and Robert Knight
8/5-8/18/1987 - In These Times

Congressional Prober Has North Connection
by Howard Levine, Vince Bielski and Dennis Bernstein
7/22-8/4/1987 - In These Times

Why is the CIA Contra Connection being Ignored?
by Dennis Bernstein and Robert Knight
3/31/1987 - Newsday
4/3/1987 - Minneapolis Star Ledger

Is North Network Cocaine Connected?
by Vince Bielski and Dennis Bernstein
10/16/1986 - In These Times

Florida Airport Open to Contra Arms
by Vince Bielski and Dennis Bernstein
10/16/1986 - In These Times

The Dirty Dealing in the Underground Contra Aid Network
by Vince Bielski and Dennis Bernstein
10/16/1986 - In These Times

By Category:

CIA Contra Connection

How the Contras Invaded the USA
by Dennis Bernstein and Robert Knight
Jan-Feb 1997 - The Shadow

Anatomy of a Coverup
by Dennis Bernstein and Robert Knight
11/28/1996 - Tucson Weekly
11/21/1996 - Boulder Weekly

Snow Blind
by Dennis Bernstein and Robert Knight
11/21/1996 - Tucson Weekly

Ollie North and Drugs
by Dennis Bernstein and Howard Levine
11/20/1996 - The Texas Observer

Federal Court Records Offer Plenty of
Leads on CIA-Contra Drug Trafficking
by Dennis Bernstein and Robert Knight
11/15/1996 - JINN Pacifica Online News

Right Hand, Left Hand - DEA Agents
Decade Long Battle to Expose CIA-Contra-Crack Story
by Dennis Bernstein and Robert Knight
10/8/1996 - Salon

Covert Action Rides Again
by Dennis Bernstein
11/1/1995 - San Francisco Bay Guardian

Why is the CIA-Contra-Cocaine Connection
Still Being Ignored?
by Dennis Bernstein and Robert Knight
9/22/1996 - The Baltimore Sun
9/22/1996 - The Herald Leader

DEA Agents Accuse American Spies
of Spying on them
by Dennis Bernstein and Robert Knight
9/12/1996 - JINN Pacifica News Service

Haiti, Drugs and the CIA
by Dennis Bernstein
12/6/1995 - JINN Magazine - Pacifica News Service

Haiti's Nightmare: The Cocaine Coup
and the CIA Connection
by Paul DeRienzo
Apr-Jun 1994 - The Shadow no. 32

Why is the CIA Contra Connection being Ignored?
by Dennis Bernstein and Robert Knight
3/31/1987 - Newsday
4/3/1987 - Minneapolis Star Ledger



Iran Contra: The Guardian Series

Witnesses Who Were Absent: Part I
by Peter Shinkle and Dennis Bernstein
9/23/1987 - San Francisco Bay Guardian

Contra Resuppliers Who Did Not Testify:
Part II
by Peter Shinkle and Dennis Bernstein
9/30/1987 - San Francisco Bay Guardian

An Uncompromising Look at the
Government's Role in the Drug Trade
by Peter Shinkle and Dennis Bernstein
11/18/1987 - San Francisco Bay Guardian

Report Links NSC With Costa Rica Drug Mystery
by Peter Shinkle and Dennis Bernstein
12/2/1987 - San Francisco Bay Guardian

U.S. Hires Drug Dealer to Deal
Humanitarian Aid
by Peter Shinkle and Dennis Bernstein
5/4/1988 - San Francisco Bay Guardian



Iran Contra: In These Times Series

Is North Network Cocaine Connected?
by Vince Bielski and Dennis Bernstein
10/16/1986 - In These Times

Florida Airport Open to Contra Arms
by Vince Bielski and Dennis Bernstein
10/16/1986 - In These Times

The Dirty Dealing in the Underground
Contra Aid Network
by Vince Bielski and Dennis Bernstein
10/16/1986 - In These Times

Congressional Prober Has North
Connection
by Howard Levine, Vince Bielski and Dennis Bernstein
7/22-8/4/1987 - In These Times

Three Committees Track Down
Smuggled Drugs, Not Smoking Gun
by Dennis Bernstein and Robert Knight
8/5-8/18/1987 - In These Times



Coverups

People of the Opiate
by Dennis Bernstein and Leslie Kean
12/16/1996 - The Nation

Burma Boiling - Burma Military's Dirty Mission
by Dennis Bernstein and Leslie Kean
9/16/1998 - San Francisco Bay Guardian

The Gulf War Comes Home
by Dennis Bernstein and Thea Kelley
3/1995 - The Progressive

Gulf War Syndrome Covered Up - Chemical and Biological Agents Exposed
by Dennis Bernstein
Covert Action Quarterly #53



Black Church Burnings

Mississippi Burning
by Dennis Bernstein and Ron Nixon
7/17/1996 - San Francisco Bay Guardian

FBI Agents Downplay Civil Rights Aspects of Black Church Burnings
by Dennis Burnstein and Ron Nixon
6/13/1996 - JINN Magazine - Pacifica News Service



Washington Now
Government, Law and Politics

LSD Sentencing on Trial in the Supreme Court
by Dennis Bernstein and Thea Kelley
12/6/1995 - JINN Magazine - Pacifica News Service

Defending Pariahs: Interview with William Kunstler
by Dennis Bernstein and Julie Light
San Francisco Bay Guardian

Mumia Abu-Jamal: Broadcasts Spiked?
by Dennis Bernstein
4/10/1996 - San Francisco Bay Guardian

King Alfonse
by Dennis Bernstein
2/21/1996 - San Francisco Bay Guardian

Eye on New York: The D'Amato Ethics Investigation
Albany, 1996

Isabel Allende Interview
3/1995 - Mother Jones










-------
The Real Drug Lords

A brief history of CIA involvement in the Drug Trade

by William Blum

1947 to 1951, FRANCE
According to Alfred W. McCoy in The Politics of Heroin in Southeast Asia,
CIA arms, money, and disinformation enabled Corsican criminal syndicates in
Marseille to wrestle control of labor unions from the Communist Party. The
Corsicans gained political influence and control over the docks -- ideal
conditions for cementing a long-term partnership with mafia drug
distributors, which turned Marseille into the postwar heroin capital of the
Western world. Marseille's first heroin laboratones were opened in 1951, only
months after the Corsicans took over the waterfront.

EARLY 1950s, SOUTHEAST ASIA
The Nationalist Chinese army, organized by the CIA to wage war against
Communist China, became the opium barons of The Golden Triangle (parts of
Burma, Thailand and Laos), the world's largest source of opium and heroin.
Air America, the ClA's principal airline proprietary, flew the drugs all over
Southeast Asia. (See Christopher Robbins, Air America, Avon Books, 1985,
chapter 9 )

1950s to early 1970s, INDOCHINA
During U.S. military involvement in Laos and other parts of Indochina, Air
America flew opium and heroin throughout the area. Many Gl's in Vietnam
became addicts. A laboratory built at CIA headquarters in northern Laos was
used to refine heroin. After a decade of American military intervention,
Southeast Asia had become the source of 70 percent of the world's illicit
opium and the major supplier of raw materials for America's booming heroin
market.

1973-80, AUSTRALIA
The Nugan Hand Bank of Sydney was a CIA bank in all but name. Among its
officers were a network of US generals, admirals and CIA men, including
fommer CIA Director William Colby, who was also one of its lawyers. With
branches in Saudi Arabia, Europe, Southeast Asia, South America and the U.S.,
Nugan Hand Bank financed drug trafficking, money laundering and international
arms dealings. In 1980, amidst several mysterious deaths, the bank collapsed,
$50 million in debt. (See Jonathan Kwitny, The Crimes of Patriots: A True
Tale of Dope, Dirty Money and the CIA, W.W. Norton & Co., 1 987.)

1970s and 1980s, PANAMA
For more than a decade, Panamanian strongman Manuel Noriega was a highly
paid CIA asset and collaborator, despite knowledge by U.S. drug authorities
as early as 1971 that the general was heavily involved in drug trafficking
and money laundering. Noriega facilitated ''guns-for-drugs" flights for the
contras, providing protection and pilots, as well as safe havens for drug
cartel otficials, and discreet banking facilities. U.S. officials, including
then-ClA Director William Webster and several DEA officers, sent Noriega
letters of praise for efforts to thwart drug trafficking (albeit only against
competitors of his Medellin Cartel patrons). The U.S. government only turned
against Noriega, invading Panama in December 1989 and kidnapping the general
once they discovered he was providing intelligence and services to the Cubans
and Sandinistas. Ironically drug trafficking through Panama increased after
the US invasion. (John Dinges, Our Man in Panama, Random House, 1991;
National Security Archive Documentation Packet The Contras, Cocaine, and
Covert Operations.)

1980s, CENTRAL AMERICA
The San Jose Mercury News series documents just one thread of the
interwoven operations linking the CIA, the contras and the cocaine cartels.
Obsessed with overthrowing the leftist Sandinista government in Nicaragua,
Reagan administration officials tolerated drug trafficking as long as the
traffickers gave support to the contras. In 1989, the Senate Subcommittee on
Terrorism, Narcotics, and International Operations (the Kerry committee)
concluded a three-year investigation by stating: "There was substantial
evidence of drug smuggling through the war zones on the part of individual
Contras, Contra suppliers, Contra pilots mercenaries who worked with the
Contras, and Contra supporters throughout the region.... U.S. officials
involved in Central America failed to address the drug issue for fear of
jeopardizing the war efforts against Nicaragua.... In each case, one or
another agency of the U.S. govemment had intormation regarding the
involvement either while it was occurring, or immediately thereafter....
Senior U S policy makers were nit immune to the idea that drug money was a
perfect solution to the Contras' funding problems." (Drugs, Law Enforcement
and Foreign Policy, a Report of the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations,
Subcommittee on Terrorism, Narcotics and Intemational Operations, 1989)
In Costa Rica, which served as the "Southern Front" for the contras
(Honduras being the Northern Front), there were several different ClA-contra
networks involved in drug trafficking. In addition to those servicing the
Meneses-Blandon operation detailed by the Mercury News, and Noriega's
operation, there was CIA operative John Hull, whose farms along Costa Rica's
border with Nicaragua were the main staging area for the contras. Hull and
other ClA-connected contra supporters and pilots teamed up with George
Morales, a major Miami-based Colombian drug trafficker who later admitted to
giving $3 million in cash and several planes to contra leaders. In 1989,
after the Costa Rica government indicted Hull for drug trafficking, a
DEA-hired plane clandestinely and illegally flew the CIA operative to Miami,
via Haiti. The US repeatedly thwarted Costa Rican efforts to extradite Hull
back to Costa Rica to stand trial.
Another Costa Rican-based drug ring involved a group of Cuban Amencans
whom the CIA had hired as military trainers for the contras. Many had long
been involved with the CIA and drug trafficking They used contra planes and a
Costa Rican-based shnmp company, which laundered money for the CIA, to move
cocaine to the U.S.
Costa Rica was not the only route. Guatemala, whose military intelligence
service -- closely associated with the CIA -- harbored many drug traffickers,
according to the DEA, was another way station along the cocaine highway.
Additionally, the Medell!n Cartel's Miami accountant, Ramon Milian Rodriguez,
testified that he funneled nearly $10 million to Nicaraguan contras through
long-time CIA operative Felix Rodriguez, who was based at Ilopango Air Force
Base in El Salvador.
The contras provided both protection and infrastructure (planes, pilots,
airstrips, warehouses, front companies and banks) to these ClA-linked drug
networks. At least four transport companies under investigation for drug
trafficking received US govemment contracts to carry non-lethal supplies to
the contras. Southern Air Transport, "formerly" ClA-owned, and later under
Pentagon contract, was involved in the drug running as well. Cocaine-laden
planes flew to Florida, Texas, Louisiana and other locations, including
several militarv bases Designated as 'Contra Craft,'' these shipments were
not to be inspected. When some authority wasn't clued in and made an arrest,
powerful strings were pulled on behalf of dropping the case, acquittal,
reduced sentence, or deportation.

1980s to early 1990s, AFGHANISTAN
ClA-supported Moujahedeen rebels engaged heavily in drug trafficking while
fighting against the Soviet-supported govemment and its plans to reform the
very backward Afghan society. The Agency's principal client was Gulbuddin
Hekmatyar, one of the leading druglords and leading heroin refiner. CIA
supplied trucks and mules, which had carried arms into Afghanistan, were used
to transport opium to laboratories along the Afghan Pakistan border. The
output provided up to one half of the heroin used annually in the United
States and three-quarters of that used in Western Europe. US officials
admitted in 1990 that they had failed to investigate or take action against
the drug operabon because of a desire not to offend their Pakistani and
Afghan allies. In 1993, an official of the DEA called Afghanistan the new
Colombia of the drug world.

MlD-1980s to early 199Os, HAITI
While working to keep key Haitian military and political leaders in power,
the CIA turned a blind eye to their clients' drug trafficking. In 1986, the
Agency added some more names to its payroll by creating a new Haitian
organization, the National Intelligence Service (SIN). SIN was purportedly
created to fight the cocaine trade, though SIN officers themselves engaged in
the trafficking, a trade aided and abetted by some of the Haitian military
and political leaders.

William Blum is author of Killing Hope: U.S Military and CIA Interventions
Since World War ll available from Common Courage Press, P.O. Box 702, Monroe,


Maine, 04951, USA; tel: (207) 525-0900; fax: (207) 525-3068


__________________
A TAINTED DEAL http://www.motherjones.com/politics/1998/06/tainted-deal

 LA DEA; Murder of Kiki Camarena http://www.laweekly.com/news/how-a-dogged-la-dea-agent-unraveled-the-cias-alleged-role-in-the-murder-of-kiki-camarena-5750278  

"Several informed sources have told me that an appendix to this Report was removed at the instruction of the DOJ at the last minute. This appendix is reported to have information about a CIA officer, not agent or asset, but officer, based in the LA Station, who was in charge of Contra related activities. According to these sources, this individual was associated with running drugs to South Central L.A., around 1988. Let me repeat that amazing omission. The recently released CIA Report Vol II contained an appendix, which was pulled by the DOJ, that reported a CIA officer in the LA Station was hooked into drug running in South Central Los Angeles." Maxine Waters Oct, 1998
https://fas.org/irp/congress/1998_cr/h981013-coke.htm   

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For Release, August 2, 2004

For more information contact
Michael Evans - 202/994-7000
mevans@gwu.edu

U.S. INTELLIGENCE LISTED COLOMBIAN PRESIDENT URIBE AMONG
"IMPORTANT COLOMBIAN NARCO-TRAFFICKERS" IN 1991

Then-Senator "Dedicated to Collaboration with the Medellín Cartel at High Government Levels"

Confidential DIA Report Had Uribe Alongside Pablo Escobar, Narco-Assassins

Uribe "Worked for the Medellín Cartel" and was a "Close Personal Friend of Pablo Escobar"

Washington, D.C., 1 August 2004 - Then-Senator and now President Álvaro Uribe Vélez of Colombia was a "close personal friend of Pablo Escobar" who was "dedicated to collaboration with the Medellín [drug] cartel at high government levels," according to a 1991 intelligence report from U.S. Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA) officials in Colombia. The document was posted today on the website of the National Security Archive, a non-governmental research group based at George Washington University.

Uribe's inclusion on the list raises new questions about allegations that surfaced during Colombia's 2002 presidential campaign. Candidate Uribe bristled and abruptly terminated an interview in March 2002 when asked by Newsweek reporter Joseph Contreras about his alleged ties to Escobar and his associations with others involved in the drug trade. Uribe accused Contreras of trying to smear his reputation, saying that, "as a politician, I have been honorable and accountable."

The newly-declassified report, dated 23 September 1991, is a numbered list of "the more important Colombian narco-traffickers contracted by the Colombian narcotic cartels for security, transportation, distribution, collection and enforcement of narcotics operations." The document was released by DIA in May 2004 in response to a Freedom of Information Act request submitted by the Archive in August 2000.

The source of the report was removed by DIA censors, but the detailed, investigative nature of the report -- the list corresponds with a numbered set of photographs that were apparently provided with the original -- suggests it was probably obtained from Colombian or U.S. counternarcotics personnel. The document notes that some of the information in the report was verified "via interfaces with other agencies."

President Uribe -- now a key U.S. partner in the drug war -- "was linked to a business involved in narcotics activities in the United States" and "has worked for the Medellín cartel," the narcotics trafficking organization led by Escobar until he was killed by Colombian government forces in 1993. The report adds that Uribe participated in Escobar's parliamentary campaign and that as senator he had "attacked all forms of the extradition treaty" with the U.S.

"Because both the source of the report and the reporting officer's comments section were not declassified, we cannot be sure how the DIA judged the accuracy of this information," said Michael Evans, director of the Archive's Colombia Documentation Project, "but we do know that intelligence officials believed the document was serious and important enough to pass on to analysts in Washington."

In a statement issued on July 30, the Colombian government took exception to several items reported in the document, saying that Uribe has never had any foreign business dealings, that his father was killed while fleeing a kidnap attempt by FARC guerrillas, and that he had not opposed the extradition treaty, but merely hoped to postpone a referendum to prevent the possibility that narcotraffickers would influence the vote.

The communiqué, however, did not deny the most significant allegation reported in the document: that Uribe had a close personal relationship with Pablo Escobar and business dealings with the Medellín Cartel.

The document is marked "CONFIDENTIAL NOFORN WNINTEL," indicating that its disclosure could reasonably be expected to damage national security, that its content was based on intelligence sources and methods, and that it should not be shared with foreign nationals.

Uribe, the 82nd name on the list, appears on the same page as Escobar and Fidel Castaño, who went on to form the country's major paramilitary army, a State Department-designated terrorist group now engaged in peace negotiations with the Uribe government. Written in March 1991 while Escobar was still a fugitive, the report was forwarded to Washington several months after his surrender to Colombian authorities in June 1991.

Most of those on the list are well-known drug traffickers or assassins associated with the Medellín cartel. Others listed include ex-president of Panama Manuel Noriega, Iran-contra arms dealer Adnan Khashoggi, and Carlos Vives, a Colombian entertainer said to be connected to the narcotics business through his uncle.

Click here to read the document

23 September 1991 (Date of Information 18 March 1991)
Narcotics - Colombian Narco-trafficker Profiles
Defense Intelligence Agency, Intelligence Information Report, Confidential, 14 pp.
Source: Declassification Release Under the Freedom of Information Act, May 2004

Is the Document Accurate?

As stated in the document, the report is "not finally evaluated" intelligence information. In other words, the information reported in the document is only as good as its source. In this case, the DIA has withheld from release the source of the information as well as the comments of the reporting official from the Department of Defense, making it difficult to verify the accuracy of the information listed in the document. However, the document differs from the average field report in several ways:

1) The summary indicates that information in the report was cross-checked "via interfaces with other agencies," indicating that some evaluation had already taken place.

2) The summary offers no caveats or qualifications on the credibility of the information and is stated as fact. It thus seems likely that the originator of the report (the "source") believed the information to be true.

3) The report includes many details like identification card numbers and dates of birth, giving it the appearance of an official, investigative document. The fact that the numbered list corresponds to photographs that were provided with the original suggests that the report had a variety of uses, including criminal investigations and immigration cases.

4) Much of the information on other individuals identified in the report is accurate and easily verifiable.

5) It is evident that a significant amount of time and energy went into compiling this report, and that it did not come from a single source at a cocktail party as these reports often do.

Official Response

Full text of communiqué from the Colombian government (Casa de Nariño) - Spanish (English translation below)

"La Presidencia de la República ha tenido conocimiento en el día de hoy sobre información en poder de algunos medios de comunicación, relativa a un documento de la Defense Inteligente Agency de los Estados Unidos, elaborado en septiembre de 1991. Dicho documento fue revelado en virtud de un derecho de petición en ese país.

"El documento sugiere que Álvaro Uribe Vélez tenía en ese entonces relaciones con el narcotráfico y el Cartel de Medellín, que su padre fue asesinado por sus relaciones con los narcotraficantes, que era amigo personal de Pablo Escobar y participó en la campaña que llevó a este a la Cámara de Representantes como segundo renglón de Jairo Ortega, y que, como Senador, Uribe se opuso al tratado de extradición.

El documento señala que se trata de información que no fue evaluada (“Not finally evaluated”).

Frente a lo anterior, la Presidencia de la República informa lo siguiente:

1) Esta información es la misma que, en su momento, hizo parte de los ataques de que fue objeto el Presidente Álvaro Uribe Vélez como candidato durante su campaña presidencial.

2) En 1991, Álvaro Uribe Vélez, entonces Senador, estuvo en los Estados Unidos en un programa académico de la Universidad de Harvard, mientras sesionaba la Asamblea Constituyente, periodo durante el cual tuvo lugar la revocatoria del Congreso.

3) Álvaro Uribe Vélez no ha tenido negocios de ningún tipo en el extranjero. Como lo explicó durante su campaña a los medios de comunicación, cuando se debatieron los mismos temas, sólo tuvo dos cuentas bancarias en el exterior: una en un banco de Bostón, adjunto a la Universidad de Harvard y otra en Oxford, Inglaterra, mientras estuvo en esa universidad en 1998. No tiene un solo bien en el extranjero.

4) Alberto Uribe Sierra, padre del Presidente, fue asesinado por el 5º frente de las FARC el 14 de junio de 1983 al resistir un intento de secuestro. Uribe Sierra enfrentó a sus secuestradores; en el enfrentamiento resultó herido su hijo Santiago.

5) Álvaro Uribe Vélez fue elegido Senador en tres oportunidades: en 1986, 1990 y 1991 como miembro del movimiento “Directorio Liberal de Antioquia - Sector Democrático“. (Jairo Ortega, de quien Escobar fue segundo renglón, fue elegido a la Cámara de Representantes por un movimiento diferente en 1982).

6) En los anales del Congreso de 1989, consta la posición del senador Uribe Vélez sobre la extradición. La única que el Senador tuvo sobre el tema durante su desempeño como Senador.

Posición que fue reiterada en el año 2002 por el entonces candidato presidencial en entrevistas para los periódicos El Tiempo y El Espectador de Bogotá y la Cadena Radial Caracol:

"Después, en la segunda ronda, infortunadamente, la Cámara de Representantes incluyó ese mico para que se llevara un referéndum preguntándoles a los colombianos si rechazaban o no la extradición en lo que deberían ser las elecciones parlamentarias de marzo de 1990". (…) “yo me levante y dije que era altamente inconveniente que ese referéndum coincidiera con las elecciones parlamentarias porque entonces se corría el riesgo de que el narcotráfico presionara esas elecciones. Dije que una alternativa debería ser que, si se iba a llevar adelante el referendo se llevará adelante después de las elecciones parlamentarias y después de la elección presidencial, para que no hubiera lugar a presiones". (El Tiempo, 23 de marzo de 2003).

7) Durante su Gobierno, Álvaro Uribe ha autorizado la extradición de más de 170 personas solicitadas por diferentes países para ser juzgadas por narcotráfico y otros delitos, incluido el lavado de activos.

8) Como Presidente se opone a la modificación del mecanismo de extradición vigente.

Bogotá, julio 30 de 2004


Full text of communiqué from the Colombian government (Casa de Nariño) - English [Unofficial English translation by Michael Evans]

"Today, the President of the Republic has learned about information in possession of the news media relating to a document from the Defense Intelligence Agency of the United States from September 1991. The document was released by virtue of a right to petition in that country.

"The document suggests that Álvaro Uribe Vélez then had relations with narcotrafficking and the Medellín Cartel, that his father was assassinated for his relations to the narcotraffickers, that he was a personal friend of Pablo Escobar and participated in his campaign to become assistant parliamentarian to Jairo Ortega, and that, as Senator, Uribe opposed the extradition treaty.

The document indicates that the information it contains is "not finally evaluated."

In the face of this information, the President of the Republic states the following:

1) This information is the same that, at the time, was part of the attacks that President Álvaro Uribe Vélez was subjected to as a candidate during his presidential campaign.

2) In 1991, Álvaro Uribe Vélez, then Senator, was in the United States in an academic program at Harvard University, while the Constitutional Assembly was in session, during which period the Congress was suspended.

3) Álvaro Uribe Vélez has not had business of any kind outside of Colombia. As he explained to the news media during his campaign, when these same issues were raised, he had only two foreign bank accounts: one in a bank in Boston, attached to Harvard University and the other in Oxford, England, while he was at that university in 1998. He does not have even one foreign asset.

4) Álvaro Uribe Sierra, father of the President, was assassinated by the 5th Front of the FARC on 14 June 1983 while resisting a kidnapping attempt. Uribe Sierra confronted his kidnappers; the confrontation resulted in the wounding of his son Santiago.

5) Álvaro Uribe Vélez was elected Senator three times: in 1986, 1990 and 1991 as member of the "Directorio Liberal de Antioquia - Sector Democrático" movement. (Jairo Ortega, to whom Escobar was assistant parliamentarian, was elected to the Parliament by a different movement in 1982).

6) In the congressional archives from 1989, Senator Uribe's position on extradition is clear. The only position that the Senator ever took on this issue during his tenure as Senator. A position that was reiterated in 2002 by the then-presidential candidate in interviews with the newspapers El Tiempo and El Espectador de Bogotá y la Cadena Radial Caracol:

"Later, in the second term, unfortunately, the House of Representatives included this rider to advance a referendum asking Colombians to accept or reject extradition when it should have been the parliamentary elections of 1990". (...) "I got up and said that it was highly inconvenient that this referendum coincided with the parliamentary elections because then they were running the risk that narcotraffickers would affect these elections. I said that an alternative should be that, if they are going to raise the referendum, to raise it after the parliamentary elections and after the presidential election, so that they could not bring these pressures to bear. (El Tiempo, 23 de marzo 2003).

7) During his Government, Álvaro Uribe has authorized the extradition of more than 170 individuals solicited by various contries to be tried for narcotrafficking and other crimes, including money laundering.

8) As President he opposes the modification of the mechanism of extradition now in force.

Bogotá, 30 July 2004

Press Reports

Joseph Contreras, "A Harsh Light on Associate 82," Newsweek, International Edition, 9 August 2004 edition

Also see: Joseph Contreras, "Blacklist to the A List," Newsweek 9 August 2004 edition -

Juan Forero, "'91 U.S. Report Calls Colombian Leader Ally of Drug Lords," New York Times, 2 August 2004

T. Christian Miller, "U.S. Intelligence Tied Colombia's Uribe to Drug Trade in '91 Report," Los Angeles Times, 2 August 2004

Dan Molinski, "U.S. Defends Uribe Over Alleged Drug Ties," Associated Press (via Guardian Unlimited), 3 August 2004

"Departamento de Estado de E.U. rechaza documento que vincula a Álvaro Uribe con el narcotráfico," El Tiempo, 1 August 2004

Semana.com - ENTREVISTA con Michael Evans
"La historia detrás del documento de inteligencia que acusó a Uribe de tener vínculos con el cartel de Medellín," 8 August 2004






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A TAINTED DEAL http://www.motherjones.com/politics/1998/06/tainted-deal

 LA DEA; Murder of Kiki Camarena http://www.laweekly.com/news/how-a-dogged-la-dea-agent-unraveled-the-cias-alleged-role-in-the-murder-of-kiki-camarena-5750278  

"Several informed sources have told me that an appendix to this Report was removed at the instruction of the DOJ at the last minute. This appendix is reported to have information about a CIA officer, not agent or asset, but officer, based in the LA Station, who was in charge of Contra related activities. According to these sources, this individual was associated with running drugs to South Central L.A., around 1988. Let me repeat that amazing omission. The recently released CIA Report Vol II contained an appendix, which was pulled by the DOJ, that reported a CIA officer in the LA Station was hooked into drug running in South Central Los Angeles." Maxine Waters Oct, 1998
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A Harsh Light On Associate 82

http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/5570107/site/newsweek/

A declassified Pentagon report claims Uribe once worked for Pablo Escobar


By Joseph Contreras
Newsweek International

Aug. 9 issue - In September 1991 the U.S. Department of Defense compiled a list of individuals believed to be associated with Colombia's notorious Medellin drug cartel. There are 106 names on the newly declassified intelligence document, and they read like a who's who of thugs, assassins, midlevel traffickers and crooked attorneys. The cartel's ruthless kingpin, Pablo Escobar, was prominent on the list, of course, along with the former Panamanian dictator Gen. Manuel Antonio Noriega. But the real head turner is item No. 82, which reads as follows: "Alvaro Uribe Velez—a Colombian politician and senator dedicated to collaboration with the Medellin cartel at high government levels. Uribe was linked to a business involved in narcotics activities in the U.S.... Uribe has worked for the Medellin cartel and is a close personal friend of Pablo Escobar Gaviria."

                                                               


The Pentagon report portrays Uribe in a light sharply at variance with his current image as Washington's main ally in the U.S.-financed war on drugs in South America. But in those days, he was among dozens of Colombian pols who openly opposed the extradition of their drug-trafficking countrymen. Uribe has since changed his views—and, in fact, his government has sent scores of drug traffickers to the United States for prosecution since he took office.

The report was obtained by the National Security Archive, a Washington-based nongovernmental research group. The identity of the document's author was removed by Pentagon censors. The detailed thumbnail descriptions of the Medellin cartel's associates suggest that the data came from Colombian or U.S. counter-narcotics officials, and the text states at the beginning that the report "forwards profiles on the more important narco-terrorists contracted by the Colombian narcotic cartels." It is stamped CONFIDENTIAL NOFORN WNINTEL, meaning that its contents shouldn't be shared with foreign nationals. The U.S. ambassador to Colombia in 1991, Morris Busby, does not recall the document, and efforts to reach the U.S. Defense Intelligence Agency liaison officer in Bogota in 1991, retired Army Col. James S. Roche Jr., failed to elicit a response. In a two-page written statement, the office of the Colombian president denied that Uribe had links of any kind to a business in the United States as asserted in the 1991 report. But the statement did not address the allegations that Uribe had worked for the Medellin cartel and was a close friend of Escobar, who was killed in a 1993 police raid.

© 2005 Newsweek, Inc.







Blacklist to the A List

Once deemed a bad guy, Uribe is now a top ally



By Joseph Contreras and Steven Ambrus
Newsweek

Aug. 9 issue - The declassified Defense Department intelligence report, dated September 1991, reads like a Who's Who of Colombia's cocaine trade. The list includes the Medellin cartel's kingpin, Pablo Escobar, and more than 100 other thugs, assassins, traffickers and shady lawyers in his alleged employ. Then there's entry 82: "Alvaro Uribe Velez—a Colombian politician and senator dedicated to collaboration with the Medellin cartel at high government levels. Uribe was linked to a business involved in narcotics activities in the U.S. ... Uribe has worked for the Medellin cartel and is a close personal friend of Pablo Escobar Gaviria." Escobar died in a 1993 police raid. Two years ago this week, Uribe became president of Colombia.

                                                               

Washington loves him. In a two-page written statement, the Colombian president's office denied that Uribe had links of any kind to a U.S. business, as described in the 1991 report. (The list was obtained by the National Security Archive, an independent U.S. research group.) But the statement did not address the allegations that Uribe had worked for the Medellin cartel and was Escobar's close friend. It may be that Uribe thinks his recent actions speak louder than denials: in the last two years, Colombia has extradited 140 accused traffickers to the United States—a figure unmatched by any previous president. "This is probably one of the most pro-American presidents in Latin America's entire history," says Adam Isacson, at the Center for International Policy in Washington.

Still, questions persist. Uribe has been talking peace with outlawed right-wing paramilitaries. These groups began in self-defense against an out-of-control Marxist guerrilla movement, yet they supported themselves via the drug trade. After winning office on a pledge to stop leftist guerrillas, Uribe is now offering leniency to paramilitaries who renounce trafficking and disarm. "Some of these people don't even have anti-guerrilla credentials," says Isacson. "They're just drug traffickers who've bought their way into the paramilitary movement as a way to claim political status, legitimize their fortunes and walk free." Most Colombians seem unconcerned. With the president's approval ratings hovering above 70 percent, he's likely to get a constitutional amendment later this year to let him run again in 2006—and win.

© 2005 Newsweek, Inc.



International Mail Call

Colombia's President

Newsweek International

Sept. 27 issue - Our Aug. 9 story on Alvaro Uribe, based on a controversial Pentagon report, led readers to the Colombian president's defense. Cried one, "NEWSWEEK, you were had!" Said another, "Uribe is winning the drug war."


Defending Uribe's Record

It's unfair of NEWSWEEK to publish a declassified "intelligence" report from 1991 that leaves the impression that, at the time, the U.S. government suspected Alvaro Uribe, now president of Colombia, of being linked to narcotics trafficking ("Off the Hook?" Aug. 9). To the contrary, Uribe was known to those of us who followed his career as one of those brave public figures willing to openly proclaim their opposition to the drug cartel that then threatened to dominate his home city of Medellin. I was chief of South American affairs in the State Department when I first saw that inaccurate report from the Defense attache and complained. The U.S. Embassy in Bogota later corrected the record. That correction should have been declassified along with the original sloppy report that NEWSWEEK too readily credited.
Phillip McLean
Washington, D.C.

NEWSWEEK, you were truly and grossly had! Communist guerrillas in Colombia, especially those known as the FARC, feed well-elaborated lies to poorly informed journalists. They even spend a lot of money buying columnists of the most influential international publications to discredit President Uribe, the first true enemy they have found in Colombia's troubled recent history. In fact, he is the No. 1 champion of the battle against terrorist gangs fueled by dope money. Your readers should know that FARC is not a political organization; it consists of drug producers and smugglers of the worst kind. They generate terror in little towns deep in the countryside and spread fear among farmers in their quest for political power. They are responsible for thousands of kidnappings, assassinations and disappearances. They abuse the liberty that our Constitution grants them and they have a few representatives elected to Congress whose job it is to disinform and spread calumny against President Uribe because he is winning the war against drug traffickers and terrorists.
Said Gutierrez
Madrid, Spain

Your article regarding the president of Colombia is unbecoming of a magazine of your stature. What was stated in that article is unsubstantiated. The intelligence report does not offer any actual proof of those accusations. It is common knowledge that Uribe's father's farm bordered Pablo Escobar's father's farm and the two elders shared a great interest in horses. It would be simple to assume that Uribe and Pablo Escobar knew each other. However, no one has ever shown that there were any established ties between the two. Uribe has enough enemies that, if this were true, it would have been investigated and prosecuted a long time ago. It is sad that your magazine decided to fuel a personal vendetta against a sitting president who is fighting a very difficult war against insurgents and right-wing paramilitaries. Do some more research, please.
J. David Perez
Clearwater, Florida

You argue that Alvaro Uribe had connections with paramilitary and narco groups. This information is false: our president has shown an excellent governing style. NEWSWEEK should be more careful with information that is not confirmed.
Carlos Arias
New York, New York

How dare you publish an unverified document with allegations that Colombia's president had connections with drug dealers, listing him in the same category as Pablo Escobar? Did you just pick up gossip from somewhere that fits your own political agenda? How dare you make such a strong statement about someone who has extradited more than 140 drug dealers to the United States? Nobody has confronted Colombia's conflict as President Uribe has. We are, for the first time in decades, winning this war—thanks to this administration. Ask the U.S. government about it. The Colombian people are so happy with Uribe that, for the first time in our history, we are considering changing our Constitution in order to re-elect him. After two years as president, his approval rating topped 80 percent.
Maria Mendoza
Bogota, Colombia

Why are you trying to discredit the best president Colombia has had in decades? Dragging out an old and mistaken accusation by the U.S. Department of Defense against Alvaro Uribe certainly does not speak well of your journalistic objectivity or good judgment.
Timmy Ashe
Cali, Colombia

Re-Elections in Latin America?

Joe Contreras's analysis of Colombia's risk in seeking a constitutional change that would permit President Uribe to seek re-election ("The Re-Election Risk," June 28), cites other countries in South America, notably Argentina and Peru, where similar initiatives led to failed leadership. But Colombia's challenges in the fight against terrorism and drug trafficking are unique and require bold solutions and strong leadership. Colombians have found this in President Uribe, which is why after 24 months in power as Colombia's chief executive, he remains the most popular president in the country's modern history. Colombia has strong and mature political institutions and a strong tradition of elections. Besides, contrary to what Contreras implies in citing Congressman Gustavo Petro, Colombia has a free press that serves as an effective check against any Colombian leader who would seek to exercise political power beyond what the country's Constitution provides. If the Constitution is amended to enable President Uribe to seek a second term, he remains accountable to a Colombian electorate who will decide if his continued leadership is beneficial to the nation.
Fernando Rojas
Medellin, Colombia




__________________
A TAINTED DEAL http://www.motherjones.com/politics/1998/06/tainted-deal

 LA DEA; Murder of Kiki Camarena http://www.laweekly.com/news/how-a-dogged-la-dea-agent-unraveled-the-cias-alleged-role-in-the-murder-of-kiki-camarena-5750278  

"Several informed sources have told me that an appendix to this Report was removed at the instruction of the DOJ at the last minute. This appendix is reported to have information about a CIA officer, not agent or asset, but officer, based in the LA Station, who was in charge of Contra related activities. According to these sources, this individual was associated with running drugs to South Central L.A., around 1988. Let me repeat that amazing omission. The recently released CIA Report Vol II contained an appendix, which was pulled by the DOJ, that reported a CIA officer in the LA Station was hooked into drug running in South Central Los Angeles." Maxine Waters Oct, 1998
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U.S. attorney withdraws charges over Cali cartel

Damage control after allegation that ex-president was bribed


Associated Press
Updated: 6:55 a.m. ET March 18, 2005

BOGOTA, Colombia - A U.S. federal attorney who accused the Cali drug cartel of bribing former President Ernesto Samper and dozens of congressmen to pass a favorable extradition law retracted his statement after Colombia threatened to stop turning over suspected traffickers to the United States.

Samper denied the allegations by U.S. Attorney Paul Perez, made in a March 9 court paper obtained by The Associated Press on Thursday. Still they caused an uproar in Colombia as officials questioned whether the United States remained committed to the 1997 treaty.

U.S. Ambassador William Wood held a late-night news conference to try to repair the damage, insisting the United States would comply with the extradition requirements from its key ally in Latin America.

'Confusion' cited
Wood, however, refused to explain why the document was shelved, saying only there had been a “confusion” and that he had just handed President Alvaro Uribe a revised version that omitted any mention of the accusations against Samper and the other politicians.

In a statement, Perez’s office confirmed a new document had been filed with the U.S. District Court in Tampa, Fla., but also gave no reason for the decision.

Perez’s statements about Samper came in a response to arguments from extradited cocaine kingpin Joaquin Mario Valencia Trujillo that evidence should not be allowed for crimes committed before December 1997.

Asked whether the United States believed Samper and the others were innocent of the charges, Wood said: “All I can say is that the withdrawal and revocation of this document carries its own message.”

“The new document does not have anything to say about the alleged bribery surrounding Congress’ 1997 decision to renew the extradition process,” he said.

Perez’s March 9 statement said Samper received $5 million in bribes from the Cali cartel to promote passage of the Colombian law that prohibits extraditions for crimes committed before December 1997. The Cali cartel controlled the world’s cocaine trafficking networks in the mid-1990s but went into decline after its leaders were arrested in 1995.

First public accusation
Perez’s comments marked the first time Samper had been publicly accused of receiving traffickers’ bribes during his 1994-98 term. He previously was accused of taking Cali cartel contributions during his election campaign.

“I reject in the most categorical and absolute manner the accusation presented ... by a prosecutor in Florida,” Samper said, reading a statement to The AP over the phone.

Perez dismissed Colombia’s extradition law — Article 35 of the Colombian Constitution — as “the product of the successful bribery of [then] Colombian President Ernesto Samper and the Colombian Congress by the Cali cartel to immunize them from extradition to the United States.”

Colombia’s ambassador to Washington, Luis Alfonso Moreno, demanded Perez explain himself.

“What the prosecutor has affirmed puts at risk the extradition treaty,” Moreno told local RCN Radio. “Prosecutor Perez has the obligation, if he has proof of a supposed bribe from the defunct Cali cartel, to present it to the Colombian government as quickly as possible.”

Uribe, who has sent more than 200 Colombians to face U.S. justice in the past two years, made no comment.

In the March 9 paper, Perez said U.S. prosecutors would show that Samper and the Colombian Congress were bribed.

“The government will present testimony that the Cali cartel, of which the defendant is and was a member, jointly collected $5 million to pay President Samper to support Article 35 and make it law,” Perez wrote. “Testimony will also establish that almost one-half of the entire Colombian Congress was similarly bribed by the Cali cartel to support the identical legislation.”

Gilberto and Miguel Rodriguez Orejuela, the two brothers who led the Cali cartel, were recently extradited to Miami to face trial. U.S. prosecutors say the brothers continued to run their drug empire from behind bars after they were arrested in Colombia in 1995.

Colombian investigations have shown the Cali cartel contributed millions of dollars to Samper’s 1994 presidential campaign, although he claimed ignorance of the donations. The United States revoked Samper’s visa during his four-year term as president of a country that produces most of the world’s cocaine.

© 2005 The Associated Press. All rights reserved. This material may not be published, broadcast, rewritten or redistributed.

New Wave of Colombia Drug Kingpins Emerges


By DAN MOLINSKI
Updated: 10:57 a.m. ET Sept. 22, 2004

BOGOTA, Colombia - A new wave of drug kingpins is emerging in Colombia _ traffickers who operate from the shadows, seeking only profits and avoiding the excesses of previous generations of drug lords, a top intelligence official said.

"They're basically dedicated to laundering profits in the international financial system, and they're experts in marketing," Col. Oscar Naranjo, head of Colombia's judicial police, said Tuesday in an interview with The Associated Press.


Previous generations of traffickers led lavish lifestyles, and some like Pablo Escobar even ran for political office, raising their profile and attracting the interest of law enforcement.

Naranjo, one of Colombia's most respected law enforcement officers who works closely with U.S. drug agents, said the development of drug trafficking in Colombia, the world's main source of cocaine, can be broken down into generations.

_ The first generation, in the 1960s and 1970s, smuggled tons of marijuana from the mountains of Colombia to the United States.

_ Moving into cocaine trafficking, the second generation was headed by Escobar's Medellin cocaine cartel, which waged a bloody terrorist campaign of bombings and assassinations in the 1980s to avoid being extradited to the United States. Escobar was killed by police in 1993, after the heyday of the Medellin cartel was already over.

_ The third generation, headed by the Cali cartel, was "more sophisticated" and tried to corrupt politicians to escape justice instead of ruling by brute force, but still remained in the public spotlight.

Now, in addition to leftist rebels, their right-wing paramilitary foes, and the Northern Valley cartel which is an offshoot of the Cali mob, the fourth generation of traffickers has emerged, the police commander said.

"Today, they want to be invisible," Naranjo, wearing a sober business suit, said in the interview at the AP offices in Bogota. "We don't even know the names of the big capos."

The new drug traffickers are harder to track since they, unlike their predecessors, are not the ones producing or monitoring the production of the drugs, Naranjo said.

Instead, these new traffickers simply purchase the cocaine and heroin from the rebel and paramilitary groups in Colombia that over several years have set up large, well-protected cocaine production facilities in Colombia's jungles.

While drug trafficking used to revolve around a few kingpins such as Escobar, today the business has become a free market, replete with subcontractors. Those interested in trafficking drugs can negotiate with various groups to buy cocaine and heroin and then separately deal with transporting the drugs, typically to Mexico and then to the United States, Naranjo said

This new way of doing business has also turned Mexican drug traffickers, who traditionally remained at home while Colombian traffickers delivered the goods, into traveling businessmen, Naranjo said.

"In the past the Colombian narcos brought the drugs to Mexico," he said, explaining that now, the Mexicans, particularly from the powerful Gulf cartel, come here looking for business.

He said Mexican traffickers have come to Colombia carrying up to US$1 million in cash to buy the drugs, and then organize smuggling them to Mexico, usually in shipping containers aboard freighters that depart from Colombia's Pacific coast.

Copyright 2004 The Associated Press. All rights reserved. This material may not be published, broadcast, rewritten or redistributed.



U.S. soldiers, officials nabbed in cocaine sting

16 to plead guilty in bribery and extortion conspiracy


The Associated Press
Updated: 2:41 p.m. ET May 12, 2005

WASHINGTON - FBI agents posing as cocaine traffickers in Arizona caught 16 current and former U.S. soldiers and law enforcement personnel who took $220,000 in bribes to help move the drugs through checkpoints, Justice Department officials said Thursday.

Those charged include a former Immigration and Naturalization Service inspector, a former Army sergeant, a former federal prison guard, current and former members of the Arizona Army National Guard and the state corrections department, and a Nogales, Ariz., police officer, officials said.

All 16 have agreed to plead guilty to being part of a bribery and extortion conspiracy, the result of the nearly 3½-year FBI sting, acting assistant attorney general John C. Richter and FBI agent Jana D. Monroe said. Monroe directs FBI operations in Arizona.


The single conspiracy count carries a maximum prison term of five years and a fine of $250,000. The 16 defendants have agreed to cooperate with the ongoing investigation, officials said.

Phony trafficking organization
The FBI set up the phony trafficking organization in December 2001, then lured military and police personnel with money to help distribute the cocaine or allow it to pass through checkpoints they were guarding, officials said.

One defendant, John M. Castillo, 30, was on duty as an INS inspector at a border checkpoint in Nogales in April 2002 when he twice allowed a truck he believed was carrying at least 88 pounds of cocaine to enter the country without being inspected, the Justice Department said.

In another instance, also in 2002, several of those charged met an aircraft piloted by undercover FBI agents that was carrying 132 pounds of cocaine at a remote desert airstrip, officials said. In full uniform, they supervised the loading of the cocaine into two military Humvees assigned to the National Guard and another government vehicle, then drove to a resort hotel in Phoenix. There, another undercover agent posing as a trafficker paid them off in cash, the Justice Department said.

The FBI used real cocaine seized in other operations, the officials said. The 16 suspects transported more than 1,230 pounds of cocaine and accepted more than $222,000 in bribes, the officials said. Each escorted at least two shipments of cocaine to Phoenix, Las Vegas and other locations, they said.

© 2005 The Associated Press. All rights reserved. This material may not be published, broadcast, rewritten or redistributed.


Colombia seizes more than 13 tons of cocaine

Government says drugs belonged to right-wing paramilitaries


Updated: 8:58 a.m. ET May 14, 2005

BOGOTA, Colombia - More than 13.5 tons of cocaine stored in underground chambers was seized near Colombia’s southwest coast, authorities said Friday.

The cocaine was discovered Thursday in the jungle in Narino state, which lies along the Pacific coast and the Ecuador border. Five people were arrested.

“We believe this is the biggest storage area of cocaine in the world,” Navy Capt. Jairo Pena said Friday.


The seizure — one of the largest in recent years — represents more than 3 percent of what the U.S. government says is Colombia’s annual potential cocaine output of 430 tons.

Gen. Jorge Daniel Castro, chief of the Colombian National Police, said the cocaine belonged to right-wing paramilitary forces and leftist rebels. The groups are bitter enemies but have been known to occasionally cooperate in drug trafficking to earn huge profits.

“When committing a crime for economic reasons, they take advantage of any opportunity in search of means for financing terrorism,” Soto said.

Narino is one of Colombia’s prime cocaine-producing regions. Colombia produces the vast majority of the world’s cocaine.

In 2004, the U.S. Coast Guard and U.S. Navy seized 28 tons of cocaine from two fishing boats off the coast of the Galapagos Islands.

© 2005 The Associated Press. All rights reserved. This material may not be published, broadcast, rewritten or redistributed.


__________________
A TAINTED DEAL http://www.motherjones.com/politics/1998/06/tainted-deal

 LA DEA; Murder of Kiki Camarena http://www.laweekly.com/news/how-a-dogged-la-dea-agent-unraveled-the-cias-alleged-role-in-the-murder-of-kiki-camarena-5750278  

"Several informed sources have told me that an appendix to this Report was removed at the instruction of the DOJ at the last minute. This appendix is reported to have information about a CIA officer, not agent or asset, but officer, based in the LA Station, who was in charge of Contra related activities. According to these sources, this individual was associated with running drugs to South Central L.A., around 1988. Let me repeat that amazing omission. The recently released CIA Report Vol II contained an appendix, which was pulled by the DOJ, that reported a CIA officer in the LA Station was hooked into drug running in South Central Los Angeles." Maxine Waters Oct, 1998
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August 2, 2004
'91 U.S. Report Calls Colombian Leader Ally of Drug Lords
By JUAN FORERO
NY TIMES


Associated Press
President Álvaro Uribe backs U.S. efforts against drug trafficking.

BOGOTÁ, Colombia, Aug. 1 - A recently declassified American intelligence report from 1991 says that President Álvaro Uribe, now a staunch ally in Washington's war against drug trafficking, was at that time a close associate of Colombia's most powerful drug lord and an ardent ally of the cocaine traffickers then engulfing this country.

A spokesman for Mr. Uribe denounced the findings in the 13-year-old report, by the Defense Intelligence Agency, on Colombia's biggest drug traffickers as "the same information" presented in a smear campaign by political opponents in the 2002 presidential election. Senior American intelligence officials and diplomats cautioned that such reports might not be accurate. However, the statement issued by the spokesman for the president did not directly address the report's most damaging assertion: that Mr. Uribe was linked to the top drug kingpin of the era, Pablo Escobar.

The report, dated Sept. 23, 1991, and obtained through the Freedom of Information Act by the National Security Archives, a private, nonpartisan research group based in Washington, says Mr. Uribe, then a senator from the northern state of Antioquia, was "dedicated to collaboration with the Medellín cartel at high government levels."

The report, which the archives is making public on Monday, calls Mr. Uribe a "close personal friend" of the cartel's leader, Mr. Escobar, and says Mr. Uribe took part in the drug lord's successful efforts to secure a seat as an auxiliary congressman. It said Mr. Uribe was linked to an unidentified business involved in narcotics in the United States, that as a senator he opposed extraditing traffickers to the United States and that his father, Alberto Uribe, was killed because of his drug ties.

In response to inquiries by The New York Times, Ricardo Galán, a spokesman for Mr. Uribe, issued an eight-point response on Friday that said the Defense Intelligence Agency report was of a preliminary nature. The statement said that in 1991 Mr. Uribe was studying at Harvard and that he had never had business dealings in the United States.

The statement also said Mr. Uribe's father was killed resisting Marxist rebels who were trying to kidnap him. It affirmed Mr. Uribe's commitment to extradition, though it only loosely explained then-Senator Uribe's opposition to a proposed referendum on extradition. It did not address the report's allegation that Mr. Uribe took part in the campaign that propelled Mr. Escobar to Congress.

Robert Zimmerman, a State Department spokesman, was more emphatic in denying the report's findings. "We completely disavow these allegations about President Uribe," he said, adding, "We have no credible information that substantiates or corroborates the allegations in an unevaluated 1991 report."

Still, the report is sure to raise new questions about allegations made in 2001 and 2002, when Mr. Uribe was campaigning for the presidency, about possible ties to drug dealers, including the powerful Ochoa clan in Medellín, Colombia's drug-trafficking center. Solid evidence was never presented, though, and Mr. Uribe won in a landslide based on his pledge that he would fight Marxist rebels and drug traffickers.

The United States has strongly supported Mr. Uribe since then, and he is considered among the Bush administration's closest allies in its effort to curb drug trafficking.

During his two years in office, much of Colombia's vast drug fields have been eradicated in defoliation efforts financed by Washington. About 150 Colombians accused of drug trafficking have been extradited to the United States, more than double the number extradited by Mr. Uribe's predecessor during his four-year term.

Senior diplomats and intelligence officials involved in the drug war in Colombia at the time cautioned against drawing conclusions from the report, noting that such documents were routinely produced with little vetting or oversight.

But Michael L. Evans, the director of the Colombia documentation project of the National Security Archive, said the report provided strong evidence of Mr. Uribe's involvement in the drug trade. "We now know that the D.I.A., either through its own reporting or through liaison with another investigative agency, had information indicating that Álvaro Uribe was one of Colombia's top drug-trafficking figures," he said, though it was unclear what other agency might be involved.

He said the document's summary categorically stated that the report provided "information on the more important Colombian narco-traffickers."

The report says information on some of the people cited in it has been crosschecked with other agencies, though it is not clear if Mr. Uribe was among those whose alleged involvement was carefully traced by another agency. It was sent to Washington with a corresponding list of photographs, indicating its possible use for investigative purposes.

"All indications are this is not your run-of-the-mill field report," Mr. Evans said. "I don't think it's a smoking gun. It's a document that the Defense Intelligence Agency had, and they took it seriously enough to forward to Washington with minimal, if any, caveats at the time."

The intelligence document lists 104 drug traffickers and associates, including lawyers, right-wing paramilitary fighters, a Peruvian rebel commander and a Colombian singer. A summary detailing each subject's ties to the drug trade follows.

Among those on the list are Mr. Escobar; Manuel Noriega, the former president of Panama now jailed in Miami on drug-trafficking charges and Adnan Khashoggi, an arms dealer.

Past questions raised about Mr. Uribe included allegations that he was friendly with the Ochoa family, which had been involved in trafficking cocaine with Mr. Escobar before he was killed by the Colombian police in 1993. Mr. Uribe was also accused of having granted, when he was head of the civil aviation authority, permits to pilots who were accused of transporting cocaine. From 1995 to 1997, when he was governor of Antioquia, drug-running paramilitary groups multiplied in that state.

Mr. Uribe has steadfastly denied the accusations. Furthermore, it is not unusual for politicians, celebrities or industrialists in Colombia, long plagued by drugs, to be acquainted with drug dealers. Mr. Uribe, for instance, says he knew the Ochoas only because of their common interest in Colombia's paso fino horses. Ernesto Samper, Colombia's president from 1994 to 1998, was accused of taking money from traffickers and subsequently was denied a visa to travel to the United States.

"It's not implausible, because the milieu in the 1980's was very much dominated by the drug trade and Pablo Escobar was such a dominant figure," said Michael Shifter, a senior analyst at Washington's Inter-American Dialogue, a policy group that closely tracks Colombia. "Regrettably, it wouldn't be so surprising for there to be some contacts between anyone who was an aspiring political figure and Pablo Escobar."

Morris Busby, who became the American ambassador shortly after the report was written and said he did not remember it, cautioned that some of the reports collected by intelligence agencies came to questionable conclusions.

He and other diplomats and intelligence officers, told about the report, noted that its labeling as "not finally evaluated" and indicated that its author relied on raw information that had not been confirmed.

"What it means is, we're telling you everything we're hearing," said Busby, now retired. "It's not evaluated in that it's been bounced against other things they had."

William Naughton, who was the Defense Intelligence Agency's officer for Latin America at the time, said the info in the report "may contain reliable information or not."

"It's not something you'd necessarily go to court on," he said.

Bernard Aronson, a former assistant secretary of state for Latin America who closely supervised the American war on drugs in Colombia in the 1990's, said intelligence reports on drug trafficking were sometimes influenced by rivalries for financing and prestige among the Central Intelligence Agency, the Defense Intelligence Agency, the Drug Enforcement Administration and others heavily involved in Colombia.

"These people tend to be brave people, but they're a special breed," Mr. Aronson said of those who work for such agencies. "They are sometimes cowboys and they are not always known for their analytical prowess."



http://www.americas.org/item_15825
U.S. Intelligence Tied Colombia's Uribe to Drug Trade in '91 Report
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Published by the Los Angeles Times, 8/2/04

By T. Christian Miller, Times Staff Writer
WASHINGTON — Colombian President Alvaro Uribe, one of the Bush administration's most steadfast allies in South America, was allegedly a "close personal friend" of slain drug lord Pablo Escobar and worked for his Medellin cartel, according to a newly released U.S. military intelligence report.

The 1991 report by the Defense Intelligence Agency describes Uribe, then a rising star in Colombian politics, as "dedicated to collaboration" with the Medellin cartel, at the time the world's richest criminal organization and the source of most of the cocaine imported into the U.S.
The memo devotes a single paragraph to Uribe and his alleged narcotics involvement, listing him 82nd among 104 of the "more important Colombian narco-traffickers."

The allegations about Uribe, who was elected president in 2002, were strongly repudiated by the Colombian government, the State Department and the Pentagon.

All three described the memo, released to a nonprofit research group under a public records request, as uncorroborated information contradicted by Uribe's strong support for efforts to wipe out cocaine in Colombia and extradite drug suspects to the United States.

Under Uribe, Colombia's production of coca, the source of cocaine, has dropped by more than 50% through intense, U.S.-funded fumigation efforts, and more than 160 suspected drug traffickers have been indicted, U.S. defense officials said.

"We completely disavow these allegations against President Uribe," said Robert Zimmerman, a spokesman for the State Department's Western Hemisphere Affairs Bureau, which monitors Colombia. "We have no credible information that substantiates or corroborates the allegations."

News of the memo comes at a delicate time for Uribe, who is negotiating a peace deal with right-wing paramilitaries involved in drug dealing and is seeking a constitutional amendment to allow him to run for a second term in office.

The memo, which was made public today, appeared likely to resuscitate rumors about Uribe's controversial past, including his alleged connections with the drug trade. It also feeds perceptions of pervasive drug corruption in Colombia, which nearly felled former President Ernesto Samper in the 1990s, when it was discovered that his presidential campaign had received drug money.

"This is a very hard blow," said Daniel Garcia-Peña, a former Colombian government peace negotiator and left-leaning political analyst. "Being an official report from a U.S. agency, this is going to reopen a chapter that Uribe thought he'd closed. It's grave, grave."

Uribe isn't the only popular figure listed in the memo. No. 89 is Carlos Vives, then an aspiring actor and now a Grammy-winning pop star. The memo describes Vives as being "involved in narcotics trafficking" and said he worked closely with an uncle who was a trafficker in the Medellin cartel.

Vives, who has lived in Miami since the early 1990s, could not be reached for comment Sunday. Sources said he was a favorite performer of traffickers from his coastal region of Santa Marta, who would invite him to perform at their parties. The same sources said they doubted that Vives was directly involved in trafficking.

Pentagon and State Department officials took pains to deny the validity of the information in the document, which was obtained through a Freedom of Information Act request by the National Security Archives, a nonprofit research group in Washington.

A Pentagon spokesman said the memo consisted of unconfirmed allegations and did not represent an official position of the Department of Defense. The spokesman said he knew of no other intelligence reports linking Uribe to the narcotics business.

"It's not a smoking gun. The reliability and validity of this raw data is very suspect, to say the least," said Army Lt. Col. Chris Conway, a Pentagon spokesman.

One U.S. intelligence official said that the memo, produced shortly after President George H. W. Bush ordered the military to begin tracking drug trafficking more closely, was based on a single confidential informant in Colombia.

The official noted that such information is typically passed on unedited to military intelligence analysts in Washington to avoid misinterpretation of the raw data.

This explanation is backed up by the presence of several errors in the report. One drug trafficker is listed as Fidel Castro with an alias of "Rambo" — an apparent mix-up with Fidel Castaño, a legendary onetime assassin and paramilitary fighter who went by that moniker.

"The one thing you don't want to do is sanitize the information in a report like this," the intelligence official said. "You want to keep it [as] close to raw intelligence as you can."

Colombian government officials denied that Uribe had dealings with the drug trade. They said the charges were similar to attacks Uribe faced during his 2002 presidential campaign and questioned whether the source for the document had political motives.

They pointed out factual errors in the document, which said Uribe had "attacked all forms" of an extradition treaty with the U.S. that Escobar had opposed. Uribe supported the treaty, they said, though he suggested postponing a vote to avoid pressure from drug lords.

They also noted that Uribe was studying at Harvard University in 1991 and questioned why the U.S. Embassy would issue a visa to someone suspected of having drug connections.

"The document shows that it is about information that was not evaluated," said a statement issued by Uribe's press office.

Nonetheless, Colombia experts said the document revived questions about Uribe's background.

Human rights groups have frequently alleged that the hard-charging politician had ties to right-wing paramilitary groups, and rumors have surfaced about purported drug links.

"We do know that DIA believed the document was serious and important enough to pass on to intelligence analysts in Washington," said Michael Evans, director of the Colombia Documentation Project for the National Security Archives.

But skeptics of Uribe were careful about the document's assertions about drug links. Uribe has based his political career on his reputation for honesty and his fight against corruption.

"It's not entirely unbelievable, but you need to put it in context, and you need a lot more specifics," said Adam Isacson, an expert on Colombia with the left-leaning Center for International Policy. "Was he turning a blind eye [to drug dealing], or was he actually part of the circle?"

The context goes back to the 1980s, when Pablo Escobar had turned a small drug-running operation into a criminal empire centered in Medellin, where Uribe was appointed mayor in 1982.

Uribe has long acknowledged that his youth and career in Medellin brought him into contact with drug world figures. A horse lover and cattle rancher, Uribe grew up competing in dressage events with the Ochoa clan, who would later become close allies of Escobar.

Cocaine money was omnipresent in Medellin at the time and Escobar was seen as a Robin Hood type who built houses and soccer fields for the poor. He paid off some politicians, killed others and had himself elected as a substitute representative to the national assembly.

The memo suggests that Uribe's links to Escobar date at least from that period. It says Uribe "participated" in Escobar's political campaign to win the seat.

The memo also said Uribe had links to an unnamed business tied to narcotics activities in the U.S. and that Uribe's father was killed for ties to drug lords. Uribe's father was killed by rebels with the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia in 1983. Colombian military officials have long described the incident as a botched kidnapping attempt.

Although several Colombian and U.S. officials said it was possible that Uribe knew Escobar or ignored signs of drug trafficking, they discounted the idea that he played an important role in the operations.

Thomas E. McNamara, the U.S. ambassador to Colombia until a few months before the memo was written, said Uribe "never came up on my screen."

"If everything said in that short paragraph were true, those of us in the embassy working the issue hard would have had him in our scopes," said McNamara, now a counterterrorism consultant to the State Department. "He wasn't."

Whatever its validity, the document is likely to play a role in Colombia's politics. Uribe has drawn a host of critics despite his popularity for curtailing rebel attacks and kidnappings.

The publication of the document comes as criticism of the talks with paramilitaries is increasing. The U.S. has faulted Uribe's negotiators for being overly forgiving of the rightists, who are suspected of killing thousands of peasants. And Colombians are demanding results, since as many as 400 people have been killed or kidnapped by paramilitaries since the talks began.

Military analyst Alfredo Rangel predicted that the president would emerge with his credibility intact.

"Since he's been the object of so many accusations that haven't taken root, the public will see this as a rehashing of old accusations," Rangel said. "The public won't trust the substance of these accusations, and it will give him an opportunity to show they aren't true."


Special correspondent Ruth Morris in Bogota contributed to this report.

This article was originally published by the sources above and is copyrighted by the sources above. We offer it here as an educational tool to increase understanding of global economics and social justice issues. We believe this is 'fair use' of copyrighted material as provided for in section 107 of the US Copyright Law. AMERICAS.ORG is a nonprofit Web site with the goal of educating and informing.

Posted on Mon, Aug. 02, 2004



http://www.mercurynews.com/mld/mercurynews/news/world/9304703.htm

U.S. Defends Uribe Over Alleged Drug Ties

DAN MOLINSKI

Associated Press

BOGOTA, Colombia - The United States rushed to the defense of Colombian President Alvaro Uribe Monday after a recently declassified 1991 U.S. military intelligence report linked him to powerful drug traffickers more than a decade ago.

Both the State Department and the Pentagon delivered unusually strong statements in support of Uribe, who is a strong ally of Washington in the war on drugs.

"We completely disavow the allegations about Uribe. It's not credible information," State Department spokesman Robert Zimmerman said Monday, noting that Uribe has a record of strong opposition to drug trafficking.

"No conclusions can be drawn from it," said Lt. Col. Chris Conway, a Pentago spokesman, who said the report was raw, uncorroborated information from a single source.

The document was prepared by the Defense Intelligence Agency 13 years ago, when Uribe was a Colombian senator. It was released Monday by the National Security Archive, a private research group based in Washington that used the U.S. Freedom of Information Act to make the document public.

The report placed Uribe as No. 82 on a list of 104 "important Colombian drug traffickers." It stated that Uribe had close ties to the powerful Medellin cartel, whose leader was former drug kingpin Pablo Escobar.

"Uribe has worked for the Medellin cartel and is a close personal friend of Pablo Escobar," states the 14-page document, in which Uribe is mentioned in just one paragraph.

Luis Alberto Moreno, Colombia's ambassador to the United States, told local radio Monday that the report was a rough draft document prepared by lower-level officials. He said it was never fully evaluated by higher officials in the U.S. Defense Department.


"Uribe's record on drug trafficking speaks for itself," Moreno said.

Indeed, Uribe has been committed to reducing drug trafficking since he took office in August 2002. Uribe has worked closely with Washington on an aerial eradication program in which U.S.-funded airplanes fly over drug fields and spray them with weed killer.

He also has authorized the extradition of more than 170 suspects to various countries, mainly for drug trafficking.

Uribe denied similar accusations of drug ties during his election campaign two years ago. Voters took little notice of the charges and elected him in a landslide victory.

Today, few politicians in Colombia, where most of the world's cocaine is produced, have links to the drug underworld. But observers note that many of them have some form of drug ties in their past.

Most Colombians are pleased with Uribe's hard-line stance against leftist guerrillas who have been fighting the government for four decades.

Uribe's office disputed other accusations in the 1991 document as well.

The U.S. document claims Uribe's father was killed because of his son's links to drug traffickers, but the president's office says he was killed while resisting a kidnapping attempt.

 





__________________
A TAINTED DEAL http://www.motherjones.com/politics/1998/06/tainted-deal

 LA DEA; Murder of Kiki Camarena http://www.laweekly.com/news/how-a-dogged-la-dea-agent-unraveled-the-cias-alleged-role-in-the-murder-of-kiki-camarena-5750278  

"Several informed sources have told me that an appendix to this Report was removed at the instruction of the DOJ at the last minute. This appendix is reported to have information about a CIA officer, not agent or asset, but officer, based in the LA Station, who was in charge of Contra related activities. According to these sources, this individual was associated with running drugs to South Central L.A., around 1988. Let me repeat that amazing omission. The recently released CIA Report Vol II contained an appendix, which was pulled by the DOJ, that reported a CIA officer in the LA Station was hooked into drug running in South Central Los Angeles." Maxine Waters Oct, 1998
https://fas.org/irp/congress/1998_cr/h981013-coke.htm   

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maynard

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http://www.drugwar.com/castillo.shtm



Cele Castillo on patrol in Vietnam, 1971 Felix Rodriguez' deputy at the U.S. Milgroup in Illopango, CORU assassin Luis Posada Carriles, was the terminal chief that sent Eugene Hasenfus off on his ill-fated October 1986 flight. Gustavo Villoldo, who was with Rodriguez at the Bay of Pigs and hunting Ché in Bolivia, functioned as a "combat advisor" to the Contras under writtten orders from Bush aide Gregg. He helped Rodriguez and Posada turn Illopango into a major drug port, according to Celerino Castillo, the DEA's senior Country Attaché to Guatemala and El Salvador from 1985 to 1990. It was Castillo who had developed much of the DEA evidence used by Senator Kerry.

Castillo was a heavily decorated Vietnam combat veteran who had recently commanded very dangerous DEA operations in New York, Peru and Guatemala. In New York, in the early 80’s, the bilingual street wise Tex-Mex demonstrated the nerve and talent to go after major dealers, producing bust after major bust. Castillo’s biggest bust, of an extensive Sicilian heroin importing and distribution operation, actually depended on his ability to translate the Spanish Pig-Latin of the ring’s warehouse manager.

This caused Castillo to find himself, in 1984, as the only Spanish-speaking DEA agent in Peru. That, of course, is an indication of the suicidal racism endemic in law enforcement culture, as Castillo was painfully aware.

His continuing record of major busts found Castillo in tactical charge of Operation Condor, coordinating DEA, CIA and Peruvian military elements. He made the largest coke bust in Peruvian history, a cocaine manufacturing and distribution compound that housed more than 600 people:

“The South American newspapers published multi-page articles on the raid, repeating the numbers: Four tons of coca paste seized from a lab capable of churning out 500 kilos of pure cocaine every day. The Peruvian government estimated the compound’s value at $500 million. It was the biggest cocaine lab capture in South American history.... We later discovered that the lab belonged to Arcesio and Omar Ricco, members of the Cali cartel.”

The undiplomatic Castillo insisted on pointing the finger directly at the covert elements within the Peruvian command structure responsible for protecting this and other jungle refineries. This caused Castillo's transfer to Guatemala.


Castillo in front of his major Operation Condor tool, a chopper; Castillo

"In October of 1985, upon my arrival in Guatemala, I was forewarned by Guatemala DEA, Country Attaché, Robert J. Stia, that the DEA had received intelligence that the Contras out of Salvador, were involved in drug trafficking. For the first time, I had come face to face with the contradictions of my assignment. The reason that I had been forewarned was because I would be the Lead Agent in El Salvador."

Col. James Steele, commander of the U. S. Military Group at Ilopango, arranged for Castillo to co-train elite drug squads for Salvadoran military intelligence. Their Salvadoran trainer was Dr. Hector Antonio Regalado, D'Aubuisson's top aide. "August 03, 1986, Ramiro Guerra, Lt. Col. A. Adame, Dr. Hector Regalado (Dr. Death, who claimed to have shot Archbishop Romero) and myself went out on patrol in El Salvador." Regalado combined his training at the School of the Americas in Ft. Benning with his expertise as a dentist to inflict excruciating pain during "interrogation." It was these Nazi skills that he taught to Castillo's "drug" squads.

The situation was the same in neighboring Guatemala: "I participated in numerous joint operations with the CIA and Guatemalan security forces, principally the D-2 (Guatemalan military intelligence...)....The level of CIA and DEA involvement in operations that included torture and murder in Guatemala is much higher than the [6/28/96 Intelligence Oversight Board] report indicates. With US anti-narcotics funding still being funneled to the Guatemalan Military, this situation continues."


Castillo’s evidence photo and note

“Dec. 03, 1988, DEA seized 356 kilos of cocaine in Tiquisate, Guatemala (DEA #TG-89-0002; Hector Sanchez). Several Colombians were murdered on said operation and condoned by the DEA and CIA. I have pictures of individuals that were murdered in said case. The target was on Gregorio Valdez (CIA asset) of the Guatemalan Piper Co. At that time, all air operations for the CIA and DEA flew out of Piper.”


Castillo’s photos of the murdered pilots

“With every killing, G2 took stacks of cash and bags of cocaine. In a faint nod to the law, they usually turned over a portion of the confiscated dope to beef up the country’s drug war numbers. they sold the rest, or saved it to frame future victims.”


One of the dead pilots, drowned in a bucket of water; Castillo's note

"The CIA, with knowledge of ambassadors and the State Department and National Security Council officials, as well as Congress, continued this aid after the termination of overt military assistance in 1990....Several contract pilots for the DEA and CIA worked out of [the Guatemala] Piper [Company in Guatemala City] and most were documented narcotic traffickers."

Castillo realized he couldn't control the situation at all. He was simply being used for his logistical clout. The Salvadoran and Guatemalan militaries controlled the actual busts, which were politicized, and from which the coke almost always found its way into the hands of military intelligence, which resold it, by the ton. These butchers were, in fact, the dealers. Castillo's stomach turned. "I realized how hopelessly tangled DEA, the CIA, and every other U.S. entity had become with the criminals."

"The CIA and Guatemalan army also label as communist sympathizers anyone who opposes the traditional oppressive role of the Guatemalan military. Therefore, they label as communists or communist sympathizers, priests and nuns who work to elevate the position of the poor in society, union organizers...indigenous leaders (the Indians are kept down so that they can be used as cheap laborers by the rich, who are supported by the military) and student activists....The CIA supports the intimidation, kidnapping and torture, surveillance and murder of these people."

"As an example, look at the case of Dianna Ortiz, the American nun who was working with poor children and was kidnapped, raped and tortured by Guatemalan soldiers....I was present at the US Embassy in Guatemala, when, just after the incident, several members of the DEA, State Department and CIA jokingly asked me if Dianna Ortiz had been good at sex. The reason they were teasing me was that she had said that an American Hispanic with possible ties to the US Embassy had been present during her torture and rape. Since everyone at the Embassy knew that I worked with the Guatemalan Military's D-2, and Sister Ortiz reported that soldiers had captured her, the people at the Embassy assumed that I was the American involved. (She was later shown photos of me and stated that I was not the person she had seen there, referred to by the soldiers as their boss.) I believe the reason that these DEA, State Department and CIA personnel would joke about such a thing is that they label Dianna Ortiz as a communist sympathizer. People with that mind set do not believe that she should be protected."

Castillo investigated Col. Julio Alpirez, who ordered the 1993 murder of captured guerrilla leader Efraín Bámaca, Jennifer Harbury's husband. Michael Devine, an American innkeeper, was also murdered by Alpirez. "He was killed in June 1990, murdered by Guatemalan soldiers, according to the IOB report. What the report does not mention, however, is that Colonel Alpirez was the director of the notorious Archivos while he was also a CIA asset and that he hadpreviously been reported to the DEA for drug trafficking. This is documented in DEA General file number GFTG-88-9077 with filename "Corrupt Official" dated June 09, 1988. I was the agent who initiated the file."

"Colonel Alpirez is also documented as a narcotics trafficker in DEA case file number TG-88-0009 entitled"Moreno-Campos, Aparicio", dated August 25, 1988 and submitted by me. In both case files, Alpirez is named along with his subordinate, Carlos Rene Perez-Alvarez, who was known as Won Ton of La Mano Blanca (the White Hand of the death squads). Carlos Rene Perez-Alvarez operated "la panel blanca" (the White Van)that has patrolled the streets of Guatemala for so many years, kidnapping and murdering people for the death squads."

"On page A-3, the report refers to a personality profile on DeVine that was 'generally positive, but noted a somewhat aggressive manner and a readiness to denounce people involved in narcotics trafficking.' The latter comment is, in my view, a key to thereason that he was killed. The connections of DeVine to Alpirez, Alpirez to the CIA, the CIA to the D-2 and the D-2 to the murderof DeVine can all be found in the IOB report, supporting what I was told about the case."

"Here is what I believe to be the truth about the DeVine case, according to my sources. 1. Colonel Alpirez was trafficking drugs. (see DEA case filenumber GFTG-88-9077 and number TG-88-0009). 2. Colonel Alpirez was a CIA asset (according to the IOB reportand numerous other sources). 3. DeVine gained knowledge of Alpirez's drug trafficking activities while Alpirez was training Kaibil forces in the Petenclose to his farm. 4. DeVine reported Alpirez's drug trafficking activities to the US Embassy in Guatemala. 5. After DeVine reported Alpirez to the US Embassy, RandyCapister, a CIA agent operating out of the embassy, contacted Colonel Francis (Paco) Ortega, former head of the D-2, and a CIAand DEA asset. He told Ortega that DeVine had reported ColonelAlpirez (another CIAasset) for drug trafficking. (per phoneconversation between myself and Randy Capister after the death of DeVine in 1990). 6. Colonel Ortega contacted the new head of the D-2, Colonel Cesar Cabrera, who had been under Ortega's command earlier (WhenColonel Ortega was head of the D-2, Cabrera was a lieutenant colonel and Ortega’s second in command). 7. Cabrera, chief of the D-2 ordered the so-called"interrogation" of DeVine and was therefore 'indirectlyresponsible for DeVine’s death' (See IOB report page A-3). (This "interrogation" included a machete blow that almost completely severed DeVine's head from his body.)" (All parentheses Castillo's)

It was Alpirez' protected drug plantations and dealing structure, two years after the murder of DeVine, that Efraín Bámaca, Commandante Everardo, threatened to expose. Although Castillo could shed professional DEA light on CIA complicity in the drug dealing of its ally, Guatemalan D-2, Walsh couldn't "declassify" Castillo's testimony, or save his career. Castillo's book, Powderburns, is essential reading for anyone after a realistic assessment of the Drug War.


Jennifer Harbury on hunger strike in front of the Guatemalan National Palace, October, 1994, with a picture of her murdered husband, Efraín Bámaca Velasquez

Although Iran-Contra Special Prosecutor Lawrence Walsh interviewed Castillo extensively, not one word of his verifiable, professional testimony, backed up by DEA case file and NADDIS numbers, could be found in Walsh's voluminous 1993 Final Report of the Independent Counsel for Iran/Contra Matters. Walsh had no choice - Castillo's testimony had been "classified." Likewise the remarkable testimony of CIA agent Brenneke, elicited by Congressman Alexander. Explained Walsh, "In addition to the unclassified Volumes I and II of this report, a brief classified report, Volume III, has been filed with the Special Division. The classified report contains references to material gathered in the investigation of Iran/contra that could not be declassified and could not be concealed by some substitute form of discussion." Later on in the report, referring to dope-dealing CIA Costa Rica station chief Joe Fernandez, Walsh complained that "We've created a class of intelligence officer who cannot be prosecuted."

"The main target of that case was a Guatemalan Congressman, (Carlos Ramiro Garcia de Paz) who took delivery of 2,404 kilos of cocaine in Guatemala just before the interrogation. This case directly implicated the Guatemalan Government in drug trafficking (The Guatemalan Congressman still has his US visa and continues to travel at his pleasure into the US). To add salt to the wound, in 1989 these murders were investigated by the U.S Department of Justice, Office of Professional Responsibility. DEA S/I Tony Recevuto determined that the Guatemalan Military Intelligence, G-2 (the worst human rights violators in the Western Hemisphere) was responsible for these murders. Yet, the U.S. government continued to order U.S. agents to work hand-in-hand with the Guatemalan Military. This information was never turned over to the I.O.B. investigation."


The murdered Jairo Gilardo-Ocampo, José Ramón and Maria Parra-Iniguez

"I have obtained a letter, dated May 28, 1996, from the DEA administrator, to U.S. Congressman Lloyd Doggett (D), Texas. In this letter, the administrator flatly lies, stating that DEA agents 'have never engaged in any joint narcotics programs with the Guatemalan Military.' I was there. I was the leading Agent in Guatemala. 99.9% of DEA operations were conducted with the Guatemalan military."


DEA agents Von Briesen and Castillo with a machine gun toting Guatemalan G-2 agent in the background; Castillo’s note

The Office of Professional Responsibility actually used false testimony from Castillo's would-be Guatemalan assassin, Col. Moran, to force Castillo's premature retirement. Felix Rodriguez, on the other hand, was full of medals from Salvadoran generals and Col. James Steele.




                               

Welcome to the official website of retired DEA Agent Celerino "Cele" Castillo III.                 Cele Castillo served for 12 years in the Drug Enforcement Administration where he built cases against                 organized drug rings in Manhattan, raided jungle cocaine labs in the amazon, conducted aerial eradication                 operations in Guatemala, and assembled and trained anti-narcotics units in several countries.

                The eerie climax of agent Castillo's career with the DEA took place in El Salvador. One day, he received a                 cable from a fellow agent. He was told to investigate possible drug smuggling by Nicaraguan Contras operating                 from the Ilopango Air Force Base.

Castillo quickly discovered that the Contra pilots were, indeed,                 smuggling narcotics back into the United States - using the same pilots, planes and hangers that the Central                 Intelligence Agency and the National Security Council, under the direction of Lt. Col. Oliver North, used to                 maintain their covert supply operation to the Contras.

               
               

               
       

       

       



               

               

Cele Castillo in Vietnam

               

               

DEA Agent Cele Castillo in Guatemala

               

               

Cele Castillo with Vice President George H.W. Bush in Guatemala (1986)

               

               

Cele Castillo with President Carter in Peru (1984)

               

               

Cele With Peruvian Army Generals

               

               

Operation Condor in Peru and Volcano in Guatemala

               

               

Cele With Fellow DEA Agents

               

               

Cele at Cocaine Bust in Guatemala

               

               

Cele having lunch in Vietnam

               

               

Russ Reina, Bob Stia and Cele Castillo

               

               

Cele In Vietnam

               

               

Randy Capister, his wife and Cele

               

               

Cele in training at DEA Academy

               

               

Cele paying his repects at Vietnam War Memorial

               

               

Fellow Army Buddies In Vietnam

               

               

Cocaine evidence




__________________
A TAINTED DEAL http://www.motherjones.com/politics/1998/06/tainted-deal

 LA DEA; Murder of Kiki Camarena http://www.laweekly.com/news/how-a-dogged-la-dea-agent-unraveled-the-cias-alleged-role-in-the-murder-of-kiki-camarena-5750278  

"Several informed sources have told me that an appendix to this Report was removed at the instruction of the DOJ at the last minute. This appendix is reported to have information about a CIA officer, not agent or asset, but officer, based in the LA Station, who was in charge of Contra related activities. According to these sources, this individual was associated with running drugs to South Central L.A., around 1988. Let me repeat that amazing omission. The recently released CIA Report Vol II contained an appendix, which was pulled by the DOJ, that reported a CIA officer in the LA Station was hooked into drug running in South Central Los Angeles." Maxine Waters Oct, 1998
https://fas.org/irp/congress/1998_cr/h981013-coke.htm   

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maynard

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Slip Opinions Home Page | Keyword | Case | Docket | Date: Filed / Added |    Download WordPerfect version (18737 bytes)     Download RTF version (13509 bytes)

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

TENTH CIRCUIT


WALTER LEE GRASHEIM,

Plaintiff-Appellant,

v.

EDWIN CORR, Individually and in his official capacity as Ambassador to El Salvador; CELERINO CASTILLO, III, Individually, and in his capacity as a Special Agent for the Drug Enforcement Administration,

Defendants-Appellees.



No. 99-6259

(D.C. No. CIV-98-1246-W)

(Western District of Oklahoma)


ORDER AND JUDGMENT(*)


Before BALDOCK and McWILLIAMS, Circuit Judges, and SHADUR, District Judge.(**)


In a 23-page complaint filed on September 9, 1998, in the United States District Court for the Western District of Oklahoma, Walter Lee Grasheim ("Grasheim") brought suit against the United States of America, four of its governmental agencies, eleven named individuals and six John Does. Two of the named individual defendants were Edwin Corr ("Corr"), the ambassador to El Salvador when the events which formed the basis for the complaint occurred, and Celerino Castillo, III ("Castillo"), a special agent for the Drug Enforcement Administration assigned to El Salvador at the time of the underlying events. In this appeal we are only concerned with Corr and Castillo, who, collectively, will hereinafter be referred to as "the Defendants."

In his complaint Grasheim, who apparently was a United States citizen, alleged that from 1984 through September 1, 1986, he was residing in and doing business in El Salvador and, at the same time, was under contract with the Department of Defense to provide equipment in the form of night vision equipment and expertise as well as training the Salvadoran Armed Forces. He further alleged that, when he was temporarily in the United States, the Defendants unlawfully conspired with themselves and others to have the local Salvadoran authorities raid his residence in El Salvador, ostensibly for drugs, which they did on September 1, 1986. In that search, in which no drugs were apparently found, Grasheim alleged that numerous of his personal effects were illegally seized. Based thereon, Grasheim asserted a Bivens claim under Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents, 403 U.S. 388 (1971) and a RICO claim under 18 U.S.C. § 1964, et seq., against Defendants and others. Grasheim then went on to allege that after September 1, 1986, the Defendants "fraudulently concealed" their participation in the raid, tolling any statute of limitations, and that he didn't become aware of the true facts until "late 1996" when he learned that Castillo had published a book wherein he admitted "orchestrating" the raid. Grasheim sought actual damages in the amount of $2,500,000.00, treble damages for his RICO claim and punitive damages in excess of $1,000,000.00.

Corr and Castillo filed motions to dismiss or, alternatively, for summary judgment based on the applicable statutes of limitations. (It is agreed that the Bivens claim has a

two year statute of limitations and the RICO claim a four year statute.) At the hearing on Corr's and Castillo's motions to dismiss, matters were relied on which were outside the pleadings, whereupon the district court elected to treat the motion to dismiss as a motion for summary judgment under Fed. R. Civ. P. 56, and allowed the parties time within which to file "all material" pertinent to a Rule 56 motion.(1) On June 21, 1999, after argument, the district court granted summary judgment for both Corr and Castillo, holding that both the Bivens claim and the RICO claim were time barred. In so holding, the district court concluded that on the record before it, "Grasheim knew, or should have known, at least by 1990 the critical facts giving rise to his causes of action." The district court further stated that "because Grasheim was aware of sufficient facts at least by 1990 to pursue his lawsuit, the court finds no grounds to support Grasheim's argument that the limitation periods should be equitably tolled until 1996." Grasheim appeals the judgment thus entered.

As stated, the district court concluded that on the record before it Grasheim either knew or should have known "at least by 1990 the critical facts giving rise to his causes of action," which would mean that the complaint, filed in 1998, was well beyond both the two year and four year statutes of limitations. On appeal, Grasheim's position is that he didn't really know of any cause of action he might have against Corr and Castillo until late 1996, when he learned of Castillo's book implicating Castillo, Corr, and others in the unlawful raid of Grasheim's home in El Salvador, which, if correct, would mean that the complaint, filed in 1998, would be within the two year and four year statutes of limitations. The Defendants argue that the district court's determination that Grasheim "knew or should have known" by 1990 is amply supported by the record, and suggest that actually Grasheim "knew or should have known" as early as the fall of 1986.

For purpose of a statute of limitations, a cause of action accrues when the plaintiff knows or has reason to know of the injury which is the basis for the action and its cause. Baker v. Board of Regents, 991 F.2d 628, 632 (10th Cir. 1993); Arvayo v. United States, 766 F.2d 1416, 1419 (10th Cir. 1985). We reject any suggestion that a plaintiff must "conclusively" know of the injury and its cause before a statute of limitations is triggered. Chasteen v. Unisia Jecs Corp., 216 F.3d 1212, 1218 (10th Cir. 2000); Baker, 991 F.2d at 632. Our study of the record convinces us that the district court did not err in holding that Grasheim knew or should have known at least by 1990 the "critical facts," and, indeed, such is amply supported by the record. Events occurring between 1986 and 1990, which are enumerated by the district court in its order, support its determination that Grasheim's claims are time barred and preclude him from asserting claims made some 12 years after the fact.(2)

Judgment affirmed.

ENTERED FOR THE COURT

Robert H. McWilliams

Circuit Judge


FOOTNOTES
Click footnote number to return to corresponding location in the text.

*. This order and judgment is not binding precedent, except under the doctrines of law of the case, res judicata, and collateral estoppel. The court generally disfavors the citation of orders and judgments; nevertheless, an order and judgment may be cited under the terms and conditions of 10th Cir. R. 36.3

**. Honorable Milton I. Shadur, District Judge, United States District Court for the Northern District of Illinois, sitting by designation.


1.On motion, the district court first dismissed Grasheim's claim against the United States and the agency defendants. Individual defendants severally filed motions to dismiss under Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b), alleging, inter alia, that Grasheim's claims were time barred. Grasheim filed a response to those motions. The district court granted those motions for all individual defendants except Corr and Castillo. At the same time, the district court noted that since Corr and Castillo had presented matters outside the pleadings, it would treat their motions to dismiss as motions for summary judgment under Fed. R. Civ. P. 56. As indicated, we are here only concerned with Corr and Castillo.

2.In addition to the matter mentioned by the district court in its order, we also note that on December 13, 1990, Grasheim, when interviewed by an FBI agent, stated, inter alia, that he had learned that a few days before the September 1, 1986, raid on his house, Castillo and others met with Corr and discussed raiding his house for drugs and that he (Grasheim) believed that the drug charge was "totally trumped up to get him out of the picture for some unknown reason." To counter this and other evidence tending to show "knowledge" by at least 1990, Grasheim by affidavit suggested that he was only "bluffing" in an effort to establish the true facts.


http://www.kscourts.org/ca10/cases/2000/12/99-6259.htm


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A TAINTED DEAL http://www.motherjones.com/politics/1998/06/tainted-deal

 LA DEA; Murder of Kiki Camarena http://www.laweekly.com/news/how-a-dogged-la-dea-agent-unraveled-the-cias-alleged-role-in-the-murder-of-kiki-camarena-5750278  

"Several informed sources have told me that an appendix to this Report was removed at the instruction of the DOJ at the last minute. This appendix is reported to have information about a CIA officer, not agent or asset, but officer, based in the LA Station, who was in charge of Contra related activities. According to these sources, this individual was associated with running drugs to South Central L.A., around 1988. Let me repeat that amazing omission. The recently released CIA Report Vol II contained an appendix, which was pulled by the DOJ, that reported a CIA officer in the LA Station was hooked into drug running in South Central Los Angeles." Maxine Waters Oct, 1998
https://fas.org/irp/congress/1998_cr/h981013-coke.htm   

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maynard

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CIA Gave $10 Million to Peru's Ex-Spymaster

       

                                By                 Angel Paez,                 The Public i. Posted July 3, 2001.

       
                               
Vladimiro Montesinos, who now faces trial on murder, arms and drug trafficking charges, used millions of CIA dollars to, among other things, send guns to Colombia's FARC guerrillas.         Tools
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The Central Intelligence Agency gave ex-Peruvian spymaster Vladimiro Montesinos at least $10 million in cash over the last decade, as well as high-tech surveillance equipment that he used against his political opponents, the Center for Public Integrity has learned.

Montesinos, who now faces trial on murder, arms and drug trafficking charges, among others, had founded and personally controlled a counter-drug unit within Peru's National Intelligence Service, known by its Spanish acronym SIN.

It was to that Narcotics Intelligence Division, known as DIN, that the CIA directed at least $10 million in cash payments from 1990 until September 2000, U.S. officials told the Center's International Consortium of Investigative Journalists. Most of the money was to have financed intelligence activities in the drug war, though officials acknowledged a small part was for antiterrorist activities.

The CIA knew the money was going directly to Montesinos and had receipts for the payments, the sources said. "It was an agency-to-agency relationship," said one U.S. official, speaking on condition of anonymity in Lima, the capital, "with Vladimiro Montesinos as the intermediary.... Montesinos had the money under his control."

The new information on Montesinos is part of an extensive soon-to-be-released report by the International Consortium of Investigative Journalists (ICIJ) on U.S. aid to Latin America. The material on Montesinos is based on multiple interviews with U.S. and Peruvian officials.

A CIA spokesman in Washington refused to confirm or deny that the agency had helped fund DIN, and that part of those funds went into Montesino's pockets.

However, an intelligence official who asked not to be further identified confirmed that Montesinos had pocketed some, but not most, of the funds. He said that the CIA had been fully aware that Montesino was involved in corrupt deals and that the CIA had briefed the National Security Council, State Department and Pentagon about the alleged corruption. He said the agencies directed the CIA to continue to work with Montesinos because he was Peru's designated chief of counternarcotics and the only game in town.

Montesinos disappeared in October as the regime of Peruvian President Alberto Fujimori collapsed under wide-ranging corruption allegations and was seized in Venezuela on Saturday night, June 23. Montesinos was returned to Peru on June 25 to face an array of government charges.

U.S. Shrugged Off Reports

Over the years, the United States accumulated plenty of evidence of corruption, human rights abuses and other anti-democratic actions by Montesinos, but it shrugged off the reports because Montesinos -- the unofficial head of the National Intelligence Service -- was a CIA asset deemed key to Washington's drug war in the Andes.

But the final blow appeared to be Montesinos double-dealing in Colombia. In what is surely among the most embarrassing turns in post-Cold War U.S. foreign policy, Montesinos used his CIA-backed position of influence to get rich and to betray his benefactors. He arranged an arms deal that sent at least 10,000 AK-47 assault rifles from Jordan to Colombia's leftist FARC guerrillas, collectively public enemy number one in the U.S. war on drugs in Latin America and the main target of Washington's $1.3 billion counternarcotics aid package to Colombia.

Montesinos had long been fingered as corrupted by drug money, although many of the earlier claims that surfaced came from arrested drug dealers. But by 1997, the State Department began to document Montesinos' questionable activities in its annual human rights reports. The Senate Appropriations Committee noted in 1999 that it had "repeatedly expressed concern about U.S. support for the Peruvian National Intelligence Service" and requested that it "be consulted prior to any decision to provide assistance to the SIN."

Diversion of Funds No Surprise

The CIA suspected that Montesinos was involved in some illegal activities and was not surprised when informed of the diversion of funds, U.S. sources said. It continued doing business with him "because he solved problems, including problems he created himself," one U.S. source told ICIJ.

The U.S. Embassy has provided Peru's anti-corruption prosecutor with detailed information about the CIA's payments to Montesinos in response to the Peruvian government's wide-ranging investigations into Montesinos' malfeasance. The prosecutor, Ana Cecilia Magallanes, has told U.S. officials that she has documents showing the diversion of SIN money, including the CIA payments, toward illegal activities. Sources would not elaborate on what those activities included, but the prosecutor said it did not appear that those monies were diverted into Montesinos' personal accounts.

However, Peruvian prosecutors also allege that Montesinos collaborated with drug traffickers, who paid him and his associates protection money. After 10 years as the power behind Fujimori, Montesinos had at least $264 million deposited in foreign bank accounts in Switzerland, the United States, the Cayman Islands and other nations, Peru's equivalent of attorney general, Nelly Calderon Navarro, announced in June.

According to U.S. embassy officials in Lima interviewed by ICIJ, the SIN's narcotics intelligence unit was funded and assisted by both the CIA and the State Department's Bureau for International Narcotics and Law Enforcement. The State Department's share included $36,000 in 1996, $150,000 in 1997 and $25,000 in 1998, according to U.S. Embassy officials. In 1999, State withheld aid to the SIN because of congressional anger about reports that Montesinos was using the unit to gather intelligence on the regime's political opponents.

Three separate Peruvian military intelligence sources told ICIJ that surveillance equipment provided by the CIA for use in the drug war was instead used by the SIN to intercept the conversations of opposition political figures, journalists, businessmen and military officers suspected of disloyalty to the Fujimori regime. "Intelligence services" were sold to wealthy individuals, corporations or influential officers. A buyer could pay $1,000 to $2,500 per week to receive intercepts from the tapping of a single phone. Or, the military intelligence sources said, the wealthy buyers could pay spies to gather other information about individuals of their choosing.

Support Began in 1970s

The CIA began supporting Montesinos in the mid-1970s when he, as a middle-ranking Peruvian army officer, came to Washington on an unauthorized visit and handed over documents concerning Soviet arms deals with Peru. When the CIA learned of Montesinos' double-dealing with Colombia's FARC guerrillas, according to U.S. and Peruvian sources, it decided to try to bring him down.

The demise began with the mysterious release of a videotape showing Montesinos paying a $15,000 bribe to an opposition politician in September 2000. Hundreds of videotapes subsequently made public showed Montesinos and his subordinates paying off politicians, businessmen and journalists. Former military officers and civilian officials have since come forward to provide court testimony about the regime's involvement in bribery, arms and drug trafficking, and human rights violations including torture, espionage, extortion of political opponents and harassment of the press.

Peruvian military sources, speaking on condition of anonymity, told ICIJ that they believed that the CIA leaked some of the videotapes showing Montesinos' dirty deals.

Fujimori, who was re-elected president in June 2000 and amended the Peruvian constitution in order to retain the office for nearly three presidential terms, fled to Japan, where he resigned from office on Nov. 20, 2000.

Angel Paez is a Peruvian member of the Center for Public Integrity's International Consortium of Investigative Journalists.

http://www.alternet.org/story/11131/

__________________
A TAINTED DEAL http://www.motherjones.com/politics/1998/06/tainted-deal

 LA DEA; Murder of Kiki Camarena http://www.laweekly.com/news/how-a-dogged-la-dea-agent-unraveled-the-cias-alleged-role-in-the-murder-of-kiki-camarena-5750278  

"Several informed sources have told me that an appendix to this Report was removed at the instruction of the DOJ at the last minute. This appendix is reported to have information about a CIA officer, not agent or asset, but officer, based in the LA Station, who was in charge of Contra related activities. According to these sources, this individual was associated with running drugs to South Central L.A., around 1988. Let me repeat that amazing omission. The recently released CIA Report Vol II contained an appendix, which was pulled by the DOJ, that reported a CIA officer in the LA Station was hooked into drug running in South Central Los Angeles." Maxine Waters Oct, 1998
https://fas.org/irp/congress/1998_cr/h981013-coke.htm   

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maynard

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        Sunday, 24 June, 2001, 16:57 GMT 17:57 UK        
Montesinos: The end of the road
                                                       
                Vladimiro Montesinos
                                       
Mr Montesinos was involved in rooting out rebel groups
                               
                                                                               
BBC News Online looks back on the career of Vladimiro Montesinos which climaxed in scandal and intrigue in the Peruvian presidency.

For years Vladimiro Montesinos Torres was the 'eminence gris' in Peru behind the presidency of Alberto Fujimori.

The tragedy for ordinary Peruvians is that they enthusiastically voted for Mr Fujimori in 1989 believing one of his key campaign pledges - to end the country's rampant corruption.

                                               

                               
                former president Alberto Fujimori
                                       
Fujimori distanced himself from his former ally
                               
               
Yet throughout the 1990s Vladimiro Montesinos, as head of the intelligence service, was propping up Mr Fujimori by trying to bribe anyone who could be useful to the president.

His arrest in Venezuela has brought to an end a chapter of Peruvian history that began in 1989 with great hope but climaxed last year when Mr Fujimori took refuge in Japan following mounting accusations of government corruption involving Mr Montesinos.

Private lawyer

Mr Montesinos began his career in the Peruvian armed forces in the early 1970s, but in 1977 was thrown out of the army and sentenced to a year in jail.

In the 1980s, he began a fresh career as a private lawyer in the Peruvian capital, Lima.

Among his clients were several people charged with drug-trafficking offences, and others charged with tax evasion and fraud.

He is said to have met Alberto Fujimori when the latter was running for president for the first time in 1989-1990.

Mr Montesinos helped him over various charges of fraud, and is also credited with proving by means of a much-questioned birth certificate that Mr Fujimori had been born in Peru, and not in Japan - which would have excluded him from standing for the presidency.

Accusations

Following Mr Fujimori's election, Mr Montesinos was put in charge of anti-drug operations carried out in conjunction with the United States.

He was also closely involved in the successful campaign to root out the Sendero Luminoso (Shining Path) guerrilla movement.

Mr Montesino's power increased after the 1992 when President Fujimori suspended the constitution, closing down congress and the judiciary and taking a stranglehold on all aspects of institutional life in Peru.

                                               

                               
                Protesters burn an effigy of Vladimiro Montesinos
                                       
Bribery allegations led to protests demanding Mr Montesinos' arrest
                               
               
It was Mr Montesinos who helped appoint the new members of the armed forces' high command, and supreme court judges.

In 1997 he was Mr Fujimori's close adviser during the hostage crisis at the Japanese ambassador's residence, which ended when all the members of the Tupac Amaru group were killed.

His activities as security adviser to President Fujimori and as secretly-appointed head of the Peruvian intelligence services led to many accusations of human rights abuses against him.

None of these accusations was ever proved.

Direct challenge

As head of the intelligence services, Mr Montesinos was said to be responsible for an extensive network of informers which he used to threaten and blackmail opponents of the president, but again, nothing was ever traced back to him directly.

                                               

                               
                Protesters demanding that all the Vladi videos be made public
                                       
Protesters demanding that all the Vladi videos be made public
                               
               
                                                        It appears that it was these shady practices which ultimately brought about his downfall.

According to Peruvian press reports, the video film taken of him allegedly bribing a member of an opposition party to switch his allegiance to Mr Fujimori before elections last year was shot with one of his own hidden cameras.

When the video became public knowledge, President Fujimori was forced not only to distance himself from Mr Montesinos but to announce that he was resigning and calling early elections to find a successor.

Mr Montesinos headed for exile in Panama, where he apparently has business interests.

But a month later, the Panamanian authorities decided they would not grant him asylum there, and Vladimiro Montesinos flew back to Peru, apparently to mount a direct challenge to President Fujimori.

There had been fears that he might try to instigate a military coup. But following the formal resignation of Mr Fujimori on 20 November, the Peruvian military swore to abide by the constitution, and to respect any political changes made after the president's departure.

All the time the mystery around Mr Montesinos grew as he had gone into hiding, with reports of him being spotted in various parts of the world and rumours that he had undergone plastic surgery to change his appearance.

At the same time the shocking extent to which he had bribed the higher echelons of Peruvian society became apparent. Mr Montesinos left behind some 700 Vladi Videos, as they have become known.

Those that have been broadcast show him successfully giving money to a range of people to secure their support.


The Betrayal of Peru's Democracy: Montesinos as Fujimori's Svengali

Covert Action Quarterly -- Summer 1994

                                by Gustavo Gorriti




Commentary
The Spy Who Would Rule Peru
An investigative journalist recalls his quest to expose a notorious power-monger

By Gustavo Gorriti

February 1, 2005 — Vladimiro Montesinos, the spy who was almost king, is now an inmate in a prison he ordered built while his power was unchallenged. It is inside the Peruvian navy's main base in Callao.

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There with Montesinos is Abimael Guzmán, the Shining Path leader who led a 12-year insurgency believed to have killed more than 35,000 people. Other leaders of Shining Path and MRTA (another defeated insurgent organization) are also imprisoned at the base. For most Peruvians, evil sits there in uneasy assembly, while time drips slowly.

Time, though, is crucial for Montesinos, who's now being tried on some of the more serious charges he faces: human rights atrocities, drug trafficking and the smuggling of 10,000 assault rifles to the FARC guerrillas in Colombia. If convicted, he may be sentenced to 20, 25 or 30 years in prison—a lifetime for someone in his late fifties.

But he has managed in the past to bounce back from infamy to power. And this Houdini of the comeback perceives another chance, because Peru's democratic regime is weak. Democracy must falter or break down for him to have any chance of freedom and, equally important, revenge.

I am the journalist who wrote the first exposé about him 22 years ago, when his name had no public meaning, but when he was already a rogue spy, a narco lawyer and a strategist bent on conquering power by hook or by crook. When I wrote that exposé, I didn't think it would turn out to be the abbreviated foreword to a 20-year-old, still-unfinished story in which the spy usually had the upper hand, even when other journalists joined the fray and the spy all but ruled Peru.

The Man in the Shadows

I first wrote about Montesinos in 1983, two years after arriving at Caretas, Peru's leading newsweekly magazine. At the time, the country was transitioning away from a 12-year military dictatorship; the Shining Path insurgency was growing out of its deceptive provincial insignificance; and cocaine trafficking was becoming a poorly hidden, contradictory economic revolution.

Vladimiro Montesinos wasn't known to many at the time. He had been a young army captain in the early 1970s, during the heady days of the leftist military dictatorship led by General Juan Velasco.

In 1973, Captain Montesinos became an aide to the powerful army chief and prime minister, General Edgardo Mercado Jarrin. After the Pinochet coup against President Salvador Allende in Chile, tension increased between Peru's leftist and Chile's right-wing military regimes. Preparing for possible war, Peru bought tanks, planes and missiles from the Soviet Union. The shopping list was a top military secret, and it was kept in General Mercado's safe.

In 1974, Montesinos was suspected of spying for the U.S., charged with handing over, among other things, copies of that weapons list. General Mercado, fearing compromise and perhaps disgrace, quashed an investigation. He was neither dishonest nor incapable, but rather susceptible to flattery; apparently, Montesinos had persuaded him that he was South America's answer to Clausewitz, the renowned Prussian military strategist.

That first contact with power shaped Montesinos's goals and methods. He would never seek the limelight, but would infiltrate himself into power by becoming an advisor to honchos with ambitions greater than their qualifications.

Montesinos's luck ran out after General Velasco was deposed in 1975. Frustrated and out of favor with the new army chief, Montesinos made a two-week visit to the United States, paid for by an American government International Visitors Leader Grant. Immediately after arriving back in Lima, he was arrested on the pretext that he had not obtained formal permission for the trip from the government of Peru.

During the short investigation that followed, many top-secret documents were found in his possession. He was indicted by the army's prosecutor, who prepared to base his accusation on grounds of high treason, the penalty for which was the firing squad. But the matter didn't proceed because it would have meant disgracing General Mercado and embarrassing the army. Montesinos was cashiered from the army and sentenced to a military prison.

After his release he embarked on a new career as a narco-lawyer, networking with many crooked policemen, prosecutors and judges, thus streamlining the corruption process. He also tried to regain influence in the army, largely through extortion in a weekly column, named "Intelligence Service," published anonymously in a marginal magazine.

In late 1983, unsettled army sources gave Caretas information about the backgrounds of that column's authors. I followed up on the tip and soon discovered the murky trails leading to drug trafficking and conspiracy against Peru's then-fledgling democracy. Caretas published the story, then another, and Montesinos found himself exposed and in a weak position. When he fled the country, I thought that would be the end of the story.

The Tortuous Road to Power

Several months later, I learned that he had sneaked back into Peru. I decided to let matters rest, assuming that he was no longer a dangerous man.

It took more than a year to find out how mistaken I was, but by then Montesinos was treading into the path that would bring him to power five years later. Each of the main stations along that route was itself a major story, whose outcome he managed to influence from the shadows. The more important were:

  • The Reynaldo Rodríguez López drug-trafficking organization had corrupted key state institutions to the core. The heads of the Investigative Police in the previous five years had worked for it, as had the personal advisor to a minister of the Interior and then the prime minister. Others cooperating closely with the group included intelligence and police chiefs, a Supreme Court justice, many businessmen and at least one bank.

    They were so persuaded of their power and immunity that Rodríguez López installed a cocaine lab inside his compound, a volatile proposition as he found out when it blew up, in mid-1985. Amidst the wreckage and confusion, I rushed to wrap up a two-year investigation of that organization. Days after the explosion, Caretas published the first in a long series of reports that spawned an energetic investigation ordered by the attorney general.

    Then Montesinos took over the defense of the trafficking organization and sued the police officers in charge of the investigation. They soon found themselves on trial, harassed by lawsuits, threatening phone calls and even gunfire on Lima's Via Expresa.


  • In 1987, Hugo Denegri assumed the office of attorney general. With his honed instinct to detect over-ambition and under-qualification, Montesinos soon became Denegri's unofficial advisor, and in that capacity had him finish off the cover-up in the Rodríguez López case.


  • The May 1988 Cayara massacre, perpetrated by the army in that Andean village, became a national scandal, prompting congressional and judicial investigations. The chief of the emergency area, General Jose Valdivia, panicked and engaged in a macabre race of disinterring, re-burying and disappearing corpses, trying to stay a few graves ahead of the prosecutor.

    Montesinos offered Valdivia and the minister of defense the wherewithal to cover up the case. His calling card was the domesticated Denegri. The army agreed to cooperate and the cover-up was direct and brutal: the prosecutor's witnesses were picked up and killed one by one. All told, 40 were murdered, eight were tortured.


  • Montesinos offered to bring General Edwin Díaz, chief of the National Intelligence Service (SIN), confidential files from the attorney general's office about victims of human rights abuses and those charged with alleged Shining Path membership, along with information about their relatives. When Díaz accepted the offer, Montesinos gained a foothold in the institution he would later use to control Peru.


  • In 1990, Peru was a desperate country. The Shining Path was attacking targets in Lima with increasing tempo and ferocity. Thanks to record hyperinflation, President Alan Garcia was a discredited leader. That helps explains how Alberto Fujimori, an unknown candidate of Japanese immigrant parents, could suddenly surge in the polls in the general elections and trounce the favorite candidate, writer Mario Vargas Llosa, in the run-off.

Montesinos had managed to adhere himself to Fujimori before the run-off, when reports about Fujimori's tax cheating threatened his candidacy. For a successful narco lawyer to cover up small-time tax cheating was a breeze, but for Fujimori it was both relief and revelation.

Fujimori was ill-prepared to take charge of a wounded country and Montesinos seized the opportunity. Soon after becoming the new president's informal advisor on intelligence (but with real authority over all of the security forces), Montesinos sought to establish a regular relationship with the CIA, through its Lima station chief. He made it clear that he would be the Fujimori government's point of contact regarding intelligence matters.

Despite strong misgivings at the U.S. Embassy (especially from some DEA officers, who knew details of Montesinos's role in drug-trafficking organizations), he established a working relationship with station chief Joseph Marques—a privileged relationship with the CIA that solidified his position and would prove to be his single-most-important strength through the 1990s.

In September 1991, all Peruvian anti-drug operations were put under control of the SIN—that is, under the control of Montesinos. At the American Embassy in Lima, this enraged some from the DEA and the State Department's Narcotics Assistance Unit. But their protests went unheeded, as the CIA supported the new arrangement. The fox had finally managed to become master of the henhouse.

Winners Take All

From 1985 to 1989, I lived mostly in the United States. Although I no longer worked for Caretas, I began cooperating with the magazine's editor and publisher to uncover Montesinos.

The stories, which described Montesinos's past and his influence with Fujimori, only stimulated the Peruvian president to issue bogus denials about having any ties with the spy.

The stories also stimulated Montesinos to muzzle Caretas via a lawsuit. The magazine remained under injunction not to even mention him.

On April 5, 1992, Fujimori and Montesinos perpetrated a "self-coup," dissolved Congress and abrogated whatever semblance of democracy remained in Peru. Army troops and intelligence squads in plain clothes fanned out, neutralizing political leaders, seizing documents, hunting down enemies.

That night, I was captured in my home by a submachine gun-toting intelligence squad supported by a truckload of soldiers. I thought it would be a "traditional" police arrest. But when intelligence squad members (some of whom had perpetrated several recent killings in Lima) identified themselves as "police," I realized the situation was much worse than I had expected—something I confirmed when I found myself incommunicado in a clandestine jail at the Army Intelligence Service compound. I was a desaparecido (a disappeared one), and it looked as if Montesinos was going to exact his long-sought revenge.

He failed, but only because I had been able to spread word of what was about to happen, and international pressure finally forced my unconditional release.

I kept working in Lima, trying—sometimes a bit successfully—to make the new dictatorship miserable, but I was learning some bitter lessons. The international community—and most of the mainstream press—just wanted to forgive and forget, although I believed it was my duty to keep exposing the facts about this outlaw dictatorship. Vile threats ensued, including some quite credible, making it clear I was working on the very edge.

There was a different, bigger problem, however: I had become unemployable in Peru and had few prospects as an international correspondent. I could stand danger, but not an empty bank account. So in late 1992 I left Peru with my family, to be away (except for short journalistic visits) for the next eight years.

I tried to publish exposés on Montesinos, but was met with polite but consistent rejections by the U.S. mainstream press, in part because I was described by many as being obsessed with my subject. You are a crusader, one newspaper publisher told me, but we don't do that kind of journalism in this country.

An investigation I wrote in 1992 ("Fujimori's Svengali") was published, out of lack of choice, by Covert Action Quarterly almost two years later, branding me as a conspiracy theorist who was generally sane except when "Montesinos" was uttered. It worked well for the Fujimori regime, but I remained undeterred, even though my efficacy was limited.

Actually, what I had been able to unearth was just a fraction of a larger, more sinister truth. While some of the worthiest people in Peru—the human rights community, the top journalists, the best artists and writers—never wavered in opposing what they, like I, knew was a corrupt dictatorship, they were a distinct minority for several years. Many went along and pretended not to see, including the U.S. government.

Fujimori and Montesinos had won, and their victory would last for almost a decade.

Nowhere to Run

In 1996 I moved to Panama, hired by that country's leading newspaper, La Prensa, as associate director. One year later, after several La Prensa investigations had exposed people close to President Ernesto Pérez Balladares, he decided to expel me from Panama. I resolved to resist the deportation order, moved to the La Prensa offices and began a standoff with the authorities.

In the midst of what became a crisis, Pérez Balladares told his worried ministers there was an undeclared reason of national security for expelling me: he had been informed that Peruvian intelligence had branded me a Shining Path accomplice who had been targeted for assassination. We don't want this man killed on Panamanian territory, he told a cabinet meeting.

A few hours later the information was leaked to me at La Prensa, and I in turn transmitted it to the Miami Herald, where it was published. The Fujimori government naturally denied any intent of transnational killing, while Pérez Balladares found himself embarrassed and looking for a way to extricate himself from that confrontation.

As even Fujimori could attest, Montesinos was already the most powerful man in Peru. He was also one of the richest, thanks to an almost obsessive looting of the country. And although he feared and loathed the press, he would eventually become the biggest publisher in Peruvian history, using his overwhelming control of TV, radio and newspapers to destroy several opposition candidates who seemed potential obstacles to Fujimori's re-election bid.

To those few in the know, he was the man who could extort protection money from drug traffickers while being extravagantly praised by the CIA for his role in fighting drugs.

In 2000, a tired and reluctant Fujimori stood for still another re-election. After other candidates had been demolished by the SIN's propaganda machinery, Alejandro Toledo, another apparent also-ran, surged enough in the polls to pose a serious challenge to Fujimori. On Election Day, all of Montesinos's machinery and chicanery weren't enough to prevent early exit-poll projections from giving Toledo a lead.

In the end, Montesinos had no choice but to resign himself to a run-off.

A week later, in Miami, I was asked by Toledo to come to Peru as his advisor for the run-off. I requested a leave of absence from La Prensa and moved to Lima, where there was a real, albeit slim, chance of defeating a dictatorship.

It was an uphill struggle, but when Toledo began to frame his campaign as one of democracy versus dictatorship, his strength surged.

But faced with evidence that the voting would be rigged, he decided to withdraw from the run-off and continue his campaign for democracy. Fujimori was proclaimed president by the quiescent electoral authority, while we prepared a massive three-day march on Lima.

The second day of that huge rally, which coincided with Fujimori's inauguration on Peru's National Day, turned violent. As we marched, buildings were engulfed in flames—a ploy by government operatives, it seemed, to charge us with violence and even terrorism. But it was poorly planned and fruitless.

Montesinos, on the other hand, was busy appearing to support Fujimori, while plotting to oust him. In March 2000 he had organized a classic coup d'etat plan, but the presumed figurehead president, Economy Minister Carlos Boloña, later had second thoughts. In July, the decision was made to install the army chief, General José Villanueva Ruesta, as president. He also got cold feet.

A bribery operation to buy opposition congressmen was in full swing, with a degree of success. Its blatancy, however, made it counterproductive. When a video showing Montesinos bribing Congressman Alberto Kouri was leaked and shown publicly (Montesinos secretly filmed almost everyone he bought off), the scandal gave the final push to a reeling regime.

In short order, Montesinos found himself negotiating the terms of his exit. He eventually asked for exile in Panama and a 15-million-dollar severance payment.

Reversal of Fortunes

I was back in Panama, my leave of absence over, when Montesinos arrived there. It came about after President Mireya Moscoso gave in to pressure by the United States and many Latin American presidents to receive the exile.

But Montesinos's stay in Panama would be short-lived. On October 22, a source from Panamanian intelligence telephoned me with urgent news: Montesinos was leaving the country on a southbound chartered flight. Ten minutes later, a source from the U. S. Embassy confirmed the information.

I called Lima's Channel N, at the time the nation's only independent 24-hour cable news channel. On air, I informed Peru that Montesinos was flying back.

When he stopped over in Guayaquil, in western Ecuador, journalists were swarming the airport. The surprise was on him.

Montesinos landed at an air force base in Pisco, but nothing was the same. His Praetorian Guard had melted away, and all the generals could offer was surreptitious help. So he went into hiding.

Montesinos fled Peru even before Fujimori went into self-imposed exile, in November 2000. The spy hadn't prepared for a reversal of fortune, and after a tortuous journey to the Galápagos Islands, then to Costa Rica, and finally to Venezuela, he ended up, forlorn and rightly frightened, in a lower-middle-class house in Caracas, more kidnapped than protected by his greedy custodians. He was lucky in the end to be caught alive.

I imagine he was even relieved to be returning to Peru. He had his life. He would be going back to a prison whose guards and their chiefs had been his subordinates, whose weaknesses he knew well. Back to be tried by a judiciary he had manipulated first and controlled later. No one would torture him. This was, after all, a democracy, one of those that tend to be short-lived in Latin America, as Montesinos knew while preparing his defense.

In 2001 I returned for good to Peru, and again became an advisor to Toledo in that year's presidential campaign. He won, and I continued to advise him through the transition weeks.

A few days before Toledo's inauguration I went to resign and say goodbye. He read my farewell letter, which he found difficult to understand. He said he needed me as his chief of intelligence.

I couldn't help but laugh. After all these years of battling, to have the president ask me to sit in Montesinos's still-warm chair was partly funny, mostly sad. Apparently, for him it was natural that the journalist who had helped defeat the spy would become a spy himself in the process. I said no, of course, and left as I had promised a year earlier to return to independent journalism.

So, a few disenchanting years into democracy later, I was sitting in the courtroom, watching Montesinos. He was clearly weakened. Mystery had been taken away from him. The man of the shadows had become one of the most documented spies in history. He stood as it were under a klieg light, intimacies exposed by the detailed testimony of former aides, lovers, collaborators, and especially by the hundreds of videos reproducing his transactions. The portrait that emerges is anything but flattering. True, he appears enterprising, audacious, vindictive and relentless, but also shallow and insubstantial.

Yet, as I looked again at him sitting in the courtroom, exposed, the weight of the legal system on him, I knew that I wasn't looking at a finished man.

http://www.publicintegrity.org/ga/report.aspx?aid=647

                       



__________________
A TAINTED DEAL http://www.motherjones.com/politics/1998/06/tainted-deal

 LA DEA; Murder of Kiki Camarena http://www.laweekly.com/news/how-a-dogged-la-dea-agent-unraveled-the-cias-alleged-role-in-the-murder-of-kiki-camarena-5750278  

"Several informed sources have told me that an appendix to this Report was removed at the instruction of the DOJ at the last minute. This appendix is reported to have information about a CIA officer, not agent or asset, but officer, based in the LA Station, who was in charge of Contra related activities. According to these sources, this individual was associated with running drugs to South Central L.A., around 1988. Let me repeat that amazing omission. The recently released CIA Report Vol II contained an appendix, which was pulled by the DOJ, that reported a CIA officer in the LA Station was hooked into drug running in South Central Los Angeles." Maxine Waters Oct, 1998
https://fas.org/irp/congress/1998_cr/h981013-coke.htm   

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Peru's Spy Chief Growing Powerful

Associated Press -- 27 March 2000

                                by Monte Hayes


               

                LIMA, Peru (AP) - The government's critics say he's a sinister genius with a dark past. His defenders                 say Peruvians owe him gratitude for his role in neutralizing a leftist insurgency that threatened Peru's stability.                

               

                                But all agree on one thing: intelligence chief Vladimiro Montesinos is growing more powerful. Many believe his                 power now exceeds even that of President Alberto Fujimori, who is seeking a third term in April 9 elections.                

               

                                ``Montesinos controls the armed forces, the judicial system, the attorney general's office,'' political scientist                 Fernando Rospigliosi contends. ``He has immense power, more than Fujimori.''                

               

                                Montesinos is the shadow at Fujimori's ear, always close by but out of the public eye. He is a man who prefers                 the night, meeting with the president during the pre-dawn hours. He is accountable to no one except Fujimori.                 Many Cabinet members have never met him.                

               

                                ``Today the true power in Peru is Vladimiro Montesinos, an absolutely unscrupulous man,'' says Francisco Loayza,                 a former member of the intelligence service. Loayza introduced Montesinos to Fujimori during his first presidential                 campaign in 1990 and has written a book about Peru's spy chief called ``The Dark Face of Power.''                

               

                                Feared for his extensive network of spies and informants, Montesinos is the key player in Fujimori's authoritarian                 regime and the architect of his re-election drive. Election monitors within and outside Peru accuse Montesinos'                 National Intelligence Service of being behind a dirty tricks campaign to intimidate and discredit Fujimori's                 electoral foes.                

               

                                With Fujimori leading his opponents in public opinion polls and expected to win a third five-year term, government                 critics predict Montesinos' grip on power will tighten.                

               

                                Peruvians got a glimpse of that power recently when retired army Cmdr. Francisco Morales Bermudez, who headed a                 military government in the 1970s, recalled during a television interview that Montesinos, then an army captain,                 had been expelled in disgrace for forging documents and served a year in prison.                

               

                                The next day, the army high command issued a scathing communique attacking Morales Bermudez, who is widely                 respected for paving the way for the return of democratic rule. It called him a liar.                

               

                                Fujimori also accused Morales Bermudez of lying, saying he had political ambitions and wanted to muddy Montesinos'                 image.                

               

                                Montesinos, as usual, made no public appearance to defend himself.                

               

                                A few days later, an indignant Morales Bermudez appeared on television to show copies of army documents proving                 Montesinos was court-martialed and cashiered. He was found guilty of forging Morales Bermudez's name to a permit                 that allowed him to make an unauthorized trip to the United States.                

               

                                ``Montesinos must have tremendous power if the president and the army come forth to support a man full of dishonor                 who was punished by the army itself,'' Morales Bermudez says.                

               

                                The relationship between Fujimori and Montesinos and the question of who is more powerful is a frequent topic of                 conversation among Peruvians.                

               

                                Never seen at any public function until a few years ago, Montesinos of late has taken to appearing at military                 ceremonies, where generals pay respect to him as if he, and not Fujimori, were commander in chief.                

               

                                Last April, in the only interview he has ever given, the 54-year-old Montesinos appeared with Fujimori in a                 carefully staged setting at the headquarters of the National Intelligence Service. The two wore identical gray                 suits and checkered ties.                

               

                                Montesinos took questions from a television reporter, who admitted later that the intelligence chief had given                 him the questions to ask beforehand.                

               

                                ``Intelligence agents always work in silence,'' Montesinos told his interviewer, explaining his mysterious ways.                

               

                                Rospigliosi, the political scientist, says Montesinos has so much power that ``he is rewriting history, trying to                 erase his shameful past.''                

               

                                After being released from military prison in 1978, Montesinos became a lawyer for the drug underworld before                 hooking up with Fujimori. In 1996, a major drug trafficker accused him of taking payoffs but later recanted his                 trial testimony. Montesinos' intelligence service also has been linked to death squad killings and torture.                

               

                                Loayza, the former intelligence agent, says he brought Fujimori and Montesinos together.                

               

                                He says outgoing President Alan Garcia ordered the intelligence service to help Fujimori defeat famed Peruvian                 novelist Mario Vargas Llosa for the presidency in 1990 because Garcia feared an investigation into corruption in                 his government if Vargas Llosa won.                

               

                                The intelligence service learned Vargas Llosa's campaign was going to accuse Fujimori of tax fraud for having                 undervalued several houses that the then lowly paid university president and his wife, Susana, had built and                 sold to supplement their income.                

               

                                Loayza says he knew Montesinos could torpedo the investigation through his contacts in the judicial system. One                 night, he took him to Fujimori's home for a meeting with the candidate. Within three days, Montesinos had resolved                 the problem to the delight of the Fujimoris, Loayza says.                

               

                                ``Montesinos crept in like gas under the door,'' Loayza recalls.                

               

                                Today, Susana Higuchi is divorced from Fujimori and running for Congress on an opposition ticket. Her opinion of                 Montesinos has changed.                

               

                                ``His intelligence serves for evil. He is like a sword of Damocles over the president,'' she says.                

               

                                In December, a newspaper discovered a bank account in Montesinos' name with more than $2 million. It said he had                 received average monthly deposits of $170,000 from December 1998 to November 1999 from an unknown source. His                 public salary has never been revealed.                

               

                                Montesinos requested an investigation to clear his name, and the attorney general quickly issued a ruling that                 there were insufficient grounds to bring charges of illicit enrichment.                

               

                                Hernando de Soto, a respected economist who worked closely with Fujimori in his first term, says it may be                 difficult to dislodge Montesinos from power - even if Fujimori suffers a surprise defeat in his bid for a third                 term.                

               

                                ``He's Peru's most unpopular man and its most accused man,'' de Soto says. ``They're going to be after him with                 bloodhounds when this is over, so, of course, he doesn't want it to be over.''

Ex-spymaster guilty of corruption

Bookstore
El paraíso en la otra esquina
El paraíso en la otra esquina
Published by the Miami Herald, 3/3/05

http://www.miami.com/mld/miamiherald/news/world/americas/11036415.htm


 
Peru's former spy chief was convicted again, this time for taking payoffs from imprisoned drug dealers -- and his legal troubles are not over.

 

Former spy chief Vladimiro Montesinos has taken another legal hit, continuing his ignominious transformation from Peru's most feared man to an oft-convicted criminal.

A special anticorruption court convicted Montesinos on Tuesday of taking payoffs from jailed drug traffickers in exchange for leaning on judges to lessen their sentences.

The shadowy intelligence chief under President Alberto Fujimori during the 1990s, he received a seven-year sentence, which he will serve concurrently with a 15-year sentence from a previous corruption case. He has now been convicted in seven different cases.

But Montesinos' legal woes are only beginning. There are nearly 70 cases pending against him, including the most serious.

''The tentacles of the empire he created are so vast, and he brought so many people into the corruption net -- prosecutors say that over 1,400 people associated with him could ultimately be the target of criminal charges -- that it will literally take years to bring them all to trial,'' said Sally Bowen, co-author of The Imperfect Spy: The Many Lives of Vladimiro Montesinos.

WEAPONS TRIAL

In a separate but concurrent trial that began early last year, Montesinos faces charges of masterminding the sale of 10,000 AK-47-type assault rifles to leftist Colombian guerrillas.

His representatives allegedly purchased the Soviet-era rifles from Jordan in 1999 and air-dropped most of them over isolated parts of Colombia.

The anti-corruption court is expected to deliver its verdict in that case in about six weeks.

Prosecutors are seeking a 20-year sentence, which would run concurrently with his previous sentences -- in effect adding five years to his prison term.

DRUG CASE

Among the other upcoming high-profile cases against him are two in which he is accused of facilitating drug trafficking in Peru in exchange for a share of the profits.

He will also go to trial on charges that he directed a death squad known as the Grupo Colina, which killed 15 people during a barbecue in a Lima shantytown in 1991 and nine students and a professor one evening at a Lima university in 1992.

In each case, the government said those killed were suspected of having links to the Shining Path guerrillas then terrorizing Peru. Prosecutors are seeking a 25-year sentence in that case.

PAYOFFS TO TABLOIDS

In January, Montesinos was convicted of paying hundreds of thousands of dollars to owners of tabloid newspapers to smear opponents of Fujimori when he ran for reelection in 2000. Along with Montesinos, chiefs of the army and the air force were also convicted, as were 10 other people, including tabloid editors, middlemen who delivered cash, and publicists hired to invent damaging headlines and news stories.

Montesinos received his longest sentence -- 15 years -- last June when he was convicted of paying millions of dollars to television station owners to broadcast favorable news about Fujimori.

OUT OF OBSCURITY

Fujimori was a little-known university chancellor when he was elected president in 1990 at a time when Peru seemed to be melting down. Shining Path was waging a murderous war against the state, and inflation had soared to 7,500 percent a year. Montesinos, a discredited army officer, joined Fujimori's inner circle, became adept at pushing aside potential rivals, and turned the military and intelligence service into his personal crime-filled fiefdom.

A video made public in 2000 that showed him paying off an opposition member of Congress unmasked him.

He fled the country, was captured in Venezuela in 2001, and has remained behind bars at a naval prison since then.

The Peruvian government has recovered $174 million that Montesinos stole and hid in the international banking system, and is still trying to recoup $50 million or so.

Ronald Gamarra, formerly a member of the special prosecutor's office that has been targeting Montesinos, said the 59-year-old at best could win early release after serving 20 years in prison.

But President Alejandro Toledo believes Montesinos is trying to win favor with Peruvian politicians, hoping the next administration or Congress will free him.



Who Really Supports Cocaine Traffickers?

       

                                By                 Kevin Nelson,                 AlterNet. Posted April 6, 2004.

       
                               
This week, despite having no clear evidence, US prosecutors announce an investigation of Jean Bertrand Aristide's alleged ties to cocaine traffickers; meanwhile, a Peruvian court tries Vladimir Montesinos -- a 30-year CIA asset -- for supplying Colombian drug traffickers with weapons.         Tools
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More stories by                         Kevin Nelson
               

This week, despite having no clear evidence, US prosecutors announce an investigation of Jean Bertrand Aristide's alleged ties to cocaine traffickers; meanwhile, a Peruvian court tries Vladimir Montesinos -- a 30-year CIA asset -- for supplying Colombian drug traffickers with weapons.

April 3- AFP reports: Prosecutors are investigating whether Haitian former president Jean Bertrand Aristide took millions of dollars from drug traffickers who moved cocaine through his impoverished nation, it was reported.

"It's in the early stages," one law enforcement source told The Miami Herald. "It's a bit premature to say we've got anything yet. But you're not wrong if you say that's where we're going."

The report quoted officials in Florida and Washington as saying investigators had been briefed on reports that relatives of Aristide and his wife, Mildred, hold nearly 250 million dollars in European banks. The officials added, however, that there is no indication yet whether the funds actually exist.

Haiti's Justice Minister Bernard Gousse meanwhile said that Friday he planned to set up a commission next week to investigate allegations against Aristide "from misuse of government funds to human-rights abuses."

Aristide's Miami lawyer Ira Kurzban attributed the investigation to politics: "After kidnapping President Aristide, the Bush administration is not content to simply end democracy in Haiti -- they need to politically assassinate Aristide."

April 4- The Scotsman reports: Vladimiro Montesinos is a legendary figure in Latin America and is now at the centre of the most explosive trial in Peruvian history, watched with the kind of devotion usually only reserved for soap operas.

But the 58-year-old's latest trial, in which he is accused of smuggling 10,000 rifles to Colombian terrorists, has also seen the US intelligence services become embroiled in an embarrassing row about whether the CIA not only knew what Montesinos was up to and turned a blind eye, but have actively undermined Washington's multibillion-dollar war on drugs by doing so.

The plot is something out of a John le Carre novel. In 1999 a shadowy spymaster brokers an arms deal to send 10,000 AK-47 rifles to guerrillas of the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC).

A Lebanese arms dealer, Sarkis Soghanalian, known as 'The Merchant of Death', gets the rifles from Jordan and puts them on a Ukrainian plane that parachutes them into the Colombian jungles controlled by the rebels.

The payment for the consignment comes from Brazil's most feared drug lord, Luiz Fernando da Costa, better known as 'Freddy Seashore' after the slum from which he rose to power. He gets his payment in drugs from the FARC, allegedly 20 tonnes of cocaine.

The story is spectacular enough, but there is another complicating and compelling element: if not the involvement, then the knowledge of the deal on the part of the CIA. Peruvian prosecutor, Ronald Gamarra, after two years of investigation of the case and hundreds of interviews, is convinced the CIA knew of the plot.

"In the trafficking of the arms to the FARC, Montesinos could have had the support of the CIA," said Gamarra. "I don't have hard evidence of it, but various leads indicate that it is probable."

That there have been links between the CIA and Montesinos for the best part of 30 years is no secret. In 1976, Montesinos was expelled from the army and put in prison for selling secrets to the CIA, when George Bush senior held the top post at Langley.

Montesinos then put himself through law school and became the defender of drug traffickers. But once he became former president Alberto Fujimori's right-hand man in 1990 the relationship with the CIA became still closer and Montesinos became known by the American agency as 'Mr. Fix'.

Gamarra believes the CIA have something to hide, saying that the FBI and Drug Enforcement Administration have been very co-operative in his investigations, while the CIA has stonewalled him on everything.

His fears are supported by arms dealer Soghanalian, currently in US custody. Soghanalian said he would not have had anything to do with the deal had not the CIA been aware of it.

In his declaration to US authorities he said: "When I went to get the license from the Jordanian authorities I went to [US] military intelligence and foreign intelligence [the CIA]. I said that this was an area very sensitive to the Americans on a political level."

His testimony is backed by the Jordanians. The AK-47s, made in East Germany, were destined, so the Jordanians thought, for the Peruvian army.

According to Atef Halasa, the head of protocol at the Jordanian Foreign Ministry, his country would not have released the weapons without informing US authorities. Halasa was reported as saying that the American government not only knew of the deal, but that it was authorized by the CIA.

The severity of the accusations against the CIA has sent US authorities into panic. The FARC have long been on Washington's terrorist list and the Colombian government is one of the largest recipients of US military aid in the world after Israel and Egypt. Over the years, several Americans have been killed by the Colombian rebels, who have threatened to target US personnel in their bloody war to seize power and establish a Marxist regime.

Indeed the FARC have three US intelligence operatives in their power, captured after their spy plane crash landed in guerrilla territory in February last year.

The CIA has refused to comment, except to say, "it's a matter before the courts".

The former CIA Head of Station in Peru, Robert Gorelick, believed to have been the linkman for the agency with Montesinos, has also refused to testify in a Peruvian court.

Montesinos during interrogation in May 2002 said he "met an average of two or three times a week with Mr. Gorelick".

State Department spokesman Phil Chicola, responsible for the Andean nations, called the accusations against the CIA "the greatest foolishness... irresponsible, black propaganda made by people that do not know what they are talking about".

Many find it unbelievable that the CIA would have turned a blind eye to, or actually helped with, such an order, actively undermining the work of the US in Colombia, arming the guerrillas that Washington describes as "narco-terrorists".

But a senior judicial source in Peru said the CIA appears to be instigating a process to get Montesinos extradited to the US to face some charges there, most likely in an attempt to halt the damaging proceedings in Peru and prevent more explosive revelations.

"How can people doubt that the CIA is capable of something like this," said a senior Peruvian judicial source on condition of anonymity. "Did the Iran Contra scandal teach you nothing?"



       

__________________
A TAINTED DEAL http://www.motherjones.com/politics/1998/06/tainted-deal

 LA DEA; Murder of Kiki Camarena http://www.laweekly.com/news/how-a-dogged-la-dea-agent-unraveled-the-cias-alleged-role-in-the-murder-of-kiki-camarena-5750278  

"Several informed sources have told me that an appendix to this Report was removed at the instruction of the DOJ at the last minute. This appendix is reported to have information about a CIA officer, not agent or asset, but officer, based in the LA Station, who was in charge of Contra related activities. According to these sources, this individual was associated with running drugs to South Central L.A., around 1988. Let me repeat that amazing omission. The recently released CIA Report Vol II contained an appendix, which was pulled by the DOJ, that reported a CIA officer in the LA Station was hooked into drug running in South Central Los Angeles." Maxine Waters Oct, 1998
https://fas.org/irp/congress/1998_cr/h981013-coke.htm   

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Vladimiro Montesinos:
The Betrayal of Peruvian Democracy
Fujimori's Svengali
by Gustavo Gorriti

On April 5, 1992, almost two years after he was elected president of Peru, Alberto Fujimori dissolved parliament and seized dictatorial powers. The mastermind behind the conspiracy to overthrow democracy is Vladimiro Montesinos. For over two decades, Montesinos has operated from the shadows. Narco-lawyer, traitor, human rights violator, former soldier, spy, he has mesmerized Fujimori and used close links to drug trafficking organizations, and then to the CIA, to become not only the country's de facto drug czar, but perhaps the most powerful person in Peru.

On the night of November 13, 1992, Lima was surrounded by a sort of fog of war. In the temporary panic accompanying that night's attempted coup, the shroud of intrigue and secrecy lifted for a few hours, and the truth began to emerge. In the seven months since President Fujimori staged his auto golpe, his self-coup, he had conducted extensive purges within the judiciary and the state apparatus, aggregated dictatorial power, and come increasingly under the sway of his personal Svengali Vladimiro Montesinos. Some in the military had had enough. That November night they planned a counter-coup to restore constitutional rule and unseat the dictator. The conspiracy was doomed to fail. Probably infiltrated, it may have been an elaborate sting designed to lure into the open and entrap those army officers opposed to Fujimori's armed seizure of dictatorial powers. But as often happens, the provocateurs lost temporary control of the operation just as they sprang the trap. When more officers than expected followed Gen. Jaime Salinas, the brave but unfortunate leader, the coup suddenly looked viable. Fujimori panicked. He fled the presidential palace and headed for army headquarters. But midway, he changed direction and rushed to the Japanese Embassy in Lima, seeking refuge.

With his whereabouts unknown, the regular system of communications broke down. Voices reached out across the night on cellular phones, while tape recorders hooked up to scanners recorded the conversations. Fujimori, his voice slightly distorted by anxiety but unmistakable in its nasal tone, was at one end of the line. A rapid fire high-pitched voice at the other end reassured him that he was sending men to reinforce the presidential escort. Fujimori gave directions on how to reach him.

As the tape recorders eavesdropped, the man with the high thin voice went into gear. He suggested actions to army commander-in-chief, General Nicolás de Bari Hermoza Ríos, identifiable from his barking proclamations of allegiance to Fujimori. Hermoza immediately acceded and said: If we don't find him [coup leader Salinas] now, we'll detain him tomorrow. Why don't we detain him right now? asked the other. I have agents here....I'll have him detained, we'll take him out by force, Hermoza echoed enthusiastically. By force, by force.

Later, when several arrests had been made, they talked again. It seems we reacted fast, said Hermoza. Who gave you the information? I'll tell you later, answered the other. Then just before dawn, after the coup had fizzled and General Salinas had been captured in a shoot-out, the conversation resumed, for a little gloating. He [Salinas] is half crazy; he's out of focus, said Hermoza. He's all fucked up. He's dead, sentenced the other man. The other man, the one with the high-pitched voice, was promptly identified. It was Vladimiro Montesinos. While some people claimed he was the most powerful man in Peru after Fujimori, others asserted he was the real power, albeit behind the throne.

Several army officers detained that night at the National Intelligence Service's (SIN, Peru's equivalent of the CIA) headquarters experienced Montesinos' power in its most crude form. Montesinos and others hit Lt. Col. Enrique Aguilar del Alcázar in the face; later his hands were tied behind his back and he was hanged by his arms (a torture technique known in Peru as la pita or la colgada ) until pain compelled him to sign whatever they asked. Montesinos pricked Maj. Salvador Carmona (ret.) in his arms and legs with needles and had him strung up colgado. He hit Lt. Col. Marco Zarate and when the officer tried to hit back, Montesinos' bodyguards tied him to a chair and administered electric shocks until he signed the documents they presented. Maj. César Cáceres, a former aide of Gen. Salinas, was thrown face down on a mattress. Two policemen caught his arms in a shoulder bar, and as a third sat on his waist and pounded on his back, Montesinos hit him in the face. Two days later, Cáceres was hanged by his arms tied behind his back. I told them, he later wrote from prison, anything they wanted because I felt my arms were being yanked off my body.

Those who denounced the torture or criticized Montesinos or Hermoza were targeted: The homes of Gen. Luis Cisneros (ret.) and two other political leaders were bombed. Gen. Alberto Arciniega a counterinsurgency commander in the coca-carpeted Upper Huallaga Valley was sent into retirement and sought asylum in the Argentine Embassy.

Quest for Revenge, Victory and Power

They learned the hard lesson many already knew: Montesinos is a dangerous man to cross. He has much in common with the bizarrely brutal dictators of Latin American literature and history. But the reality of his life is less like a fictionally dramatic linear rise than a series of improbably melodramatic ups and downs. Montesinos went from an early experience of power to an enterprise in betrayal; from utter disgrace and pariah status to a quest for revenge, victory, and power.

A sad and earnest child, Montesinos grew up in genteel poverty in Arequipa, a city in the south of Peru which was also home to the families of writer Mario Vargas Llosa and Shining Path leader Abimael Guzmán. The docile son of a family that prided itself on learning and culture, Vladimiro was a good student. He went into the army because his father thought a military career would offer stability. In 1966, he graduated with no particular distinction from officer's school in Lima and was posted back home as a sub-lieutenant.

He soon became engaged to a local heiress. After she gave him the loan he asked for, he dumped her and refused to return the money. Only on threat of prosecution did Montesinos' father scrape together the cash and pay the debt. Montesinos was developing his behavioral signature: Seduce, use, and betray. The pattern, first stamped on a hapless woman, would later be perpetrated on a much larger scale.

Making His Move

Although somewhat of a misfit in the rough, unsophisticated milieu of junior army officers, Montesinos soon demonstrated another characteristic behavior: He positioned himself close to power and the secrets it held. Indeed, that period was perhaps the only time in history when Peru had secrets worth keeping and therefore worth selling. It was an opportunity not lost on the ambitious young junior officer.

In October 1968, Peru's armed forces had overthrown President Fernando Belaunde. Under the leadership of Gen. Juan Velasco Alvarado, Peru embarked on a program of leftist radical reforms which promptly put the military regime at loggerheads with the United States. Velasco expelled the U.S. military mission, and in the early 1970s decided to buy Soviet weaponry to strengthen Peru's standing in the region. After Pinochet's coup in Chile, the Nixon administration got closer to Chile, while Velasco prepared for what he thought would be a showdown with Pinochet. Montesinos tested the winds and attached himself to Gen. Edgardo Mercado Jarrín, with whom he shared origins in Arequipa, intellectual pretensions, and political ambitions. In January 1973, when Mercado became prime minister, minister of war, and commander-in-chief of the army, Montesinos became his personal aide and one of a small group of advisors. Some in this inner circle would remain part of the Montesinos story until the present: Of the two civilians, Rafael Merino is still a close associate, while Francisco Loayza became a bitter enemy; of the four military officers, Col. Sinesio Jarama later branded Montesinos a traitor.

Montesinos would buy books for the general, suggest quotes for his speeches, and hint that he was destined with proper help to be South America's Clausewitz. Montesinos soon became indispensable. Alfred Stepan, then working for the Rand Corporation on the subject of the Peruvian military, and later a professor at Columbia University, met Montesinos in Peru. He remembers him as someone who would pop up at odd hours....I never saw him in uniform. This young man presented himself as a military intellectual...and he had read a lot of the stuff....There was no question that he was unusual....He didn't even appear to have an office. I have never met anyone like him in my research...an active duty who acts very much as a free agent.

As a free agent, he kept himself busy. While his boss, Gen. Mercado, was negotiating weapons acquisitions with the Soviets, Montesinos had the run of his office, drafting Mercado's speeches, flattering the general, making extensive use of the photocopy machine, and going through the office safe. Even after it was discovered that he had removed a document, Montesinos retained that access. Years later, Mercado would say that Montesinos came to his office, eyes brimming with tears, and confessed he had taken the document only out of intellectual curiosity.

There is little doubt that Montesinos was snooping. In fact, with the increasing level of Byzantine intrigues among opposing factions, everyone was trying to spy on everyone else. Then intelligence agents began to get information that the presidential weekly agenda was arriving at the U.S. Embassy almost as soon as it was approved by Velasco. Suspicion fell on Montesinos. According to former army intelligence chief Rafael Córdova, even before entering Mercado's office, Montesinos had been a paid agent of army intelligence. That role was bad enough, but spying for a foreign power was unprecedented and treasonous. Some junior officers tailed him and became convinced he was trafficking in top-secret documents, mainly to U.S. intelligence officials. Years later, in 1990, Col. Córdova, then-chief of army intelligence, charged that in the 1970s Montesinos had peddled Peru's complete list of Soviet weaponry, the list of new weapons acquisitions, Velasco's weekly agendas, and contingency plans for war with Pinochet's Chile.

Horacio Verbitsky, a leading Argentine journalist and author who sought refuge in Peru after receiving death threats from right-wing terrorists in Argentina, saw Montesinos often. He had, says Verbitsky, this safe box on the wall in his home where he kept all manner of very secret documents....Once he opened the box, took some documents out and showed them to me....[They] had something to do with the strategic equilibrium with Chile. Means, weaponry, something like that. I was very surprised to see the documents and very surprised that he would show them to me. To Verbitsky, Montesinos was a strange individual. He came to the center of power while still very young, he says. He was a seducer, who at the same time awakened mistrust in all of us who knew him. We used to ask each other: `To what service does he belong?'

Montesinos' First Coup Plot

It was during these politically charged years, that Montesinos became involved in his first presidential coup plot. In mid-1973, he tried to persuade Gen. Mercado to overthrow the physically and politically vulnerable president. While Velasco was still hospitalized after an aneurysm and leg amputation, Mercado organized a discreet meeting in his house with Rafael Merino, Col. Sinesio Jarama, and Capt. Montesinos to discuss ousting Velasco. Several alternatives were proposed, mostly by Montesinos, but Mercado hesitated, and the meeting ended inconclusively. Soon after, the pro-Velasco forces organized a rally in front of the hospital. When Cuban ambassador Antonio Núñez Jiménez marched prominently in front and prodded Mercado into declaring his support for the ailing president, the coup project fizzled on the spot.

Velasco, however, was losing his grip. Military radicals and moderates and their civilian collaborators conspired against each other, and as provocateurs shifted from side to side, Montesinos continued to plot. He approached Julio Cotler, one of Peru's top social scientists, who had written about being disenchanted with the military reform process. The captain claimed he belonged to a group of young military officers who were appalled at the betrayal of revolutionary principles. These young Turks were taking matters into their own hands and planning to kill the corrupt generals in the high command. Would Professor Cotler lend his intellectual support? Cotler threw him out of his office.

Years later Cotler saw Montesinos, already out of the army, sitting in on one of his classes. At the end, he came to say hello. Cotler, a very direct man, asked him, Do you remember when I threw you out of my office? Yes, Montesinos remembered. And tell me, asked Cotler, how could you think I could fall into such a transparent provocation? Montesinos smiled, Ah! Dr. Cotler, you wouldn't believe how many fell!

Cast from the Inner Circle of Power

When Mercado retired in 1975, his protege Montesinos, asked to be transferred to the Ministry of Agriculture where he became an advisor to the minister, Gen. Enrique Gallegos Venero, one of the young radical colonels behind the Velasco coup in 1968. And there, too, he continued to conspire, trying to play all sides.

Montesinos befriended several foreign journalists. One of them was married to a man with access to reliable information. Montesinos would occasionally give her a ride in his big American car from the Ministry to Military Region II's headquarters the stronghold of the radical officers to deliver documents taken from the ministry. He would try to get information from me he couldn't get from my husband, she said. He had those marvelous speakers in his car with a collection of Bach cassettes....He would leave me in his car, listening to the most marvelous things, while he went to do his thing. She remembers him as intellectually appealing: He knew how to fish things up, and where...but physically, he looked like a manipulator; he was very intelligent, but you could never trust him. The moderates who ousted Velasco and came to power in August 1975 with Gen. Francisco Morales Bermúdez also mistrusted Montesinos. They knew he had spied on the radicals, and they harbored misgivings about him. In mid-1976, the new commander-in-chief of the army, Gen. Guillermo Arbulú, ordered Montesinos transferred to El Algarrobo, a remote garrison near the Ecuador border.

Suddenly, after three heady years as a key source of information and misinformation with access to the top levels of power, Montesinos became an ordinary captain in a desolate backwater posting. He grew reckless.

To Disgrace and Prison

On August 27, after only two days at El Algarrobo, he requested sick leave, returned to Lima, stole a blank army travel form, falsified it, and went to the U.S. Embassy. There he received an official invitation to the U.S., which had either been on hold or was instantly arranged. On September 5, 1976, he illegally flew out of Lima as an official guest of the U.S. government. Once in Washington, however, his stay was far from clandestine. Officially and inaccurately presented as aide to Prime Minister Gen. Guillermo Arbulú, he met with, among others, Luigi Einaudi, then at the Policy Planning Staff of the State Department, and CIA Office of Current Intelligence officer, Robert Hawkins. He also spoke with an official Cuba hand about visiting Cuba, as personal guest of Raúl Castro, and met with several academics both in Washington and Connecticut. When he gave a talk at the Inter-American Defense College, a Peruvian general spotted him and cabled Lima.

On his return to Peru on September 21, 1976, Montesinos was immediately arrested, his house was searched, and his safe found and opened. After army counterintelligence looked inside, the search intensified and even the floor boards of his house were lifted up. A week later, a military tribunal cashiered him out of the army and ordered him confined to a military prison and guarded round-the-clock.

The U.S. Embassy responded meekly to Peru's strong protest to Montesinos' clandestine invitation: It regretted the concern caused the Government of Peru by the invitation extended to a military officer....The Embassy agrees with the Ministry's suggestion that in the future the Foreign Ministry should be informed of such invitations extended to members of the Armed Forces of Peru. Montesinos' legal situation worsened. After reviewing the file, the military prosecutor, General Alberto Vargas Ruiz de Somocurcio, recommended that the charge include treason to the fatherland, which carried a mandatory death sentence. Within memory, no army officer had been convicted of that crime.

Montesinos' cousin, Sergio Cardenal, took charge of the defense. I could talk with him only with an officer present throughout the interview. He was held in a room surrounded by soldiers at all times. In the end, General Vargas dropped the high treason charge: A conviction would have caused enormous embarrassment and destroyed Mercado Jarr!n's good reputation in the army. Nonetheless, many, including former army intelligence chief Rafael Córdova and General Jarama, consider Montesinos a traitor. I believe, said Jarama, he did betray his fatherland. On May 31, 1977, he was convicted of falsehood and desertion of command, formally expelled from the army, and sentenced to one year in jail. He would emerge a disgraced civilian.

Lawyer for Drug Organizations

Any possibility of a military career gone, Montesinos used his jail time to study law. Soon after he was freed, he graduated and briefly became partners with his cousin, Sergio Cardenal. After a few months, he began to prosper.

Montesinos saw that there were two main money-making crimes: fiscal fraud and cocaine trafficking, and he carved out a practice that took advantage of both. At each step of the judicial process, corrupt police, prosecutors, judges, and jailers competed to extract the maximum in bribes and kickbacks. Montesinos integrated the process. He got police to identify the best cases and tailor their reports with the prosecution and trial in mind, built a network of allies and informants inside key institutions, and identified corrupt police and judges.

Within a few years, Montesinos became a sought-after legal and administrative strategist for drug traffickers, providing services that went far beyond the practice of law. He rented homes for Colombian traffickers, advised accessories of traffickers when to go into hiding, managed the disappearance of files of fugitive Colombian traffickers to prevent extradition requests, and in at least one case, produced falsified documents to buttress his defense of a cocaine dealer. (He lost that case thanks to a dogged prosecutor, who, years later, was one of the first people sacked in Fujimori's post-coup purge.) He also maintained contacts in the army, and through them was able to procure useful intelligence about high-ranking army officers whom he smeared in a column he anonymously wrote for a now defunct Lima tabloid. The high command was enraged and in 1983 ordered its prosecutor, General Abraham Talavera, to revive the 1976 high treason accusation. For the second time, Montesinos was identified, disgraced, a fugitive. He fled the country to Ecuador and then to Argentina. Rid of the nuisance, the army's command lost interest. Talavera complained bitterly, to no avail.

This time, however, Montesinos had his share of allies. While he was abroad, colleagues in corruption rallied on his behalf. In mid-1984, the Supreme Military Council, by then staffed with some lawyers who worked on the side for Montesinos, exonerated him of all charges. He returned quietly to Lima and resumed his work. For the army, however, even by their loosened standards, he remained a pariah. In July 1985, then-army commander-in-chief, Guillermo Monzón, upgraded an order banning Montesinos from any army installation.

Defending Corrupt Police

For the drug mafia, on the other hand, Montesinos' handle on the system made him almost indispensable. There are major differences in the way corruption, including cocaine trafficking, works in Peru and Colombia. In Colombia, traffickers try to keep the state at arm's length. In Peru, they try to infiltrate it. Thus, media exposure has tremendous power to force the healthier parts of the state to act. In July 1985, the biggest Peruvian narcotics trafficking organization was uncovered, in part because of an accidental cocaine lab explosion, and to a large extent through investigations by Peru's leading news magazine, Caretas. They revealed that Reynaldo Rodríguez López's drug organization had thoroughly infiltrated the state, especially the police. Sparked by the media revelations, the public outcry was immediate. The energetic attorney general, César Elejalde, put the full resources of his organization behind the investigation, which was led by smiling but tough police general, Raúl Chávez. A year later, in 1986, with fugitive Rodríguez López arrested and in jail, they felt close to the Mafia's core.

But Montesinos had taken charge of the defense of the more important corrupt police generals and soon it became known that he coordinated the defense strategy of the organization as a whole. In July 1986, he had Gen. Chávez sued in a military court because of this investigation, accusing him of insulting a superior officer. The military court, to everyone's astonishment, accepted the argument and opened trial proceedings against Chávez and his key subordinates. It took a strong journalistic campaign to shame the military judges into stopping the trial. But a barrage of judicial accusations, 14 in all, accepted by corrupt judges, slowed down Chávez's investigation. He, his top lieutenants and their relatives received threatening phone calls. Chávez even had a running shoot-out with members of a band of killers for hire. He walked everywhere with a sub-machine gun ready at his side.

In 1987, before the investigation could be completed, Attorney General Elejalde was succeeded by Hugo Denegri. It soon became evident he had an unofficial but key advisor. Cautiously keeping a low profile, Vladimiro Montesinos was back again. In Denegri, he found an individual occupying a position that was well beyond his capabilities, but not beyond his ambitions for power.

Denegri sabotaged Gen. Chávez's investigation at once. In February 1987, he replaced all the prosecutors and put two of Montesinos' close friends in charge of the case. They essentially killed the investigation and accused Chávez, of all things, of drug trafficking. To no avail, both Chávez and Elejalde denounced Montesinos' role and his unseemly and close connection with Denegri. By 1988, many of the important members of the drug trafficking organization were guaranteed impunity. Montesinos now had the run of the attorney general's office, and that fact alone tremendously strengthened his position in the police and the judiciary.

Still, the armed forces remained forbidden territory for him. That year, however, an opening presented itself.

Fixing the Coverup on the Cayara Massacre

In May 1988, a Shining Path unit ambushed an army convoy in Cayara district in the southern part of Ayacucho province, the cradle of the guerrilla insurgency. By this time, the Maoist insurgents influenced significant areas in the Andes and upper jungle while at the same time gradually increasing activity in the cities. In the Cayara attack, they killed four soldiers and wounded 14 others. General José Valdivia, an artillery officer nicknamed el Mariscalito, the Little Marshal, ordered patrols to converge on the area and mete out punishment. On May 14, seven patrols entered the town of Cayara and wreaked havoc. Inside the church, where cowering townspeople had taken refuge, they separated the men from women and children and killed five men on the spot.

One of the other patrols that had fanned out into the surrounding countryside intercepted a group of peasants. They again separated the men and began a hasty interrogation-torture session, which escalated into mass murder as 24 peasants were clubbed, axed, or knifed to death. Three survived.

That night, the place swarming with soldiers, a wounded man was apprehended, along with an 80-year-old woman. They were never seen again. Four days later, Gen. Valdivia flew in a helicopter to Cayara and ordered the population to gather. He read a list of alleged Shining Path sympathizers and asked those named to step forward. None did. Later that day, however, three on the list were captured by a military patrol. Soon after being seen alive on May 20, their corpses were found.

News of the killings arrived in Lima, and the outcry was immediate. Although Peru had become one of the more notorious human rights violators in the world, press freedom and democratic institutions made it possible to investigate and sometimes to prosecute those responsible for the more blatant atrocities. In Lima, a Senate commission was appointed to investigate the massacre; and in Ayacucho, prosecutor Carlos Escobar began collecting damaging evidence on Valdivia. He was encouraged by acting Attorney General Manuel Catacora, standing in for Denegri, who was on a trip to Europe.

Valdivia was panicking. Every time he tried to erase traces of the crimes, he entangled himself further. He got into a macabre race of burying and disinterring corpses, trying to keep ahead of the prosecutor's investigation. At that point, the army high command stepped in to help with the coverup. We didn't want yet another general disgraced, said a former high ranking military officer, so we sent two generals from the second military region to tidy things up.

But Escobar's investigation had gone too far for a conventional whitewash to work. Despite the obvious personal danger, Escobar had witnesses, cohesive written testimony, and plans to dig deeper. For the military, Escobar had become the problem. At that point, Montesinos began to advise artillery officer Valdivia. Attorney General Denegri was summoned from Rome, and in July 1988, Montesinos, Denegri, and two staffers met in a Lima restaurant to plan the removal of Escobar from the case and engineer impunity for Gen. Valdivia.

At Montesinos' prodding, Denegri set up a meeting on army grounds with the defense minister, Gen. Enrique López Albújar, to propose a solution. It was agreed he would bring along an unnamed advisor. It was Montesinos. He was stopped at the gate where his photograph was on display, high and visible, with instructions to bar his access to any military installation. López Albújar was informed, and agonized over what to do. Also on hand was his own advisor, Gen. Talavera, the man who had accused Montesinos of high treason. But the stakes were too high, and he let Montesinos in.

Talavera didn't open his mouth during the lunch, but Montesinos was in a genial mood. Rather than discuss tactical details of the coverup to follow, the meeting was simply a first step in a collaboration, and in yet another comeback for Montesinos. The coverup was direct and brutal. Although the badly harassed Escobar managed to submit a report in November 1988 accusing Valdivia and demanding that he should be brought to trial, he was ordered to hand over all information and was removed from the case. Then, Montesinos surreptitiously took the Cayara file containing Escobar's reports from the prosecutors' office and delivered it to officers of Valdivia's staff, who copied it, made some changes, and planned their actions.

In December 1988, three witnesses essential to the case were assassinated by hooded men at a highway roadblock. Another witness managed to survive a while longer. Martha Cris"stomo Garc!a was assassinated in Ayacucho in September 1989. A little earlier, a prosecutor almost as ductile as his boss conducted a new review and closed the case. Prosecutor Escobar, who was persistently followed and threatened, asked the U.S. government for asylum. Valdivia's military career continued its ascent, thoroughly influenced by and indebted to Montesinos.

A Match Made in Hell

Montesinos' next move was to reestablish contact with the intelligence services. His old friends Rafael Merino and Francisco Loayza worked at the National Intelligence Service, as a senior analyst and a part-time analyst respectively. Both persuaded intelligence chief General Edwin Díaz that Montesinos could be of use.

And indeed, at the end of 1989, Montesinos presented the reluctant Díaz with his ticket back into the fold: detailed files from the attorney general's office on all people ever accused of subversive acts and on most victims of human rights abuses; seven or eight thousand of them.

Almost every day, Montesinos, now a collaborator on the SIN's payroll, arrived at the intelligence agency offices carrying packages of files, which were promptly computerized.

He was back on the inside and finally positioned to access the highest power if he could pick the right person to back. As elections to replace discredited President Alan García approached, few people in Peru doubted that writer Mario Vargas Llosa would win. At SIN, both Merino and Loayza were moonlighting as advisors to the Vargas Llosa camp.

Then, among the also-rans in the 1990 elections, an obscure candidate showed a modest increase in the polls. Alberto Fujimori, a gray academic, compensated for an un- remarkable intellect with an uncommon craftiness. Although he aimed at a Senate seat, he ran his own presidential ballot to achieve better name recognition. When he finished a surprising second, a run-off between him and Vargas Llosa was scheduled. President García directed SIN to cooperate with the candidate. Almost immediately, Fujimori needed the kind of help the intelligence agency could provide. Investigations revealed that the candidate had a plethora of embarrassing problems. The García government had given him a farm previously expropriated in the name of agrarian reform. And, more seriously, the candidate of Honesty, Technology, and Work was revealed as pertinaciously fraudulent in underpaying his taxes and undervaluing sales in the real estate business that he operated with his wife. After compiling a file, a congress deputy formally asked the attorney general to open criminal charges against the candidate.

When Fujimori's camp despaired of finding a clean way out, General Díaz ordered Montesinos to help the afflicted candidate. In a short time, more than one witness was persuaded to modify his testimony and the files were fixed by subservient prosecutors. Then, sanitized documents in hand, Montesinos went to the worried Fujimori to tell him that he no longer had a problem but a solution. The effects of that visit endure to this day.

According to a National Intelligence Service source, the sanitized documents "were given to Montesinos. It was a nice work....We looked for effect. We knew that Fujimori would be worried to death, consulting over the problem; and suddenly Vladimiro would appear with the solution which would instantly save his political life. Could the SIN begin this relationship on better footing?" Fujimori and his wife Susana were more than impressed and saw Montesinos, not SIN, as their savior. Montesinos, one can safely assume, was not unhappy with the credit, and the debt it implied. Yet, as Fujimori's political fortunes skyrocketed, he remained frightened and insecure. He became increasingly dependent on the clandestine resources that General Díaz and Montesinos could provide. Díaz offered not only his own secret polls, but also wiretapping transcriptions and updated intelligence. But it was Montesinos who, after accompanying Díaz on most of his visits, would return later alone; a nighttime semi-clandestine visitor to Fujimori's, or his sister's, home.

Maximo San Roman, Fujimori's running mate who later became president of the Senate, remembers the visits before the runoff. He came at night, close to eleven, and went straight to the house of Fujimori's sister, where Fujimori would be waiting alone. The almost nightly assignations cemented a symbiotic relationship between the paranoid outlook of the candidate and the conspiratorial feedback of the intriguer.

After Fujimori's sweeping victory, Montesinos convinced Fujimori that his life was in danger, and persuaded him to move to the Círculo Militar, the army officer's social club, which was guarded by army troops. It was a calculated gamble Montesinos won when, as Fujimori's personal advisor, he was granted open access to the army facilities from which he had been banned in disgrace. Those few who openly opposed Montesinos' reinstatement into the ranks of the respectable incurred substantial risk. Montesinos convinced the elected president of a web of plots to unseat or kill him. In a self-fulfilling prophecy, Fujimori accepted Montesinos' enemies as his own.

Montesinos Plays Mephisto

On July 28, 1990, when Fujimori became the president of Peru, Montesinos instigated the purges of those mutual enemies. One of them, army intelligence chief Colonel Rafael Córdova, for whom Montesinos' growing influence was an abomination, was peremptorily sacked from the position and sent into retirement. The new Minister of the Interior found himself with a list of close to 100 police officials to dismiss, including those who had investigated Rodríguez López, the drug-deputy del Pomar, and one of the most efficient anti-drug operatives among the police, General Juan Zárate Gambini.

People linked to Montesinos were named to crucial posts in the army, the police, and the interior and justice ministries. General Valdivia (who had been saved by Montesinos in connection with the Cayara massacre) was named head of the crucial Military Region II. He dedicated himself, along with Montesinos, to fine-tuning plans for the self-coup that would finally be executed in 1992.

Montesinos' next step in consolidating power was to neutralize those elements in the army which had thwarted his ambitions in the past. The best instrument for controlling the army was the intelligence services which he promptly upgraded. Their growth was largely inward, as increased resources were allocated for spying on army officers. Under the heavy hand of new army intelligence chief and Montesinos artillery buddy, Col. Alberto Pinto Cárdenas, intimidation reached previously unknown proportions.

Some tried to forestall Montesinos' influence. Vice-president and president of the Senate San Román warned Fujimori to get rid of that character, that the relationship could be harmful to him. But although Fujimori refused to dismiss Montesinos, he tried to keep their dealings semi-clandestine. This secrecy gave Fujimori (and, as it would turn out, also gave the CIA) a certain level of plausible deniability. And Montesinos turned secrecy into a source of strength: He literally became a man of the shadows; he could touch almost anyone from there, but no one could touch him.

Late at night, he would go straight to Fujimori's bedroom at the presidential palace. The president's military aides would see Montesinos, usually dressed in an overcoat uncommon in Lima going through the metal doors which Fujimori had installed in his private quarters. There, Fujimori's paranoia would be deliciously thrilled and policy would be made. From September to October 1990, Montesinos sat in on most meetings between the minister of defense and the joint chiefs of staff as Fujimori's personal representative. After a couple of unsubtle messages, the commanders-in-chief would patiently wait for the doctor, and then stand as he entered the room.

Gen. Díaz, realizing too late he had been used, was prodded to resign. His replacement, Brigadier Gen. Julio Salazar Monroe, who had managed to stay in active service despite consistently substandard performance, was the perfect straw man: He was clever enough to understand he was just a figurehead, yet not bright enough to get bored and quit. Montesinos' two closest associates at the time were Rafael Merino, the brains; and Pinto Cárdenas, the fangs.

By the end of 1990, no one dared openly contest Montesinos' authority in the armed forces or even less so in the police. Both he and Fujimori played the deniability game. Up to June 1991, Fujimori said that Montesinos was simply his lawyer, not a government official. Only in March 1992, after continuous grilling by the media, did he have to admit that Montesinos worked for SIN.

Strengthening Links with the CIA

As Montesinos reinforced his position, he also strengthened his relationship with the CIA. This link solidified the CIA's comeback in Peru. After Velasco had expelled the U.S. Military Mission and cut off the CIA's local antennae in the late 1960s, the Company's contacts with the Peruvian security forces were considerably weakened. Paradoxically, it was during the rhetorically anti-American Alan García regime that ties tightened again. García's right-hand man, Agustín Mantilla, forged close working relations with the Agency, and was a guest at their Langley headquarters.

Now in prison (he was arrested in the April 5 coup), Mantilla admitted that he had been aware of an intense relationship between Montesinos and the CIA, from the very beginning of Fujimori's regime, and even before. [Montesinos] regularly saw the chief of station in Lima, but he was also invited to CIA's headquarters, and he was in Langley at that time. Let's say that I am aware of an intimate relationship since 1990.

Many at the U.S. Embassy, especially those connected with the drug war, were unhappy over that collaboration and distanced themselves off-the-record: If a person offers you information, you always take it, no matter how disreputable the source. And if people offer you information which consistently turns out to be true, you take it consistently....[Montesinos] has insisted on talking only with one man, and he sees him sometimes two weeks apart. That man was the station chief in Lima, who, in the words of another U.S. diplomat was bamboozled by Montesinos. At any rate, by 1990, Montesinos, for all his drug and human rights baggage, was a prized and protected asset of the CIA.

By April 1991, because of that protection, he felt secure enough to move in and take control of the Peruvian side of the drug war. It was a classic case of the fox guarding the hen house; but secrecy and the CIA's help silenced objections.

Montesinos used his position to push the Lima office of the Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA) from its lead role and to replace it with the CIA. Since 1985, when the DEA had supplied important information to Gen. Chávez on the Rodríguez López drug organization which Montesinos was then defending, the ex-drug lawyer had feared and loathed the DEA. Right on cue, in 1991, Fujimori publicly attacked the DEA, first in the Upper Huallaga, and then at the San Antonio presidential drug summit.

In September 1991, Montesinos had commandeered almost all the Peruvian side of the U.S.-Peru joint anti-drug programs. That month in a shocking surprise to the DEA and the State Department's Narcotics Assistance Unit (NAU) a SIN anti-drug arm was created and became an independent directorate. The outfit's creation wasn't even discussed, much less decided in Peru. It was decided in Washington through inter-agency meetings, in which the State Department's voice apparently didn't count much, says a former Lima-based drug warrior.

Some DEA and NAU personnel were enraged. Aside from issues of turf, the idea of Montesinos in charge of the Peruvian side of the drug war was a macabre irony. Many with long experience and good intelligence sources in Lima feared a sickening replay of the Noriega story. They held informal meetings and drafted a cable. It was never sent. Where is the proof? they were asked. You know what they mean here by proof, says the same source, a smoking gun.

The Fox Gets Control of the Chicken Coop

When some DEA agents tried to probe deeper into Montesinos' ties with traffickers, they ran into a bureaucratic stone wall. A frustrated embassy official explained U.S. government reluctance to examine Montesinos' connections with drug traffickers: If you have a son, are you going to be looking for his defects?

This disingenuousness was replicated in Washington. On June 18, 1992, Sen. Alan Cranston (D-Calif.) wrote to Assistant Secretary of State for Hemispheric Affairs Bernard Aronson: What has Montesinos' relationship been to the U.S. intelligence community, and are we not running the same risk with him in terms of the seriousness of our commitment in anti-narcotics activities that we ran with Reagan-era pal Manuel Noriega? The answer, signed on August 7 by Janet G. Mullins, then in charge of Legislative Affairs, was evasive. We do not have regular diplomatic contact with [Montesinos] and are therefore limited in what we can say. There are reports that he wields great influence with President Fujimori and with the Peruvian military. Others dispute these reports. A U.S. congressional source who investigated the matter concluded that the CIA has a relationship with him. He is a very valuable asset....This should be of great concern to us.

The new anti-drug outfit did not, of course, catch traffickers or cocaine. Its members, trained and equipped by the CIA, were used for many other purposes, such as routine human rights violations and the overthrow of democracy in the April 5 coup. In the end, the unit functioned much as a similar one did in Haiti where intelligence service anti-drug units formed and trained by the CIA ended up cosponsoring the coup that overthrew Aristide;and another in Venezuela where intelligence units trafficked drugs on their own account.

Trying to Tame the Courts and Media

As Montesinos consolidated his hold on power, the threat of media exposure constrained his ability to act. Reporting by Caretaswas particularly worrisome. Through telephone wiretapping and spying, Montesinos discovered that the magazine's editor, Enrique Zileri, was working on another expos. On June 6, 1991, Montesinos sent one of his associates, former journalist Víctor Riveros, to offer a deal in his name: He would feed Zileri a steady flow of first-rate intelligence, and in return, Caretas would not touch Montesinos.

When Zileri turned the deal down, Montesinos launched a lawsuit charging that the magazine had terribly offended him by nicknaming him Rasputin. This was the second lawsuit that Montesinos brought against Caretas. Despite the flimsiness of the charges and Caretas' extensive evidence, Montesinos now had control of the courts and was able to easily win the case. After the self-coup, those judges supportive of Montesinos were rewarded; the few who had remained independent were purged. Ombudsman Guillermo Cabala told Sam Dillon, then with the Miami Herald, that Montesinos had fired him out of personal vengeance. After this purge, the judiciary is going to be completely submissive to the executive, and by that I mean Vladimiro Montesinos, Cabala said.

Montesinos' judicial victory against Caretas boosted his intimidation capability enormously. As author Rebecca West wrote in The New Meaning of Treason: The traitor can change the community into a desert haunted by fear..., and fear was Montesinos' currency. With it he had bought direct control of the national and army intelligence services, complete with their dirty tricks and assassination teams.

A Desert Haunted by Fear

It was a resource he did not shrink from using. On the night of November 3, 1991, a group of men armed with silencer-equipped submachine guns broke into a pollada, a chicken barbecue in the Barrios Altos district, a poor, crowded neighborhood in central Lima. Although they were less than 30 meters from the police intelligence directorate's headquarters and no more than 50 meters from another police precinct, the hooded men parked their four-wheel vehicles just outside the entrance and burst into the grim multi-family building. They rounded up everyone the light of soul, the drunk, the stunned children had some lie on the floor, almost on top of each other, and began shooting at the mass of human flesh.

Counterpoint to the blasting music, one survivor remembered the silenced shots sounding like popcorn. In less than a minute, 15 people, including an eight-year-old child, had been killed in the small room. Four survived with critical wounds. *47 What remained is what you have after people are massacred in small places. Blood reaches far and high, slaughterhouse smells remain for days, bodies seem compressed one against the other.

Despite a half-hearted effort to pin blame on the Shining Path, the signatures were clear. The house had been under army intelligence surveillance since early that year. The killers all used the army's assassination weapon of choice, a silencer-equipped H & K submachine gun. They disregarded the close proximity of the police. (In fact, a troop transport, filled with soldiers, drove in front of the two police units as the assassination was taking place and left the area immediately afterwards.) And finally, the death-squad vehicles had license plates. Somebody jotted down the numbers: One was assigned to the office of Santiago Fujimori, the president's brother; the other to the office of David Mejía, the vice-minister of the interior. The police reported that the vehicles had been stolen.

The massacre was as brutally inept as the one at Cayara, only this one happened in central Lima. The outraged congress appointed a commission of inquiry, but as the prosecutor Pablo Livia was preparing to do ballistic tests with weapons belonging to army intelligence, he was taken off the case and purged after the April 5 coup.

Crossing the Rubicon

Why the massacre? That two or three people at the barbecue were believed to be Shining Path sympathizers, and the penchant for brutality shared by Pinto Cárdenas and Montesinos could have provided enough justification. It is also possible that the killing was a bridge-burning operation to push the doubtful or reluctant within Fujimori's entourage down the road to a coup d' etat.

Many members of Fujimori's entourage had come to realize that they had much to lose under a law-abiding, democratic regime. The only way to guarantee impunity was to complete the plunge into illegality. In the months that followed, several reliable military sources leaked names of the death-squad members and details of the action. In late 1992, Vice President Máximo San Román distributed intelligence notes clandestinely sent to him by dissident agents. The papers described in detail how the massacre had been planned and executed; they pointed to Montesinos as ordering the operation. One week later, Sí newsweekly ran a story, based on confidential sources, which identified the participants and the chain of command all the way to Montesinos.

After his self-coup, on receiving a request from figurehead SIN Director Julio Salazar, Fujimori promoted all the officers who had been identified as participants in the mass-murder.

With the pollada affair setting the public agenda, Montesinos and Fujimori secretly concentrated on planning the self-coup. It is now clear that, by early 1990, one of the things they had agreed on was the eventual overthrow of democracy. As the Peru Report, with well-placed sources in Peru's intelligence establishment, wrote soon after the April coup, the coup structure was also in place almost from the start of Mr. Fujimori's period in July 1990.... The objective of the coup was to seize dictatorial power and discard laws that restricted him under democratic procedure.

Only Montesinos, Fujimori, and their most immediate accomplices Peru's real chain of command were in the know. General Valdivia, for whom toppling democracy meant impunity for the Cayara massacre, was in charge of the military side. The air force and navy commanders-in-chief were kept in the dark until the eve of the coup. According to most sources, the self-coup had been planned for 1993, but a number of factors pushed up the schedule. Most problematic was the increasingly assertive parliament, which had, for instance, rejected the promotion of two close Montesinos associates, Brig. Gen. Julio Salazar Monroe and Col. Enrique Causso.

At any rate, by late March, Fujimori was sleeping less at the government palace, and more at army headquarters, where his closest companions were Montesinos, Pinto
Cárdenas, and Valdivia. There, they prepared the coup.

On April 5, 1992, General Valdivia, closely watched by Pinto Cárdenas, executed the successful coup. Democracy and the rule of law were finally overthrown after 12 immensely difficult years, betrayed from the inside. Dozens of people, including the author, who had criticized the government, were rounded up during the window of impunity which the early hours of a coup usually open. In some cases, such as those of former President Alan García (who managed to escape) and former Interior Minister Agustín Mantilla, the government tried to use those arrests to rouse popular support and justify the coup. In other instances, the arrests were naked examples of a gangster regime in action, bent on revenge. When Montesinos and Fujimori arrested this writer, they miscalculated; they had not foreseen the strong international protest which forced my release.

They also misjudged the integrity of some. Vice President San Román denounced the coup, broke with Fujimori, and was proclaimed the legitimate president of Peru by the dissolved parliament, assembled for the occasion. The nomination had only moral value, but it demanded no small amount of courage. A month later, interviewed by an Organization of American States (OAS) mission in Lima to negotiate a way out of the coup, San Román warned that if a return to democracy was not accomplished soon, the country would be handed over to drug traffickers. Any dialogue with Fujimori had only one condition: Montesinos' dismissal. He is the president in the shadows, San Román told the mission. The true ruler of Peru is Montesinos, and Fujimori is only a facade. Retired army general, Sinesio Jarama, expressed the same point with soldierly directness, I think that Montesinos...finally found his puppet.



__________________
A TAINTED DEAL http://www.motherjones.com/politics/1998/06/tainted-deal

 LA DEA; Murder of Kiki Camarena http://www.laweekly.com/news/how-a-dogged-la-dea-agent-unraveled-the-cias-alleged-role-in-the-murder-of-kiki-camarena-5750278  

"Several informed sources have told me that an appendix to this Report was removed at the instruction of the DOJ at the last minute. This appendix is reported to have information about a CIA officer, not agent or asset, but officer, based in the LA Station, who was in charge of Contra related activities. According to these sources, this individual was associated with running drugs to South Central L.A., around 1988. Let me repeat that amazing omission. The recently released CIA Report Vol II contained an appendix, which was pulled by the DOJ, that reported a CIA officer in the LA Station was hooked into drug running in South Central Los Angeles." Maxine Waters Oct, 1998
https://fas.org/irp/congress/1998_cr/h981013-coke.htm   

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(continued)

The Oblivion Commandos

Puppeteer or ventriloquist, there he was, Montesinos, the paradigmatic pariah, finally in the center of power, unhampered by accountability. It had been a long road to power, and now power was needed to erase the path dirty and dangerous with the traces of old crimes. So the first post-coup operatives were directed to unleash amnesia.

Between April 5 and 10, while Fujimori continued to insist he had carried out the coup to end economic recession, fight drugs, and defeat the Shining Path, scores of uniformed soldiers and plainclothes military intelligence agents did the real work. By night, they entered the offices and central archives of the Palacio de Justicia, Peru's judiciary center, and the Fiscal!a de la Naci"n, the attorney general's building. Soon, the buildings echoed with the dull thud of weighty files thrown from shelves and drawers. The oblivion commandos worked through two days and nights. In order to save themselves the bother of carrying the documents down narrow flights of stairs, soldiers and spies threw the papers from a balcony into military pick-up trucks parked below. When the sacking ended and before the judicial purge began one-third of the nearly 30,000 files of active judicial cases in Peru had been removed. The buildings remained empty for days, surrounded by a ring of soldiers.

Gone were hundreds of files useful for blackmail or slander; gone were files concerning lawsuits around Fujimori and his family; and gone were all the files, not previously removed, on Montesinos. This paper purge was, in fact, one of the main reasons for the coup a coverup coup, where not only bothersome individuals, but history itself was purged.

A few days later, a more relaxed Fujimori sat at a military headquarters watching TV. On the screen was his new spokesman, Foreign Minister Augusto Blacker, an ambitious economist whose servility would soon be repaid with dismissal from the cabinet. He was explaining to the foreign press that the government of emergency and national reconstruction would last in its extra-constitutional role for 18 to 20 months. Fujimori smirked and turned to people surrounding him, among them Montesinos' close associate, Rafael Merino, He must have meant 18 years, not 18 months! Some weeks later, as Fujimori was lulling the OAS general assembly with promises of a prompt return to democracy, military intelligence agents were busily distributing a leaflet in Lima: Under a picture of the dictator, the title said it all: Fujimori: President for life of Peru.

The folded leaflet, signed by an ad-hoc New Dawn Movement, was as close as Montesinos ever came to delivering his own political manifesto. "So, [Fujimori] used force and this is supposedly an evil thing because it is illegal? What did they want! ...Is it not true that in the origin of all modern states, might always preceded right? Political freedom is only a relative idea....With an audacious coup, Pisistratus took the citadel and prepared Pericles's century. Brutus violated the constitution, expelled the Tarquin, and founded, through knifings, a republic whose greatness is the most magnificent spectacle ever witnessed in the universe....When did the kingdoms of Spain, France, and Germany become powerful? Wasn't it with the likes of Leon I, Jules II, Philip II, Louis XIV, Napoleon? Men all with a terrible fist, leaning more on their swords' pommels than on their countries' constitutions...and if we need contemporary examples, we'll find plenty of them: Spain, Taiwan, Singapore, South Korea, Chile, etc. They are now happy and prosperous democracies, only thanks to previous authoritarian regimes."

To graft that happiness to Peru's future, it continued, we need to centralize authority and command, but mostly, we need a continuity in power, or, what is the same, a president for life.

To the Victor

All that was left was for Montesinos to savor in public the fruits of the victory he had engineered, by necessity, in secret. The moment came some weeks into the dictatorship. Brushing aside the rejection of the already closed legislature, Fujimori promoted Salazar Monroe to full general and Colonel Causso to brigadier general. After the open ceremony at army headquarters, all the generals, one by one, walked the line to where Montesinos, the only man in civilian clothes, stood, and paid their respects to the man who counted, the godfather. This was victory.

A few still resisted and spoke out from Caretas and other magazines, to the main political parties, to Máximo San Román, who reiterated his worry that the country is falling into the hands of a Mafia. But acknowledgment of Montesinos' influence ran beyond the fawning line of generals at the ceremony. Former enemies who had spoken openly against him would now become wet with fright if he, or Pinto, or even Merino addressed a pointed, or passing, remark mentioning them, their property, their families. All the generals now had to hide their terror behind enthusiastic allegiance and servile obeisance. As Sir John Harrington wrote long ago:

"Treason doth never prosper: what's the reason? For if it prosper, none dare call it treason."

The U.S. administration, initially flustered, shrugged off the violation of democracy with mumblings about realpolitik and legitimized the coup. Fujimori was the name of the game, the only game in town, the same old our son-of-a-bitch game.

Montesinos Publicly Linked to Human Rights Crimes

Even then, at the beginning of 1993, Vladimiro Montesinos' name and the extent of his power, however shadowy, were open secrets. Then in April and May, two extraordinary revelations surrounding yet another horrific human rights violation forced them irrevocably into the public glare. On July 18, 1992, a professor and nine students from the Enrique Guzmán y Valle teachers' college (La Cantuta) had been abducted by armed men and never again seen alive. Although pressure from press, human rights groups, and family members kept the case itself from dying, it languished with hundreds of other human rights violations in a purgatory of official denials and neglect.

Then, at the beginning of April 1993, Henry Pease, an opposition congressmember, read a document signed Sleeping Lion. Members of this clandestine group of active duty officers were disgusted by the politics of disappearance and assassination. They detailed the crime of La Cantuta: The Colina death squad kidnapped the ten, murdered them, and then hurriedly buried, disinterred, and reburied the bodies. The document named the death squad members, beginning with its operational chief, Major Santiago Martín Rivas,and revealed that it operated under orders from the de facto head of the National Intelligence Service, Vladimiro Montesinos, and army chief Hermoza. According to Sleeping Lion, the Colina group had carried out various other murders in addition to those at La Cantuta, including the November 1991 urban massacre at the barbecue in the Barrios Altos section of Lima. (This crime had also been independently linked back to Montesinos almost from the moment it took place.)

The painstakingly detailed Sleeping Lion document forced the constituent assembly to create an investigative commission. After testifying before it on April 20, 1993, Gen. Hermoza verbally attacked the opposition members on the commission and accused them of collusion with terrorism. The next day, tank units began parading through the streets of Lima in an open demonstration of power. The assembly backed off.

It was into this tinderbox of repression and fear that Gen. Rodolfo Robles a man who clearly had privileged access to information threw a lighted torch. On May 6, 1993, the well-respected commander of the army's academic centers, the third man from the top of the Peruvian army hierarchy, made a gesture without precedent in the history of his institution. As he was about to be kicked upstairs to the institutional oblivion of a Washington posting and his sons trans- ferred to the guerrilla zones, Robles went to the U.S. Embassy, where he was joined by his family, and asked for asylum.

At a hastily called news conference, his wife read an eight-page handwritten letter from her husband which expressed the profound emotion of a decision made at high personal cost. The general, it announced, was leaving the institution to which I have dedicated 37 years of my life, from the age of 16, in order to denounce

"an intolerable degradation for a soldier and for a man, which is related to the systematic violation of the human rights of the Peruvian population on the part of a group of thugs who, under the orders of the ex-army captain Vladimiro Montesinos Montesinos [sic] and the servile approval of EP [Peruvian Army] General Nicolás de Bari Hermoza Ríos, the unworthy commanding general of the EP, are committing crimes that are unjustly smearing all of the glorious Peruvian army."

"[I] denounce the following before my people: The crime of La Cantuta, in which a professor and ten [sic] students of this university were victimized, was committed by a special intelligence detachment that operates under the direct orders of the presidential advisor and virtual chief of the SIN, Vladimiro Montesinos Montesinos [sic], and whose activity is coordinated with the Army Intelligence Service (SIE) and with the Intelligence Directorate (DINTE) of the army, but is approved and always known by the commanding general of the army. "

A few weeks later, from his exile in Buenos Aires, Robles added, surprisingly, the name of his principal source: Gen. Willy Chirinos, who, for a short time some weeks after the La Cantuta kidnapping, had been the director of army intelligence. According to Robles, Chirinos had tried to deactivate the Colinas death squad, but was first thwarted and then fired by Montesinos.

The effect of his asylum request and denunciations was explosive. With this act of defiance, Robles transformed a grimly routine disappearance case into what Americas Watch Investigator for the Andean Region, Robin Kirk, called, the most important human rights case since the beginning of the internal war in Peru in 1980, not because of the number of corpses or the gravity of the affair, but because it is the case where the relationship to the executive is the clearest....In the other cases, they came to [identify the responsibility] of the commanding officer. In La Cantuta, it was politics at the highest level.

Digging Up the Evidence

Still the Fujimori administration stonewalled. On July 8, 1993, however, almost a year after the kidnappings, and three months after Robles' denunciation, the independent magazine Si received a map pinpointing a clandestine grave in the Cieneguilla district adjacent to Lima, allegedly containing the remains of some of the victims of La Cantuta.

Now the coverup began in earnest. Refusing to investigate, Fujimori-appointee, Attorney General Blanca Nélida Colán, threatened the editor of Sí with prosecution. At the same time, the anti-terrorist police produced detainees who, it claimed, were Shining Path members who had delivered the map to Si as part of an elaborate propaganda hoax. (The man charged with concocting the map was held for a year despite a complete lack of evidence. Eventually the regime was forced to release him, but not to acknowledge the injustice.)

But in the end, the dead spoke. In the common grave at Cieneguilla among the half-burned human remains was a key chain with four keys. Raida Cóndor, mother of Armando, one of the disappeared students, recognized it as her son's.

Rumors were rife that the police and justice officials would attempt to alter the keys, despite their having been photographed by the press. Finally, growing national and international pressure forced the justice official in charge of the case to test the keys. They fit and also unlocked the door to the coverup. In a relatively short time, other graves containing the remains of the disappeared were discovered. Fujimori announced in an interview with the New York Times that some army officers were under arrest. Then, in a hurried process with a military tribunal, the death squad members were sentenced to various prison terms. The army itself, however, continued day by day to centralize under Hermoza's command, and the intelligence services remained under the control of the now very notorious but still unofficial Vladimiro Montesinos.

The Future of Democracy

The climate of intimidation has begun to lose its oppressive capacity. In October 1993, a constitutional referendum organized by Fujimori to legitimize his regime ended with the democratic opposition gaining a healthy 47 percent of the vote.

Since then, the independent press has continued to reinvigorate itself and Fujimori's position has been further eroded. Even surveys conducted by pollsters close to the regime now give a clear lead to a man who, at this point, looks likely to become the opposition candidate former U.N. Secretary General Javier Pérez de Cuéllar. International pressure has forced the regime to back down from its previous hardline agenda and assume the unconvincing image of a kinder, gentler Fujimori.

Montesinos himself has had some failures to lament. He tried to steal credit for the capture of the Shining Path leader Abimael Guzmán. In fact, the anti-terrorist police, commanded by Gen. Antonio Ketín Vidal, tracked down and arrested the elusive guerrilla leader. After Ketín informed the press of this feat, Montesinos was so furious, he promptly engineered Ketín's removal.

Then, Montesinos' plan to pull a psywar victory backfired. He met often with Guzmán in his cell and persuaded him, by means unknown, to write letters to Fujimori asking for peace negotiations. The first two letters were timed for release just before the October 1993 referendum on the constitution. The move turned out to be totally counterproductive for Fujimori. It not only helped the opposition, but also harmed the army's counterinsurgency strategy. Guzmán's call for negotiations was seen as capitulation. It distanced him from the largely reorganized Shining Path leadership and energized the guerrilla attacks.

Fiascos and setbacks aside, both Fujimori and Montesinos are still firmly entrenched. It remains to be seen whether, if Fujimori is defeated at the 1995 election, they will surrender power peaceably. If history is any guide, there is reason for worry. Fujimori and his Svengali might once again trample legality and democracy as they did in 1992.

__________________
A TAINTED DEAL http://www.motherjones.com/politics/1998/06/tainted-deal

 LA DEA; Murder of Kiki Camarena http://www.laweekly.com/news/how-a-dogged-la-dea-agent-unraveled-the-cias-alleged-role-in-the-murder-of-kiki-camarena-5750278  

"Several informed sources have told me that an appendix to this Report was removed at the instruction of the DOJ at the last minute. This appendix is reported to have information about a CIA officer, not agent or asset, but officer, based in the LA Station, who was in charge of Contra related activities. According to these sources, this individual was associated with running drugs to South Central L.A., around 1988. Let me repeat that amazing omission. The recently released CIA Report Vol II contained an appendix, which was pulled by the DOJ, that reported a CIA officer in the LA Station was hooked into drug running in South Central Los Angeles." Maxine Waters Oct, 1998
https://fas.org/irp/congress/1998_cr/h981013-coke.htm   

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maynard

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The Meaning of Montesinos
Gustavo Gorriti, Peruvian Journalist
Monday, December 18, 2000 at 1 p.m. EST

Vladimir Montesinos, ousted as chief Peru's intelligence service in September, spent 10 years wielding enormous power behind the scenes in Peru and winning praise of U.S. officials. Now he is a virtual fugitive under investigation for selling guns to leftist rebels and laundering $58 million in Swiss bank accounts.

Gustavo Gorriti, now a journalist in Panama, has followed Montesinos's remarkable career for more than a decade. He will talk about the man, the source of his power in Peru, the allegations of murder and drug trafficking that shadow him, and his future.

Gorritti is the author of "The Shining Path: a History of the Millenarian War in Peru" (University of North Carolina Press.) He was the 1992 winner of the Maria Moors Cabot Prize awarded by the Columbia School of Journalism. He won the King of Spain Journalism Prize in 1996. In 1998, the Committee to Protect Journalists gave him its International Press Freedom Award.

Submit your questions for Gustavo Gorriti now.

Editor's Note: Washingtonpost.com moderators retain editorial control over Live Online discussions and choose the most relevant questions for guests and hosts; guests and hosts can decline to answer questions.



washingtonpost.com: There were news reports over the weekend suggesting that Vladimir Montesinos had been seen in Costa Rica and the Carribean. So let us begin our discussion of Montesinos by asking Gustavo Gorriti: Can you tell us the latest on what is known about his whereabouts?


washingtonpost.com: There were news reports over the weekend suggesting that Vladimir Montesinos had been seen in Costa Rica and the Carribean. So let us begin our discussion by asking Gustavo Gorriti: Can you tell
us the latest on what is known about Montesinos and his future?

Gustavo Gorriti: According to the testimony of some of his bodyguards, Montesinos was last seen when he left the yacht that brought him from Peru and the Galapagos to Coco island, off Costa Rica. His yacht met another at night, somewhere in between Coco and mainland Costa Rica. According to a Costa Rica minister, he left that country headed for Aruba. Aruban officials, though, have denied that Montesinos ever entered their territory. Most versions concur that he was headed towards Venezuela, whose government, as was to be expected, has also denied having him.


washingtonpost.com: Do you think that he is still shopping for political asylum?

Gustavo Gorriti: I think he's shopping for a safer status than political asylum. It's either a protected life under an assumed identity or the possibility of assuming the role of, say, president Chavez's advisor. He is also thinking hard, without a doubt, about his coming back to Peru.


washingtonpost.com: Can Montesinos realistically think that he would be safe from prosecution in Peru? For example, does he have enough parliamentary allies to secure amnesty?

Gustavo Gorriti: Not now. Not in the current political climate. The members of parliament he bought would be extremely afraid of giving him overt support. The same goes for prosecutors. Covertly, though, he might still have ample room for maneuvering.


Washington D.C.: Montesinos as President Chavez's adviser? You've gotta be kidding.

Gustavo Gorriti: Some people thought the same when rumors had him as president Fujimori's adviser in 1990. I am not saying he is Chavez's adviser now, but Chavez fits perfectly well the profile of somebody Montesinos would want to advise, and would find the way, if given the opportunity, of making himself indispensable


Washington D.C.: What was the exact relationship between Fujimori and Montesinos? Is Fujimori a willing accomplice, or did he just look the other way?

Gustavo Gorriti: To call it complex would be almost an understatement. Fujimori was so thoroughly bamboozled by Montesinos that it is sometimes hard to decide on whether he was a willing accomplice all the way or whether he was consistently fooled throughout his periods. In the end, of course, Fujimori emerges as an accomplice, sometimes pathetic but an accomplice anyway.


Washington D.C.: 1 - How can Peru get Alberto Fujimori back for questioning?

2 - Is there any chance that Fujimori and / or Vladimiro Montesinos can be brought to justice in another country, like Pinochet?

3 - Many people in Peru seem to fear the return of former president Alan Garcia. Is he as dangerous as people make him out to be?

4 - Why are Peru's political parties so disorganized? Why are they having so much difficulty forming a united front to govern the country?

Gustavo Gorriti: That's a very difficult proposition now. Japan does not give up on its citizens very easily, and Fujimori-san is, it's official now, a Japanese citizen


washingtonpost.com: To follow up on the last questioners second query: What do you see as the chances of Montesinos and/or Fujimori being prosecuted in another country?

Gustavo Gorriti: As for Fujimori, he probably won't risk meeting Spanish judge Baltazar Garzon if he can help it. So I don't see him getting a lot of frequent flyer miles in the near future, barring some short visits to his pal, Muhatir Muhammad in Malaysia. With Montesinos, hopes are brigther, due to the fortunate circumstance of his not being a Japanese citizen.


Panama, Rep. of Panama: Why [did it take] so long for the world to realise who Montesinos really was? Do you think the "marcha de los cuatro suyos" and Toledo´s campaign contributed in any way to Montesinos´ downfall?[edited]

Gustavo Gorriti: a) Because very few people or institutions, including those that should have been concerned, wanted to know Montesinos's dark background. Fujimori's regime was seen as a success story (free markets, defeat of the Shining Path, etc.) and therefore any substantial information that would disfigure that stereotype was ignored or dismissed. Montesinos's very close relationship with the CIA also played a major role.
b) Yes. I believe that Toledo's campaign brought to light a national mood of rejection of the dictatorship. It was seen clearly that the majority of the people stood strongly against Fujimori; and the Marcha de los 4 Suyos also demonstrated that Toledo movilized the fervor of the people and that Fujimori's regime had no other protection than sheer military force and the extremely dirty tricks of Montesinos's intelligence service.


Baltimore, Maryland: I would like to know just why so much fuss is being made over this Montesinos. He is being made to sound like some sort of super-sleuth who has the secrets on lots of people and is poised to bring a lot of them down with him. I say he's more like Luis Roldan, the first civilian head of the Spansh Civil Guard who absconded secret funds and vanished until he was found hiding out in Southeast Asia. Roldan turned out to be nothng more than a banal, petty thief, a chorizo, as they say in Spain. Isn't Montesinos of the same ilk?

Gustavo Gorriti: I wish he was like Roldan. Roldan never ruled a country behind the scenes, as Montesinos did; and the amount of funds he absconded with, really makes him a petty thief compared with Montesinos's kleptocracy.
And the fact is, yes, that he has the dirty secrets of just too many politicians and business people in Peru. Most of those embarrasing secrets were on tape. I am told they are on DVD now.


Sacramento, California: Do you feel safe from Montesinos now in Panama, or do you still worry he can send someone to harm you?

Did you know the torture took place in the Peruvian Pentagon in downtown Lima? If you were a woman, the military would line up and sexually abuse you, putting a magnum to your head and then insist you perform oral sex on them. Then they would torture you using a variety of techniques: electric shocks, the submarino, threatening to sear your eyeballs with a molten hot knife. Finally, they would leave you for dead, if you weren't already, on the beach. Will you write about this horrible chapter in Peruvian history in your next book? [edited]

Gustavo Gorriti: I was held in the "Pentagonito" after being seized and "disappeared" in the aftermath of the April 5, 1992 coup. I wasn't tortured, maybe because the international outcry brought about by ny detention forced them to release me. But a few years later, former intelligence agent Leonor La Rosa was held in the same place and brutally tortured. A colleague of hers, Mariella Barreto, was murdered and beheaded. In both cases, Montesinos and his people wanted to stop the information leaks from their service to investigative journalists


Arlington, VA: What's it like being a journalist covering such a dangerous beat? Does your life ever get threatened?

Gustavo Gorriti: It was threatened often. Threats by themselves do not harm you, but can make life pretty difficult, especially when they extend to your family. Which was my case.
As a journalist, I felt that I had no choice but to continue investigating these people and never showing any fear. After all, I knew that my being a journalist entailed a certain form of protection, in the sense that they would have to think hard before committing themselves to actual action. And I saw people who risked everything to let facts be known, who had no protection at all. They continued taking risks even after the horror of the La Rosa and Barreto's cases. How could a journalist not do his work under those circumstances?


Near Waco, Texas:
I read that Fujimori's daughter had an American Express credit card paid for by a fraudulent Montesinos company based in Panama. Did La Prensa uncover that information?

I was informed that when narcotrafficers were caught by Montesinos and the military, it was often an elaborate performance (worked out between the military and the drug traffikers) for the United States to demonstrate success and guarantee that US "combating drug" funds would continue to flow ... ultimately, into Montesinos pockets. Do you have any information regarding this and who will take Montesinos place in this complex nexus of drugs, military and the CIA?

As you know, Montesinos was courted by the CIA for quite some time. Do you have any more information about the nature of their relationship? Did Montesinos attend our School of Americas? [edited]

Gustavo Gorriti: a) That information was first uncovered in a television news program in Lima. We reproduced it at La Prensa.
b) Montesinos, as Panama's Noriega in the past, could provide performances to satisfy all sides. On the one hand, they had an aerial interdiction program that brought quite good results in interdicting the aerial cocaine bridge between Peru and Colombia. On the other hand, he could protect, with precise tactical information, those traffickers willing to pay the steep protection fees he charged. For those American officials supporting the relationship with Montesinos, there were always the right statistics at hand, with numbers impressive enough to dismiss the other side of the coin as unproved allegations.
Montesinos was not just courted by the CIA. He worked closely with American intelligence since the 1970's. In the 1990's the relationship was reassumed and promptly he wasn't anymore just a highly placed "asset" but "Mr. Fixit" himself.


washingtonpost.com: Will U.S policymakers pay a price for their support of Montesinos? Specifically, how do you think future Peruvian governments will respond to U.S.-sponsored war on drug producers in Colombia?

Gustavo Gorriti: Unfortunately, I think that most hard-earned lessons in the relationship between Montesinos and the US government will be unheeded. Peru's new government (not the present caretaker regime, but the one that will take office on July 28 next year) will face so many urgent chores and tasks to solve and will need so desperately the United States' support that I don't think it will have the will to bring Montesinos's issue to the fore. As for the U.S., if experience shows us anything, is that American policymakers, and certainly American spooks, will always seek expediency, without great regard for other considerations. Noriega, Cedras and many others in the recent past, can attest to that. So, it is for us Peruvians, I think, to never let this issue go until Montesinos is brought to justice.


washingtonpost.com: Unfortunately, our time is up. Many thanks to Gustavo Gorriti for his insights and to everybody who sent in questions. A transcript of this discussion will be posted shortly in the World section of washingtonpost.com To stay up to the minute on international news from a Washington perspective, bookmark http://www.washingtonpost.com/world

http://discuss.washingtonpost.com/wp-srv/zforum/00/gorriti1218.htm


__________________
A TAINTED DEAL http://www.motherjones.com/politics/1998/06/tainted-deal

 LA DEA; Murder of Kiki Camarena http://www.laweekly.com/news/how-a-dogged-la-dea-agent-unraveled-the-cias-alleged-role-in-the-murder-of-kiki-camarena-5750278  

"Several informed sources have told me that an appendix to this Report was removed at the instruction of the DOJ at the last minute. This appendix is reported to have information about a CIA officer, not agent or asset, but officer, based in the LA Station, who was in charge of Contra related activities. According to these sources, this individual was associated with running drugs to South Central L.A., around 1988. Let me repeat that amazing omission. The recently released CIA Report Vol II contained an appendix, which was pulled by the DOJ, that reported a CIA officer in the LA Station was hooked into drug running in South Central Los Angeles." Maxine Waters Oct, 1998
https://fas.org/irp/congress/1998_cr/h981013-coke.htm   

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maynard

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Reply with quote  #150 
Chávez reignites war of words with Bush
Accuses DEA of supporting drug trafficking

                        http://www.guardian.co.uk/international/story/0,3604,1544804,00.html
                                        Agencies in Caracas
Monday August 8, 2005
The Guardian
               
               
       
                Venezuelan President Hugo Chávez escalated his war of words with America yesterday, when he accused the US drug enforcement administration (DEA) of spying, and said Venezuela was suspending cooperation with the agency.

Mr Chávez, who regularly accuses the US of plotting against him, said "the DEA is not absolutely necessary for the fight against drug trafficking."

The DEA was using the fight against drug trafficking as a mask to support drug trafficking and to carry out intelligence in Venezuela against the government, Mr Chávez told reporters.

                                                               


                                                               
"Under those circumstances we decided to make a clean break with those accords, and we are reviewing them," Mr Chávez said, referring to the cooperative agreements under which the DEA has operated in Venezuela.

Prosecutors last month opened an investigation into the DEA's activities in Venezuela. "We have detected intelligence infiltration that threatened national security and defence," Mr Chávez said.

While he recognised that Venezuela is a transit point for Colombian cocaine, Mr Chávez said Venezuela's armed forces have made important advances against trafficking.

"We will continue working with international organisations against drug trafficking," he said.

Mr Chávez said specifics of the DEA decision will be announced soon. Mr Chávez's comments were the most specific to date on the accusations against the US agency.

The US ambassador, William Brownfield, said last week in a radio interview that the US hoped to maintain cooperative anti-drug efforts in Venezuela, and that without them "there is only one group that wins, and that group is the drug traffickers".

Mr Chávez sharply criticised US policy on drugs, saying that while the US is the world's top consumer of drugs, its government does little to try to lessen consumption.

He also criticised the US Central Intelligence Agency and Federal Bureau of Investigation of not doing enough to catch drug kingpins in the US.

The accusations were the latest in a series of rhetorical clashes between Mr Chávez and American officials.

The US secretary of state, Condoleezza Rice, has called Venezuela a "negative force" in Latin America and accuses Mr Chávez of turning it into a totalitarian society.

Last month saw the launch of Telesur, a pan-Latin American television channel based in Caracas. The channel's promotors describe it as an antidote to US media domination, but American politicians say it is a vehicle for anti-US propaganda.

Even before the channel was launched, the House of Representatives voted to enable the US to broadcast its own signals into Venezuela in retaliation. In response, Mr Chávez threatened to launch "electronic warfare" with the US.

Relations between Venezuela and the US have been tense since Mr Chávez took office in 1999. Mr Chávez accuses the CIA of involvement in the military coup that briefly deposed him in 2002, and in February said that President Bush was plotting to assassinate him.

US officials dismissed the accusations as ridiculous, but the White House gave implicit support to the coup attempt and has done little to hide its displeasure with Mr Chávez.

Despite frequent harsh words between governments, Venezuela remains a major supplier of oil to the US.

__________________
A TAINTED DEAL http://www.motherjones.com/politics/1998/06/tainted-deal

 LA DEA; Murder of Kiki Camarena http://www.laweekly.com/news/how-a-dogged-la-dea-agent-unraveled-the-cias-alleged-role-in-the-murder-of-kiki-camarena-5750278  

"Several informed sources have told me that an appendix to this Report was removed at the instruction of the DOJ at the last minute. This appendix is reported to have information about a CIA officer, not agent or asset, but officer, based in the LA Station, who was in charge of Contra related activities. According to these sources, this individual was associated with running drugs to South Central L.A., around 1988. Let me repeat that amazing omission. The recently released CIA Report Vol II contained an appendix, which was pulled by the DOJ, that reported a CIA officer in the LA Station was hooked into drug running in South Central Los Angeles." Maxine Waters Oct, 1998
https://fas.org/irp/congress/1998_cr/h981013-coke.htm   

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